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We live in a world where advancement in technology coupled with human’s creative 
and innovative mind has led to the design of safer and better performing infrastructures 
(nuclear power plants, chemical process plants, high speed trains, spaceplanes, etc.), 
which are needed for a modern society. However, due to the interconnected socio-
economic and technological landscape that is rapidly evolving, safety continues to have 
many new challenges (known unknowns, unknown unknowns) that add onto changed 
variants of the old challenges (e.g. modified known unknowns). Additionally, 
governance and legislation can be slow to catch up with this dynamic pace of change. 
At times, overregulation can occur, resulting in a significant resource investment 
towards compliance for existing infrastructure operators or for aspiring start-ups that 
would like to enter the market, but end up struggling or even abandoning the sector. 
 
Inspired by this background, the European Safety and Reliability Data Association’s 
Foresight in Safety Project Group prepared the 53rd ESReDA seminar with a purpose 
to launch an open dialogue with stakeholders in the safety arena. Thus, by providing 
an open forum where experiences in foresight in safety approaches from different 
sectors could be shared, cross-fertilisation of ideas, such as how foresight could be 
mainstreamed into safety practice in a more consistent manner, could be discussed. 
 
The seminar offered a technical programme with four keynote speeches from: 
• Fabiana Scapolo, European Commision Joint Reserach Centre, Belgium; 
• Ana Afonso, European Food Safety Authority, Parma, Italy; 
• Antonio d'Agostino, European Union Agency for Railways, Valenciennes, France; 
• Lorenzo Fiamma, European Maritime Safety Agency, Lisbon, Portugal.  
 
There were also 23 other presentations made by stakeholders from universities, 
research centres, industry, government service and safety authorities. The topics 
addressed were related to foresight from various perspectives: safety, risk assessment, 
scenarios, resilience, horizon scanning, early warning signals, database management, 
whistle-blowers, knowledge management, big data, data visualisation, etc., and from 
various industries: nuclear, chemical, electricity, food, maritime, railroad and aviation.  
 
There were 57 participants from 15 countries (Belgium, Czech Republic, Finland, 
France, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States). 
 
After the seminar, as a part of a feedback process, participants were asked to provide 
some keywords about the seminar. The organisers used these keywords to obtain a 
word cloud shown on the figure below. The project group will build on the seminar 
result, along with the rich compendium of experiences gained throughout the entire 
process building towards the seminar. It will take stock of these results and investigate 
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A tool to support policymaking and how it can be applied to 




European Commission Joint Research Centre, Foresight, Behavioural Insight & Design 
for Policy Unit 






The presentation will start with a brief introduction on why thinking about the future 
is becoming more and more a necessary activity for many organisations and domains. 
From there, definition and key characteristics of foresight will be provided together 
with an overview on what Foresight is and how and when it should be applied to policy 
making. An illustration on features, requirements and capabilities needed for foresight 
in a policymaking context to deliver will be delivered.  
The presentation will also illustrate a number of possible foresight activities and 
methods. These include horizon scanning, trend analysis, visions, scenarios, 
technology assessment. Some examples on how these methods are applied will be 
provided. 
The presentation aims also at reflecting on how foresight could be applied to safety 
management and risks assessment. It will suggest some practical ways of 
implementation.  
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Uncertain future. Unsafe future? Or foresight in safety – 
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Foresight is a relatively new research discipline, established in the 1960s especially in 
Japan and United States, and later further developed in many research environments 
in other countries. The purpose of the use of foresight techniques is to employ a 
participant-based process for the systematic collection of forward-thinking knowledge 
and develop visions and future perspectives in a medium and in a long-term 
perspective. Based on a holistic approach and making use of knowledge of former 
events - such as results from the investigations of accidents and near misses and 
knowledge of the present situation - one can improve the current decisions and promote 
better prevention and harm reduction measures. Unfortunately, foresight methodology 
has so far been used only to a small degree in a safety context. 
The paper will briefly review the evolution of foresight-theories and outline its 
historical background. It will describe the characteristic elements in foresight and give 
an overview of the most important methods used. In this context, the basic 
comprehension forms within the safety thinking are analysed, and it will be argued for 
changes in the moral and ethical values within safety for technological changes and 
improvements, as well as for the developing safety as a societal value. It is emphasized 
that the recognition of a necessary system shift must take place on two levels: as an 
incremental shift with derivative solutions for known problems, and as a substantial 
change with disruptive solutions for new problems. In addition to comparative 
examples of release of energy during aviation and railway accidents, and nuclear 
 Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) 
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disasters, also the characteristics of so-called "weak signals" are discussed. The 
necessity of a paradigm shift is underlined. 
The paper ends with a brief description of the ESReDA PGs approach to foresight 
methodology within the safety area, and examples of challenges are given, and 
recommendations proposed for a new holistic safety management based on feed 
forward as well as on feedback information and insights.  
Keywords: foresight, safety, ESReDA, accident investigation, future 
1.  Basic attitudes to the future 
The human being has always been concerned about its place in existence: the past, 
present, or future. Many have been especially concerned about the future that lay in 
front of them as a single man, in front of the family, in front of the genus or in front of 
the local society. Today we include also the nation, the major regions such as EU and 
the global community. 
The attitude of the future has varied according to which point of view one had: 
religious, political, social, economic, demographic, commercial and other variables 
such as ethnicity, age, gender, status, sexual orientation. Some main sections can be: 
 The future as fear and threat (religion, but as heaven in a new life!) 
 The future as happiness and joy (ideology, religion, social engineering) 
 The future as unimportant and immaterial (determinism) 
 The future as characterized by risks, probabilities and possibilities (science) 
 The future as adaptive and prosperous (technology and socio-technical engineering) 
 
The time horizon may for analytical reasons be divided between short term, middle and 
long term. 
 
Each of these approaches have been described in religious literature (the Bible), in 
many philosophical books, in scientific works, in technical papers and books, in novels 
and poetry, in science fiction etc. Many conceptions about our future destiny form part 
of our oral traditions. Famous persons who have contributed to futuristic thinking, 
include i.e. Leonardo da Vinci, Jules Verne, H.G. Wells, Herman Kahn, Johan Galtung, 
Stephen Hawkin, Aldous Huxley, Robert Jungk, George Orwell, Alvin Toffler, etc. 
 
Some recent examples of global treats include studies made by OECD, studies about 
opportunities and trends in technology (South by Southwest 2016) and several climate 
reports. Samsung’s SmartThings report1 about Future living is an example of a very 
                                                 
1 http://www.samsung.com/uk/pdf/smartthings/future-living-report.pdf 
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long-time horizon (till 100 year) and how the digital revolution can have massively 
implications on our lifestyles by changing our homes, our cities and countries. 
 
2.  The origins of the foresight scientific approach – the theories and 
the history 
The systematic approach to Foresight Thinking as a science may be dated back to 
1950/60-ies with the start of Technology Assessment and Forecasting. Today, modern 
safety thinking has elaborated in many directions and is used in different connections. 
Foresight includes the use of a variety of methods and techniques-depending (e.g. 25 
methods). The actual notion "foresight in safety" is analyzed and defined in a separate 
chapter. 
 
The scientific approach labelled as “foresight” is defined in contrast to another 
discipline which was named future research or futures studies. “Future research/futures 
studies” was often disputed within scientific circles: could such an approach – which 
was not based on theories and hypotheses and tested against empirical data, be included 
as “real scientific research”? Or was it an art?2 Although a final agreement has still not 
been reach, it is clear that the studies of futures (possible, probable, or preferable), has 
neither the traditional characteristics from natural sciences nor the methodology from 
some social sciences. However, futures studies are now both an academic branch (e.g. 
environmental/climate sector and dedicated research centres, often with scientific 
programs) and – much more widespread – semi-commercial (think tanks) or pure 
commercial bureaus offering a broad repertoire of techniques, such as trend 
studies/trend analysis, which are widely used in many connections and markets. 
 
As futures studies, strategic foresight studies had many early authors and scientists that 
initiated or anticipated the more systematic and knowledge-based understanding which 
were established after the WWII. Strategic foresight studies developed mainly from 
defence planning as part of the military complex and expanded later to the public sector 
(state/regional innovation), to large regional organisations (such as EU) to the private 
sector (such as multi-national companies). 
 
3. Foresight traditions – the middle term and long-term perspective 
The foresight approach is part of a wider scientific tradition: to use analyses about the 
past, about the present situation (diagnosis), to identify future objects and the 
possibility to reach them (prognosis), and how to reach the future goals (prescription). 
But here again, the actual studies differ in many ways between the two extremes: on 
one side pure basic scientific research about the future, and on the other side pure 
business studies, e.g. in the context of strategic foresight management. 
 
Luke Georghiou (PREST, Manchester University) has defined foresight as an approach 
overlapping three other disciplines: future studies, strategic planning and policy 
analysis. Although ‘foresight’ has been connected to or partly integrated in other 
research fields, the foresight tradition as a whole has some unique elements. 
                                                 
2 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Futures_studies 
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Some characteristics of the foresight approach are3: 
 
Process:  cross-disciplinary and cross-sectorial/participation and action-
oriented 
Time: medium to long term perspectives (often 5 – 50 years) in contrast to 
0 – 5 years for risk assessment (short perspective). 
Goal: aimed at present-day decisions and mobility/joint actions by 
identifying “possible future developments, driving forces, emerging 
technologies, barriers, threats and opportunities” 
Results “Outlooks, proposals of future developments, scenarios, visions, 
roadmaps, action” 
Prerequisite:  the world is multi-dimensional and basic uncertain 
 
Scientists that use future techniques in their research (futurists) as well thinks tanks and 








 Scenario method 
 Delphi method 
 Future history 
 Monitoring 






 Failure mode and 
effects analysis 
 Futures wheel 
 Technology road 
mapping 









 Theory U 
 
Both individuals (researchers, authors, scientists etc., see part 1), university institutes 
and organizations (Foresight professional networks, public-sector foresight 
organisations, and non-governmental foresight organisations) have allocated resources 
in order to develop and implement foresight studies and results in many sectors. As 
examples may be mentioned as networks World Future Society and World Futures 
Studies Federation, as organizations in the public sector National Intelligence Council 
and NASA /both US), The Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (EU), 
Government Office for Science (UK) and Norwegian Research Council (Norway), as 
NGOs Rand Corporation, Hudson Institute, Copenhagen Institute for Future Studies, 
Strategic Foresight Group and Project 2049 Institute. The reports and findings may be 
published in journals like Futures, Journal of Future Studies, Technological Forecasting 
and Change, and the magazine The Futurist.  
 
Safety seems to be at the edge of a paradigm shift, both from a theoretical and a 
practical perspective. In the European safety science community, a wide array of new 
approaches is studied. Some challenge the validity of safety science as a science (Safety 
Science 2014), while others proclaim new safety concepts and notions, such as 
Resilience Engineering, a New View on Human Error or Safety I and Safety II.  Such 
                                                 
3 Partly based on op.cit and Raija Koivisto (2009) Integrating future-oriented technology analysis and 
risk assessment methodologies in Technology Forecasting & Social Change 76 (2009) 1163-1176. 
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developments challenge and redefine commonly shared notions such as precaution, 
cause-consequence relations, human performance, cognition and culture with 
sometimes far reaching consequences for their application. ESReDA advocates the 
generic value and applicability of safety investigations across industrial domains and 
scientific disciplines. ESReDA foresees a predictive Foresight on Safety and its 
integration in a system engineering perspective. In several industrial sectors with a 
high-tech nature, safety is considered a shared responsibility, superseding a single actor 
or mono-disciplinary perspective.  Life Cycle Analysis seems indispensable for an 
assessing safety throughout the life cycle of complex legacy systems, addressing 
specific characteristics of transport, process and nuclear power applications. 
 
4.  Safety, investigations and the modern system approach 
Within the safety area methods and approaches, such as safety investigation, scenarios, 
risk analysis and assessment, the measurement of "weak signals" and other indicators, 
may be useful. Future thinking may be in use in different industrial sectors (such as 
energy production, the production of chemical substances and products, consumable 
production, transportation and to some extent also in the consumer-/service sector), but 
often restricted to a short or medium-term time horizon. 
 
Such new thinking is accompanied by a change in moral and ethical values on safety. 
Recent developments focus on an additional approach to technical design notions such 
as failsafe and safe life, crash worthiness, damage tolerance, compartmentation, 
redundancy and reliability. With the introduction of ICT as a fundamental new 
technology, new ethical notions such as Value Sensitive design and Responsible 
Innovation principles have been developed. They deal with complexity, system design 
and integration of safety assessment by Encompassing Design and Multidisciplinary 
Design Optimization methods, Knowledge Based Engineering and Value Engineering. 
New legal definitions dealing with safety assessment and liability have been introduced 
such as Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide, shifting social 
responsibilities for unanticipated consequences back to manufacturers and designers. 
 
The consequences of application of new materials such as composites, technological 
innovations in ICT, food, system-of-system networks and Internet of Things cannot be 
predicted and assessed by today’s evaluation methods. A new combination of learning 
from feedback and feed forward is not yet developed and validated. New thinking such 
the ESReDA Cube has indicated several opportunities to tackle such quests. 
 
Since safety of innovative complex and dynamic systems cannot be assessed based on 
their past performance, new approaches and notions should be developed. A distinction 
between socio-organizational and socio-technical system categories becomes 
inevitable, dealing with their intrinsic, inherent and emergent properties as specific 
classes of hazard, threats and consequences. A distinction between high energy density 
systems and dynamic network concepts is necessary to deal with massive instantaneous 
outbursts of energy of a mechanical, chemical or nuclear nature and the way 
consequences propagate through networks. A new distinction should be made between 
normal, undisrupted performance which is highly predictable and controllable, and 
non-normal situations, emerging from drift, natural growth, aging and exceedance of 
designed performance envelopes.  New mental representations of human performance 
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become necessary, since Tayloristic models of compliant behavior and rational 
decision making theories do not provide satisfactory explanations of abnormal behavior 
in normal situations or normal behavior in abnormal situations. A Good Operatorship 
notion dealing with competence rather than compliance is under development in several 
high-tech sectors such as in aviation and the maritime counterbalancing prospects of 
full automation towards unmanned operated transport systems. 
 
In assessing their safety performance, we can not only deal with new systems and 
technological innovation. Existing systems in their full maturity have a long and lasting 
past performance and have gone through a series of decisions, assumptions and 
modifications that are hardly fully known, let alone documented. The notion of 
transition management in matured, complex systems with a high level of technological 
change potential is in its early phases of development. A distinction between disruptive 
and derivative technology is crucial to understand its dynamic behavior. Due to the 
very high-performance levels such catastrophic consequences can manifest themselves 
as very high consequence and very low probability events beyond the responsibility of 
individual actors and entities. Interferences may occur due to unknown interrelations 
between components that have been forgotten, neglected or unexplored. In practice, 
such dynamics are referred to as Unknown Unknowns, but are actually discernable as 
design induced consequences during operations. Foresight is also knowledge and 
operational experience based hindsight. 
The role of accident and incident investigations can gain a new dimension if such 
aspects are incorporated in the investigation methodology. A common investigation 
methodology across industries and disciplines should lay the basis for such a new 
approach. Supported by a legal recognition and procedural embedment in practice, such 
as the ICAO Annex 13 approach. 
 
In other articles, these approaches are described and discussed. 
 
Traditionally, many industrial companies have concentrated on learning from past 
events, such as accidents, production problems, distribution and usage problems, and 
developed internal safety policies and industry norms after that. Many safety 
authorities, including regulatory agencies, have also followed this pattern. Feedback to 
the design of technology and organizations and managing safety during operations have 
greatly benefitted from such learning. We designed, created and proclaimed a category 
of Non-Plus-Ultra-Safe systems, such as aviation. There are however, necessities and 
opportunities to combine feedback and feed forward learning, integrating safety as a 
social value at all systems levels and life cycle phases. 
Safety management based on a systematic combination of learning of past events and 
issues and analysis and methods for insight into the future challenges seems still not 
very widespread within several key high-risk areas. This working group aims at 
reinforcing feedback and feed forwards loops between hindsight and foresight 
experiences and expertise. 
 
Safety is to be revalued as a strategic societal value, instead of the presently preferred 
notion as a Key Performance Indicator within organisations, to be assessed against 
other operational aspects such as economy and efficiency. Safety is a public value, not 
only a corporate value within an ETTO decision making context on an operator level. 
A shift back from control to comprehension is inevitable in dealing with modern, 
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complex and dynamic socio-technical and socio-organisational systems in their 
operating environment. 
Only by re-addressing the context of such systems, a credible foresight on their nature 
and safety performance can be established. 
 
In safety thinking a transition is taking place from reactive, to proactive, to predictive 
thinking. Such thinking is twofold: 
 in technological developments with respect to technological innovation and 
disruptive applications 
 in socio-economic and social developments with respect to risk awareness, 
perception, risk acceptance and management. 
 
A Zero Vision paradigm is emerging: no risk is acceptable and lethal accidents are 
intolerable. At the same time, systems become more embedded, complex and dynamic. 
The scale is increasing with respect to the volumes, numbers and sizes of the transport 
means and the energies that can be released from them, while the systems safety 
performance has achieved a Non-Plus Ultra-Safe level. The law of diminishing returns 
seem to become dominant with respect to conventional solutions. A preference is 
noticeable towards new notions that deal with foresight during operations such as Early 
Warnings, or recovery from non-normal situations, such as Resilience Engineering. 
Both developments erode the need to remain vigilant and proficient with respect to 
safety. Investments in road safety have dramatically been reduced. As a consequence, 
the death toll in Europe is increasing again. Safety in aviation is jeopardized by the 
limits to growth due to the capacity of the infrastructure, both airside and landside. 
Such system related developments can be foreseen by analysing their architecture and 
exploring higher order drivers for change and efficiency, such as business models, 
policy making and governance. 
 
With respect to socio-technical systems with a non-plus ultra-safe performance level, 
aviation, railways, maritime, nuclear and process industry can be considered as 
belonging to a specific category of high energy density systems, capable of creating 
catastrophic consequences of a physical nature. Preventing accidents of an 
unprecedented magnitude remains a prime reason for existence for safety 
investigations. 
 
There is no Golden Bullet with respect to one encompassing safety performance 
indicator. An analysis of the safety performance in aviation indicates a complex 
interaction between airworthiness requirements and passenger service performance 
indicators. Rather than aiming at a further decrease of the overall accident rate as 
performance indicators, safety enhancement efforts could be invested in a better 
understanding of the system principles and properties. Safety investigations are a 
pivotal approach to this purpose. 
 
Recognition of a necessary system change can be acquired at two levels: 
 an incremental shift with derivative solutions for known problems 
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 a substantial shift with disruptive solutions for new problems. 
 
In the second case however, innovation processes and adaptations cannot be 
implemented by a single actor or from a single perspective or discipline. The concept 
of Cyclic Innovation needs to be mobilized to achieve sustainable effects, which are if 
not predictable, at least are descriptive or comprehensible. 
 
The magnitude of energies that are to be controlled during normal operations and can 
be released during accidents is comparable between aviation, railway and the nuclear 
sector (see Table I): 
 
Table I: Comparison of energy magnitudes across railway, aviation and nuclear sectors. 
 Weight Speed Altitude Energy 
High Speed Train 430 tons 250 km/h ground level 1053 MW 
 320 km/h ground level 1740 MW 
A380 Jumbo jet MTW 575 900 km/h 10.000 m 75 000 MW 
at take-off 
MTOW 575 tons 
260 km/h ground level 1500 MW 
at landing 
MLW 386 tons 





Average size   800 MW 
Borsele (Neth)  Sea level 450 MW 
Chernobyl  Sea level 600 MW 
Fukushima  Sea level 784 MW 
 
Weak signals are not weak by definition. Based on signal theory, there are several 
reasons for a weakness of signals: 
 strong signals can be suppressed to weak signals 
 the can be misinterpreted by distortion during transmission 
 a signal can be missed in the spectrum at the receiving end 
 a signal can be overruled by a signal of another nature 
 the frequency of transmission can fall beneath a perception threshold level. 
 
In practice such weak signal debates are dealing with either a technical, behavioural or 
social nature of signals, with primary production processes or secondary processes, 
while the diversity across actors and stakeholders may create confusion and 
disagreement of their validity as service providers for user’s safety or for technical 
reliability. 
 
A simultaneous use of feedback and feed forward mechanisms can be underpinned by 
the Full Information Paradigm of Klir (see fig). According to this paradigm, the 
acquired body of knowledge and experience collected over decades in a system 
provides a basis for safety and risk considerations. Such a body of knowledge is 
overwhelming for legacy systems with a worldwide impact such as energy, process 
industry and transport, making the NPUS safe, but also reluctant to change. Their 
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ability to adapt is hampered by vested mental constructs, assumptions and 
simplifications, expertise and consensus on scientific paradigms, methods, notions and 
techniques, both theoretical and practical. 
 
 
Figure 1. Hierarchical ordered control loops. 
 
‘Old views’ have to be discarded and abolished in case of a paradigm shift in safety 
thinking, similar to Schumpeter’s ‘creative destruction‘ on economic theory. Otherwise 
an opaque blending is created by mixing old and new views into a hybrid concept. In 
the past, we have seen a stall of such a dialectic process by proclaiming A versus B 
concept of safety, to be replaced by another version of C versus D. Such a debate does 
not restrict itself to an academic discourse, but may hamper progress. A fall back on 
old views and repetition of debates across domains and disciplines frequently occurs, 
allocating public, corporate and personal responsibilities for safety, emphasizing the 
roles of whistle blowers and regulators.  
 
We advocate the abolition of three obsolete notions: 
 replace the application of predefined, simplified accident models by the scenario 
concept as a consensus basis for reconstructing the course of the event, 
 replace the notion of 'human error' by a new view on human behaviour, 
 reconsider the notion of 'cause' in the perspective of multilinear interactions. 
Abolition of the use of accident models is likely to meet resistance to change due to: 
 a lack of understanding of system engineering theory by non-technical scientists 
and practitioners 
 monodisciplinary paradigmatic perspectives in psychology on human performance 
and cognition 
 disciplinary demarcation lines between technical and social sciences and 
Hierarchical ordered control loops

















Enhancing Safety: the Challenge of Foresight 
 17 
 cognitive stubbornness and resistance to change at both an individual, corporate 
and governance level. 
 
5.  Foresight in safety; an epilogue 
‘Foresight’ has developed as a scientific research field during the last ten-years and has 
been more elaborated concerning theories, hypothesis and concepts. Many universities 
around the world have now foresight research on their research agenda, and some have 
also established scientific degrees and education programmes. Outside universities, the 
foresight approach has been used by several public and private institutions, enterprises 
(esp. multinational companies) and consultancy firms/think tanks etc. The main 
implementation is connected to change management, strategic analysis and policy 
development. Corporate foresight has been defined as: 
 
“..an ability that includes any structural or cultural element that enables 
the company to detect discontinuous change early, interpret the 
consequences for the company, and formulate effective responses to 
ensure the long-term survival and success of the company”4 
 
5. 1 Preliminary conclusions 
 The foresight approach seems to have high potential utilitarian value for exploring 
safety enhancement on the short term. 
 The use of foresight notions and methods have so far only to a small degree been 
incorporated in systematic safety management at a governance and corporate level 
 More research is needed on both national and EU level to identify adequate and 
appropriate methods and to investigate the utilitarian value of applying foresight in 
safety in a medium and long-term perspective. 
 More emphasise should be laid down on exploring the possible value of transferring 
experiences and knowledge from the use of foresight methods in other societal 
sectors in different countries and EU to the safety arena. 
 
Safety is an indispensable strategic value in the transition process from derivative to 
disruptive solutions in developing innovative as well as legacy systems. The main 
challenge for safety professionals is to develop new notions, methods, tools and 
techniques to cope with the challenges that accompany such a transition. These efforts 
could benefit from unexplored and so far unchartered domains and disciplines. 
Foresight is a promising prospect. 
 
To paraphrase Richard Booth in his inaugural lecture in 1979: Safety is too important 
a matter to be left to futurologists. 
 
 
                                                 
4 Rohrbeck, Rene (2010) Corporate Foresight: Towards a Maturity Model for the Future Orientation of 
a Firm. Springer Series: Contribution to Management Science, Heidelberg and New York. 
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Aviation has been recognized as one of the ultimate safe socio-technical systems. This 
contribution discusses the conditions and context that moulded the system safety to its 
present level by applying integral safety, a sectoral approach and safety as a strategic 
value. At present the aviation system consists of institutional arrangements at the 
global level, a shared repository of knowledge and operational experiences, feedback 
from reality, the notion of Good Airmanship, together with the choice of technology as 
the flywheel for progress. This architecture made aviation a Non-Plus Ultra-Safe 
system characterized by a safety performance level of beyond 10-7 accident rate. To 
cross this mythical boundary in legacy systems like aviation, it is imperative to apply 
game changers such as socio-technical systems engineering, disruptive technologies 
and innovation transition management. In such a transition, a shift in focus occurs 
from performance to properties, from hindsight to foresight, highlighted by the case 
study of the stall recovery device, the Kestrel concept. 
Keywords: aviation, system safety, foresight, engineering design, safety investigation 
1. Introduction 
A Non-Plus Ultra-Safe performance is no reason for complacency. In view of the 
oncoming growth and expansion in aviation, a further increase of safety is required to 
maintain the present performance level and to assure public confidence in the system. 
The size of the ‘City in the Sky’ at 30.000 feet is prognosed to double from the present 
1 million inhabitants to 2 million in 2030 (Boosten, 2017). 
 
To cope with this prognosed growth, abolition of obsolete safety constructs is 
inevitable. New safety notions are required in a transition from accident contributing 
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factors to state/space modelling with safety Eigenvectors and multiple solution 
domains. Despite their low frequency, prevention of physical consequences of major 
events in such high energy density systems remain pivotal due to their catastrophic and 
disruptive potential. Application of systems control theoretical approaches should 
enable a transition from reactive and proactive towards predictive capabilities. Early 
interventions in the design process enable identification of intrinsic hazards and 
inherent safety properties that have to be dealt with during normal and non-normal 
operations and system states.  
 
Incorporation of higher system orders, engineering design principles and innovative 
and disruptive change enable a combination of both reactive, proactive and predictive 
responses which facilitate foresight in safety. Because in aviation, we must continue to 
innovate and improve to safely defy gravity tomorrow. 
 
2. How did aviation become so safe? 
2.1 Engines for change 
Four engines for enhancing foresight and predicting safe behaviour at a systems level 
are identified which, each by themselves, are a necessary but insufficient condition for 
safety enhancement. In addition, they have to occur simultaneously in order to 
implement a new concept in the aviation sector on a sustainable basis. These engines 
are: 
 
These engines are: 
 Institutional arrangements at the level of the state and its sovereignty in an 
supra-national context of non-governmental organisations 
 feedback from reality, based on precaution and independence of investigations 
 system engineering principles, technological innovation and system state 
transitions 
 Knowledge Based Engineering, by understanding empirical and experimental 
data. 
 
As these engines coincide, a structural need for timely adaptations and system change 
occurs. Impulses for change can be explained based on internal, structural needs of the 
sector itself, not only by a public concern on the credibility of a sector. In case of an 
external impulse, such as with an aviation disaster, sometimes several similar events 
have to occur before a sector responds. A worldwide implementation of each these 
engines has not only lead to a significant increase in safety, but also contributed to 
developing expertise and knowledge about the actual safety performance of the sector. 
They served as foresight, designed into the system from the start on. A vital issue has 
been maintaining public confidence in the sector in order to develop a worldwide 
aviation industry (Kahan, 1998). On one hand, in passenger transport, the public is the 
customer who puts faith in a safe, efficient and smooth performance of the services 
rendered. Once this faith is lost, the sector will have to face the fear of going out of 
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business. On the other hand, the performance of the transport sector is in the public 
domain. Accidents are visible in the public eye, being bystanders and potential risk 
bearers in case of a disaster, such as an air crash in an apartment building, a release of 
hazardous materials or a tunnel fire. Rescue and emergency in incident and disaster 
handling are public duties in case of a disaster. Independent Transport Safety Boards 
make public governance at the State level a direct stakeholder in transportation 
accidents at the systems level in contrast to corporate management of fixed installations 
in other high-tech sectors such as process industry and nuclear power supply (Vuorio, 
Stoop and Johnson, 2017). Due to the complexity and high-technology nature, aviation 
has additional specific characteristics, which necessitate a technical investigation into 
unexplained failure of such transportation systems. These characteristics are based on 
the precaution principle, creating a common body of knowledge in aviation.  
 
2.1.1 Institutional arrangements 
The first international aviation conference in 1889 raised four fundamental juridical 
questions with regard to national sovereignty of the airspace and safety of aviation 
(Freer 1986.1): 
 Should governments license civil aviation? 
 Should there be special legislation to regulate responsibility of aviators towards 
their passengers, public and owners of the land where descent is made? 
 Should the salvage of aerial wrecks be governed by maritime law? 
 Should there be new rules for establishing the absence or death of lost aviators? 
 
Establishing rules for uncontrolled flights in airspace or above territorial waters led to 
the first international aerial congress amongst 21 states in 1910 in Paris. The First 
World War spurred aviation technology, leading in 1919 to the International Air 
Convention on technical, judicial, and military aspects of aviation and the 
establishment of the International Commission for Air navigation (ICAN) (Freer, 
1986.2). The answers to these questions firmly establish safety and the investigation of 
accidents as a distinguishing feature of the aviation sector.  
During the early development of public transport systems, the precaution principle has 
been applied as the most sophisticated engineering design approach of the 19th century 
(McIntyre, 2000). This precaution principle is defined in aviation as: first comprehend 
then control, create foresight by gaining insight. It combines a timely response to failure 
with an in-depth analysis in order to understand the failure mechanisms. It was only 
during the Second World War that a probabilistic component in safety thinking was 
added as a second school of thinking to this approach. Due to a lack of empirical data, 
probabilistic approaches should reduce uncertainty on new concepts and configurations 
to facilitate prioritization and cost-effectiveness estimates of safety enhancement 
measures. After the Second World War, corporate risk management was introduced as 
a third school in thinking, evolving into a public safety and governance between all 
actors involved in safety in the transportation area (McIntyre, 2000). 
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As the flywheel for progress, the level of technical harmonization has been selected 
focusing on navigation, communication and reliability. The precaution principle and a 
timely feedback of findings are pivotal. Annex 13 set the terms for cooperation between 
states which are involved in an aviation accident, namely the States of occurrence, 
operations, registry and manufacturing (ICAO, 2001). The large-scale introduction of 
civil aviation required a change in aircraft design. Before the war, civil aircraft were 
derivatives of military aircraft with respect to their design concepts as well to their 
construction and materials. After the war, large civil aircraft became disruptive designs 
because they had to transport great numbers of passengers over long distances, based 
on regular timetables, putting high demands on endurance, range and comfort. In 
contrast to these requirements, military aircraft were designed for relatively short-range 
combat performance, serving as airborne battle stations. 
 
2.1.2 Feedback from reality, separated from blame and state interference 
Even before the Second World War, the concept of learning from deficiencies was 
promulgated in aviation.  Safety was viewed as an industry-wide problem, rather than 
one for any single operator, manufacturer or State. The concept was further developed 
in wartime aviation.  Flanagan et al. (1948) conducted possibly the first study of 
incidents and "near misses" in aviation when he surveyed U.S. Army Air Corps crews 
to determine what factors influenced mission success and failure. Anticipating modern 
insights, he found that the critical factors were to be found more in human performance 
than aircraft technology.  In order to keep public faith in the aviation industry, a 
common process of learning without allocating blame was deemed necessary. In order 
to provide a timely feedback to all stakeholders in the sector, accident investigations 
had to be separated from judicial procedures, which focus on individual responsibilities 
and liability. 
This blame-free approach has clearly borne fruit.  Technical investigations into the 
failure of designing and operating aircraft have seen an impressive development. Based 
on a limited number of ‘showcases’ design principles were developed, such as fail-safe, 
safe life, damage tolerance, crash worthiness, situation awareness or graceful 
degradation. Several famous cases such as the De Havilland Comet, Tenerife, UA-232 
Mount Erebus, TWA-800, Valuejet and Swissair 111 have identified deficiencies in the 
aviation system, sometimes at some remote from the proximal cause of the triggering 
event. They have led to many practical changes as well as new expertise on specific 
academic areas varying from as metal fatigue to human failure, crew resource 
management or life-cycle maintenance. 
During the 1960s, the issue of independence was raised in order to relieve 
investigations from a dominant influence of the State. During investigations, the 
influence of State interests, secondary causal factors and circumstantial influences 
should also be addressed. The debate on this matter can be traced to around 1937, after 
a series of major air crashes. Arriving at such independence, however, proved to be a 
long process, and still is not completed. In responding to specific European needs in 
harmonizing practices current in the States of the Community, an additional procedural 
arrangement on ICAO Annex 13 has been developed. This development led to the EU 
Directive 94/56/EC on Accident Investigation, despite fundamental differences 
between legal systems in the various countries of the Community (Cairns 1961, Smart 
2004). Conflicts of interest linked to the issue of double inquiries by technical 
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permanent bodies and by judicial authorities were recognized, but nevertheless lead to 
a Community strategy to adaptation of the existing legal and institutional framework, 
harmonizing national legislation and strengthening cooperation between Member 
States (ETSC, 2001). As a consequence of the notion that incident investigation and 
analysis could be a source for safety recommendations, the EU has issued a Directive 
2003/42/EC on mandatory incident registration in aviation. So far, the aviation sector 
has been unique in issuing mandatory, governmental investigations of systemic 
incidents from its conception on beyond the corporate level of investigations (Vuorio, 
Stoop and Johnson, 2017). 
 
2.2 System engineering principles 
2.2.1 Multiple safety performance indicators 
Historically, safety in aviation is not only expressed in institutional arrangements and 
policy targets, but also in international, technical airworthiness requirements. Taking 
into account that zero risk is unachievable in any human activity, acceptable safety 
target levels had to be established in the perspective of an unbalance between safety 
and expected growth (Hengst, Smit and Stoop, 1998). An array of potential units for 
measuring risk can be used, discriminating relative safety related to the traffic volume 
and absolute safety, related to the annual number of fatalities. Differences across fleet 
segments and services, scheduled, non-scheduled flights and general aviation, accident 
rates per aircraft class and world region, as well as life expectancy of aircrafts have to 
be taken into account. Risk acceptance by the general public and personal appreciation 
of risk depends on convenience and pleasure in the various types of private and public 
risk taking activities. For each activity, a unit of measurement has to be selected since 
it makes a large difference whether safety is related to the absolute number of fatalities, 
a critical flight phase or the distance and time flown. For air services, as the criterion 
for safety performance the fatality rate per passenger km is used, while for 
airworthiness the level of safety is expressed per aircraft hour of flight. These two 
criteria are related by the number of passengers per aircraft, the survivability rate per 
aircraft and the blockspeed of the aircraft (Wittenberg, 1979). 
 
This relation can be derived from statistics of air transportation quantitative data by: 
 Number of passengers km P 
 Aircraft flying hours   U 
 Aircraft flying kilometres  S 
 Assuming K passenger fatalities in R fatal accidents, the fatality rate per 
passenger km is K/P and the fatal accident rate per flight hour R/U. 
 
For the relation between these quantities holds: 
 
U/P*K/R*R/U = K/P                                             (1) 
 
In this expression are introduced: 
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 k = K/R = average number of fatalities per fatal accident 
 
 p = P/S = average number of passengers per aircraft 
 
 VB = S/U = average block speed 
 
Then for equation (1) can be written: 
 
 1/VB*k/p*R/U=K/P                                             (2) 
 
Or in words: Pass.fatalities/pass.km = fatal acc./flight hours *fatal per acc./pass per 
aircraft*1/blockspeed. This dimension analysis shows that the introduction of long haul 
flights, increased survivability rate per accident, increase in blockspeed and larger 
aircraft have had a major influence on the decrease of the fatality rate per passenger 
km. Surprisingly, this dimension analysis indicated that these safety performance 
parameters are based on air services and airworthiness design parameters and not on 
safety design principles such as failsafe, safe life, damage tolerance, graceful 
degradation and crash worthiness.  
 
This dimensions analysis refers to an aircraft design and certification perspective, while 
later developments applied an operational perspective. Safety management systems and 
maintenance, repair and overhaul established safety performance indicators for normal 
situations throughout the operational life of aircraft. 
 
2.2.2 Towards a systems engineering perspective 
In addressing the issue of acceptable safety levels, two assumptions are made: 
 With the expected increase of traffic volume, safety levels may not fall below 
the achieved levels for reasons of public acceptance 
 The level of growth is linear related to the number of accidents. 
 
Consequently, the percentage of the total growth of the traffic volume expressed in 
passenger km must be compensated by an equivalent decrease in percentage of the 
fatality rate per passenger km. In the past, safety improvements have been 
accomplished by pragmatic changes in technology, aircraft operations and ground 
equipment. These achievements have been a combined effort of all parties involved: 
manufacturers, airline operators, authorities and research institutes. 
 
Advocating a more rational tool for establishing a safety level -such as cost-benefit 
analysis- such approaches are confronted with hardly comparable costs for value of 
life, operating costs and cost for safety investments. While costs of individual accident 
are relative low on a sectoral level of costs, the overall safety enhancement measures 
following from such accidents may be excessive for the sector. A target safety level for 
aviation based on a rational cost-benefits approach seems hardly achievable 
(Wittenberg, 1979). 
 
More rational approaches had to be developed in the 1970’s for the introduction of civil 
jet aircraft and new technologies such as the supersonic Concorde and Automated 
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Landing System development. The allowable probability of failures is inversely related 
to their degree of hazard to the safety of the flight. No single failure or combination of 
failures should result in a Catastrophic Effect, unless the probability can be considered 
as Extremely Improbable, in effect lower than a 10-7 accident rate. Interesting in this 
approach is the total amount of flight hours per year that are produced by the aviation 
industry as such. Only a few aircraft types can surmount the 107 requirement, 
accumulating sufficient flying hours. Consequently, accomplishment to the overall 
safety target of the airworthiness code can never be proved by actual flight data but 
should be settled by a System Safety Assessment approach. Due to the effect of the 
increase of aircraft speed and aircraft size, the passenger fatality rate expressed per 
passenger km has decreased in the past far more than the fatal aircraft accident rate per 
flight hour. In the coming decades, the favourable effect of aircraft speed will not occur 
and only the effect of aircraft size may remain. This parameter analysis demonstrates 
that changes in aircraft size and long range flights will consequently have an important 
impact on the improvement factor required for the fatality rate per passenger km versus 
the fatal accident rate based on the aircraft flying hours.  
 
2.3 Knowledge Based Engineering (KBE) design 
In assessing the fulfilment of the societal values and acceptance of designs, the 
prediction of tolerable loads and acceptable behaviour of designs is not so simple and 
well-defined as it seems. In the striving for excellence, the concept of failure is central 
to understanding engineering, for engineering design has as its first and foremost 
objective the obviation of failure (Petroski, 1992). As stated by Petroski, to understand 
what engineering is and what engineers do, is to understand how failures can happen 
and how they can contribute more than successes to advance technology (Italics added). 
As a challenge in the Science, Technology and Society debate on Human Values, 
engineering has as its principal objective not the given world, but the world that 
engineers themselves create. Extra-engineering motives and considerations of these 
values result in a continuous change that arises from these challenges. This means that 
there are many more ways in which something can go wrong than in the given world. 
In his analytical study on aerospace engineering methodology, Vincenti indicates the 
transition from craftsman thinking in experimental progression towards knowledge 
based design of artefacts (Vincenti, 1990). In the 1930’s the empirical and experimental 
design of aerofoils was gradually replaced by analytical and mathematical 
understanding of the mechanisms that ruled aerofoil design. Such  transition towards a 
knowledge based design was supported by wind tunnel testing of scale models and 
flight tests. Scientific research focused on the role of viscosity, transition between 
laminar and turbulent flow, laminar flow aerofoils and elliptic lift distribution. This 
application of scientific research in order to reduce uncertainty in the attempts to 
achieve increased performance created a growth in knowledge. Increased knowledge 
in turn acts as a driving force to further increase knowledge. As defined by Constant 
(quote by Vincenti, 1990) the phenomenon of ‘presumptive anomaly’ may stimulate 
better understanding of the behaviour of an artefact. 
 
“Presumptive anomaly occurs in technology, not when the conventional system fails in 
any absolute or objective sense, but when assumptions derived from science indicate 
either that under some future conditions the conventional system will fail (or function 
badly) or that a radically different system will do a much better job.” 
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Vincenti concludes that presumptive anomaly, functional failure and the need to reduce 
uncertainty in design act as driving forces to a growth of engineering design 
knowledge.  
 
In aviation engineering design, safety investigations have been providing feedback 
from reality by exploratory reconstructions and analytical interpretations of facts and 
findings derived from accident investigations. Challenging design assumptions, model 
simplifications and operational restrictions in examining the validity of this knowledge 
store have contributed to the growth of design knowledge. Through safety 
investigations, systemic and knowledge deficiencies were identified, leading to novel 
safety principles in engineering design. Eventually, this has led to Knowledge Based 
Engineering as a specific school of design thinking (Torenbeek, 2013). 
 
The search for performance optimization and reduction of uncertainties has created a 
continuous exploration of design variations and selection of better performing design 
solutions. This has created generations of commercial and military aircraft designs with 
similar morphology, configurations and properties. Such solutions can either have a 
derivative or disruptive nature. Vincenti elaborates on the role of this variation-
selection process in the innovation of aerospace design (Vincenti, 1994). Developing 
‘anomalies’ should be considered in a historical context of design requirements, 
gradual changes in the operating context and consequences of design trade-offs. 
Although ‘anomalies’ may temporarily deviate from prevailing engineering judgement, 
specific concerns may force to deviate from this mainstream in exploring innovations. 
The variation-selection model of Vincenti takes it for essential and unavoidable that 
any search for knowledge that is new, that is not attained before, must involve an 
element of what is called ‘unforesightedness’. The outcome cannot be foreseen or 
predicted when the variant is proposed. Foresight on performance has been both tested 
at the component and subsystem level prospectively by modelling and simulation and 
retrospectively by flight testing and operational feedback. Such ‘unforesightedness’ 
comes with balancing gains as well as costs. The outcomes of such a balancing may 
favour specific design trade-offs, but should be considered in their historical context 
and operational demands. As speed increased, drag became dominant in the design 
trade-offs in designing retractable gears. The generalized knowledge that retractable 
gears were favourable, was the product of an unforesighted variation-selection process 
and was valid for a specific class of aircraft designs (Vincenti, 1994). Similar trade-
offs in context can be observed in the design of modern commercial aircraft in 
balancing weight and fuel consumption versus structural integrity and dynamic stability 
(Torenbeek, 2013). Flight envelope protection was introduced to refrain the pilot from 
entering the margins of the operational envelope at the cost of loss of pilot situation 
awareness in critical situations (De Kroes and Stoop, 2012). The application of 
automation in cockpits has a proven track record of substantial gains in safety, 
efficiency and accuracy, but comes at a cost of loss of pilot situation awareness in 
critical situations, increased cognitive task loads and loss of basic flying skills. The 
notion of ‘unforesightedness’ has not yet been expanded from the component to the 
systems level. 
 
3. Socio-technical systems engineering challenges 
The driving forces for enhancing safety foresight come from both within a sector and 
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without.  From within, improvements in technology and a need for awareness of 
potential negative effects of technology drive the need to understand the causes of 
accidents. From without, public trust, political pressure and international coordination 
drive the need to prevent and mitigate accidents.  For commercial aviation, all of these 
came together at the same time -as the need for interoperability, punctuality and 
reliability, international determination of responsibility and responding to the inherent 
human fear of being in the sky- and converged to demand the highest standards of 
proactive safety. Such safety foresight had to cope with system properties of both a 
legal, social and technical nature.  
 
3.1 Legacy systems and ‘early warnings’ of safety performance  
In designing complex socio-technical systems, due to their legacy nature and 
dependences on other systems, there is no opportunity for real time and full scale testing 
during introduction and adaptation.  Apart from their complexity, there are 
unacceptable consequences of fault and failure propagation of disruptions through a 
global network that operates on a 24/7 basis. The vulnerability of such systems is a 
critical parameter in assessing the consequences of change and adaptation. Such 
vulnerability is assumed to be caused by unpredictable and unnoticed interactions 
between system components. According to Dekker, ‘drift into failure’ is a gradual, 
incremental decline into disaster driven by environmental pressure, unruly technology 
and social processes that normalize growing risk (Dekker, 2011). 
 
However, due to a lack of understanding of its incubation, ‘drift into failure’ inevitably 
makes a conventional trial and error approach inapplicable in high technology network 
systems. Such a trial and error approach should be replaced by a predictive approach 
on a systems level of performance. Applying ‘early warnings’ of mishaps to prevent a 
‘drift into failure’ during final phases of the design and construction or during normal 
operations is too late an intervention. Huge costs will occur for control and 
modification after detection of unacceptable deficiencies and deviations. Consequently, 
‘drift into failure’ is an obsolete construct in controlling and explaining ‘emergent 
properties’ in high technology systems. This construct should be replaced by 
structuring system development and positioning of safety assessment tools and 
techniques at specific points in each phase of the design, development and operations 
of such systems. In creating new solutions with predictive potential on safety foresight, 
several with respect to safety so far unchartered scientific domains and disciplines have 
to be mobilized. Based on aerospace engineering experiences serious candidates are 
simulation and prototyping, forensic engineering, value operations methodology and 
state/space vector modelling (Vincenti, 1990; Torenbeek, 2013).  
 
Analysing the complexity of socio-technical systems, the notion of ‘drift into failure’ 
is frequently used as an explanation of ‘emergent’ behaviour (Dekker, 2011). The 
underlying notion of the ‘incubation period’ of such a drift before it emerges as a 
unanticipated property, remains undefined, unmeasurable and does not cover the 
dynamics of such a drift. This ‘drift into failure’ lacks the description and explanation 
of a triggering event and conditions that sets a sequence of events in motion. The 
margins and boundaries that separate regular performance from emergent failure 
remain undefined and hence, uncontrollable. The concept of state/space vectoring of 
safety events has been conceptually formulated as a potential answer to these issues of 
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safety margins (Stoop and Van der Burg, 2012). State-space modelling serves the 
identification of performance boundaries and dissimilarity distances between safe and 
unsafe performance by introducing vulnerability and margins to system boundaries 
under specific conditions (Van Kleef, 2017). To communicate about safety, actors have 
to agree on system states and margins to boundaries, using design requirements and 
specifications as starting points. Introduction of limit states, operating envelopes and 
viable envelopes facilitate understanding of margins for prevention and recovery.  Such 
a state/space modelling approach defines safety as a social construct within physical 
boundaries and operational conditions. Simultaneously, such an approach defines the 
resilience margins for system recovery and complies with the European codes for 
technical safety directives and safety integrity levels (Van Kleef, 2017). This 
state/space vector approach enables quantification of survivability margins to operating 
limits and a measurable comparison between various system states. Such an approach 
does neither rely on a normative judgement on acceptability of risks, nor on quality of 
design or performance. 
 
An adequate definition of the notion of ‘state’ is given by systems theory. The state of 
a vector ?⃗?(𝑡) in its present situation can be described, based only on the information 
and control based on the previous situation. We only need this information to predict 





?⃗?(𝑡) = 𝑓(?⃗?(𝑡), ?⃗⃗?(𝑡), 𝑑(𝑡), 𝑡) and ?⃗?(𝑘 + 1) = 𝑓(?⃗?(𝑘), ?⃗⃗?(𝑘), 𝑑(𝑘), 𝑘). 
 
In this equation ?⃗⃗? is the control vector and 𝑑 the disturbance. This first equation is the 
continuous time version, while the second is the discrete or event based version, in 
which k is the actual event. 
 
Rather than just stating safety factors we now have a concept of real system safety 
related events having an impact magnitude and a directional bias relative to the 
dimensions of the system model. The model suggests multi-vectorial design solution 
spaces which have meaning relative to the dimensions of safety in terms of the 
contribution or impact within each dimension and the overall resulting orientation or 
direction of the safety issue being considered. Consequently, safety is significantly 
elevated from the very basic consideration as a factor, to a new level where it is being 
quantified as a multi-dimensional quantity with a resulting orientation that defines the 
choice of the designer or operator relative to their values regarding safety. With 
reference to the Value Operations Methodology, this leads us to the position where 
safety can be integrated into the general design approach of the air transport system 
according to an equation relating KPI to some delta value of the form: 
 
ΔV = αC(C1/C0)+ αU(U1/U0) + αM(M1/M0) + αE(E1/E0) + αP(P1/P0) + αS(S1/S0)  + ε 
 
where Cost efficiency is represented by C (revenue/cost), Utilization by U, 
Maintainability by M, Environmental Quality by E, Passenger Satisfaction by P, Safety 
by S and finally including an error ε, consideration. Consequently, safety as a function 
of: safety = fn (context, culture, content, structure, time), can be characterised with the 
individual drivers associated with each dimension so that safety in its vectorial and 
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most realistic form can be integrated into the overall integrated system of systems 
design solution space. In shifting from factor towards vector, safety critical behaviour 
of open and dynamic systems can be analysed by identifying inherent properties during 
design before they manifest themselves as emergent properties during operations. By 
doing so, safety can be assessed and optimized pro-actively as a critical strategic value 
against other system values in a dynamic and complex systems perspective. This 
approach substantiates the notion of foresight. 
 
3.2 High energy density systems 
Socio-technical systems must be safeguarded by design due to their specific 
characteristics as a distinct category of high energy density complex systems. 
Management of the operational energy that is stored in the system is a challenge that 
must be controlled proactively throughout all system states, mission phases and 
operating constraints. 
 
Due to the increase in size and scale of modern socio-technical systems, the 
uncontrolled release of energy in a specific event can result in catastrophic material 
consequences and loss of all lives of a large population at risk, both inside and outside 
a system. The operational energy stored in complex systems can be expressed in 
Megawatts as the sum of kinetic and potential energy. The energy content of a High 
Speed Train and a Jumbo jet that has to be controlled during operations can be 
compared to nuclear power plants with respect to their catastrophic potential, as 
depicted in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 Operational system energy content 
 
 Weight Speed Altitude Energy 
High Speed Train 430 tons 250 km/h ground level 1053 MW 
 320 km/h ground level 1740 MW 
A380 Jumbo jet MTW 575 900 km/h 10.000 m 75 000 MW 
at take-off 
MTOW 575 tons 
260 km/h ground level 1500 MW 
at landing 
MLW 386 tons 





Average size   800 MW 
Borsele (Neth)  Sea level 450 MW 
Chernobyl  Sea level 600 MW 
Fukushima  Sea level 784 MW 
 
Such an operational energy management strategy is interesting in particular in aviation 
with respect to the balance between kinetic energy due to the airspeed control and 
potential energy due to the altitude and attitude control. The operational energy of an 
aircraft has to be controlled and dissipated back to zero in order to bring the flight to a 
safe end. This kinetic and potential energy distribution varies across the various flight 
phases. This means that the energy balance management in the cruise flight phase is 
based for 25% on the speed control and for 75% on the altitude and attitude control. 
During final approach and landing, the potential energy reduces from 75% at cruising 
altitude to 19.6% of the total energy content. The energy ratio between theses phases 
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subsequently changes from potential energy management towards a predominant 
kinetic energy management by keeping control over speed and attitude. 
 
3.3 Intrinsic systemic hazards 
From the early days of aviation, stall has been an inherent system hazard. Otto 
Lilienthal crashed and perished in 1896 as a result of stall. Wilbur Wright encountered 
stall for the first time in 1901, flying his second glider. These experiences convinced 
the Wright brothers to design their aircraft in a ‘canard’ configuration, facilitating an 
easy and gentle recovery from stall. Over the following decades, stall has remained as 
an intrinsic hazard in flying fixed wing aircraft. Stall is a condition in which the flow 
over the main wing separates at high angles of attack, hindering the aircraft to gain lift 
from the wings. Fixed-wing aircraft can be equipped with devices to prevent or 
postpone a stall or to make it less (or in some cases more) severe, or to make recovery 
easier by training and certifying pilots.  
 
A further analysis reveals some more fundamental flight performance issues (Obert, 
2009): 
 All stall recognizing and mitigating strategies have not eliminated the stall as a 
phenomenon; major stall related accident still occur 
 Airspeed indications rely on the use of Pitot tube technology. Applications of a 
new technology such as GPS provides redundancy in air data information 
 In contrast with roll and yaw control, pitch control of aircraft is not redundant. 
There are no substitute strategies for controlling pitch of commercial aircraft, 
in contrast with the military, where thrust vectoring is an option 
 Angle of Attack in commercial aviation is a secondary parameter, derived from 
Indicated Air Speed. There is no direct alpha indicator, in contrast with the 
military 
 4th generation civil aviation aircraft lack the ability to create a negative pitch 
moment throughout the flight performance envelope by having direct access to 
speed and attitude as safety critical flight parameters. 
 
Despite all efforts to reduce stall and deep stall to acceptable levels of occurrence, such 
events still happen occasionally in the commercial aviation community, raising concern 
about their emerging complexity, dynamics and impact on public perception on safety 
of aviation (Salmon, Walker and Stanton, 2016). Such events have been subjected to 
major accident investigations are swerve as triggers for change throughout the industry. 
Most recent cases are Turkish Airlines flight TK1951, Colgan Air flight 3407, Air 
France flight AF 447, Air Asia flight 8501 and Air Algerie flight 5017.  
 
In a debate on high-altitude upset recovery, Sullenberger –captain of the Hudson 
ditching of flight US 1549- described stall as a seminal accident. "We need to look at 
it from a systems approach, a human/technology system that has to work together. This 
involves aircraft design and certification, training and human factors. If you look at the 
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human factors alone, then you're missing half or two-thirds of the total system 
failure...". 
 
4. Beyond 10-7 safety 
4.1 Derivatives versus disruptives: the Valley of Death 
The responses of aircraft manufacturers to stall have been different. Airbus took a 
different approach in designing the Primary Flight Display (PFD) than Boeing with 
eventually, equal safety performance levels. Airbus designed alpha floor protection in 
the fly by wire concept, which should greatly reduce opportunities for stall by 
automatically adjusting pitch and power to counteract the stall. Boeing choose to 
address pilot recognition of an impending stall. The Asiana B 777 accident 
demonstrated that pilots my fail to recognize low energy states preceding a stall, much 
as the Air France A330 accident demonstrated that alpha floor protection may fail due 
to unreliable speed and altitude sensors. By applying existing technology and design 
features that are incorporated to mitigate stall consequences, neither approaches are fail 
safe. 
The introduction of Glass Cockpits and 3D Flight Displays have improved the 
navigation task of pilots considerable, but have not simultaneously improved the pilots’ 
attitude towards spatial and situational awareness (Lande, 2016). 
Manufacturers have reduced the workload of pilots and introduced the flight envelope 
protection to avoid entering a stall situation. However, stall and deep stall as a low 
speed/high alpha flight condition are inherent to the physical properties of fixed wing 
aircraft, similar to vortex ring state conditions for helicopters. A safe escape from such 
inherent flight conditions requires basic knowledge of pilots on aerodynamics and 
flight mechanics. Disorientation and confusion may lead pilots into loss of attitude 
awareness. The availability of a large and intuitive Primary Flight Display with an 
Angle Of Attack indicator, integrated in the Basic-T configuration may enable a pilot 
in a quick regain of control by providing the pilot with situational awareness (Lande, 
2016). According to Lande, future PFD’s should be based on a synthetic picture of the 
outside world with overlaid prominent and transparent primary flight instruments, 
including an AOA indicator. It enables the pilot to gain a 3D attitude awareness. Apart 
from flying in non-normal conditions spatial disorientation may also be caused by 
somatogravic and somatogyral illusions. The strongest visual cue a pilot has becomes 
absent in visual flight in darkness, where reliance on flight instruments becomes critical 
in absence of a natural horizon.  
In the discussion on a recent series of accidents, the focus has been on pilot knowledge 
and skills and less on Primary Flight Display design. Developments in glass cockpits 
and data integration provide an opportunity to explore issues in situation awareness, 
spatial disorientation, automation attitude and team work for a next generation of 
aircraft handling and cockpit design (Mohrmann et.al., 2015). Trade-offs, based on 
cost-benefit considerations however, depend on customer acceptance, cost awareness 
and public confidence in the safety of aviation. Introducing safety enhancement design 
solutions is submitted to a complex interaction between design, manufacture, operation 
costs and societal appreciation of safety. The outcomes of such trade-offs define 
whether it is possible to introduce either a derivative or a disruptive solution. Most 
innovative and disruptive solutions that are developed technically successful, do not 
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survive the Valley of Death in their implementation phase due to such considerations 
(Berkhout, 2000). 
In elaborating visual interpretation of information, a series of disruptive concepts can 
be considered potential game changers in enhancing flight safety. These game changers 
supersede the level of intervening either in the man or the machine component of 
complex and dynamic sociotechnical systems. They are frequently discussed in 
attempts to cross the 10-7 boundary. Such concepts deal with Angle of Attack indicators, 
Intuitive Primary Flight Display, recovery from non-normal flight situations, 
asymmetric flight, Total Energy Management Systems and Good Airmanship 
substantiation. These disruptive designs however, died in beauty in the Valley of Death 
between their invention and implementation due to a lack of a transition strategy and 
integration at a systems level. 
While pragmatic solutions have achieved a high level of sophistication in stall 
mitigation and recovery, a more fundamental approach to stall avoidance should be 
developed in order to deal with this intrinsic system property. A new unit of analysis 
of flight control should be applied, combining both design of man, machine and their 
interfaces (Woods, 2016). Such a unit of flight control enables integration of disruptive 
designs into a new man-machine-interface concept. An innovative solution to this more 
fundamental issue should comply with principles of dynamic flight control over the 
fundamental forces that are exercised on general aviation and commercial aircraft and 
the feedback to the pilot in a combined intuitive and cognitive decision making (Stoop 
and De Kroes, 2012). 
 
4.2 The Kestrel concept 
In leaving the Valley of Death, similarities with bird flight control enable a integration 
of several of the disruptive designs into the Kestrel concept, consisting of: 
 Introducing new aerodynamic forces instead of manipulating existing forces 
 Introduction of such aerodynamic forces in uncorrupted air flow 
 Generating high pitching moments by small forces combined with long arms 
 Introducing correcting forces only in case of emergency. 
 
An innovative design is suggested, based on these principles of dynamic vehicle control 
(De Kroes, 2012). The design combines four building blocks as engines for foresight; 
understanding flight dynamics, integral systems approach, total energy management 
and intuitive man-machine-interface design. This design is called the ‘Kestrel’ concept, 
aiming at creating redundancy for physical lift generation by stall shields during high 
Angle of Attack conditions, supported by dedicated software for the integral man-
machine-interface flight control unit (see fig 1.).  
 
Assessment of the ‘Kestrel’ concept as a feasible and desirable innovation can only be 
done in the early phases of conceptual design on a consensus base. Discussing the issue 
of stall and remedies for stall related accidents cannot be allocated to a single actor or 
isolated contributing factor. 
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Feedback from operationally experienced people such as pilots and accident 
investigators provide insights in the actual responses of the system under specific 




Fig 1. The Kestrel concept 
 
5. Conclusions 
In answering the initial question, How did aviation become so safe, an analysis of the 
history of aviation shows a preoccupation with safety from the beginning, because of the 
intrinsic hazards involved in flying. Foresight has been designed into the aviation system 
from the start on. 
 
Several characteristics have favoured a foresight on safety as a strategic design value, 
based on retrospective experiences: 
 Institutional arrangements at a sectoral level, such as ICAO and its Annexes 
structure 
 Harmonized legal responsibilities at the national State level  
 Integral safety performance indicators throughout the system life cycle phases 
 Feedback from reality by learning from mishaps, accidents and incidents 
 Selecting technology as the flywheel for progress created a shared body of 
knowledge during design and operations, substantiated in a KBE design 
methodology 
 Application of a 'variation-selection' process in experimental exploration of 
technological innovation and disruptive design solutions. 
Nose end 
stall shields 
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In replying to And Beyond and to enable crossing the mythical 10-7 risk boundary in 
aviation, innovative strategies should be explored to facilitate a prospective foresight 
on safety: 
 Application of system engineering principles and state-space modelling 
approaches; 
 Shifting from safety performance indicators to system properties and design 
principles; 
 Recognition of game changers and transition strategies in order to surpass 
Valley of Death traps in implementing innovations and disruptive solutions; 
 Exploring disruptive variations to substantiate their integration at the 
conceptual  design level in creating a new unit of man-machine-interfacing 
design concepts, such as the 'Kestrel' concept. 
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The paper presents some insights from the author’s research results on reviewed issues 
related to the level of Risk and Safety Margins (SM) for Nuclear Power Plants, 
regarded as complex systems. The overarching approach to safety review is presented 
and it is illustrated on some practical real cases. The focus is on the aspects like the 
specifics of the SM evaluations for various lifecycle periods, the iterative process of 
such evaluations, the consideration of human factors, being part of the model itself.  It 
is also illustrated, that for real cases, this approach was (for several decades of the 
author’s experience) the basis for foresight in safety in various projects of nuclear 
installations in various lifecycle phases.   
Keywords: Safety margin, risk, topological space, human factors, nuclear installations. 
1. Introduction 
There were important developments in the last time in the study of complex systems 
and the theories derived from applied physics related to them. In this respect, the 
applied nuclear science, along with the cavalcade of models in modern physics shad a 
new light on the issue on “What type of better high energy systems we want to build 
and how to improve their performance?”. These goals are tightly connected with the 
need to build such systems, which have less harmful impact on the population, 
environment and the workers. As in the fundamental science research, in the nuclear 
engineering and its associated technologies (artificial intelligence, environment 
protection etc.) there is a trend to consider fundamental changes in the research and 
practical engineering activity, i.e. to switch from almost four centuries of the old 
scientific approach “Discours de la méthode” to a new one (“Discours sur la création 
de la réalité”[1;2]), in which the observer and the object under design / review / 
operation are very closely connected and sometimes it is highly difficult to separate 
them – a speech very well understood by the Artificial Intelligence (AI) specialists and 
high tech domains increasingly using AI. 
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One important aspect of this switch is the capability to find new solutions (for improved 
systems for instance), based on the search for key answers in some deep (miss) 
understandings / biases / “myths”, previously taken for granted, on various issues, 
including “How harmful are those systems” and “How to evaluate this?”.  
The new approaches allow a more systematic and preventive insight on the potential 
safety issues for complex systems.  
 
In this context and with this new perspective this paper is presenting some insights on 
significant moments and aspects for a set of specific complex systems (presented in 
[3]) and their impact on the people, environment and workers: the nuclear power plants 
(NPP) and the issue of their safety. In previous papers a set of connected aspects to 
those issues were considered [2; 4], as follows: 
 The specifics of risk and safety analyses for NPP 
 Interface and sometimes “clashes” with other technologies (like digital in nuclear 
installations, IT and security issues etc.), as well as combined risks evaluations. 
 Realizations on the deep “messages” from natural installations existent before even 
humans existed, like for instance lessons from natural reactors (Oklo theories and 
some Mars discoveries)[7].  
 “Oikinomia” as a guiding rule on security of energy supply and the need to rethink 
the whole energy lifetime and chain aspects, or in other words lessons from ancient 
societies to the modern societies on energy issues. 
 Interfaces with human factors(HOF) (management approaches changes, safety 
culture, leadership attitudes changes etc.) 
 Real actual acknowledgment of the fact that developers of new nuclear technologies 
realize that they will be in place in the next century, i.e. in another environmental 
conditions, in different societies / civilizations than now, different human 
generations and new even totally unknown with communication and living 
technology available (for example “How a generation “Z” or “post Z”(“Post zet 
generation”) person from (let us say 2085) will look at and use/operate the control 
room of a 2020 NPP design ?”). 
 
2. Method 
The safety of a NPP is measured by functions, which depend on many features, 
including those defined by the design and operation of a NPP, in a concept of various 
layers of protection, called Defence in Depth (DiD). An important component 
considered in the evaluation of the efficiency of the DiD protection is “Safety Margin” 
(SM). In some type of evaluations this criterion is consider to be in a biunivoc 
correspondence with another one called “Risk” (Risk is defined as a criterion 
measuring the damage produced by the challenges to the NPP considering the 
probability of occurrence of those challenges). 
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In general, the SM evaluations are performed at the design phase and monitored and 
reviewed continuously during operation. There are therefore SM obtained in one 
iteration and SM obtained after a series of iterations, which are dependent of time (the 
NPP lifecycle time). A sample of such criteria considered for SM evaluations is in 
Figure 1. As illustrated in Figure 1 the SM criteria are actually defined by groups of 
criteria, which could be considered of having common features (defining a “facet”, i.e. 
technical facets – 1 and 2 or organizational – society facets 3-6). They define a space 
of possible variation of the degree of safety included in the 3D figure. 
 
 
Figure 1. Criteria for defining Safety Margin (SM) in a 
NPP. 
This paper presents two main author’s ideas related to the foresight in safety for the 
case of nuclear power plants (NPP), as regarded from the perspective of an insider 
involved in various practical projects over a period of three decades: 
 
The NPP history is seen as a history of a technology (being subject to be described 
by s-curve). From the perspective of NPP as a technology there were a series of 
important milestones of the dominant safety approaches in considering Safety Margin 
(SM) and/or Risk and trying to foresee which the best strategies to cope with safety 
challenges are. These milestones are described for the phases of the technology: 
Creation, Infancy, Maturity, End of Life (EOL). 
For each phase dominant approaches to judge SM and project actions for safety 
foresight evolved as follows: 
 Point like reference (setting values as targets not to be exceeded and judging SM 
based on the distance to a predefined level) - specific for "infancy" period 
 Curve like defining an acceptable area for a dominant variable of the definition of 
SM. Various parameters considered in sensitivity analyses. SM is defined as 
belonging to an acceptable surface, specific for end of "infancy" and beginning of 
maturity. 
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 Sophisticated multivariable description of the SM, were the acceptable zone is 
defined as an acceptable volume, specific for end of maturity and getting closer to 
end of life. In the maturity period an attempt to consider HOF is made but the issues 
lead to the inclusion of the "observer" in the safety model, making foresight difficult 
if not impossible, due to questionable level of objectivity. On the other side making 
systems more sophisticated gets to the point where the changes lead to an area of 
complex system of chaotic behavior, with the warning that there is a limit of safety 
improvements to increase / improve foresight for safety of a complex system like 
NPP. 
The NPP and nuclear engineering in general has to be considered from what it actually 
is: a technology. For this technology the evaluations on its evolution, the evaluations 
on safety and the foresight on its safety have to consider the effect of lifecycle 
evolutions specific for any technology, as shown in [2;4;5]. Based on the author’s 
experience [2], there are three periods of the NPP lifecycle, which are significant for 
the approaches used to evaluate their SM: 
 Point like reference (setting values as targets not to be exceeded and judging SM 
based on the distance to a predefined level) - specific for "infancy" period 
 Curve like defining an acceptable area for a dominant variable of the definition of 
SM.Various parameters considered in sensitivity analyses. SM is defined as 
belonging to an acceptable surface, specific for end of "infancy" and beginning of 
maturity. 
 Sophisticated multivariable description of the SM, were the acceptable zone is 
defined as an acceptable volume, specific for end of maturity and getting closer to 
end of life. In the maturity period an attempt to consider HOF is made but the issues 
lead to the inclusion of the "observer" in the safety model, making foresight difficult 
if not impossible, due to questionable level of objectivity. On the other side making 
systems more sophisticated gets to the point where the changes lead to an area of 
complex system of chaotic behavior, with the warning that there is a limit of safety 
improvements to increase / improve foresight for safety of a complex system like 
NPP. 
 
There is an “End of Life period (EOL)”, when the challenges to consider more and 
more sophisticated combinations of challenges leads to a degree of complexity of the 
artefact, that triggers the level after which chaotic behaviour is most probable [2;4]. 
Those periods and theirs specifics are represented in Figures 2 and 3.  The figures 
illustrate safety paradigms evolutions during the lifecycle and after major 
accidents and the adopted in each period safety oversight strategies to improve 
safety. The focus is on the criteria and decisions taken on SM. 
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Figure 2. Lifecycle evaluation functional for SM 
 
 
Figure 3. Safety paradigms and SM approaches for NPP 
[2; 4]. The periods are those reported by the author for the 
projects in which he participated [2; 4] 
 
The assumptions and the methodological features of the safety evaluations (for the 
particular case of SM) and on the safety oversight strategies for NPP, as decided during 
the last decades, have therefore, in the author’s opinion, a set of specifics: 
 They had to solve a diversity of safety governing issues in various periods and to 
define strategies for the foresight on safety for the next periods in order to improve 
safety of NPP. This lead to a diversity of methods. However the consideration of 
SM from the perspective of NPP technology as an evolving one gives a very 
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interesting, unifying set of insights on the past history and possible actions for the 
future. 
 A series of actions taken before acknowledgement of the new possible 
methodological approaches are now very clearly aligned to a series of dominant 
strategic approaches, as for instance: systemic approach to NPP safety, the need for 
consideration of complexity, including the HOF impact of high non linearity type 
on the SM / Risk modelling. 
 Improvement of mathematical tools to make them adaptable to a higher complexity 
of safety evaluations and safety foresight tasks 
 Recognition and consideration of the lifecycle period specifics as an important 
factor to the development of methods. 
 
The result of those specific features leads to a diversity of a “mushroom“ type 
(apparently annoying) of methods, that do not discard in the author’s opinion, but 
enhance the point, that their diversity, governed by some principles mentioned before, 
makes them specific for the nuclear safety evaluation status of the last decades and for 
the predictable foresight strategies of the near future. 
However even if there is diversity, in the author’s opinion based on practical use of 
safety evaluations, participation in the safety decisions for real NPP cases and foresight 
on safety for future built, there is a unifying feature of all those diverse methods. 
 
These unifying features consist of the following: 
 They had to solve a diversity of safety governing issues in various periods and to 
define strategies for the foresight on safety for the next periods in order to improve 
safety of NPP. This lead to a diversity of methods. However the consideration of 
SM from the perspective of NPP technology as an evolving one gives a very 
interesting, unifying set of insights on the past history and possible actions for the 
future. 
 A series of actions taken before acknowledgement of the new possible 
methodological approaches are now very clearly aligned to a series of dominant 
strategic approaches, as for instance: systemic approach to NPP safety, the need for 
consideration of complexity, including the HOF impact of high non linearity type 
on the SM / Risk modelling. 
 Improvement of mathematical tools to make them adaptable to a higher complexity 
of safety evaluations and safety foresight tasks 
 Recognition and consideration of the lifecycle period specifics as an important 
factor to the development of methods. 
 
3. Results 
The results applying the diversity of methods on SM / Risk for some real cases of 
practical value in the last decades are presented in this part. 
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3.1 SM evaluations for the “Infancy period”  
3.1.1 SM evaluations by using Risk and /or equivalent to Risk criteria 
SM methods during this period evaluated the dependence of the margin to imposed 
limits of safe operation on one variable and a set of parameters considered relevant for 
the impact on SM. For instance if the criterion used is the “Risk “[9;10], then during 
the late infancy period the area below the curve (the type of variation and its magnitude) 
was considered to be an indicator on the achieved level of SM. 
 
Various type of plant characteristics as variables of the SM function might be used. In 
order to make the choice on the dominant parameter, the NPP is regarded from various 
diverse perspectives. For instance schematic cybernetic representations are made or a 
model called Reliability Equivalent Diagrams (RED) and accident scenario [2] 
description are used. In order to evaluate the safety features for such models specific 
methods were developed, as for instance the method called Probabilistic Safety 
Analyses (PSA) (from the vast literature the author is mentioning some of its own PSA 
models [2]). 
 
Another possible set of approaches is to consider NPP model as a cybernetic machine 
or a thermodynamic machine [4] (as in the case represented in Figure 3 for a generation 
IV NPP called Pebble Bed Module Reactor (PBMR) [4; 9]. 
 
 
Figure 4. Comparison of various SM functional 
 
NPP may be also considered as a special type of Complex System (CS), as modelled 
in [4]. In this case, the SM indicator, evaluated using “Risk”, may be calculated as: 
) Pd * PPR * (PIE f =Risk                                             (1) 
 
Where: 
PIE - is the probability of the challenge to CAS, called Initiating Event (IE) 
PPR - is a probability representing the system pattern for each IE challenge 
Pd - is a normalized probability representing the damage produced by a given IE 
 
The risk model is defined by the contribution of various minimal cut sets (MCS) to the 
global risk frequency. It shows that there is the following type of dependency on a 
certain probability of a given event: 
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) h(pi) + g(pi))-(1* pIE = MCS                                             (2) 
Where: 
pIE - is the probability of the event, for which various changes and impacts are 
evaluated during a specific analysis; 
g(pi); h(pi)) – are functions of the probabilities of basic events other than pi 
 
In [4] an amended risk criterion, defined as “synergy”, was used for real cases of SM 
evaluations. This criterion is using information from the probability of events, the level 
of damage and the limits in epistemic knowledge, evaluated using the information 
entropy. 
 
In any of the above approaches the goal is to evaluate a risk criterion (RC-formula (3)) 
versus the “Total Design and Operation” (TC-formula (4)) criterion (for instance “The 
delivered energy”) and to find the areas were an optimum for both criteria are reached 
(Figure 5). The SM is evaluated, in this case, for a variable and no parameters. 
 
c1x  -e *c0 = 1y                                             (3) 
 
xn*c2  =  2y                                             (4) 
RC is considered versus TC for the SM evaluation process for a variable and no 
parameters. 
In line with this approach, if parameters impacting on risk are considered, then the risk 
may be evaluated for a variable and a set of dominant parameters (Figure 5). This 
approach is illustrated by its use in the NPP risk optimization during the design phase 
[4], as in a case of PRA study for the generation IV NPP. SM was evaluated by 
calculating Risk in a study on new plant [4; 9; 10].  
The Figure 5 illustrates the fact that, if we consider the parameters during 
sensitivity studies, then the acceptable space of safe situations of NPP (of PBMR 
type is defined by a 3D volume, that was called in the study “Risk Bowl” defined as 
an aggregate 3D risk criterion. This is a general presentation of risk calculations of 
RC type (as per formula (3)) that is performed for all parameters considered fixed. 
 
 
Figure 5. Risk bowl 3D risk representation [4]. 
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3.1.2. SM evaluations by using feedback from operation  
 
In [2; 4] an approach was used for the evaluation on the changes in dominant 
approaches in SM of NPP after major accidents. For this purpose the NPP history was 
considered from the point of view of its behaviour as a technology, described by a so 
called “s-curve” (Figure 6) 
During major accidents from the NPP history so far, it was noticed that the SM were 
reassessed, as the real experience showed that the initial margins were not 
conservative [2]. Based on the expert review of the changes in the main directions in 
SM evaluations and focus after each major accident it was proposed to consider a set 
of “safety paradigms” specific for each phase after such an event [2; 5; 6] and which 
were governing the safety oversight process for NPP for the next periods.  
It was also shown that the paradigms were connected with the changes in management 
structures, management styles, safety culture and leadership attitudes (Figure 3) [8; 12]. 
The s-curve has the form for SM as defined by formula (4), while the drop in SM 
after a major accident is of (5) type. 
 
                                            (5) 
 
                                            (6) 
 
Figure 6. NPP as a technological curve considering 
challenges and falls of SM [2;4] 
 
3.1.3. SM evaluations by using combined methods 
A key issue for a better SM evaluation, prediction and monitoring is related to the 
method adequacy. From the vast literature on this topic some results obtained by the 
author will be mentioned [9; 10]. This issue is increasingly more important after each 
major accident, challenging the used methods for the SM evaluations and searching for 
their improvements. There are some main types of methods (if we exclude the lessons 
learnt from past: deterministic (D), probabilistic (O), operational feedback (O), and 
quantitative risk analyses (R), data-methodology-epistemic uncertainties (U).  The 
combination of those methods leads to a set of “methods of various grouping (Mi) 
categories” (as illustrated in Figure 7).  In [9; 10] it was shown that there are specific 
areas and criteria were each of the method is best fit (Figure 8). 
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Figure 7. Areas of applicability for various methods in SM 




Figure 8. Areas of applicability for various methods in SM 
evaluations [9, 10] 
 
For this approach of using combined methods, if the NPP model is considered to be a 
hierarchical one, then the Risk evaluations are to be performed for the main 
components of the plant model and for each level and their combination. The 
calculations are made by using combination rules for the defined criterion (in this case 
Risk). In those formulas usually the combination rule is a convolution integral, as the 
R functional is of probabilistic nature. The total global criterion is considered after 
combining it at each level for all components and then it is combined between 
levels. [ 9,10].  Each of those hierarchy levels generates in its turn a Complex System 
(CS) by itself and therefore, a systematic review of the adequacy of the method and 
compliance with the object to be studied are required in order to confirm, that the 
methods used are compliant with the specifics of the CS.  
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On the other side, the risk evaluations performed using this type of modelling 
consist of a structured hierarchical process, starting from defining the model at the 
first level, evaluating risks at the second level of the process and reviewing compliance 
of risk metrics with the imposed targets for them. This last level usually leads to a 
feedback review of the process for more detailed evaluations and / or changes in CS so 
that the targets will be met.  
 
Multilevel / hierarchical risk model of a NPP [4]. For the author’s experience 
during a set of three periods (Period I – Period III) of SM paradigm changes (as 
illustrated in Figure 3)  a set of practical SM evaluation projects were performed 
as reported in [2;4]. The criteria used are in Table 1 and the summary of this activity 
is represented in Figure 9. The self-assessment of the SM evaluations as a whole is 
done by a multicriterial analysis. For the same set of evaluations detailed information 
on the specific methods used (PRA review, deterministic analyses review etc.) are in 
[9; 10]. The conclusions on the efficiency in safety foresight actions and safety 
decisions based on those evaluations are illustrated in Figure 9. The figure illustrates 
the groups of the strategies adopted during the SM tasks for the projects under 
review, including a foresight for a specific NPP case for the next 10 years. 
 
Table I. Criteria of a specific experience in using various SM evaluation methods [9; 10] 
 
Code   Definition of the criteria used for the safety evaluations 
CRU Credibility of uncertainties 
CRC Credibility of the level of conservatism 
LEC Level of conservatism  
SM Safety margin acceptability 
DiDA Defence in depth Acceptance criteria for levels and in general 
DiDI Defence in depth - Independence of levels 
CEE Cliff edge effects 
DPC 
The adequacy of the  type of method acceptable  - deterministic (best 
estimate or not), probabilistic, combined, using operating experience 
(OPEX) 
CHC Impact of capability to manage change control 
CGEN Impact of generation / technology phase & HOF 
CSIT Impact of site selection predefined criteria  
CEP Emergency Plan and mitigating actions  
 
Figure 9 shows results of the convergence and stability of decisions based on the SM 
combined evaluations and illustrate for the presented example, on a real case of using 
safety decisions and paradigms during a period of about 25 years and two major 
paradigm changes, that the global effect of SM changes and the adopted foresight 
strategies was a positive one and it lead to stable solutions in SM predictions for diverse 
cases. However, this evaluation showed that, that are some areas of potential concern, 
of which the most recent after Fukushima are related to: the modelling of the Human 
and Organizational factors (HOF), the Change Management versus initial design intent 
and the modelling of complex highly dynamic systems requiring new theoretical 
backgrounds. 
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Figure 9. Self-assessment on the results of using diverse 
SM [9, 10]. 
 
3.2 New trends in SM evaluations for the “Maturity period” of the NPP 
3.2.1 The extended use of HOF modelling in SM evaluations  
One impact of the NPP entering into a “maturity period” was that the SM 
evaluations needed to focus more on the HOF elements. The HOF elements were 
presented in [8; 9; 10] as elements of a systemic approach defined for a NPP structure 
as represented in Figures 10. Figure 10 represents a real case of HOF modelling for a 
NPP defined by its safety structure, safety culture and leadership components. HOF for 
a NPP company and its hard and soft safety structure [8;9;10] Evaluation of the weak 
points of the matrix representation of safety structure and challenges to it for an 
Emergency Plan of a real plan case lead to the need to get a linear model. This was 
achieved by using Laplace transforms [9; 10; 12]. After the weak points were defined, 
a detailed evaluation of it was performed with the EP specific tools and standards. 
It is important to note, that the matrices describing those structures are of the type 
represented in Figures 10 [9; 10] and that the results of the operational research are 
under a format of eigenvalues of the problem.  
 
The eigenvalues dependencies on the dominant parameters, which are calculated 
after a series of sensitivity analyses, indicate the optimal values for SM of the systemic 
description adopted for NPP from HOF perspective.  The eigenvalues indicate a set of 
weak points of the structure, having a clear practical significance [9; 10; 12]. 
 
Enhancing Safety: the Challenge of Foresight 
 50 
 
Figure 10. Representation of a NPP HOF model using 
matrix form [9; 10]. A Specific case of the Emergency Plan 
optimization [12]. 
 
However the results for such evaluations of SM considering the HOF contributions 
are reaching in our view the limits specific to the evolution and description of any 
system, by increasing the level of complexity. As it was mentioned in other results 
[2;4], there is a certain moment of the evolution of the complex system, after which 
any intended modification leads actually to an area of chaotic, in the sense mainly 
for SM as unpredictable, response. And in addition to this aspect the model including 
HOF elements has a high degree of subjectivity that needs to be carefully considered 
in safety decisions. 
Another example of such evaluations using operational research is illustrated in 
Figure 11, illustrating a sample of dominant safety aspects to be considered as a 
foresight for safety plan after Fukushima accident [2; 4; 6].  
 
Figure 11. Post Fukushima SM evaluations on dominant 
issues to be followed [2; 4; 6] 
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Consideration of the safety evaluations and results on SM are also part of the decision 
making on safety. From this perspective (as shown in [4]) the Risk Informed Decision 
Making (RIDM) process with more than two players (Industry, Regulatory Body 
and Public) has the problem of convergence of adopted decisions, as no stable 
solution exists for such a game with three players; the stable solution may be 
achieved only by common agreement on the acceptable level of risk and / or the 
acceptable level of safety, given the difference between the calculated SM / Risk and 
their perceived values. In Figure 11 there are several options for a basis to the safety 
decision and foresight on NPP safety after Fukushima, with graded levels of confidence 
(from lowest – Option E to highest - Option A). 
 
3.2.2. Topological spaces modelling 
As it was presented in the previous paragraph the modelling of the complex systems / 
technologies reaching the end of “Maturity period” leads to the need for more refined 
description for the variables and parameters of a NPP system, which define the level of 
SM.  Therefore in NPP modelling, as in other industrial areas (like aviation) the need 
to defined space states of the levels of risk / safety margins appear as solutions for more 
complex tasks [4]. 
 
The use of the space state models is connected with the need to decide on a set of 
dominant variables of the SM optimization.  
In energy systems an approach from mathematics was proposed to define this set 
as dominant fundamental criteria/ parameters, called syzygies (they are for 
instance defined by the physical parameters like energy produced, entropy loss, 
information entropy specific to the control systems etc.) and examples were shown 
for energy systems in [4]. By considering the SM of the NPP as multivariable systems, 
new approaches are used. These approaches are considering the models of NPP for the 
last phases of the maturity period as needing the development of more special 
operational research, able to take into account multiple variables. One of those is called 
“topological spaces” approach.  
 
For such approach the SM is considered in a biunivoc relationship with the 
internal volume of the resultant multi – D description, obtained after a series of 
iterations (Figure 12) [1]. 
 
The space states produced for the SM are not just volumes, but generalization of 
volumes in multi-dimensional spaces (Figures 1, 2 and 12). The value of the volumes 
is indicating the level of SM. The type of topological geometrical figure is an indication 
if the optimization is on a good track (as the volume depends as indicated in the figures 
on the type of poliedra) [1]. 
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Figure 12 Safety Margin (SM) Topology in a multi-
iterative evaluation. 
 
The poliedra are calculated by using the matrix description as presented in [1]. 
An illustration for the multiunit PSA is presented in Figure 13. Such a 
representation requires the definition of a series of connections assumed for the 
evolution of elements of the structure that have to consider their evolution from one 
iteration to another. The algebraic basis for the poliedra is in the format of octonions) 
(as illustrated in Figure 13) [1]. 
 
Figure 13. The algebraic description of topological spaces 
in Figure 12 [1] for a real case [9; 10]. 
 
A practical example of the latest results of this approach are in [11], as defined for 
the modeling of a real case of Multi Unit Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) called  
MUPSA starting from a Single Unit PSA (SUPSA).  
The development of improved integrated models SUPSA-MUPSA lead to the need to 
define the space of the risk accepted areas in a 3D format, considering the dimension 
of the SUPSA, the dimension of MUPSA and the common area connecting the two 
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areas. (as represented in Figure 14). The areas are represented by the dominant minimal 
sequences of a real case calculation while developing the SM / Risk volume from one 
unit to more than 2 units. Therefor the the practical future tasks of this type the use of 
3D- Reliability Equivalent Diagrams (3D-RED) and 3D – Risk Spaces is foreseen 
as having a potential impact in improving the prediction capability. 
 
This is in line with results obtained from a different approach by the use of the 
cube [14]. 
However, it is expected that, there is for any technology a potential moment of 
challenge, when any more complicated model (of the object and with the modeller) will 
produce such products, technical realities, that will be subject to more and more 
frequent unexpected sharp changes in the safety / risk level.  
 
It is expected that the description of such challenges of very low probability, but high 
and correlated between them impact events (issue known as a cliff edge effect problem) 
are specific for technologies entering last phases of their maturity. 
 
An example presented in this paper is on the results obtained so far in MUPSA, 
indicating that there is a clear limit of possible modelling of such cliff edge effects and 
this limit is given by the type of plant technology itself, i.e. by its lifetime cycle 















The paper presents a view on the evaluation of SM for some complex systems (NPP) 
considering the fact that: 
 The history of a complex system is a one of its dominating technology, which has 
a clear cut of its life cycle periods. 
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 The evaluation is performed in steps during all this lifetime and in iterations, 
creating a set / area / volume of acceptable from risk perspective states. 
 The SM evaluation for mature period leads to the need of including the modeler 
into the model of acceptable states, which requires changes in the methodologies 
and a new view on models and objects. 
Further steps of the project considering the SM evaluation in an integrated lifecycle 
manner are expected to produce more results to support various conclusions for a 
specific technology (NPP). 
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The McNamara Fallacy Blocks Foresight for Safety 
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The Netherlands. 





Famously, ‘what gets measured gets done’, but the sociology behind the measurements, 
particularly those used to manage organisations, are little studied in the field of safety. 
Yankelovich described a pattern dealing with traps of quantification that he called the 
"McNamara fallacy" and which has four steps.  
Process safety might be particularly vulnerable to the McNamara fallacy because the 
paradigm of reliance on numbers is very strong in engineering culture. However, as 
we argue, the McNamara fallacy is less a failing of individuals, than it is an outcome 
of the forces that produce order in organisations. In this paper after an explanation of 
the four steps of the “fallacy”, we will argue how some failures of foresight are 
connected to poorly managed quantification, which is, according to Woods (2009), a 
basic form of organization failure. 
Keywords: Measurement, Modelling, Safety, McNamara Fallacy, Quantitative fallacy 
“There's a quote from T.S. Eliot that I just love: 
We shall not cease from exploring 
And at the end of our exploration 
We will return to where we started 
And know the place for the first time. 
 
Now that's in a sense where I'm beginning to be.” 
 




                                                 
5 http://www.errolmorris.com/film/fow_transcript.html.  Accessed 2nd October 2017 
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Foresight is the imagining of future possibilities based on knowledge of the past and 
present. According to Stark (1961) prediction and foresight are related activities, but 
they are not the same. In prediction, the emphasis is on judgmental thinking, assigning 
probabilities, and on accuracy. In contrast, foresight is the awareness of possibilities 
“with logic its only constraint”. Stark points out that foresight “precedes (or should 
precede) prediction”. 
 
Risk analysis is widely practiced across industries, and although it can give good 
results, the approach has some inherent weaknesses (Dien and Dechy, 2016): 
 incomplete identification of risks—a weakness which although generally 
acknowledged is sometimes lost from sight in specific analyses (see Aulnay et al., 
2017); 
 it does not take account of the complexity of sociotechnical life (Perrow, 
1984)— Interactions between social subsystems and, on the other hand, 
between social element and technical element are hardly modelled; 
 imagination concerning scenarios is censored by plausibility. This creates 
confusion between impossibility and improbability of occurrence, especially 
for low likelihood events (see for instance Fukushima); 
 worst case scenarios that do not take account of some initiators (see for 
instance the contribution of bow-doors kept open to the capsize of the Herald 
of Free Enterprise ferry); 
 there is limited updating of analysis in the light of operational experience. 
Sometimes this is limited to direct and immediate causes (often technical, but 
with root causes put aside, which often human and organisational aspects). 
 
In the contemporary literature, foresight is often treated as an organisational ability 
(e.g. Osman, 2015; Rohrbeck, et al, 2015). Research on what foresight is, how it might 
be taught and methodologically supported, seems plentiful, but has yet to find a firm 
theoretical basis (Piirainen and Gonzalez, 2015). However, even when conceived as an 
organisational ability, foresight is produced by the minds of individuals.  
 
This paper concerns the conditions in organisations that may affect the quality of 
foresight. As an entry into the subject, it makes a connection between foresight and the 
so-called McNamara6 fallacy. As will be explained, the fallacy describes how foresight 
can be blinded by corporate overemphasis of a given set of metrics. The present paper 
considers the impact of the McNamara fallacy, and the mechanisms that mediate it, on 
the employee’s contribution to foresight of safety.  
 
                                                 
6 It is a moot point why Robert McNamara’s name has been memorialised in this way, but it is likely to 
be connected to his role as US Secretary for Defence (1961-1968) during the Vietnam War (1955-1975). 
When Smith wrote his piece in 1972, the public mind still closely associated McNamara with the 
unremitting destruction being wrought in Vietnam. Only later did contemporary sources reveal that, even 
by 1966, McNamara bitterly understood the failures of foresight that started and escalated the war. As 
he said in 2003, “war is so complex it's beyond the ability of the human mind to comprehend all the 
variables. Our judgment, our understanding, are not adequate. And we kill people unnecessarily.” 
(http://www.errolmorris.com/film/fow_transcript.html.) See also, McNamara (1995). 
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1.1 The McNamara Fallacy and the Fischer’s Quantitative Fallacy 
The McNamara fallacy was coined by the social scientist, Daniel Yankelovich. As 
reported by Smith, 19727, the fallacy can be stated as: 
 
“The first step is to measure whatever can be easily measured. This is okay as far as it 
goes. The second step is to disregard that which can't be measured or give it an 
arbitrary quantitative value. This is artificial and misleading. The third step is to 
presume that what can't be measured easily really isn't very important. This is 
blindness. The fourth step is to say that what can't be easily measured really doesn't 
exist. This is suicide.” (Smith, 1972; page 54) 
 
Wikipedia, at the time of writing8, states that the McNamara fallacy is “also known as 
the quantitative fallacy”. While the present authors agree that there is a connection 
between the two, we contend that the McNamara fallacy contains lessons for foresight 
that go beyond those contained in the quantitative fallacy. 
 
1.2 Some lessons for foresight from the quantitative fallacy 
What is the quantitative fallacy? Stating it pithily as “the facts which count best count 
most” Fischer (1970) explains that the quantitative fallacy is to behave as though “facts 
are important in proportion to their susceptibility to quantification” (page 90). His 
critique is aimed at historical analysis, and particularly a trend for advocacy of certain 
methodologies. It is an attack on the misuse of quantification. As he puts it  
 
“Criteria of significance should not be methodological, but substantive in 
nature. They should always be grounded in the nature of the problem itself 
and not in the tools of problem solving. The purpose of historical inquiry is 
not to vindicate a method but to discover what actually happened. Every 
efficient means to this end is legitimate, but none alone can be erected into a 
standard of legitimacy.” (Fischer, 1970; page 91) 
 
The erection of ‘standards of legitimacy’ is one way in which foresight can be limited. 
Fischer warns that the problem should choose the method. An overriding preference 
for a particular method, can act as a filter on reality; only those data compatible with 
the standard are collected, and interpretation will be limited to those future possibilities 
that are compatible with the standard. As Kingston and Mertens (2007) note, “beware 
methodolatory”. 
 
For example, on February 1, 2003 the space shuttle Columbia disintegrated during its 
re-entry phase into the Earth's atmosphere after a 16-day mission on orbit around the 
Earth. The seven astronauts on board died in the accident. The technical cause of the 
accident is clear. During the launch phase, few seconds after lift-off, a piece of 
insulating foam separated from the external fuel tank. It struck the shuttle's left wing at 
                                                 
7 The exact provenance is not certain, but the earliest published source that the present authors could 
verify is an article in the September, 1972 edition of the Atlantic Monthly magazine. That article was 
written under the pseudonym ‘Adam Smith’, but Yankelovich (2012) confirmed that he had discussed 
the ideas with the journalist in question. 
8 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/McNamara_fallacy accessed 2 October 2017 
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a high speed. The impact holed the leading edge of the wing, a protected area of the 
Thermal Protection System. During re-entry superheated gases (local temperature more 
than 2000°C) penetrated into the left wing, leading to the melting of a spar, the loss of 
control of the shuttle, and eventually its destruction. The hit on the wing was undetected 
in real time. It was identified on the second day of the mission after analysis of launch 
photos and films. Nevertheless, the potential for damage caused by the foam strike was 
known, as were the consequences on shuttle safety during the re-entry phase. So, one 
challenge to the Mission Management Team was to assess the danger. Indeed it was 
“very difficult to even bound the problem and initialize thermal, trajectory, and 
structural analyses. Their answers [might] have a wide spread ranging from acceptable 
to not-acceptable to horrible, and no way to reduce uncertainty” (CAIB, 2003, page 
151). One part of the assessment was carried out using a mathematical modelling tool 
called Crater. It allowed engineers to assess the effects of the impact. However, this 
tool was not designed for evaluation of large size projectile strikes. During the Columbia 
mission, Crater predicted possible damage, but the Debris Assessment Team assumed, 
without any validation—and because Crater was a conservative tool—that it would 
predict more damage than would actually occur. Assumptions and uncertainty were 
never fully presented to the flight decision makers. Furthermore, the team that conducted 
the analyses had been formed recently, and therefore could be considered as 
inexperienced. In fact, it was the first mission for which they were solely responsible for 
providing analysis with the Crater tool. In this way, a particular tool was used beyond its 
applicability limits but with no one really aware of that. It led to fatal decisions of “no-
action” regarding the strike on the left shuttle wing. 
 
The impact of the quantitative fallacy on foresight may be more fundamental. A method 
may impose a filter, but the paradigm from which it is drawn imposes more general 
limits on foresight. As Patton describes,  
 
“The paradigm is a worldview, a general perspective; a way of breaking 
down the complexity of the real world.  As such, paradigms are deeply 
embedded in the socialisation of adherents and practitioners: paradigms tell 
them what is important, legitimate and reasonable.  Paradigms are also 
normative, telling the practitioner what to do without the necessity of long 
existential epistemological consideration.” (Patton, 2008, page 423).  
 
Whereas models and methods are relatively accessible to critique, a paradigm is more 
deeply integrated into the perceptions and beliefs of its adherents. People looking to 
the future can change their spectacles, but it is harder for them to change their point of 
view. 
 
For instance, two senior engineers at Northeast Utilities, which operates nuclear power 
plants in the USA, were concerned about the way old fuel rods were cooled. They were 
concerned both by the reliability of the cooling system and by the lack of regulation 
enforcement concerning refuelling operation. They warned the management, (i.e. they 
offered new glasses for a better assessment of the situation!) and tried to fix what they 
considered an obvious safety problem. For several months, managers denied the 
problem existed and refused to report it to the American Nuclear Safety Authority. 
They even brought in outside consultants to prove senior engineers were wrong. But 
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they ended up agreeing with them. Finally, they took the case to the Safety Authority 
themselves. It also took several months for the safety authority to react (Pooley, 1996). 
 
Fischer’s advice is that we should not allow ourselves to be trapped within a paradigm. 
However, it is probably hard to take the advice. As Patton suggests, paradigms are part 
of socialisation, and as sociologists9 have been pointing out for a century or more, 
individuals readily internalise the norms of a group in order to belong to it. Hence, we 
should actually assume as normal the situation that Fischer complains about, and 
recognise that foresight is a function of group identity. Countering the restriction of 
foresight due to paradigmatic group-think is something to factor-in to the design of our 
organisations.  
 
Arguably, scientists and engineers are trained to be aware of the grounds on which they 
make predictions and the limits of their foresight. As Feynman puts it:  
 
“The first principle is that you must not fool yourself—and you the easiest 
person to fool. So you have to be very careful about that. After you've not 
fooled yourself, it's easy not to fool other scientists. You just have to be honest 
in a conventional way after that”.  (Feynman, 1974; p.12) 
 
However, about scientists communicating with a non-technical audience, Feynman 
goes on to say:  
 
“I would like to add something that's not essential to the science, but something 
I kind of believe, which is that you should not fool the layman when you're talking 
as a scientist.” … “I’m talking about a specific, extra type of integrity that is not 
lying, but bending over backwards to show how you're maybe wrong, that you 
ought to do when acting as a scientist. And this is our responsibility as scientists, 
certainly to other scientists, and I think to laymen.”  
 
With fellow scientists and engineers, one can rely to some extent on the scientifically 
literate scepticism through which the information will be filtered. Arguably, their 
foresight is stimulated by questioning conditions, as well as by spotting limitations and 
alternative interpretations of other’s results or theories. Following Feynman’s 
suggestion, when scientists or engineers act as advisors to non-scientists there is an 
additional duty to educate the scepticism of those advised. Perhaps the duty extends 
even further: to urge the advised to continue searching for other possibilities. 
 
Paradigms define groups and what group members regard as credible evidence. As 
Patton (ibid) notes, paradigms tell group members what is important, legitimate and 
reasonable. So, although members of scientific disciplines bear the individual 
responsibility to conduct themselves as Feynman suggests, their group norms will have 
some weight in deciding their actual behaviour. 
 
Fischer has a specific warning for groups whose work has a quantitative aspect:  
 
“There is an epigram, perhaps apocryphal, attributed to Lord Kelvin that 
everything which exists, exists in quantity. Enthusiastic quantifiers have 
                                                 
9 E.g. Durkheim’s mechanical solidarity, and Foucault’s ideas of institutions and discourse. 
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amended Lord Kelvin's statement to read, "Unless a thing can be measured 
quantitatively, it does not exist significantly." Therein lies a fallacy.” 
 
There is a balance then between the conditional trust implied by Feynman and the 
preference that some groups may have for quantitative evidence. Something like this 
was at work when NASA and Morton-Thiokol engineers discussed the advisability of 
launching in very cold conditions given previous observations of O-ring erosion and 
hot gas blow-by in the boosters. These concerns were raised by Morton-Thiokol 
engineers in a teleconference on the eve of the space shuttle Challenger launch in 
January, 1986. Morton-Thiokol, who supplied the Solid Rocket Boosters, 
recommended that the space shuttle launch be postponed until the temperatures 
warmed-up. They acknowledged that their recommendation was not based on 
quantitative data "saying their argument was subjective, […] qualitative, intuitively 
correct. The NASA managers did not accept this, and challenged [Morton] Thiokol to 
prove it by quantifying their concerns10” (Vaughan, 1996, p.355). As the opinion of 
these engineers was not supported by quantitative data, it could be dismissed as an 
"emotional argument". The decision to abandon a launch is not one that NASA could 
take lightly. In this case, imposing a quantitative standard of evidence might well have 
been a tactic used to vitiate the qualitative evidence of the Thiokol engineers. However, 
it demonstrates a belief in quantification by the NASA agents that exceeded their trust 
in the foresight of the subject matter experts. Vaughan concludes, "'real' technology 
conforms to the norms of quantitative, scientific positivism". 
 
It would be nice to think that scientific or technical input to foresight will always be 
based on a fresh, objective view of the problem. There is an apocryphal story about 
technical advice given to a statesman.  The advisor had gone on at length, "On the one 
hand this, but on the other hand that.” After the session, President Truman [or 
sometimes when this story is told, Winston Churchill] turned to his special assistant 
and said, "The next time I appoint an advisor, remind me to find someone who’s one-
handed!" Advisors know that not everyone wants to be educated, and in a marketplace, 
those they would advise can choose amongst advisors. 
 
In summary, the quantitative fallacy highlights three vulnerabilities of foresight: 
 the scope of foresight is reduced when numerical convenience is decisive in 
selecting and processing data. As a consequence, some futures will not be 
foreseen that otherwise might have; 
 the reduced scope of foresight becomes systematic when ‘methods choose 
problems’. Blindsides develop when methodology becomes the test of what is 
credible; 
 these two vulnerabilities will be made worse by a lack of diversity in the 
population who contribute to foreseeing the possible futures of the organisation. 
 
                                                 
10 Emphasis added 
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1.3 Impaired foresight: what does the McNamara fallacy add to the quantitative 
fallacy? 
The McNamara fallacy is more general than the quantitative fallacy about what and to 
whom it applies. Rather than the repeated misuse of numerical methods by technical 
specialists, the McNamara fallacy describes, as a series of steps, a process of 
degradation in the ability to foresee future behaviour in an organisation. The 
McNamara fallacy describes a disease of organisational foresight. 
The word ‘measure’ in the McNamara fallacy suggests quantification, but there is 
reason to interpret it more broadly. Firstly, although measurement often entails 
numbers, a glance in a dictionary confirms that numbers are a means to an end—to 
ascertain the state of something. Even were we to restrict ‘measure’ only to 
quantification, measurement theory contains quite distinct, theoretically legitimate 
alternatives about how numbers can be assigned and, therefore, what ‘to measure’ 
means in a particular case. As Hand (1996) explains, a measurement scheme might be 
based on a model that maps to an assumed underlying reality. Alternatively, a 
measurement scheme might, in fact, not assume any underlying reality, but be a 
procedure for assigning numbers in a consistent way. The McNamara fallacy is 
concerned with how actors may misinform their internal representation of the systems 
they control and, by extension, misinform their foresight of those systems when 
planning or evaluating change. Later in this paper we explain how some of the 
hypothetical mechanisms of the McNamara fallacy, misinform the basis of foresight 
but also its production.  
Yankelovich repeats key phrases in his formulation of the McNamara fallacy. The verb 
‘to measure’ is used four times, and the adverb ‘easily’ modifies it three out of four 
times. In the quantitative fallacy, Fischer uses the phrase “susceptibility to 
quantification”; and the present authors regard this as one aspect of ‘easily measured’ 
in the Yankelovich formula. However, a broad view of measurement in an 
organisational setting, suggests that ease will reflect other constraints that decision-
makers in organisations are trying to satisfy. In addition to the technical ease of 
measurement, pragmatic constraints such as administrative ease, and political 
expedience will factor into the decision about what to measure and how. 
To summarise, in contrast to the quantitative fallacy, the McNamara fallacy describes: 
 how measurement in its broadest sense can be biased by expediency, and; 
 a process of degradation in the quality of foresight available in an 
organisation. 
 
2. The McNamara fallacy reduces the scope and acuity of foresight 
The moral, as it were, of the McNamara fallacy is that measurement schemes tend to 
become enshrined and inflexible in their organisations. This means that any 
shortcomings in their validity will also tend to be long-lasting. In this section, the four 
steps11 of the McNamara are considered and mechanisms proposed. 
                                                 
11 The four steps of the fallacy can be found in (Smith, 1972; page 54) 
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The ‘easily measured’ part of the Yankelovich formula plays out in numerous ways. 
‘Easy’, from a purely technical point of view, might mean a preference for data readily 
at hand, or easy to collect or process into a suitable format. As Yankelovich/Smith say, 
“This is okay as far as it goes” (ibid), however, how far that is may be a function of the 
design paradox (Frei, 2015). The paradox is that one knows less at the start of a project 
or design process than at the end. Therefore, if a measurement scheme is set-up early 
in a design or project lifecycle, unless revised, it will lack validity. 
 
In terms of foresight, if we take Stark’s (ibid) point of view, erroneous measurement 
will create in actors a faulty perception of how the organisation works, and this will be 
reflected in their view of future possibilities.  
 
For example, in 2014, SNCF discovered that 1,000 of its railway platforms were too 
narrow to allow adequate clearance for 2,000 new trains it had ordered. A quirk of the 
sampling methodology meant that measurement of existing platforms focussed on 
those built in the previous 30 years. However, older stations were built when trains 
were slimmer and, in consequence, with wider platforms. According to the French 
minister for transport, M. Frederic Cuvillier “When you separate the rail operator from 
the train company," he said, "this is what happens." A programme of platform 
modifications was put in place, an unplanned expenditure exceeding €50 million.  
(BBC, 2014) 
 
M. Cuvillier’s explanation points to the involvement of stakeholders, another issue 
implied by the McNamara fallacy. At the start of design projects (and this may also 
apply to projects in ageing systems, according to Horrocks, 2010) the decision-makers 
involved in defining measurements might not be the same as those working elsewhere, 
in mature parts of the system, or who inherit the design when it comes into service. If 
ease does indeed define measurement, then what is easy for the project leaders may 
create measurement systems focussed on their short term goals or sub-systems rather 
than the longer-term operational functioning of the whole mature system.  
 
In response to numerous operational problems in the running of public services by 
contractors, the UK Committee of Public Accounts (CPA) looked into how the civil 
service managed the contracts. They found there to be a disproportionate emphasis on 
measuring performance in the early phases of government contracts. Furthermore, not 
only was there a relative lack of operational performance measurement, there was also 
a Principal-Agent problem. The civil servants responsible for these contracts usually 
moved jobs before delivery of the contracted service or product. Therefore, the moral-
hazard was for civil servants to set-up measurement of aspects they could control well, 
but not those that would create difficulties for them. In consequence, CPA 
recommended that civil servants should “remain accountable for spending throughout 
the life of contracts”. (CPA 2014). 
 
The CPA findings suggest a number of problems for foresight. Firstly, a focus on 
measurements relevant in the short-term may displace timely consideration of factors 
that will be relevant in the longer term. Secondly, variables that are not measured 
provide degrees of freedom for decisions. However, if these unmeasured variables turn 
out to be important later in the lifecycle, decisions taken early in a project may 
unwittingly trade-off measured variables against those that are unmeasured. Thirdly, 
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moral-hazard may reinforce self-serving visions of the future that make it harder to 
foresee problems. 
 
The second step of the McNamara fallacy is to “to disregard that which can't be 
measured or give it an arbitrary quantitative value”. The phrasing suggests that this is 
seen as a deliberate decision by measurement designers. However, the McNamara 
fallacy may rely on mechanisms that operate below the level of awareness.  
 
The first mechanism—skilled unawareness—is fundamental. As described by Argyris 
(1999) skilled unawareness screens from consciousness the things the actor is doing to 
avoid confrontation or protect their own beliefs from dissonance. Some of those things 
involve subordinating their own views and beliefs, which Argyris calls skilled 
incompetence. Argyris has demonstrated that these defensive skilled routines are 
common in organisations. This would predict that actors will design measurements that 
make confrontation less likely or avoid dissonance, and for the same reasons and using 
the same psychological mechanisms, self-censor criticism of flawed measurements. 
 
Ralph Nader gives an example of self-censorship in car safety. “There was no Human 
Factors engineering being the subject of the legal discussion. And then I met a retired 
engineer from American Motors Corporation, his name was Henry Wakeland. And in 
my long conversations with him, he told me about the enormous self-censorship inside 
the industry. And I said, this can’t be so. I’m mean, you mean they don’t speak up; even 
in closed doors among themselves? He says, they’re all afraid. I said, afraid of what? 
Afraid of being marked as trouble-makers, non-players on the team. And he gave me a 
lot of examples” Nader, 2016. 
 
Avoiding confrontation is not necessarily a goal in itself, and in organisations it may 
serve a higher purpose: to preserve the political status quo. Lessig (2011) calls this 
dependence corruption. To ensure that the relationships they depend on continue, 
individuals make complex adjustments in their perceptions. Lessig makes the point that 
this is not corruption in the sense of bribery, but an aspect of the reciprocity12 that is 
fundamental in human relationships. However, in the organisational setting, 
dependence corruption means that individuals will interpret policies and data, and act 
in ways that protect the interests of those others who enable the individual to be 
effective and successful in their work. As well as the risks of measuring what is 
technically easy, it is likely that easily measured is defined in a political dimension. 
Lessig gives several examples, such as scientific studies of the harmfulness of 
Bisphenol-A (BPA is a constituent of some soft plastics). He reports that no industry-
funded study (n=13) has found evidence of harm, whereas 86% of independent studies 
(n=163) have. Lessig makes the point that the scientists who found no harm were not 
dishonest, but consented to work in studies that sought to determine risks of exposure 
rather than to look for evidence of harm. The overall effect is to make it less certain 
                                                 
12 Lessig notes that “We all recognize the drive deep in our bones (or, more accurately, our DNA) to 
reciprocate.  Some of it we see directly. Some of it we don’t. The subconscious is guided by interactions 
of reciprocity as much as the conscious. We reciprocate without thinking. We are bent to those to whom 
we are obliged, even when we believe, honestly, that we are not. What Robert Brooks wrote over a 
century ago we can repeat today: “By far the worst evil of the present system is the ease with which it 
enables men otherwise incorruptible to be placed tactfully, subtly, and— as time goes on— always more 
completely under obligations incompatible with public duty.” (Lessig, 2008; p132) 
Enhancing Safety: the Challenge of Foresight 
 65 
that it is safe or unsafe to use plastics containing BPA. Even better documented is the 
example of tetraethyl lead (TEL, an additive to petrol) in which, from the 1920s 
onwards, the scientific evidence for safety was overwhelmingly funded by the industry. 
In the mid-1960s, independent research “drew attention to the fallacy of assuming that 
observed (“typical”) lead in foods and bodies of Americans are natural and therefore 
safe and harmless. He [Clair Patterson] used a geochemical argument to estimate that 
the average (typical) body burden and concentrations of lead in the blood of Americans 
in the 1960s were at least 100 times above the background values” (Nraigu, 1998).  
 
Whether subject to unawareness or not, arbitrary measurement or disregarding data that 
contradicts vested interests may also reflect organised hypocrisy. This term was coined 
by Brunsson (2002) to describe what he found in studies of Swedish public sector 
organisations. There he saw that decision-makers created situations in which talk and 
decisions were quite separate from actions. This allowed stakeholder concern about a 
topic to be addressed, if not resolved, by talk that never transferred into action. 
Brunsson was not moralising, he was describing a rational means of controlling 
outcomes when objectives are incompatible. Arbitrary measurement makes it easier to 
talk rather than act. As Hand (1996; p.453) points out, “to be useful, the numerical 
assignment procedure has to be well defined. Arbitrariness in the procedure will reflect 
itself in ambiguity in the results.” A suitably ambiguous measurement creates a buffer 
between the world of talk and the world of action. In this way the decision-maker’s 
second step into McNamara fallacy carries the organisation across the threshold into 
organised hypocrisy.  
 
Most readers will have some familiarity with statistics about the punctuality of the 
railways. In the UK, until June this year, figures suggested that 92% to 97% trains were 
on time (BBC, 2017). However, if arrival time is measured more precisely, to the 
nearest minute, those figures fall to 65%. However, even this does not directly measure 
the impact on passengers; it excludes missed onward connections, missed or cancelled 
appointments, and so forth.  An attempt to quantify this impact arrived at a figure of 
73.47 GBP (about €82) per minute of delay (NAO, 2008). Most UK train operators 
have a policy of compensating passengers for late arrivals at stations of at least 30 
minutes, and then for a proportion of the train fare, which in the vast majority of cases 
will be rather less than €82 per minute. 
 
Technical error of measurement can be hard to spot, even when skilled unawareness is 
not obscuring it. There is always a chain of arguments that link the conclusions we 
draw from evidence to the empirical reality we seek to know about and influence. This 
is true whether the evidence is qualitative or quantitative. Sometimes we are fully aware 
of this chain, but more often not, especially when some links between the ‘map and the 
territory’ are not accessible. As Hand (1996) makes plain, there is plenty of scope for 
technical errors in constructing and using measurement schemes.  
 
It is one thing to make errors, but another thing not to detect or correct them. One can 
imagine a number of reasons why systematic errors of measurement, or other problems 
of validity, would go uncorrected. Firstly, the practical impact of poor measurement 
might be invisible or inconsequential (even if borne by others in the form of pollution, 
ill-health etc., if those people lack power or representation).  
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Secondly, the measurement scheme might be inscrutable. It is quite intimidating to 
question the validity of a measurement produced by a sophisticated analysis, perhaps 
even a computer generated algorithm, and based on a huge amount of data. Often the 
person who might be able to show the steps that connect the map to the territory is not 
there to explain things, even if such a person exists.  
 
Thirdly, as predicted by Argyris, when a measurement scheme is legitimised at a senior 
level, it is unlikely to be challenged by subordinates. The misuse of Total Recordable 
Injury Rate (TRIR) as a general measure of plant safety at the BP Texas City refinery, 
may be an example of this. As CSB (2007) point out “TRIR and LTIR13 do not 
effectively predict a facility’s risk for a catastrophic event”. Staffing cuts was a factor 
in that accident, but any adverse effects of this on process safety would not have been 
visible in occupational safety measurements such as TRIR. Concerning the lack of 
challenge by subordinates, the Baker Panel concluded that in BP even apparently 
capable individuals had “weak process safety voices” and that they did “not appear to 
participate substantially in the critical decision-making process with respect to BP’s 
U.S. refineries” (Baker, et al. 2007).  
 
Fourthly, the simplification implicit in the models which underlie most measurement 
schemes, may not be recognised as an over-simplification, in the sense that some 
relevant aspects of the system measured are not represented in the measurement. As 
Aulnay et al. (2017) note, “Modelling allows a representation of a system but results 
in loss of information and especially for liaisons between elements and sub-systems. 
Nevertheless, level of understanding induced [by modelling] is more important than 
losses of information.”  However, the implication of the McNamara fallacy is that the 
third step—to presume that what can't be measured easily really isn't very important—
leads to the fourth step: “what can't be easily measured really doesn't exist”. Modelling 
is an essential, beneficial activity in safety; and imperfection is not a reason to throw 
the baby out with the bathwater. The problem is how to maintain vigilance and allocate 




One goal of this article is to highlight the often subtle ways in which quantification 
may reduce the scope and acuity of foresight. However, none of the arguments 
presented deny or minimize the role and importance of quantification in dealing with 
safety.  
The McNamara fallacy describes what happens to foresight if an organization lives on 
a ‘starvation diet’ of information filtered through imperfect measurement. There is 
always scope for improving measurements, but even as good as they could be made, 
they are filters on reality. The nature of perception, of life in Plato’s cave, is that we 
can never ‘peek around the back’ and see reality directly.  
Foresight is integral to the creative aspect of safety practice. It is particularly evident 
in the form of hazard identification, which is meat and drink to risk assessment, both 
                                                 
13 LTIR – Lost Time Injury Rate. 
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in everyday evaluation of data and in more formal risk analyses. But does foresight 
contain all the nourishment it needs? 
The danger to foresight is that measurement can define our reality, and there are 
numerous ways in which this can happen. This paper has tried to show that many of 
these ways are properties of our institutions rather than of ourselves—even scrupulous 
scientific conduct by individuals is not a complete answer.  
The McNamara fallacy seems to be a disease of bureaucracy, not a lapse by individuals. 
Measurement schemes once established tend to endure, sometimes longer than their 
creators. And what was too hard to measure reflects not just technical limits, but the 
political realities of those creators. Does current practice do everything needed to 
continuously improve measurement schemes? Published accident investigation reports 
and plant ageing studies suggest not.  
Our professions, both as institutions and identities, also have a role. Stopping models 
and measurements from becoming our masters is something we all need to do. As 
Feynman (1974) reminded us, we shouldn’t fool ourselves. However, we have to take 
some things for granted, but which things are safely left without ‘long existential 
epistemological consideration’, as Patton (2008) puts it? 
Afterword 
The McNamara fallacy has powerful intuitive appeal, but little basis in empirical 
research. The authors hope that this paper will sensitise practitioners to the impact of 
an expedient approach to measurement on the quality of foresight in their organisations. 
We hope also that it will stimulate researchers to see if the fallacy reflects what they 
find in the field, and whether the mechanisms proposed here, and others we didn’t think 
of, are valid. 
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For several years now, resilience concepts appear to challenge traditional risk 
approaches. One of the key difference suggested is the way foresight is tackled in both. 
This paper discusses commonalities, differences and any overlaps in the use of 
foresight between these two approaches. Several lessons learned from historical cases 
are used for this purpose (before and after Toulouse chemical disaster, Fukushima 
nuclear accident, business continuity and crisis management for critical 
infrastructure). Both approaches are in fact rather complementary in fulfilling certain 
critical functions, and are less opposed than as claimed by resilience promotors. While 
the expectations and foresight differ, recovery is included in risk approaches as well 
as in resilience approaches. Furthermore, risk approaches also deal with unexpected 
events. The paper concludes with an analysis of the knowns, unknowns and awareness 
that enables one to distinguish different foresight categories in risk (defensive, reactive, 
ethical, proactive) and in resilience. 
Keywords: Risk, Prevention, Resilience, Foresight, Anticipation 
 
 
 Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) 


















Session 3:  










Enhancing Safety: the Challenge of Foresight 
 72 
  
Enhancing Safety: the Challenge of Foresight 
 73 
Potentials, limitations and problems of  
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Technological advances potentially impact all stages of the life cycle of safety related 
systems. This is increasingly so with advanced sensors, as well as the exponential 
increase of computing power, communication bandwidth and storage capacity. The 
design and operation of safety related systems can benefit significantly with potential 
to continually reduce risk through the application of advanced software and hardware 
solutions including artificial intelligence (AI). The question is which kind of 
technological advances are in use and being developed and how they can potentially 
improve safety? 
This paper aims at identifying major existing and emerging technologies with tangible 
potential safety benefits applicable to different life cycle phases of concerned systems 
(i.e., design, verification, validation, production, testing, commissioning, operation, 
maintenance, emergency response and decommissioning). These technologies 
generally comprise a combination of hardware and software used for e.g.: 
development, training, operation, monitoring, diagnoses and predictions. Examples 
are computer aided hybrid development, real time modelling analysis and various 
artificial intelligence applications. In this preliminary review the aim is to identify 
potentials, limitations and difficulties associated with the application of these advanced 
technologies for the enhancement of safety and foresight.  
Some of the problems associated with the use of advanced technologies are related to 
the increased technical complexity that they may bring to the design (e.g., software and 
digital instrumentation and control validation and verification). In addition, other 
issues related to the need for connectivity like cyber security and privacy are becoming 
even more worrying. The open question is what are the limitations or ultimate potential 
benefits which can be gained by using advanced technology to enhance safety and 
foresight (considering challenges and benefits)? 
Keywords:  safety technologies, hardware, software, modelling, artificial intelligence 
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1. Introduction 
We live in the age of rapid digitalisation which is significantly changing our lives. The 
change to society is mainly digital (new software and more powerful hardware) but it 
is also complemented with development of novel and inexpensive sensors and systems 
enabling connectivity and numerous applications, i.e.: communication systems, global 
positioning system (GPS), and internet of things (IoT), affordable data storage. This 
change is generally improving everyday life, economy and society as whole. From 
many impacts safety is of special importance because technological advances 
potentially impact safety related systems through all stages of the life cycle. A 
framework for an integrated nuclear digital environment, in [1], illustrates wide 
potentials and huge requirements. UN Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 
(DRR) 2015-2030 emphasis on using science and technology is another example, [2].  
 
The design and operation of safety related systems can benefit significantly with 
potential to continually reduce risk through the application of advanced hardware and 
software solutions. There are many questions about the role of technology in safety and 
first one is which kind of technological advances are currently in use and development? 
 
This paper portrays a preliminary study, which aims to identify major existing and 
emerging technologies with tangible potential safety benefits applicable to different life 
cycle phases (i.e., design, verification, validation, production, testing, commissioning, 
operation, maintenance, emergency response and decommissioning) of the selected 
systems described in the paper.  The goal is also to identify domains of application and 
examples of typical potential benefits emphasising potential for foresight in safety, 
along with their limitations. New technology, while solving problems, can often 
introduce new safety problems and can also face implementation challenges. This 
raises many questions about optimal development, regulation and implementation of 
new technologies. 
 
The paper is organised in the following way: Section 2 describes approach and scope; 
Section 3 presents findings and discussion; finally, Section 4 contains concluding 
remarks. This paper is part of the ongoing work in the ESReDA Project Group on 
Foresight in Safety and it presents initial results from horizon scanning. 
 
2. Approach 
Role of technology in safety and foresight is inherently connected to all safety systems 
and any other use of technology in general. This presents a rich playing field of 
opportunities for discovering many different applications, approaches, regulations and 
experience. However, learning about them and properly understanding value for 
numerous applications in all different domains is a significant challenge. Literature 
review was selected as approach to gain from multi-domain role of technology in safety 
and foresight. Considering author's background, main focus was dedicated to the 
nuclear field; however, other fields are included in an effort to make review more 
comprehensive. Similar examples from different domains are used in order to illustrate 
common solutions. Reviewing different domains is also valuable in identifying both 
generic and unique issues and potential limitations. 
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Google Scholar (scholar.google.com) online tool was used as it seems to be a very 
comprehensive and accessible cross-domain literature database. Performing search is 
as easy as for regular web search with some special functionalities for selecting time 
range, finding related articles to any selected article and looking for citations (both per 
google and per Web of Science). This is all web browser based and needless to say 
hyperlinked. Search was made mostly for the last two years, with only few exceptions, 
in order to capture most recent development.  
 
Initial search was made with key-words "technology" and "safety". Relevant articles 
were selected as pointers towards more refined search. Over 100 papers were initially 
selected and grouped by major domains including "miscellaneous" and "issues". A 
more detailed review has reduced the number of selected references for this paper to 
60. This selection is certainly representative for the role of technology in safety and 
foresight. However, this is far from the most representative or comprehensive selection 
considering rapid developments, number of domains and applications.  
 
The next section presents relevant findings across the following dimensions: 
technologies, domains, applications, life-cycle, foresight, and issues.    
 
3. Findings and discussion 
Findings about the role of technology are presented in six different dimensions in order 
to provide more complete picture. First of all, general groups of technology type were 
identified. Then, these general technologies are used in different domains. The third 
dimension is related to specific application of these technologies in different domains. 
Next dimension is the parts of life-cycle where technologies are used. While all 
identified technologies are used to enhance safety, initial effort was made to identify 
foresight as separate dimension. Final dimension is related to all issues preventing use 
or even potentially introducing new safety problems because of the use of new 
technologies.  
 
The findings of this study are presented in two subsections: technologies and issues. 
The six dimensions are presented together in relation to technologies and issues. 
Finally, the third subsection, with discussion, pays special attention to foresight. The 
approach was to mainly focus on nuclear examples when available. Examples from 
other domains were added for completeness.   
 
3.1 Findings about the role of technology in safety and foresight 
The role of technology in safety and foresight is reviewed through examples from 
literature in nuclear and other domains. Findings are presented as short explanations of 
technology, application, part of the life-cycle and contribution to foresight. Grouping 
by technologies is imperfect because of numerous applications using several 
technologies combined.  
 
3.1.1 Computing power and advanced software 
Computing power is an enabling factor for better design and for many safety 
applications. Nuclear power plant design requires highest level of safety and economic 
competiveness. High performing computing with advanced modelling and simulation 
is necessary to include multi-physics "core simulation" (e.g., radiation transport, 
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thermal-hydraulics, corrosion chemistry, etc.) requiring robust numerical solutions 
algorithms and uncertainty quantification [3].  
 
Plant simulators are a proven tools to train operators for complex systems like nuclear 
or process plants ([4]) and airplanes. Methods for selecting human system interface are 
evolving with technology development and it has to go beyond user interface, [5]. 
Simulators are improving in two different directions in order to make them completely 
realistic and simple. So called full scale simulators are able to present not just full 
operational characteristics of the plant but also accident conditions and scenarios, [6]. 
Simplified simulators are able to run on a single personal computer and still represent 
most of the plant operation. This improves both education and training for plant 
engineers and operators, [7].   
 
Virtual and augmented realities (VR and AR) are the most advanced software 
developments with potential to improve education, training and operation. In [8] and 
[9] virtual environment and simulation are suggested to improve safety during work 
and decommissioning in nuclear facilities. In [10] use of augmented reality is evaluated 
for safety signs in the working environment. Use of AR for generating safety awareness 
and enhancing emergency response for construction, earthquakes and driving is 
reviewed in [11]. 
 
Visualisation and multimedia are demonstrated to be beneficial, for example in the 
construction industry (e.g, improved safety management and training, hazards 
identification, monitoring and warnings) [12], and preventing surgery mistakes [13]. 
Building information modelling (BIM) framework is used in construction design, 
implementation and operation for different domains (e.g., for nuclear [1] and general 
waste [14]) and applications (e.g., construction risk management [15] and fire 
protection [16]). BIM is also used for planning and building of first high level 
radioactive waste final disposal facility by Posiva in Finland, [17]. Risk management 
potentials for BIM are further enhanced using ontology and web semantic technologies 
[18].  
 
Knowledge management (KM) concept is increasingly important for complex systems 
with longer life cycle and has potential to improve operation and decommissioning 
with better use of knowledge and experience,[19]. KM relies on information systems 
with databases, collaborative networking, expert systems, ontologies, web semantics 
and organizational culture.   
 
Computing and software related technologies do not always depend on high computing 
power or sophisticated software. Sometimes novel approach/algorithm could make 
safety improvement, e.g. central control of trains to avoid rear-end collisions in [20].  
 
3.1.2 Internet, communication, cloud computing, sensors, big data and AI 
Sensors are irreplaceable components for proper and safe operation as they are critical 
help for avoiding dangerous situations and reducing unwanted consequences. 
Requirements for sensors (e.g., precision, speed, robustness, connectivity and energy 
consumption) vary greatly depending on the domain and application. One example in 
security checking for explosives, where both speed and sensitivity are required, is use 
of thermo-desorption mass spectrometry, [21]. Another example is in food safety 
(disease detection) and quality, the use of hyperspectral imaging technique for 
automated non-destructive analysis and assessment applied to wide range of food 
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products, as reviewed in [22]. Sensor measurement values also depend on software 
capable to diagnose conditions and predict developments. In [23], the use of distributed 
equation and artificial immunity system is proposed for online monitoring and 
prediction in condensate and feed water system of the nuclear power plant.  
 
Internet, as a network of computers, sensors and people, has growing potential of 
technologies and applications for safety and foresight in many domains. Information 
about online search queries is used for various applications, e.g.: early detection of food 
related epidemics, [24]; perception and prediction of viral and other outbreaks, [25] 
and [26]. Together with sensor equipped smartphones this presents additional potential 
for safety technologies, e.g.: monitoring health behaviour,[27]; managing 
construction,[28]; and collision warning while driving,[29]. New software technology, 
blockchain, has potential to assure records validity which is important for proof of 
safety parts origin [30].  
 
Geographical information system (GIS) is used for integrated regional risk assessment, 
[31]. Optical, radar and other satellite data is used as support for emergency response 
services in natural, technology and social related hazards, [32]. Disaster planning, 
warnings and response are incorporating the use of social networking like tweets, [33]. 
Increasing number and combined satellites use could make them more responsive (i.e., 
in hours) with improved resolution. Global positioning system (GPS) has many 
applications from industry to personal use, however commercially available resolution 
still limits some new applications, like autonomous driving, [34]. Video, mobile and 
other data are used for safety of various applications, e.g. intersection monitoring for 
safety analysis, [35]. Wearable personal devices with biosensors (e.g., hart beat, 
movement, sleep behaviour) are able to track physiology data helpful for detecting 
valuable health related information [36].   
 
Accumulated data from increased number of sensors presents opportunity for better 
understanding of complex systems and might provide new insights for safety science, 
[37]. Analysis and interpretation of huge volumes of data ("big data") is requiring and 
enabling use of new techniques like artificial intelligence (AI). AI is machine learning 
in development with major advances with so called deep learning. Impressive AI 
results, like winning at GO game and superior medical diagnostics, are showing huge 
promises. However, timescale and limits for AI potentials are not easy to predict. About 
50% of experts believe that high-level machine intelligence will be developed in the 
next 30 years and superintelligence might be developed 30 years after, [38]. New AI 
applications automatizing, more or less demanding, human work are becoming 
available, e.g. restaurants food safety check and news writing, [39]. 
 
Modern vehicles are equipped with more and more technologies assisting drivers 
(emergency braking, blind spot monitoring, line support system, objects recognition, 
etc.), along with fully autonomous vehicles, are expected to be commercially available 
in several years. Automated vehicles embodies the implementation of leading edge 
technology solutions, which include a number of different sensors, computing power 
and AI software [40]. 
 
From a large number of safety technologies, a few more are selected as illustration of 
vast potentials for safety and foresight. Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV, drone) is used 
for numerous applications in remote monitoring. In [41], 3D radioactive contamination 
mapping is described for Fukushima-Daiichi nuclear accident. Eye movement recoding 
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and analysis allow experts, e.g. pathologists to learn and improve themselves, in [42]. 
Three-dimensional printing is used in many domains for preparation of difficult tasks, 
producing custom complex parts, and for education and training, e.g. in medicine [43].  
 
3.2 Issues with use of technology for safety and foresight 
Great potentials and promises of new technology for improving safety and foresight 
have to be tested and proven before fully introduced. This is necessary for simple 
applications like material condition monitoring ([44]) and complex solutions like 
digital control rooms (DCR), [45]. Example of DCRs shows that potential might be 
different for various domains depending on many elements, e.g. implementation and 
operators' age (in [45] potential side effects which reduce operators’ reliability in DCRs 
for nuclear power plants are demonstrated). Verification and validation (V&V) for 
digital technology is an open problem. While by nature it allows virtual testing of true 
simulations, the existence of an immense number of possible states makes full testing 
impossible. This is the case with the autonomous car [46] and nuclear digital 
instrumentation and control, [47]. Experience proves that hardware and software 
induced failures are inevitable in complex digital systems and this should always be 
already factored into the system’s recovery plan, [48]. Number of recommendations 
for research and development prioritisation in development of light water reactor is 
related to the adaptation of digital technologies (digital power plant) in order to address 
V&V and other issues, [49]. 
 
Internet and social networks are not just incredible resources, but they are also efficient 
and effective disseminators of fake information. This is an important issue during any 
emergency situation and it can have detrimental effects, as it was tragically illustrated 
during and after Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident, [50]. It is important to always 
consider imperfect, incomplete and changing state for all online data usage, [51]. 
Perhaps some “degree of uncertainty” classification could be designed to assist in 
judging the quality of data. 
 
While smartphones are allowing easy communication and access to information, they 
are also a distraction for important activities like driving, and could cause accidents, 
[52]. This is regulated in some countries and supported by apps which are recording 
activity of smartphone before accident.  
 
Cost is limiting the introduction of some technologies with proven benefits before 
widely used and fully commercialised, and this depends on many factors. Cost of life 
in the U.S. and Colombia make a difference when evaluating cost-benefit analysis of 
commute bus crash avoidance system installation, [53].  
 
Cybersecurity is one of several major issues for many internet and wireless based 
technologies because ultimate protection is impossible without losing functionality, 
e.g. for autonomous vehicles [54]. Hacking is an increasing problem on the internet 
and it might reduce trust in some new technologies like internet of things and artificial 
intelligence. Some related issues for autonomous vehicles and medical assistance 
devices are presented in [55]. 
 
Solutions for the above-mentioned issues are not trivial and will require additional 
work. For some of these issues, the solution is technology itself either already built in 
(e.g. communication for UAV collisions [56]) or complemented with other solutions 
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(e.g. documenting scientific software for nuclear safety applications [57]). Another part 
of the solution is learning by doing (e.g. for health IT [58]) after accepting new 
technology with simple criteria in order to prove that it is at least as good as existing 
technology. For some issues with new technology it will require developing new 
methods which will help prevent unwanted consequence, e.g. for detecting promoted 
social media campaigns [59]. 
 
3.3 Discussion about the role of technology in safety and foresight 
One way to summarise here presented use of technologies for safety and foresight is to 
list results across six dimensions. Table I lists findings for all dimensions.  
 
Potential for the role of technology in improving safety seems overwhelming. 
Prospective to improve foresight in safety looks also vast, e.g.: improved analysis and 
simulations to identify and anticipate safety issues; higher quality production to 
improve reliability; adaptive maintenance to prevent failures; continuous 
improvements with better operating data assessment; accident prevention with timely 
preparation and response; faster and better emergency response with appropriate 
organisation and communication [60]; prompt and appropriate accident management 
with real time assessment; improved learning from accident investigation; preventing 
societal disruptions with proper communication. 
Table I: List of identified technologies and findings for different dimensions. 
Dimension  Findings 
Technologies  computing power, software, cloud computing, sensors, laser scanning, radars, 
artificial intelligence (AI), smartphones, social networks, internet, internet of things 
(IoT), geographic information system (GIS), global positioning system (GPS), virtual 
and augmented reality (VR, AR), 3D printing, big data analytics, knowledge 
management (KM), blockchain 
Domains transport, power generation, medicine, construction, mining, military, chemical 
industry, food, weather forecast, security, communication, internet, research & 
development, smart cities, disasters risk reduction, society 
Applications optimised design without safety compromise; enhanced validation and verification; 
virtual/augmented experience for better design, operation and emergency planning; 
improved and effective education, training, operation and maintenance;   
Life-Cycle all phases and activities – concept development, design, production, commissioning, 
operation, and decommissioning; validation, verification, testing, monitoring, 
education and training. 
Foresight improved analysis and simulations; quality production; adaptive maintenance; 
continuous improvements; accident prevention; faster and better emergency response; 
prompt and appropriate accident management; accident investigation; preventing 
societal disruptions 
Issues cost, complexity; verification & validation; faster change cycles; cyber security; 
disinformation; distraction; proving benefits; privacy; AI better than human;   
 
4. Conclusion 
Extensive review presents large number of examples where technology is used to 
improve safety and foresight. Significant evidence exist that various technologies 
individually and combined could improve safety and foresight. Some benefits are 
Enhancing Safety: the Challenge of Foresight 
 80 
already in use while others are in development. There are also new issues caused by 
complexity and quick introduction of new technology. Some of them could be resolved 
by using technology. These issues will require specialists' solution, but they are also 
depending on regulation and users perception. New technology adaptation might 
improve if relative prospective to exiting technology is assumed (i.e. by not increasing 
requirements) and applying learning by doing approach.  
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The concept of High Temperature Gas Cooled and Very High Temperature Reactors 
(HTGR, VHTR) or Dual Fluid Reactors (DFR) are the examples of the attempts for 
building industrial applications based on the Generation IV nuclear technologies. 
These applications concern not only generation of electricity, but the production of 
process heat, hydrogen or hydrazine, which is of great importance for chemical 
industry. However, the licensing process of the newly designed reactors, comprising 
safety and reliability issues of the whole processing installations of the chemical plant 
needs special attention and appropriate research program to solve a number of 
foresight problems, not considered so far or not treated enough deeply in previous 
studies. The paper is an attempt to discuss these problems presenting main challenges 
for the implementation of such technologies, based on the experience gained during 
last years in Poland and in perspective of anticipated changes of the nuclear industry. 
Keywords: Nuclear Cogeneration, High Temperature Reactors, Industrial 
Applications. 
1. Introduction 
 Industry is responsible for about 24% of EU’s consumption of fossil fuels and similar 
proportion of CO2 emissions. This includes, among others, the following sectors:  iron 
and steel making, food processing, the chemical industry, ceramics and glass wares and 
machinery production. The average level of CO2 emission in different EU industries 
remains at about 37 Mt. However, in some Member States such as Germany, France, 
United Kingdom, Italy, Netherlands, Romania and Poland it is much higher, presenting 
the levels between 50 and 200 CO2 Mt. This means that the climate policies should be 
treated as strategic issues with the reduction of such emission as one of the main targets. 
This also means some strategic steps in the energy sector are supposed to be done, 
taking into account also needs of the industry. 
 Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) 
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Such a goal creates very significant economical and societal challenges. Apart from the 
emissions, the absence of alternatives to fossil fuel consumption leads to often 
unacceptable geopolitical dependence on supply countries, which is strictly related to 
energy security. This has been observed, for example, in case of Ukrainian crisis. 
In the energy sector the nuclear reactors have been serving for many years as a source 
of clean energy, with very small greenhouse gases and other noxious emissions. 
Nuclear energy, however, is known to have a much wider potential than being used 
solely for the generation of electricity. Especially, it seems desirable that the nuclear 
reactors should start providing other forms of energy (heat, cold) for industry on 
a much wider basis than today. This mechanism is known as cogeneration of heat and 
power. The ideas and technical solutions for non-electric nuclear applications have 
been developed, although, for various reasons, they have not yet reached the same 
industrial maturity as for the generation of electricity. Following the progress of the 
nuclear technologies for non-electric applications, which is manifested by numerous 
documents on cogeneration and heat production, the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) performed the initial target market analysis [1] which shown that: 
 there is increased interest in non-electric applications facilitated by the recent 
development of advanced reactor concepts; 
 the current trend to a market oriented restructuring in the energy sector requires an 
accurate estimation of the costs and benefits of nuclear applications in comparison 
with the non-nuclear suppliers of similar services; 
 globally, since the use of nuclear energy is at a crossroads, with its prospects 
ranging between negligible and highly accelerated growth, it is important to 
identify the potential of the non-electric part of nuclear applications. 
When it comes to the nuclear cogeneration of heat and power, there are more than 750 
reactor years of experience around the world, but the range of applications was mostly 
limited to rather low temperatures such as steam production for the paper and pulp 
industry, district heating and seawater desalination. Nuclear cogeneration has been 
shown to be highly efficient increasing power plant efficiency even up to 35%. 
Taking into account foresight (climate policies, reduction of dependence on fossil fuels, 
geopolitical issues) on one hand, and available nuclear technologies on the other hand 
some predictions on future applications of nuclear cogeneration can be made. The 
concepts of High Temperature Gas Cooled and Very High Temperature Reactors 
(HTGR, VHTR) or Dual Fluid Reactors (DFR) are the examples of the attempts for 
building industrial applications based on the Generation IV nuclear technologies. These 
applications concern not only generation of electricity, but the production of process 
heat, hydrogen or hydrazine, which is of great importance for chemical industry. 
However, the licensing process of the newly designed reactors, comprising safety and 
reliability issues of the whole processing installations of the chemical plant needs 
special attention and appropriate research program to solve a number of problems, not 
considered so far or not treated enough deeply in previous studies. 
The paper is an attempt to discuss these problems presenting main challenges for the 
implementation of such technologies, basing on the experience gained during last years 
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in Poland (among others, the EU program NC2I-R: “Nuclear Cogeneration Industrial 
Initiative - Research and Development Coordination” [2] and Polish program HTR-
PL: “Development of high temperature reactors for industrial applications”). 
2. Possible applications of cogeneration 
In the nearest future the best opportunities for cogeneration will be application of High 
Temperature Reactors (HTR) for the chemical industry. In this respect within NC2I-R 
project [2] a review has been made taking into account the following main processes 
compatible with HTR capabilities: 
 refinery distillation steam; 
 refinery distillation superheated steam; 
 petrochemicals - reaction enthalpy; 
 steam as utility for industrial complex; 
 paper steam (drying). 
 
Mapping of industrial sites was conducted in a manner allowing describing the heat 
market and distinctive European industrial areas. The following data were gathered: 
 rated thermal power; 
 electric power production and usage; 
 fresh steam parameters (temperature, pressure, mass flow); 
 process steam parameters (temperature, pressure, mass flow); 
 current power production unit characteristics (size, age, fuel); 
 others (e.g. environmental factors, regulatory framework etc.). 
 
In total 132 sites were identified within Europe, 57 provided data related to their needs. 
A significant share of the sample sites uses less than 100 MWth – 20 sites. About the 
same proportion needed between 100 and 250 MWth. The last significant category was 
about 500 MWth, in this category include 9 sites. The electrical power demand is 
distributed somewhat in more uniform manner. The lowest demand – up to 50 MWe 
was reported by 20 sites. Each of next categories, respectively 51-100 MWe, 101-200 
MWe and 201-400 MWe, reported between 4 and 6 sites. 
As far as need for process heat is considered it can be estimated as 600-900 GWh per 
year for temperatures below 250°C, 250-550°C and above 1,000°C. The lowest interval 
can be accommodated by light-water reactors (LWR). The highest range (above 
1,000°C) can be treated as highly prospective due to possible production of hydrogen 
and hydrogen-based fuel. The steam with temperatures about 500°C is 
a standard process heat in large industrial plants, mostly chemical. Application of 
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nuclear reactors should be easier in this case, as they would replace old steam 
generators (gas or carbon types), still using existing turbines for power generation. For 
example, in case of Polish industry it has been estimated that there is a need for such a 
steam in several plants, in total, about 6,500 MWth. 
3. Technologies 
Based on the valuable results of the German HTR development program up to the late 
1980s, significant progress has been made by a several European FP5-7 R&D projects 
which obtained further leverage through the collaborative participation of European 
organizations in international projects (NGNP, PBMR, HTR-10) and in Generation IV 
International Forum (GIF). The most outstanding examples are in the areas of fuel 
production and qualification, the qualification and coding of high temperature 
structural materials and new graphite grades (incl. through irradiation testing), 
component development (e.g. turbomachines, heat exchangers), helium technologies 
and licensing-relevant modelling (e.g. reactor physics, thermo-fluid dynamics, 
mechanics, tritium transport, source term calculations, system code integration). In 
addition, significant improvement was achieved in understanding the market and end-
user needs so as to design a power plant accordingly. The European System Integration 
studies in ARCHER and in NC2I-R, the ANTARES and SC-HTGR projects performed 
by AREVA, and several other reflect this development. 
3.1 High and Very High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactors (HTGR/VHTR) 
There are many advantages of HTGRs over conventional water cooled reactors. First 
of all, the large mass of the graphite moderator provides high heat capacity. Core 
materials are made of ceramic materials usable at elevated temperatures. The helium 
coolant is single phase and an inert fluid. Thus, chemical interactions between fuel, 
moderator, and coolant can be avoided. One of the most attractive features, however, 
is inherent safety – there is no possibility of reactor core melt [3]. This is due to usage 
of TRISO fuel and physical characteristics of the reactor causing spontaneous 
shutdown in case of the loss of coolant. 
The TRISO-coated particles have an overall diameter in the range of 500 to 1,000 μm. 
Each particle contains a spherical fuel kernel (350 to 600 μm diameter) of fissile or 
fertile fuel materials, usually in the form of uranium dioxide (UO2), plutonium dioxide 
(PuO2), or an uranium oxycarbide (UCO) mixture. Typical fuel enrichments vary from 
8 to 20%, as dictated by power rating and safety considerations. The fuel kernels are 
then coated with successive layers of pyrocarbon (PyC) and silicon carbide (SiC). First, 
a low-density PyC buffer coating is applied that provides void volume to accommodate 
fission gas and attenuates fission product recoils released from the fuel kernel. This 
layer is surrounded by successive coatings consisting of an inner PyC layer (IPyC), a 
silicon carbide (SiC) layer and an outer PyC layer (OPyC). The irradiation behaviour 
of the PyC coatings on either side of the SiC provides prestressing to assist in 
accommodating internal pressure. The SiC layer is the primary pressure vessel and is 
an effective barrier to fission product release [4]. The coated particles are overcoated 
with a resinated graphite powder to prevent particle-to-particle contact during either 
sphere making or compact formation. In the prismatic design, the overcoated TRISO 
particles are imbedded within a graphite matrix to form cylindrical compacts (Fig. 1). 
Enhancing Safety: the Challenge of Foresight 
 87 
Approximately 3,200 of compacts are inserted into a hexagonal fuel element. In the 
pebble bed design, overcoated TRISO particles are also imbedded in a graphite matrix; 
however, in this case, in the form of a spherical element with hundreds of thousands of 
them making up the core (Fig. 2). The fuel construction and performance may differ 
among various HTGR designs [5]. 
 
Figure 1. TRISO fuel in a prismatic HTGR [6, 7]. 
 
Figure 2. TRISO particles in a pebble bed HTGR [7]. 
It seems that the gas cooled high temperature reactors are optimal for the production of 
steam with 500°C is. For practical implementation, however, there is a need for 
preparing a demonstration project, which requires further work in the areas of system 
design, based as much as possible on proven technologies. As a part of the activities of 
just started GEMINI+ project and the US NGNP Industry Alliance, it is intended to 
obtain a maximum design convergence for a future demonstrator, still allowing for 
differences where licensing requirements or market needs impose them. For the 
successful demonstration, a functioning and stable licensing framework is required at 
an early stage as part of the infrastructure. This will guide the conceptual design and 
possibly required targeted R&D. This licensing framework must be capable of taking 
into account the specific safety approach of modular reactors based on inherent safety 
features of the system and addressing the coupling with industrial processes. 
Further development of HTR technology is seen in the new concept of long lifetime 
Very High Temperature Reactor (VHTR) which would produce outlet temperatures of 
~950°C for large-scale hydrogen production, process heat applications, and Brayton 
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cycle electricity production, while increasing fuel discharge burnup for better uranium 
utilization. The higher operating temperature conditions and increased burnup may be 
achieved by replacing the conventional UO2 fuel kernel with 
a stoichiometric two-phase mixture of UO2 and UC2, namely UCO [4]. 
3.2 Dual Fluid Reactors (DFR) 
The Dual Fluid Reactor is a novel concept, whose key feature is the employment of 
two separate liquid cycles, one for fuel and the other one for the coolant. A very high 
power density resulting in remarkable cost savings, and a highly negative temperature 
feedback coefficient, enabling a self-regulation without any control rods or even 
mechanical parts in the core, are the most interesting advantages of this new design. In 
the reference design of DFR proposed by Armin Huke et al. in 2015 [8], the fuel liquid 
is an undiluted actinide trichloride based on isotope-purified Cl-37, circulating at an 
operating temperature of 1,000°C. The pure Lead is to be used as a coolant. The coolant 
liquid is required to have the highest possible heat transportation capability and best 
neutronic properties. Pure molten Lead has low neutron capture cross-sections, a low 
moderation capability, and a very suitable liquid phase temperature range. 
Consequently, a DFR has increased power density, small core and fuel volume, and 
very hard neutron spectrum that improves the neutron economy and the Energy Return 
on Investment [9]. Figure 3 depicts the reactor core as well as the fuel loop and the 
primary coolant loop. The liquid fuel enters the core vessel at the bottom, spreads over 
a system of vertical tubes where it becomes critical, and leaves the reactor on top 
towards the Pyrochemical Processing Unit (PPU). The Lead coolant enters the core 
vessel from the bottom takes the heat from the fuel duct by conduction and leaves the 
vessel on top towards the heat exchanger. During each cycle the temperature of the 
Lead coolant changes from 750°C (at the bottom of the core) to 1,000°C (inlet of the 
heat exchanger) and back to 750°C (outlet of the heat exchanger). Consequently, the 
temperature inside the fuel (tube centre, not at the walls) is 1,150°C at the bottom and 
1,400°C at the top which defines the highest absolute temperature in the reactor core. 
Depending on the power needed, part of the Lead’s heat is taken for electricity 
production or as process heat. 
 
Figure 3. DFR fuel and cooling loop. The fuel circulates 
between the PPU and the core whereas the coolant loop 
connects the fissile zone to the conventional part [8]. 
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The high temperature opens many innovative applications of DFR which is depicted 
schematically in Fig. 4. In addition to electricity generation it can be used in [8]: 
 Process heat generation only. The conventional part of DFR needs to be modified 
for this application. The heat transducer to a secondary coolant cycle or a direct 
heating of a chemical reactor in close vicinity with primary coolant may be used. 
 Mixed process heat and electricity generation. The first heat exchanger which 
decouples heat energy at the high operating temperature may be followed by 
a subsequent heat exchanger which heats at a lower temperature water in a steam. 
 Radiotomic chemical production. Utilization of intensive radiation for radiotomic 
induction of chemical reactions requiring high doses [10]. E.g. Nitrogen oxide NO2 
and ozone O3 can be obtained by irradiation of compressed air; Hydrocyanic acid 
HCN from methane and nitrogen; CO from radiative dissociation of carbon dioxide. 
The DFR reference plant may produce 104-5 tons/year of these chemicals. 
 Magneto hydrodynamic generators (MHD). There is a possibility for utilization of 
an MHD generator connected to the Lead coolant loop of the DFR reactor. MHDs 
transform thermal energy and kinetic energy into electricity. These generators are 
different from traditional ones in that they operate at high temperatures without 
moving parts which may be significantly less costly than turbines. Liquid metals 
are eligible for that because of their high concentration of free charge carriers. 
 Medical isotope production. One single DFR produces at least 30 kg/year of 
Mo-99 (a precursor of 99mTc which is needed for medical diagnostics), and what is 
even more important, already provides it in a separated form. Mo-99 can be quickly 
withdrawn in large amounts with no further processing. This strongly reduces the 
handling so that a complete on-site medical-clean production of the technetium 
generators are feasible which further simplifies the logistics. 
 The hydrogen-based chemistry. Production of synthetic fuels suitable for today’s 
vehicles. The low costs make these applications competitive with fossil fuels. 
 
Figure 4. Possible applications for the DFR [8]. 
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4. General approach to licensing issues 
The analysis of licensing issues has been made within NC2I-R and HTR-PL projects 
with consideration of the previous NGNP guidelines [11]. In principle the screening of 
past and recent cogeneration applications with a nuclear heat source reveals no specific 
licensing issues beyond the standard licensing requirements of the NPP. However, for 
some standard requirements a higher effort will be needed to address specific 
cogeneration related aspects. This concerns such issues like evaluation of external 
hazards by nearby industrial facilities or fast isolation options for transfer lines out of 
the NPP site. Regarding other standard requirements, the specific safety features of 
modular HTR should lead to the improvement of the nuclear safety (e.g. reduced 
exclusion zone possible because of limited radioactive releases even during beyond 
design basis events) and of the economic conditions. 
For nuclear facilities the limits for the emissions or releases of radionuclides in general 
are defined in national regulations. It should be expected that for cogeneration 
applications the aspect of a product free (according to international or national limits) 
from artificial radioactive contamination will be even more in the focus of the public. 
This specific care should be met by promoting the radionuclide barriers already applied 
in modern NPP for normal operation and design based accidents and the additional 
advantages given by the HTR technology. The tritium contamination issue related to 
gaseous primary coolant circuit should be also addressed. Tritium, as well as hydrogen, 
is able to diffuse through the metallic walls of heat exchanger tubes or sheets and 
therefore the contamination of the secondary coolant circuit with tritium has to be 
considered in the radiological assessment. It seems that He purification systems proved 
good efficiency and that additional contamination of the secondary circuit through 
leaks could be avoided by maintaining the secondary circuit overpressure. Moreover, 
an additional barrier against the contamination of product stem or product gas by 
tritium could be provided by a tertiary circuit. Such an additional circuit has been 
already proposed in the project EUROPAIRS in order to minimize the effort for the 
licensing process of the prototype HTR. On the other hand, recent investigations in the 
ARCHER project indicate that reasonable limits of tritium contamination in process 
steam might also be met without a tertiary circuit. This surely needs further research 
and clarification. To effectively support the licensing of HTR based cogeneration 
application and in particular a prototype facility, the NC2I-R consortium recommends 
that the following activities should be conducted in addition and in advance to the 
standard licensing procedure: 
 in a pre-application phase, early discussion of the safety features specific for a 
modular HTR (e.g. passive decay heat removal, “vented containment”) with the 
regulator of the country hosting the demonstrator with the aim to achieve clarity 
about their consideration in the licensing process; 
 a demonstration that cogeneration or process heat application issues are covered by 
the licensing procedure; 
 a gap analysis for further R&D needs under consideration of the results achieved in 
the gap and SWOT analyses in the ARCHER project. 
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The licensing of the HTR shall follow the general licensing procedure covering the 
following main aspects: 
 definition of the nuclear facility, its activities and the respective boundary 
conditions (e.g. dose and discharge limits, action levels); 
 siting and site evaluation; 
 safety and environmental impact assessment; 
 safety demonstration of the proposed technology for all operation stages and 
accidental conditions; 






Because of the prototype issues and the strong interface to the local public, it has been 
pointed out that a road map should include an extended pre-licensing phase with 
a strong public involvement to promote a positive acceptance level in the local public. 
An extended environmental impact study should also be included. 
5. Needs for further research and development 
Most research needed for the implementation of HTR for industrial purposes concerns 
rather the choice of optimal solutions for specific technical problem than to overcome 
basic barriers. The other reason for the need of further research is related to solving 
licensing issues. The basic directions of research should be the following: 
 deterministic safety analysis for HTR, i.e. neutronics and thermo-hydraulics 
calculations, in particular: 
o integrated models for thermo-hydraulics and neutronics analyses; 
o development of high fidelity models for HTR; 
o validation of numerical tools used for HTR design, concerning neutronics and 
thermo-hydraulics (distribution of power, neutron flux, temperature). 
 probabilistic safety assessment of HTR integrated with chemical installation – 
integrated risk analysis chemical-nuclear installations, including analysis of 
interfaces, mutual reactions and interdependencies; 
 material science issues: mechanical and thermal characteristics, corrosion effects in 
specific radiological conditions to determine reactor safety limits; 
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 determining basic characteristics of HTR like reactivity, distribution of core 
temperature, changes of pressure gradient; 
 development and testing instrumentation of HTR; 
 studies for new concepts of fuel and core structure. 
 
In particular, the results of research should answer the following questions: 
 Which types of interactions between nuclear and non-nuclear systems have to be 
considered, concerning safety aspects during normal and accidental situation? 
 What can be the impact of non-nuclear incident (fire, explosion, toxic release) for 
the nuclear part of the installation? 
 Is there a need for higher safety standard for nuclear reactor operating as a part of 
chemical installation? 
 Is there a need to modify the strategy of the defence in depth? 
 What kind of approach (deterministic, probabilistic, hybrid) is suitable during the 
design and licensing phase for cogeneration system? 
 Which containment characteristics plays a deciding role for safe operation of 
nuclear reactor in cogeneration system? 
 Is there a need for special regulations concerning emergency planning and response 
for such a processing system? 
 
6. Safety issues 
The most important technical problems needed for licensing, identified in NC2I-R 
project, are related to safety. This concerns the following:  
 the evaluation of the fission product transfer coefficients in the fuel coatings and 
graphite matrix; 
 find the means for evaluating the fuel temperature in standard and accidental 
operation; 
 the achievement of a suitable radiative emissivity of the core barrel; 
 in service inspection of the primary structures including graphite structures, fuel 
elements (blocks) and steam generator tubes; 
 the evaluation of dust behaviour, distribution in the primary pipes and components 
(potential for accumulation, plate-out, etc.), resuspension and dust bound fission 
products phenomena and, in general, the development of a complete chain of 
computer codes for the modelling of source term in case of depressurisation 
scenarios. 
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 Probably the most crucial is to demonstrate passive decay heat removal capability, 
which is the fundamental safety requirement associated with the HTR concept. This 
should allow for determining and optimizing safety margins. Taking into account 
licensing issues the evaluation of normal and abnormal transients, based on both 
validated codes and tests (for example performed in demonstrator) is an important 
task. A number of guidelines on these issues were provided so far [12-13]. 
Uncertainty assessment related to the possibility of accidental radioactive release 
has to be done, however a conservative approach can be still a reasonable approach 
anyway. 
 Further studies, for future development, are also needed in the field of development 
of high temperature resistant fuel and material together with efforts for enhancing 
the fuel quality control and reducing uncertainties on safety parameters (fuel 
maximum temperature and burn-up). 
 Many safety problems concern the mutual dependence of nuclear and chemical 
parts. In principle the basic assumption is such that HTR and conventional 
installations should not influence each other in particular in case of severe accidents 
as explosions or release of corrosive materials. The safety related risk induced by 
external hazards ought to be independent from the cogeneration components and 
the end-user facility.  
 In this respect the question of appropriate distance between these two parts have to 
be posed and solved. This concerns, however, two-way interactions. Hence, on one 
hand, any external hazard for the reactor caused by chemical facility has to be 
evaluated. On the other hand, any radioactive hazard coming from HTR has to be 
considered and taken into account while performing risk analysis in chemical 
installation. This means that radionuclide limits have to be precisely established by 
estimation of the consequences of the releases for all possible pathways. 
Another safety issue is related to thermal hydraulic feedback/transients. Delivered by 
HTR process heat would represent the major part of the thermal power. One of the 
attractive features of HTR as a source of the heat is a possibility of processing at power 
of larger range than conventional systems. However, varying operation conditions at 
the transfer system or at chemical part will generate feedback/transients to the HTR. 
These feedbacks and transients have to be considered, evaluated and covered by 
corresponding safety systems (e.g. compressor chambers). 
7. Conclusions 
Foresight and technologies include application of nuclear cogeneration. In this respect, 
a number of advantages for using HTR as a source of process heat can be mentioned – 
the most important ones are: 
 inherent safety features of HTR; 
 more flexible operating conditions than in case of conventional systems; 
 possible decrease of restricted use zone; 
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 easier adjustment to the future needs by a possibility of adding new blocks; 
 possible shorter construction time due to the modularity. 
On the other hand, one can express some disadvantages: 
 licensing can be a challenge, because of using new technical solutions not based on 
currently operating NPP; 
 need for new regulations; 
 human factor issues have to be considered, taking into account that several modular 
reactors are supposed to be controlled. 
 
It seems that licensing procedures are the most burning issues as new regulations and 
procedures have to be developed by the regulator in order to reflect all the features of 
HTR. This, however concerns not only nuclear part, but also chemical one. Therefore, 
it seems that development a new framework for integrated approach to the safety of 
combined nuclear-chemical installations both from technical point of view, as well as, 
from legislative issues caused by the need for developing appropriate regulations, are 
necessary for successful practical realization of cogeneration applications. 
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Abstract  
Food is produced, distributed and sold on a global scale. The interconnectivity of the 
market simultaneously builds resilience in supply chains but magnifies vulnerabilities, 
so it is more important than ever to have the best possible understanding of the world 
around us, and how it is changing. Reflection is required on how new technologies 
transform our global supply chains, trade policies, and future food production. The 
identification and prioritization of emerging risks is a complex process involving the 
gathering and evaluation of large amounts of information from different sources and 
the biggest challenge is to make sense of the complex interactions of different factors 
and actors in the food system to predict and possibly prevent future risks.  
Forward-looking exercises have been employed by organisations, institutions, 
authorities or governments to enhance policy preparedness and promote prevention-
based policy approaches.  Foresight employs methods to explore change in the mid-to-
long-term future based on the assumption that developments outside the food supply 
chain and even outside the food system are either directly or indirectly related to the 
development of a particular food-borne hazard. Typical outputs from foresight studies, 
specifically scenario planning, are multiple scenarios that model systemic change in 
the food system in order to reveal potential unknown patterns of food-related 
challenges. This paper briefly describes the development and use of scenario planning 
as a foresight methodology, presents specific case studies applied in the area of food 
safety, and discusses the challenges and opportunities linked to this approach for 
identification of emerging risks and policy preparedness. 
Keywords: Global supply chains, Food systems, Emerging Risks, Foresight studies, 
Drivers of change, Scenario development, Preparedness.  
1. Introduction 
A series of food scares during the nineties resulted in consumers’ distrust of European 
Union and National competent authorities to protect public health and ensure food 
safety. To establish the highest standards of food safety and ensure free movements of 
goods an innovative regulatory package was put in place. Regulation (EC) 178/2002, 
also known as the General Food Law, lays down the basic food safety principles and 
establishes the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) as an independent scientific 
body, clearly separating risk assessment from risk management and giving EFSA a 
mission on risk assessment and risk communication in all fields directly or indirectly 
related to food and feed, animal and plant health.  
The concept of ‘emerging risks’ is embedded in the regulation: ‘The successful 
identification of risks at their early inception is at the heart of public health and 
environmental protection. Improved identification of emerging risks may become a 
major preventive instrument at the disposal of the Member States (MS) and the 
Community ’. EFSA is required to establish monitoring procedures with respect to 
systematically searching for, collecting, collating, and analysing information and data 
with a view to the identification of emerging risks in the fields within its mission.   
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Food is produced, distributed and sold on a global scale. The interconnectivity of the 
market simultaneously builds resilience in supply chains but magnifies vulnerabilities, 
and therefore it is more important than ever to have the best possible understanding of 
the world around us, and how it is changing. Reflection is required on a variety of 
emerging technologies, and how these exponentially improved new technologies 
transform fields as diverse as our global supply chains, trade policies, and the 
distributional implications of future food production. The identification and 
prioritization of emerging risks is a complex process involving the gathering and 
evaluation of large amounts of information from different sources and the biggest 
challenge is to make sense of the complex interactions of different factors and actors 
in the food system to predict and possibly prevent future risks.  
Beyond emerging risks, forward-looking exercises such as foresight studies have been 
employed by organisations, institutions, authorities or governments to enhance policy 
preparedness and promote prevention-based policy approaches. Foresight studies are 
inherently more complex than emerging risk identification, as they need to take into 
account all developments that might affect the topic at hand, and assess the effects of 
their combination on a specific system. Foresight studies usually have a longer-term 
horizon than emerging risk identification, and apply a variety of creative and 
participatory techniques, such as scenario building, designed not only to describe the 
future in a methodological and systematic way, but also to facilitate the identification 
of valuable information from the future that could have relevance for today’s decision 
making. 
This paper briefly describes foresight methodologies, presents specific case studies of 
foresight applied in the area of food safety, and finally discusses the challenges linked 
to this approach for the identification of emerging risks and policy preparedness. 
 
2. Foresight Studies 
The use of early warning systems, such as the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed 
(RASFF) of the European Union, are reasonably well developed and effective in 
identifying and addressing short-term challenges; however, they are usually reactive in 
nature and at best can identify early ‘trends’ in emerging risks. Risk assessors, risk 
managers and policy makers however, must be ready to frame longer time horizons and 
prepare for developments beyond the typical four steps of the scientific risk assessment 
cycle (Van Leeuwen and Vermeire, 2007).  
In the context of food systems, foresight approaches aim to anticipate emerging risks 
(and opportunities) that are difficult to characterise since they are the long-term 
outcomes of a range of operational and environmental factors, some of which may not 
be fully in play at the present time. Foresight employs methods to explore change in 
the mid-to-long-term future based on the assumption that developments outside the 
food supply chain and even outside the food system are either directly or indirectly 
related to the development of a particular food-borne hazard. Typical outputs from 
foresight studies are multiple scenarios that model systemic change in the food system 
in order to reveal potential unknown patterns of food related challenges. Such 
approaches demonstrate the potential for complementing the extensive and successful 
systems for monitoring the occurrence of hazards and risks within the food system. 
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2.1 Scenario planning (scenario development and analysis) 
Scenario planning involves the development, analysis and use of scenarios for 
improved preparedness to emerging risks and strategic planning; i.e. assessing the 
robustness of strategies and policy approaches that withstand the risks presented by 
alternative plausible futures. Scenarios are a foresight tool used to explore uncertainty 
in complex systems. They are defined as a set of plausible, sequentially linked events 
that might potentially occur in the future (Jarke et al., 1998), and they are designed to 
understand, analyse and communicate information about the future, often with the 
intention to clarify current actions in the light of plausible and possible futures 
(Durance and Godet, 2010; Parson, 2008; Swart et al., 2004). Scenarios provide a 
framework for considering a wide range of interacting drivers and the potential 
consequences of events in order to think through possible responses to uncertainties in 
the future, using this knowledge to support development of effective, forward-looking 
policies that address risks. Scenarios help understand the social, economic and 
environmental impacts on food systems, using this knowledge to determine where 
future intervention is best directed. However, they do not predict the future; they rather 
aim to explore what the future could look like under the influence of specific driving 
forces (De Ruijter, 2014). 
Scenarios should be: i) plausible and describe events and developments that fall within 
the limits of what might conceivably occur in the future ii) internally consistent, the 
combination of elements and factors in each scenario must be logical, compatible and 
consistent iii) fit for purpose, serving the aim of the foresight study, especially when 
looking at facilitating decision making, for example, if the aim of the exercise is to test 
the resilience of a regulatory system or a policy framework, creating a scenario that 
presents a 'perfect future' that is free of challenges would not serve the aim of the study 
iv) present multiple futures in order to capture alternative developments and better 
inform the foresight study. In such a case, care must be taken to ensure that the 
scenarios are diverse enough from each other, and not just a variation of a central 
theme, while at the same time not stretching them to such extremes that it threatens 
their plausibility. 
 
An indicative foresight study process with specific reference to scenario development 
is indicated in Fig. 1. 
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2.1.1 Environmental scanning: defining driving forces 
A key common approach to scenario development is to identify those elements that are 
crucial and can bring change to the topic/system of the study; i.e. driving forces. The 
methodology used to identify relevant drivers of change can vary between foresight 
studies, but often employ variants of the PESTLE (political, economic, social, 
technological, legislative and environmental factors) framework (Brown 2007). 
Depending on the scope of the study, drivers can be macro/high level (e.g. trade, 
economic growth, food chain structure, consumer perception or values, food prices, 
climate change), or detailed and specific to a limited process (e.g. a specific category 
of primary production in the food chain), or even a combination of both. Once a set of 
drivers have been identified and clearly described, it is important to gain insights for 
each driver, current knowledge, trends, potential developments and related future 
hypothesis. This is usually done via a literature review and in consultation with experts, 
often through workshops, interviews or more structured Delphi exercises. The 
objective is to assess varying assumptions about food system conditions in order to 
reveal areas of uncertainty. Such analysis help to clarify what logical relationships exist 
between drivers to inform how they may lead to change in the system.  
2.1.2 Scenario development: alternative plausible futures 
Setting up scenarios is a creative process with no ready-made recipes. The basic 
principle of scenario analysis is that the full extent of risks and their interconnectedness 
is assessed. Every potential risk, both on the micro- and macro level, that influences 
the safety of the food system has to be used in the scenario analysis.   
 
Scenarios are developed using a holistic approach that adopts analytical and 
deliberative/participatory techniques such as workshops, expert elicitation and 
computer-based modelling to build a spectrum of plausible alternative futures.  A key 
aspect of the approach involves assessing how the drivers of change, based on factors 
that currently exist or are likely to emerge, evolve and interact with each other in the 
future. Usually two drivers are selected, on the basis of their importance and 
uncertainty, to help construct the scaffolding and axes of a scenario. The scenarios are 
broadly defined using the extremities of these axes. A 2 x 2 matrix is created, based 
typically on an assessment of the most critical uncertainties. Each quadrant of the 
matrix represents the skeleton of a different scenario, where the relationship between 
other drivers are described and characterised to establish the scenario context. The 
selection/prioritisation processes to designate the two main drivers, or the procedure to 
characterise the behaviour of the other drivers, can vary, e.g. by order/score of strength 
of impact on the system in question, via carefully created scoring criteria, by voting on 
driver importance and uncertainty, or by specifically selecting drivers that fit the study 
aim. 
 
Additionally, beyond driver description, scenarios can feature also narratives (i.e. 
scenario descriptions). Narratives can be stories, days in the life of fictional characters, 
report-like descriptions of the current situations etc. Narratives help to better visualise 
a scenario, and offer room for more in-depth technical description of the dynamics of 
the system. Scenario narratives are developed through deliberation with key 
stakeholders and subject experts, and relay plausible future developments of the whole 
system, based on a coherent and internally consistent set of assumptions about key 
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relationships and driving forces. The shorter the time horizon of a scenario, the lower 
the chance of uncertainty, excitement and surprise. Scenarios with a longer time 
horizon make it easier to get people out of fixed mindsets, i.e. to ‘step out of the box’, 
which is crucial in forward looking exercises and can prove to be a major hurdle when 
involving in the process academic/technical experts with considerable experience in a 
narrow aspect of the topic. However, extensively long horizons undermine the 
relevance of the scenarios, and make them non-binding. Careful consideration of the 
scenario horizon to be used is therefore important. 
2.1.3 Scenario analysis  
Once scenarios have been fully described, information pertinent to the object of the 
study can be extracted. Problems, issues, challenges, opportunities and specific 
situations that appear in the scenario can be identified, analysed and used towards the 
aim of the study, e.g. proposing actions, measures, for today that can tackle or even 
prevent the problems of tomorrow. In this way, scenario planning establishes a context 
for dialogue and foresight in decision-making by providing a framework for assessing 
the robustness of policy approaches and risk governance. 
 
A number of scenario development studies have been applied to assess the resilience 
of food systems (O’Keefe et al., 2016; Lakner and Baker, 2014; Vervoort et al. 2014; 
Chaudhury et al., 2013). These scenarios deliberately challenge the mental maps of 
food system actors, exploring deviations expected from a ‘single’ future that typically 
arise from trends and events outside the vision or awareness of those involved in the 
scenario development process. The following examples showcase how forward-
looking studies employing scenarios can inform decision making in the field of EU 
food policy. 
3. Foresight studies in the area of food safety 
3.1 Precaution for food and consumer product safety: a glimpse into the future 
– NVWA (2010) 
New and improved products are entering the food supply chain and while emerging 
technologies help to deal with problems, it is also know that new products can give rise 
to new problems. The Office for Risk Assessment and Research (BuRO) of Netherlands 
Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority (NVWA) is interested in emerging 
technologies that could enter the consumer market at any time in the next 10 to 15 
years.  
Experts from various disciplines were involved in scenario planning (i.e. workshops, 
interviews) that provided a glimpse into the future by indicating which innovative 
technologies are currently under development and could potentially be applied in 
consumer products and foods in coming years. Case studies were examined on what 
society could do to prevent unacceptable risks of new technologies while at the same 
time obtaining the benefits from those technologies.  
Subsequently, three future scenarios were built setting out an extreme view on society 
i) totally safe, ii) risk=business and iii) sharing is knowledge. Each scenario was 
accompanied by a story describing in which innovative products could play a role in 
Enhancing Safety: the Challenge of Foresight 
 105 
our lives. BuRO investigated whether it is possible to identify any risks in relation to 
these innovative technologies at an early stage and ensure preparedness to control the 
risks (Van Duijne et al., 2010). Applying the risk governance approach of International 
Risk Governance Council (IRGC) (IRGC, 2009) the potential emerging risks of seven 
technological innovations were analysed: new generations GM crops, nanocomposites 
and polymer nanoparticles, synthetic nanoparticles in foods, functional foods, new food 
packaging and bioactive coatings, home diagnostics and new solar cells.  
The scenario planning approach generated new topics for the research agenda and the 
guideline for the elaboration of a risk profile for the seven innovative products. 
 
3.2 Plausible future scenarios for the UK food and feed system: exploring future 
pressures on food system actors – UK Food Standards Agency (2014) 
A scenario development project for the UK Food Standards Agency was undertaken to 
investigate how the UK food system may evolve under a different set of assumptions 
about future developments. The scenarios produced have been used to explore long-
term challenges for the food system to inform future food policy, providing information 
upon which to test the resilience of policy options against the scenarios.  
The study relied on evidence from the academic literature, published reports and the 
knowledge of experts, gathered through workshops and interviews, to produce a range 
of plausible scenarios for the UK food and feed system in 2035. Over 60 stakeholders, 
representing government agencies, academic institutions and the food industry were 
involved in the process. A wide range of expertise, including economics, social science, 
food preparation and retail, and risk management, and those at all levels of the 
organization (e.g. operational, middle and upper management staff) were involved to 
gather a range of perspectives about the long-term challenges, key trends and drivers 
of change. 
Employing morphological analytical methods (Voros, 2009), three scenario states were 
developed: Reference scenario (constant rate of change), Global Trading and Resource 
tensions; each describing different pathways that the UK food and feed system could 
take over a twenty-year period. The scenarios were exploratory and qualitative in 
nature, illustrating the consequences of trends and drivers of change on food system 
actors. There was an iterative process to validate the scenarios, involving interviews 
with a number of experts that reviewed how well the scenarios sit within a complex 
policy space. This form of validation allowed for refining the scenario frame, extending 
current thinking in a way that is both challenging and revealing. See Garnett et al. 
(2014) for a full description of the scenario process. 
The implications of the scenarios were explored for different actors within the food 
chain (i.e. from production to consumption) with a particular focus on consumer food 
safety. While food safety is one of the priorities for the UK Food Standards Agency, 
other challenging issues such as the affordability of food, food security and 
sustainability were also considered. The issue of food safety was further explored in 
case studies of three different food types (e.g. cereals, soya, meat and sandwiches) to 
illustrate how the scenarios could be used to assess policy implications for different 
actors. 
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The research outlines the strategic issues and offer insights into intervention that may 
safeguard against risks to the food (or feed) chain, and assist in developing future food 
policy. The case studies were of added-value in that they enabled further reflection on 
the issues at stake, and provided insights into interventions that may safeguard against 
impacts on the food (or feed) chain, and support consideration of appropriate regulatory 
response (e.g. safety standards or controls). 
3.3 Drivers of emerging risks and their interactions in the domain of biological 
risks to animal, plant and public health - EFSA (2014) 
The study objective was to develop a structured approach for the identification of 
drivers of emerging biological risks and their interactions in order to improve EFSA 
capacity for identification of relevant biological emerging risks. Biological risks are an 
outcome of natural processes which may be influenced by human activities or 
autonomous developments. The anticipation of emerging risks should therefore be 
based on the identification of drivers.  
A consultation of the Animal health and welfare (AHAW) and Biological hazards 
(BIOHAZ) Panels was conducted through an adapted Delphi approach. The experts 
were provided with a briefing note with background information on the objectives of 
the exercise and asked to identify drivers and emerging biological risks to animal and 
public health in the next 5-10 years. Subsequently a group of experts participated in a 
workshop focused on identifying most relevant parameters concerning viral agents 
associated with the food chain relevant for human and animal health, and how they 
interact. A parameter influence analysis was conducted to measure and visualise how 
the parameters interact: drivers (strongly influencing but not strongly influenced), 
passive (strongly influenced but not strongly influencing), critical (both strongly 
influenced and strongly influencing) or buffers (neither strongly influenced nor 
strongly influencing. In order to have a better understanding of the applicability of the 
general morphological analysis methodology (GMA), it was decided to work on a 
series of historical cases: Norovirus (since 1968), thermophilic Campylobacter spp. 
(since 1972), Shiga-toxin producing Escherichia coli in beef, mutton and vegetables 
(since 1980s), BSE and vCJD (since 1987), infectious salmon anaemia (late 1980s), 
outbreaks of Trichinella spp. in horse meat (late 1980ties), pandemic of Salmonella 
enteritidis in eggs (since 1990s), foot and mouth disease and classical swine fever 
outbreaks (1990s and 2000-2010), Asian Longhorned Beetle, Anoplophora 
glabripennis (starting in the EU in 2001), Tuta absoluta in tomato (2006), bluetongue 
spreading from the Mediterranean to northern Europe (2010), and enterohaemorrhagic 
E. coli in sprouts (2011).  
A scenario modelling framework was developed for those parameters shown to be 
‘critical’ in the parameter influence analysis. These scenarios included: i) present 
trends, ii) collapse of EU, iii) small scale farming, iv) large scale farming, v) positive 
development: good mix of parameter states leading to decreased risks.  
It was concluded that there is potential to the use of GMA methodology but further 
work was necessary in developing scenarios which can inform EFSA’s strategy for 
emerging risk identification. 
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3.4 Delivering on EU Food Safety and Nutrition in 2050 - Future challenges and 
policy preparedness – European Commission (2016) 
The European Commission's (EC) foresight study entitled 'Delivering on EU Food 
Safety and Nutrition in 2050 – future challenges and policy preparedness' (European 
Commission, 2016) aimed to assess the resilience and readiness of the current food 
safety and nutrition policy and regulatory framework to address future challenges, thus 
contributing to ensuring that the EU citizens will continue to enjoy high standards of 
safe, nutritious and affordable food. The study was jointly developed by the Directorate 
General (DG) for Health and Food Safety (SANTE) and the DG Joint Research Centre 
(JRC). Drawing from the valuable experience of a previous JRC foresight study that 
aimed to identify research priorities for diet in health for 2050 (European Commission, 
2014), the JRC-SANTE study also employed scenario development methodology. 
Key to the development of the study were two participatory technical workshops, 
featuring recognised experts of various thematic backgrounds coming from EC 
services, EFSA, EU Member States national food and health authorities, academia, 
private food sector industry and professional associations, as well as non-
governmental/consumer organisations. 
The four study scenarios were based on the developments of specific drivers that can 
bring change and significantly impact the food system: diverging developments in 
global trade, food values, EU economic growth, agro-food chain structure, technology 
uptake, and social cohesion were meaningfully combined to create four diverse and fit-
for-purpose food system scenarios for EU food safety and nutrition in 2050. Climate 
change impacts, natural resources scarcity and world population growth provided a 
constant background for all four scenarios. The four scenarios were: 'Global Food', 
'Regional Food', 'Partnership Food', and 'Pharma Food'. 
Food safety and nutrition challenges were identified from all scenarios and prioritised 
based on importance of impacts and likelihood to occur. These challenges were then 
mapped to the current EU policy and regulatory framework in food safety and nutrition, 
and, where gaps where identified and scenario-specific policy options that could 
address them were put forward. Finally, where required, research needs were also 
proposed to complement and facilitate policy options.  
Within the boundaries of the study, the EU legal framework resulted robust; certain 
elements however would need further attention to strengthen the systems resilience, 
such as: harmonisation and streamlining of risk assessment procedure, which should 
include also risk-benefit assessment, need for a benchmarking system to measure 
regulatory performance in food safety and nutrition, an effective early-warning system 
for identifying emerging risks, potential adaptation of official controls and inspection 
mechanisms for diverse future needs, provision of clear food information to the public, 
as well as investment in food and nutrition education. 
4. Discussion   
Environmental scanning for defining driving forces constitutes the backbone of 
scenario planning. Expertise on different drivers of change covering a wide range of 
subject areas, often not present in a single institution needs to be available to ensure the 
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development of plausible scenarios. Identified drivers are highly connected, but may 
show effects on different timescales that need to be considered. Experts contributing to 
the study should have in-depth experience in their own field of work, recognising that 
it is not easy to ‘step out of the box’ to consider a radically different the future, while 
at the same time retaining and communicating their knowledge of historical and current 
trends that inform us of possible developments of the system in the future. It is crucial 
that creative techniques are used to help participants envisage the future and relate this 
back to their knowledge and expertise in order to develop highly plausible scenarios 
that gain ‘traction’ in the review of policy and strategy.  
Integrating qualitative and quantitative data of different levels of uncertainty, (e.g. trade 
trends and expert knowledge views) is also necessary to reduce uncertainty and develop 
baselines and indicators of change. Analysis of drivers requires predictive modelling 
of large complexity. Bayesian network analysis is being used to investigate 
multifactorial issues, but issues related with quality of data and underlying assumptions 
must be expressed in a transparent manner. 
 Scenarios describe a potential range of futures, but this does not mean that other 
futures cannot exist. Scenarios are a tool to identify challenges; it is the alternative 
futures that are described in all scenario studies, and not a single one, that is 
important for policy preparedness.  
 Scenarios often describe worlds that are unpleasant, or that may not fit with the 
desires and vision that an individual may have. This can often lead to difficulty in 
accepting a scenario, and even a tendency to discredit it, or to even have the 
opposite effect, i.e. an attachment to a single scenario while ignoring the rest. 
Scenarios are not meant to be likable, and in fact it is probable that each member 
of the audience will not feel the same way towards a specific scenario. It is the 
usefulness of a scenario that is important, and the implications it may have for the 
system, and under such a scope even scenarios which are undesirable to some, hold 
a lot of value for effective policy preparedness. 
 Highly disruptive events and ‘black swans’ often do not make part of scenario 
development, and, although nobody argues that such low-probability and high 
impact events can indeed take place, they change the system in such a way that it 
may invalidate the scope and aim of the foresight study, it is perhaps better to 
address them specifically via appropriately designed and aimed studies. 
 
5. Conclusions and recommendations   
Foresight studies promote a prevention-oriented and pro-active risk policy approach, 
which considers food systems as a whole; such a holistic view is crucial to achieve risk 
governance efficiency and coherence in a field that is often addressed by different 
policy areas (e.g. agriculture, health, internal market) and by different government 
levels (e.g. EU, MS, local authorities). 
Scenarios present decision-makers with other perspectives and possible future options 
that reveal unfamiliar factors of developments across the food system, and raise 
awareness about inherent uncertainties. Moving from scenarios to action is the ultimate 
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measure of success of any scenario project. Often this requires scenarios be applied to 
(Henriques et al 2015): 
 Test the current (or alternative) food strategy/policy/delivery mechanisms against 
numerous scenarios 
 Understand and apply robust responses that address food safety issues revealed 
across numerous scenarios  
 Determine what would be a good strategic position to take in response to critical 
areas of uncertainty regarding food safety, or indeed risks and opportunities 
presented, across numerous scenarios 
The scenario development process itself offers a unique opportunity to engage a wide 
range of key actors in the supply chain in strategic conversations about food system 
developments (including changes in legislative and policy frameworks), thereby 
creating opportunities for the process to inform policy development. Engaging decision 
makers during scenario building is often a challenge but necessary to support the 
communication of findings. In the area of food safety and to improve the use of 
foresight approaches to policy development it is fundamental to stimulate the:  
 Development of indicators for monitoring change; 
 Analysis of impact of scenarios on strategy and decision making; 




The UK Food Standards Agency scenario project was funded as part of the Defra 
Futures Research Partnership (Project ID: SD0339). 
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The article is focused on visibility of early warning signs. It describes how the incident 
scenarios can be used as a supporting tool for foresight. Possible appearance of the 
incident scenarios represents a starting point. The use of scenarios for the 
identification of early warning signs and for the prioritization of early warning signs 
is shown. Uses of both predictive and retrospective scenarios are analysed and 
common features of both the types are identified. Ways of the use of scenarios are 
illustrated by examples. According to the article, visualisation of hazard realizations 
represents the common principal purpose of the use of scenarios. Relation of the 
visibility of hazard realizations to the visibility of early warning signs is discussed and 
demonstrated. Methods of hazard identification and risk analysis and methods of 
incident cause analysis are brought to mind in the article.  




Kate and William are married; William stays at his parental leave. He takes care about 
children and also he cooks. He likes cooking. In connection with cooking, he frequently 
makes small changes – hopefully improvements – in the kitchen.  
Kate is glad that William likes cooking. But she does not respond only positively to his 
improvements in the kitchen. For instance she does not like the bottle with oil in the 
close proximity of stove, or a heavy bowl in the shelf above the ceramic hob. Also she 
hates William’s custom to leave the frying pan on the stove unattended. See Figure 1. 
When they had a controversy over this the last time, William was arguing that nothing 
had happened yet. Kate answers that all these changes are indicators of problems that 
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could lead to an incident. In accordance with [1] she calls them warning signs or early 
warning signs (EWS) and insists on that William should avoid them. 
William replies that he does not see anything serious in these changes. Kate states that 
this is because he does not imagine any accident scenarios. She imagines the scenarios 
of possible fires in the kitchen and therefore she perceives these EWS as unacceptable. 
Kate says: 
 Scenarios make it possible to see the risk comprehensively. 
 Scenarios are a practical tool for thinking about risk. 
 Early warning signs (EWSs) can be derived from scenarios. 
 Scenarios make EWS visible through the visualisation of the role of hazards and 
controls of hazards. 
 Scenarios are a practical tool for identifying and prioritizing the EWS. 
 
 
Figure 1. William’s kitchen. 
 
1.2 Objectives 
Let us move from the kitchen into the more industrial environment. As an example we 
will use an object for production of emulsion explosive charges. Figure 2 shows basic 
arrangement of this plant. Protective walls surround light building inside of which the 
automatic filling machine produces explosive charges from the explosive paste. In this 
environment, William may play a role of personnel and Kate represents his manager. 
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Figure 2. Object for production of emulsion explosive 
charges (bird’s view). 
 
We note that someone simply sees early warning signs and other people do not see 
them similarly as Kate sees them and William does not see. Let's examine Kate's 
statements from the preceding section. Kate’s hypotheses about the visualisation of risk 
and early warning signs are to be proved in the following sections. Their applicability 
is to be shown. We want to find out how scenarios can help us perceive EWS, 
improving so our foresight and contributing so to Enhancing Safety. 
2. Scenarios make it possible to see the risk comprehensively 
2.1 Hazards represent the starting point 
Origins of danger are called hazards. Definition from book [2] states that hazard is a 
physical or chemical condition that has the potential for causing harm. Hazards in the 
industrial environment have usually the form of a presence of dangerous substance or 
a possibility of undesirable reaction or an accumulation of energy.  
In case of William’s kitchen the three forms of hazards can be represented by the bottle 
with oil in the close proximity of stove, by possibility that the oil in the frying pan 
ignites, and by the heavy bowl in the shelf above the ceramic hob. In case of industrial 
object from Fig. 2 three groups of hazards are represented e.g. by the presence of 
volumes of explosives, by the possibility of decomposition reaction in the explosive, 
or by the energy of compressed air in piping of filling machine.  
Hazards can be systematically identified. Number of suitable techniques was developed 
for this purpose. Probably the most universal techniques for hazard identification in 
industrial installations are FMEA and HAZOP. See [2]. 
2.2 Hazards are not a risk 
Mere identification of hazards however does not say too much about the risk that is 
connected with a process or with an operated system. Presence of the bottle with oil in 
the kitchen means only that the risk connected with the use of kitchen cannot be zero, 
but nothing more. Three reasons exist why mere knowledge about present hazards is 
not enough: 
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 Already the article [3] reminds us that risk increases with the increasing presence 
of hazards, but it also decreases according to measures which are intended to keep 
control over hazards. Some of such measures may prevent realizations of hazards, 
and others may mitigate the effects of realizations. Various types of these measures 
are called barriers, safeguards, regulations, or layers of protection. Here we will 
mostly use the term controls or preventive/mitigative controls. 
 The risk is not only influenced by the interaction of hazards and controls, but also 
by the interaction of hazards among themselves. This refers to the terms domino 
effect or knock-on effect. For example, the ignition of the oil in the pan can develop 
into the ignition of the oil inside the bottle. 
 The magnitude of the risk is also influenced by local environmental conditions that 
change regardless of hazards and controls. For example, the development of a fire 
in the kitchen may be different depending on whether the door and/or the window 
are open. The risk of the plant varies according to how the conditions for the 
propagation of the shock waves and the clouds of the flue gas change in the 
atmosphere. 
 
2.3 Scenarios show more than just the hazards 
Scenarios describe how the situations can develop when a hazard starts to realize. 
According to book [4] the above word “realization” means an event or events by which 
the potential in a hazard system becomes actual. In accordance with this idea the 
scenarios are sequences of events in which the first event (initiating event) starts the 
realization of a hazard. The sequence can but does not have to include other - 
developing - events in addition to the initiation event. See Figure 3. Developing events 
may be events in the hazard, failures or successes of different controls, application of 
different environmental conditions, or escalation of development to other present 
hazards. 
 
Figure 3. Scenario. 
 
In the kitchen, Kate appears to think about fire scenarios; in the charges production 
plant she would imagine explosions. For example in the kitchen a scenario may start 
by the ignition of the oil in the frying pan; continue by extinguishing of fire or by 
escalation of fire to other hazards including the oil bottle in the vicinity of the stove; 
and develop until the fire spreads to the entire fire load in the kitchen. 
Such scenarios deserve the name incident scenarios since they always cause non-
negligible damage. Such scenarios have two substantial properties: 
1. Each scenario represents one possible interaction of real conditions in the process/ 
system. The scenarios not only take into account the hazards in the process/ system 
but also the ways in which these hazards realize, how the controls fail or succeed, 
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how the hazards interact and how environmental conditions contribute to the 
development of the incident. 
2. Each scenario represents one contribution to the risk of process/ system. Each 
incident scenario represents one possibility how damage may arise in the process/ 
system. Or each scenario represents one part of the risk according to the classical 
definition [3]. 
 
Kate obviously has in mind both these two properties when saying that scenarios make 
it possible to see the risk comprehensively. In accordance with article [3], the risk of 
process/ system is for her a set of all conceivable incident scenarios in the process/ 
system. 
3. Scenarios are a practical tool for thinking about risk 
3.1 Incident scenarios are a natural tool 
Kate is one of the people who consider thinking about danger with the help of scenarios 
as something natural. The experience with the behaviour of hazards serves as a stimulus 
for this thinking. The experience does not need to be personal; knowledge-based 
experience will be enough. When Kate for instance sees Figure 4, she realizes that any 
heavy object above the ceramic hob is a hazard, and starts thinking about scenarios 
initiated by falls of heavy objects, and about relevant preventive/ mitigative controls.  
This is quite a common way of thinking. It is possible that the ability to respond to 
experience with the behaviour of hazard by spontaneous development of incident 
scenarios is a result of evolutionary selection. For example, we know that for our 
ancestor living in the cave, the presence of the sabre-tooth tiger in the neighbourhood 
represented a hazard. It is undeniable that the ability to imagine a scenario initiated in 
this hazard (ability to predict what can happen if a tiger lurks in front of the cave) and 
the ability to prepare appropriate preventive/ mitigative controls in order to minimise 
the damage caused by the realization of this hazard was the advantage during human 
evolution.  
 
Figure 4. Empirical information about a hazard and its 
behaviour. 
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Today's designer or an operator of industrial system may think about the realization of 
hazards just like Kate thinks about heavy objects over a ceramic hob or like a caveman 
thinks about a lurking tiger. For such thinking it is necessary to know the behaviour of 
the relevant hazards, to understand them on the basis of natural science or to have 
experience with them. The effectiveness of such thinking can be enhanced by adopting 
appropriate techniques. 
Incident scenarios can arise in two ways: as a result of prediction (risk analysis) or 
retrospection (incident analysis). These two options will be discussed in more detail. 
3.2 Incident scenarios may be results of prediction 
Predictive scenarios arise by developing initiating events in hazards. Event trees are 
commonly used to represent and create them (see [2]). Example event tree is in Fig. 5.  
Figure 6 contains the same list of scenarios as the event tree in Fig. 5. 
 
 
Figure 5. Event tree. 
 
When an analyst constructs an event tree, he starts from a known initiating event in a 
hazard, knows the behaviour of hazards, and is aware of controls and environmental 
conditions. He usually begins by considering how and in what order after the initiating 
event, the controls and environmental conditions should be applied to minimize the 
damage caused. This sequence of events is called success scenario. Success scenario 
defines heading of event tree. In Fig. 5 it consists of the initiating event and three 
developing events. 
The analyst then considers what the negations of controls and environmental conditions 
may cause in the development of an incident. He records the findings in the tree graph 
below the heading. Such a way he creates a list of predictive incident scenarios which 
start with the selected initiating event. 
 
 
Figure 6. List of incident scenarios from ET in Fig. 5. 
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3.3 Predictive analysis of incident scenarios 
Analysis of incident scenarios using event trees uncovers possible interactions of real 
conditions in the system, i.e. interactions of present hazards, controls and 
environmental conditions. For most of the events in the tree it is valid that they can 
change within a certain range without changing the scenario. For example, if in the tree 
in Fig. 5 the initiating event is the ignition of oil in the pan, and the first developing 
event is a fire intervention with a lid, then the fire intervention can take place at any 
time within a certain time interval of about tens of seconds without changing the course 
of the scenario. An event tree analyst considers the ranges within which the events can 
be changed. Individual scenarios from the tree thus represent whole classes of 
somewhat different scenarios, which however do not differ in qualitative terms, i.e. by 
the type of events involved. The event tree thus contains representative accident 
scenarios. For more details see, for example, article [5]. 
Predictive scenario analysis can be used even before the precise form of the individual 
conditions in the process/ system is known. Once an initiating event is defined, all the 
safety functions that are required to mitigate the incident must be defined and organized 
according to their time of intervention (see book [6]). In the case of ignition in the 
frying pan, we could consider immediate fire fighting, limitation of propagation, 
delayed fire fighting, and extinguishing by an external fire brigade. Defining safety 
functions can be very useful in the design phase because it can be used to define 
controls. 
Predictive analysis typically seeks to investigate systematically all initiating events and 
related incident scenarios. Scenarios created by predictive analysis take the form of 
conjunctions of events from which no event can be removed. When thinking about risk, 
events in scenarios that represent degradation of control over hazards are at the heart 
of interest. If the convention is kept that the tree heading contains a success scenario, 
then events that represent degradation are both initiating events and all events that 
negate successes from the heading, i.e. all the events starting in Fig. 5 and 6 with the 
word "non". 
Guidelines [7] define causal factor as a negative event or undesirable condition that if 
eliminated would have either prevented the occurrence (= incident scenario) or reduced 
its severity or frequency. This is exact description of both initiating events and negating 
events. Thus initiating event and negating events in the event tree can be called causal 
factors.  
Therefore, predictive analysis using event trees can serve as a tool for the systematic 
identification of all possible causal factors in the process/ system. 
3.4 Incident scenarios may be results of retrospection 
Retrospective accident scenarios are created as a result of the reconstruction of 
incidents in the system/ process. According to [8], such reconstruction is always 
necessary regardless of the method to be used to analyze the causes of the incident. 
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If the analysis of the retrospective scenario is aimed at preventing the repetition of the 
same or similar scenarios, it must focus on those events in the scenario that worsen the 
control over a hazard. And these are causal factors as defined in [7]. 
Retrospective analysis of the accident thus reconstructs the incident scenario and serves 
as a tool for identifying the set of causal factors for this particular incident. 
3.5 Comparison of prediction and retrospection, role of causal factors 
Causal factors are crucial (necessary and sufficient) conditions for the form of incident 
scenarios. While predictive analysis attempts to predict all possible causal factors that 
might occur, retrospective analysis identifies the combination of causal factors that 
actually occurred. If predictive analysis is flawless, then retrospective analysis should 
result in one of the scenarios created by predictive analysis. 
Actually, if we have a set of possible incident scenarios created by a predictive analysis 
for the process/ system, it is not certain that the scenario generated by the incident 
retrospection in this process/ system can be quickly identified with one of the predictive 
scenarios. There may be several reasons for unsuccessful identification:  
1) retrospective analysis may mix several scenarios that took place concurrently; 
2) scenario events in retrospective analysis are determined in more detail than those in 
predictive scenarios;  
3) certain conditions that worsen the control over a hazard in the process/ system may 
be omitted in predictive analysis. 
The most important common finding is as follows: In both predictive and retrospective 
scenario analysis, the main outcome in terms of safety is always a set of events that 
represent a worsening of control over the hazards to which our attention should be 
focused. In other words, our interest focuses on events called causal factors. 
4. Early warning signs (EWSs) can be derived from scenarios 
4.1 Scenarios make visible the threatening conditions in the process/ system 
The previous section has shown that incident scenarios can be understood as a 
combination of causal factors, a necessary and sufficient combination of events 
worsening the control over the hazards. The causal factors can be represented by the 
initiating event in the hazard, or by the failures of the measures intended to mitigate the 
realization of a hazard, as well as by the failure of the measures intended to prevent the 
realization of additional hazard, as well as the events adversely affecting the 
environmental conditions influencing the realization of hazards. 
This result shows that the scenarios make visible the ways in which hazards realize in 
a particular system/ process. They visualise the real role of hazards and related controls 
and environmental conditions in a particular system/ process. This visualisation is the 
basic purpose of both risk analysis and undesirable event analysis. 
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4.2 Better than prediction or retrospection is the combination of both 
Retrospectively, i.e. based on experience with specific undesirable events, only specific 
accident scenarios can be revealed within the incident cause analysis. From logic point 
of view, this is an inductive process. Its advantage is that it identifies the real 
weaknesses of control over the hazards, usually the most likely. It may also reveal 
weaknesses that within risk analysis remain hidden from our eyes for their delicacy. 
The disadvantage is that it reveals only some weaknesses and scenarios, not necessarily 
those that most contribute to risk. The disadvantage may also be that, in the analysis, 
causal factors are not identified in a sufficiently general manner. The results may 
mistakenly adhere only to the partial weakness, which is only a contribution to the 
general causal factor. 
Predictively, i.e. based on a system/ process analysis, the risk analysis can reveal 
theoretically all possible incident scenarios. From logic point of view, this process is 
deductive. (This means, of course, that it also contains the inductive component - 
general rules on behaviour of hazards and controls based on experience). The advantage 
of this approach is that it systematically searches for all weaknesses in the control over 
the hazards. It is able to reveal all the weaknesses and scenarios, including those with 
low frequencies. It can also reveal weaknesses that, by mere application of experience, 
remain hidden from our eyes. The disadvantage of the predictive approach, however, 
is that the analysis can not avoid various neglects and simplifications because of which 
some substantial interactions of hazards and controls may be omitted. Hence, the 
outcome of the prediction may appear to be complete, but in reality, substantial 
scenarios are missing. 
Since it is difficult to avoid above-mentioned errors when using these approaches, 
combination of a predictive and a retrospective approach seems to be a practical and 
realistic approach to identifying scenarios. 
4.3 Early warning signs are causes of causal factors 
We realized in the previous steps that a set of scenarios makes the risk of the system/ 
process visible as a set of sets of causal factors. As we have already mentioned in 
Introduction, the essence of foresight is the ability to see EWS or indicators of problems 
that could lead to an incident. In the context in which the risk is decomposed into 
incident scenarios and incident scenarios are decomposed into causal factors, the 
foresight means ability to see the signs that some identified causal factors could actually 
occur. In particular, we would like to be able to see signs of possible occurrence of 
causal factors that contribute most importantly to the risk. 
It follows from the previous paragraph that the concept of EWS can be identified with 
the causes of causal factors. However, the concept of causes does not have clear and 
unambiguous content. If we talk about the causes, we can talk about many kinds of 
events and ideas. In technical practice, at least direct causes and underlying causes are 
usually distinguished. Lower differences exist with respect to direct causes. They are 
physically detectable failures, errors, states, conditions, the combination of which 
causes an occurrence of causal factor. But there are quite different ideas in different 
approaches to incident analysis about what are the underlying causes. In relatively 
common root cause analysis (RCA) methods the underlying causes are called root 
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causes and represent deficiencies in the implementation of a safety management 
system. They could also be referred to as organizational causes. Improved RCA such 
as in [9] would include also the underlying causes in safety culture or attitudes of local 
management. Symptoms would be identified within ESReDA analysis [10] and failing 
processes within Leveson’s analysis [11]. 
This diversity means that EWSs can have very variable forms. While these differences 
in our understanding of causes can discourage us, they all point to the same general 
fact: EWSs can be determined from incident scenarios as (partial) causes of relevant 
causal factors. 
5. Scenarios make EWSs visible through the visualisation of the role 
of hazards and controls of hazards 
5.1 Steps to the identification of EWSs 
Scenarios can help see the EWSs in two steps. In the first step, we determine the causal 
factors in the incident scenarios; in the second step we determine the causes of the 
established causal factors. 
In predictive analysis, causal factors are determined as: 
 events in hazards that initiate realization of hazards 
 events in hazards that escalate damages 
 events that represent failure of controls over realized hazards 
 events that allow damage escalation by setting up adverse environmental 
conditions. 
 
The determination of causal factors is very easy in conventional event trees. Four causal 
factors are present in Fig. 5: I-event, non-D-event1, non-D-event2, and non-D-event3. 
Various techniques and approaches can be used for the identification of causes of causal 
factors. Fault tree analysis (FTA) that is recommended in book [7], is very productive 
in predictive analysis. Fig. 7 shows possible results of application of FTA to two causal 
factors. It flows from Figures 5 to 7 that cause1, cause2, and cause3 represent EWSs 
for all scenarios S1 to S4. Cause4 and cause5 are EWSs only for scenario S3. Cause2 
indicates the possibility of formation of both causal factors at the same time. Cause2 
may represent a sort of common cause failure. Typically, the EWSs with common-
cause nature may be the deficiencies in local safety management system. 
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Figure 7. Causes of two causal factors from Fig. 5 and 6. 
 
In a retrospective analysis, causal factors are selected as events that meet the definition 
of causal factor. Determination of direct causes is usually the result of an incident 
reconstruction. A hierarchy of checklists called root cause map is often used to 
determine underlying causes in RCA and improved RCAs. See book [7]. 
5.2 EWSs are gradually made visible 
The path to visible EWSs begins when the incident scenarios are constructed. Scenarios 
allow the identification of causal factors. They make visible the realization of hazards, 
which is the main purpose of the construction of incident scenarios. They make visible 
the roles of hazards and controls of hazards. Once causal factors are known, a way to 
make EWSs visible is open. Therefore, the visibility of the EWSs emerges through the 
visualisation of the role of hazards and controls of hazards. 
6. Scenarios are a practical tool for identifying and prioritizing the 
EWSs 
6.1 Predictive scenarios are appropriate for the identification of EWSs 
Example 1: A frying pan filled with oil is a hazard in the kitchen. Kate worries that the 
oil in the pan may ignite - she considers the ignition of the oil in the pan to be a possible 
initiating event. Rapid extinguishing by laying the lid on the pan minimizes damage 
after the initiating event. If this does not happen, further development depends on 
whether there is another hazard near the pan - a plastic bottle of oil. If it is not there, 
the damage is minimized: It can be expected that the oil in the pan will burn out, the 
smoke will cause damage, but the fire will not expand further. If the bottle is present 
and stays nearby, it is a matter of time when a large amount of burning oil is spilled on 
the stove and on the floor. At this point, the rapid use of a suitable fire extinguisher can 
minimize damage. If the extinguisher is not used quickly, the fire will spread across the 
room. Further development depends on whether the door is opened into the adjoining 
dining room or whether it is closed. Closed door minimizes damage in the sense that 
when the fire breaks out the window and becomes noticeable from the outside of the 
house, no further rooms are hit so far. If a fire-fighting car arrives in time, it will save 
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most of the house from the fire. The success scenario consists of an initiating event and 
five developing events. 
Three of the developing events are the use of controls, one event is the realization of 
another hazard, and one can be considered to be the application of environmental 
condition. The entire event tree (Figure 8) contains seven incident scenarios. 
 
 
Figure 8. Analysis of possible developments of ignition of 
oil in frying pan.  
 
Causal factors are determined. Based on causal factors, EWSs in the kitchen can be 
determined. For example, William’s custom to leave the frying pan unattended may 
contribute to the causes of the initiating event and is the cause of the failure of the first 
developing event. It is therefore a clear early warning signal. 
Example 2: Initiation of detonation during the start of filling machine represents a 
possible initiating event in object for production of emulsion explosive charges. 
Resulting event tree is shown in Fig. 9. EWSs that correspond with the identified causal 
factors are over-limit amounts of explosives, inappropriate deployment of explosives, 
and insufficient resistance of object.6.2 Retrospective scenarios are appropriate for 
the identification of EWSs 
 
Figure 9. Scenario of real incident in William’s kitchen.  
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Example 3: Fig. 10 shows a real incident scenario in the kitchen. The scenario reminds 
scenarios S5 and S7 from Fig. 8. Because the information about the dining room door 
status is missing in the scenario, it is not to be expected that this reconstruction of the 
incident could identify the EWSs causing the door to be opened. On the contrary, the 
causal factor CF1 is identified in the reconstructed scenario, which is missing in the 
scenarios in Fig. 8. The reason for the extra causal factor in the scenario corresponds 
to point 2 in section 3.5. Causal factor CF1 is the cause of causal factors that we find 
in scenarios S5 and S7 from Fig. 8. 
Example 4: Fig. 11 shows the scenario that actually occurred in object for production 
of emulsion explosive charges. The scenario contains causal factor CF3 that is not 
identified in the event tree in Fig. 9. In this case, the real event revealed a deficiency in 
the predictive analysis of Fig. 9. As stated in section 3.5, point 3, it was overlooked that 
controls during the start of filling machine should also include the care of the absence 
of surplus persons in the building. In this case, the retrospective analysis reveals EWSs 
that predictive analysis was not able to detect.  
 
 
Figure 10. Scenario of real incident in object for 
production of emulsion explosive charges.  
 
6.3 Scenarios allow the prioritization of the EWSs 
Prioritization of EWSs can be done analogously as determination of quantitative 
importances of components according to [12]. Let us assume that predictive analysis 
of the process/ system results in the list of incident scenarios Si, where i = 1 to N. Let 
us assume that a point estimates of frequency fi and of damage xi are determined for 
each scenario. Point estimates of scenario frequencies are determined with the use of 
point estimates of frequencies of causes of individual events in scenarios. Point 
estimate of risk of the process/ system R can be determined as a sum of all products 
fi × xi for i =1, ..., N. Let us determine a modified point estimation of risk R(EWS) as 
a sum of products fi(EWS) × xi for i =1, ..., N, where frequencies fi(EWS) are 
determined with the use of point estimate of frequency of EWS = 0/year. Priority of 
cause EWS is p(EWS) = R - R(EWS). The higher the priority, the greater the risk 
reduction can be achieved by suppressing the occurrence of the EWS. 
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7. Conclusions 
Foresight cannot take place without determining the EWSs. The article shows that 
incident scenarios may play useful roles in making the EWSs visible. This way, Kate’s 
hypotheses from Introduction are proved. Early warning signs (EWSs) can be derived 
from scenarios. Scenarios make EWSs visible through the visualization of the role of 
hazards and controls of hazards. Scenarios are a practical tool for identifying and 
prioritizing the EWSs. 
EWS can be determined from scenarios obtained by predictive or retrospective 
analysis. The path to the determination of the EWSs leads through the determination 
of causal factors. Causal factors make EWSs visible. Thus they improve foresight and 
contribute to enhancing safety. 
With the use of incident scenarios, it is possible 1) to make visible the events that are 
to be considered EWSs in the process/ system, and 2) select EWSs that deserve special 
attention (such as real-time monitoring). 
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Risk analysis is about to enter an era of larger and more complex data sets (big data), 
where the main challenges are represented by the ability to provide continuous 
acquisition, effective process and meaningful communication of information. However, 
most of the methods for quantitative risk assessment allow for static evaluations of risk 
in a frozen instant of the system life. Research on how to dynamically assess risk in 
process industry has been carried out, but no real implementation has been attempted. 
Some open questions are still undermining this approach and should be directly 
addressed to provide reliable models and exploit new technology opportunities. i) 
Which strategy should be adopted? ii) How early warnings and past events should be 
assessed and connected to the overall risk? This contribution aims to give an overview 
on preliminary answers and highlight possible uncertainties of future developments. 
Keywords: dynamic risk assessment; process industry; process safety indicators; 
information modelling 
1. Introduction 
An era of larger and more complex data sets (big data) is around the corners for risk 
analysis methods. For instance, "Google Trends" shows that the number of Google 
searches for the term "big data" has increased about 100 times since 2011 and today it 
has reached its peak (Google Inc. 2016). However, despite the increasing availability 
of new-generation wireless sensors, powerful computers and optical fibres, the main 
challenges remain related to continuous acquisition, effective process and meaningful 
communication of information. The term "dynamic risk" had its peak on "Google 
Trends" in 2009 and today its popularity on the search engine has decreased of about 
one third (Google Inc. 2016). Many factors may affect such trends and they do not 
represent the actual applications. However, this behavior may reflect the challenges of 
dynamic risk assessment to find its place in industry standard approaches. While 
dynamic risk management has become a common practice in finance in response to the 
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financial crisis in 2008 (this explains its popularity peak one year later), most of the 
methods for quantitative risk assessment in industry only allow for static evaluations 
of risk. Research on how to dynamically assess risk in process industry has been carried 
out, but no real implementation has been attempted. Some open questions are still 
undermining this kind of approach and should be directly addressed to provide reliable 
models and exploit new technology opportunities. 
This contribution provides an overview on what can be considered as big data in 
process safety and how this information can be processed by advanced techniques of 
dynamic risk analysis. A discussion on the benefits and limitations of such approaches 
is also carried out, in order to clearly identify related uncertainties and potential ways 
forward. 
 
2. Big data of process safety 
2.1 Process indicators 
Increasing attention has been dedicated to evaluation and monitoring of early 
deviations through appropriate indicators, as a way to foresee the occurrence of major 
accidents (Paltrinieri et al. 2016). A number of indicator typologies have been theorized 
and used.  
For instance, Health and Safety Executive (2006) identifies two main categories of 
indicators: leading and lagging indicators. Leading indicators are a form of active 
monitoring of key events or activities that are essential to deliver the desired safety 
outcome. They represent early deviations from the ideal situation that can lead to 
further escalation of negative consequences. Human and organizational factors often 
(but not always) represent such underlying causes. Lagging indicators are a form of 
reactive monitoring requiring reporting and investigation of speciﬁc incidents and 
events to discover weaknesses in the system. Lagging indicators show when a desired 
safety outcome has failed, or has not been achieved.  
Øien et al. (2011) affirm that we can refer to risk indicators if: they provide numerical 
values (such as a number or a ratio); they are updated at regular intervals; they only 
cover some selected determinants of overall risk, in order to have a manageable set of 
them. The latter feature has quickly become outdated due to the extensive collection 
that is being carried out in industry and the attempts made to process and elaborate 
larger numbers of them (Paltrinieri & Reniers 2017). For instance, for the first time 
since the first Seveso directive was issued in 1982, Seveso III mentions specific 
procedures for safety performance indicators and/or other relevant indicators, to use for 
monitoring the performance of safety management systems (European Parliament And 
Council 2012). The main aims of the Seveso directives are prevention, preparedness 
and response to accidents involving dangerous substances in industry in the EU. 
Lagging indicators in the form of past events are collected by the competent authorities 
of all EU member and associated countries (European Parliament And Council 2012) 
and may indicate themselves the safety performance of a Seveso site. One of the most 
complete monitoring approaches is suggested in the United Kingdom, where the 
competent authorities require also the collection of safety performance indicators, 
which may include leading indicators. Such information is periodically reviewed based 
on a priority classification of Seveso sites (UK Secretary of State 2015; HSE 2015; 
COMAH Competent Authorities 2013; COMAH Competent Authorities 2012). In 
addition, Italian and Dutch relevant regulations address safety performance monitoring 
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based on indicators and their trends (Consigio dei Ministri 2015; Staatssecretaris van 
Infrastructuur en Milieu 2015). 
2.1.1 Techniques for development of indicators 
Several approaches are used for the development of safety/risk indicators. Paltrinieri et 
al. (2016) identify four classes of methods.  
 
Class I is characterized by a retrospective perspective, where indicators are developed 
on the basis of the effect of Technical, Human and Organizational (THO) factors in 
past accidents, and correlation with the overall safety is assumed (Table I). However, 
major accidents are rare events and the correlation between critical indicators and 
safety may not be conclusively demonstrated.  
 
Class II is characterized by a predictive perspective, where indicators are defined on 
the basis of risk models (such as Quantitative Risk Analysis – QRA) for the potential 
accident scenarios addressed, and the connection to the overall risk level is logically 
supported by these models (Table I).  
 
Class III groups approaches aggregating the information provided by the indicators, 
allowing for relatively reliable evaluation of risk on a real-time basis (Table I). Limited 
sets of risk indicators may not allow comprehensive coverage of THO factors. 
 
Class IV also groups approaches aggregating information from ad hoc indicators, 
which have been specifically developed for proactive risk assessment (Table I). 
Table I shows representative approaches for the development of indicators. Several of 
these approaches for the development of major hazards indicators were primarily 
defined for the nuclear power industry. However, the chemical process and petroleum 
industries have contributed with the definition of specific techniques [11]. 
 
Table I: Representative approaches for development of technical, human and organizational indicators 
 
Indicators or approaches for their development Class References 
Operational safety indicators I (IAEA- International Atomic 
Energy Agency 1999) 
Safety performance indicators I (Holmberg et al. 1994) 
Risk indicators based on Probabilistic Safety 
Assessment 
II (IAEA- International Atomic 
Energy Agency 1999) 
Resilience-based Early Warning Indicators II (N. Paltrinieri et al. 2012) 
Indicators for risk-based inspection III (American Petroleum 
Institute 2000) 
MANGER method III (Pitblado et al. 2011) 
Risk Barometer IV (Hauge et al. 2015) 
 
2.2 Iteration of risk assessment 
As mentioned by Villa et al. (2016), several efforts have been recently devoted to the 
development of dynamic risk assessment and management approaches considering the 
evolution of assessed process. Such evolution may be described by the class III or IV 
indicators previously introduced. 
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Some of the first attempts to simulate the dynamic nature of system behaviour were 
made by Swaminathan and Smidts, who proposed a methodology to extend the 
application of event sequence diagram (ESDs) to the modelling of dynamic situations 
and identification of missing accidental scenarios (Swaminathan & Smidts 1999). 
Čepin and Mavko developed an extension of the fault tree analysis to represent time 
requirements in safety systems (Čepin & Mavko 2002). Similarly, Bucci et al. (Bucci 
et al. 2008) presented a methodology to extend fault trees and event trees in a dynamic 
perspective.  
 
The first complete dynamic risk assessment methodology for process facilities, named 
Dynamic Failure Assessment, was developed by Meel and Seider (Meel & Seider 
2008). This approach aims at estimating the dynamic probabilities of accident 
sequences, including near misses and incident data (named as Accident Sequence 
Precursors – ASP), as well as real-time data from processes.  
 
Kalantarnia et al. (Kalantarnia et al. 2010) integrated Bayesian failure mechanisms with 
consequence assessment. Starting from this foundational contribution, several 
methodologies have tried to improve the approach by introducing slight modifications. 
For instance, Hierarchical Bayesian Analysis (HBA) widened the field of application 
for DRA also to rare event, due to a two-stage Bayesian method (Khakzad et al. 2014). 
System hazard identification, prediction and prevention methodology (SHIPP) is 
another derived approach specifically addressing accident modelling, which integrate 
technical and non-technical barriers (Rathnayaka et al. 2011). Another mentionable 
contribution is the Dynamic Operational Risk Assessment (DORA) methodology 
(Yang & Mannan 2010), which included conceptual framework design, mathematical 
modelling and decision-making based on cost–benefit analysis.  
 
Benefits from iteration of risk assessment are also well known by authorities. Relevant 
regulations (e.g management regulations by the Norwegian Petroleum Safety Authority 
(Petroleum Safety Authority Norway 2011)) require iteration of QRA every 5 years or 
in case of system changes. Most of the risk management frameworks also mention the 
need for continuous update (NORSOK z013 (NORSOK 2010), ISO 31000 (ISO-
International standardization organization 2009), risk governance framework by 
International Risk Governance Council IRGC (IRGC - International Risk Governance 
Council 2009), etc.).  
 
DNV-GL has also worked on the topic (Falck et al. 2015) and CGE Risk Management 
Solutions has released an updated version of their software BowTieXP with an add-on 
on real-time monitoring of safety barriers performance (no risk assessment though). 
Attempts have been carried out by the Norwegian oil and gas industry (e.g. Technical 
Integrity Management Programme by Statoil, iSee by ConocoPhillips and Barrier Panel 
by ENI Norge), but they only address safety barriers performance monitoring and does 
not provide risk levels. 
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3. Dynamic risk assessment 
3.1 Hazard identification 
A specific method named Dynamic Procedure for Atypical Scenarios Identification 
(DyPASI) was developed in order to obtain comprehensive hazard identification 
including accident scenarios that are "not captured by hazard identification 
methodologies because deviating from normal expectations of unwanted events or 
worst case reference scenarios." These scenarios are defined by Paltrinieri et al. (2012) 
as “atypical”. DyPASI is a hazard identification method aiming at the systematization 
of information from indicators related to past accident events, near misses and literature 
studies. It supports the identification and the assessment of atypical potential accident 
scenarios related to the substances, the equipment and the industrial site considered. 
DyPASI is one of the results of the European Commission FP7 iNTeg-Risk project 
(Paltrinieri et al. 2013), which addressed the management of emerging risks. 
 
 
Figure 1. Graphical representation of Bow-Tie diagram 
with integration of branches newly identified through 
DyPASI 
 
The application of DyPASI entails a systematic screening process that, based on early 
warnings and risk notions, should be able to identify possible Atypical Scenarios 
available at the time of the analysis. The well-established approach of the Bow-Tie 
Analysis (Delvosalle et al. 2006), which aims at the identification of all the potential 
major accident scenarios occurring in an industrial site, is taken as a basis to develop 
the methodology. Specific branches may be integrated consistently with the Bow-Tie 
Diagrams and related safety barriers defined for the newly identified scenarios (Figure 
1).  
 
DyPASI may be suitable for application in each phase of the process life-cycle. It is a 
tool specifically defined for the continuous improvement of risk management, 
providing a procedure to enable systematic updating of the hazards identified and 
managed in the process. DyPASI may be used either as a “stand-alone” technique or 
may be coupled with existing conventional techniques. In the latter case, it may 
effectively integrate the existing hazard identification methods to obtain more 
exhaustive results. In particular it provides a structured and yet dynamic approach in 
the retrieval of information from early warnings and atypical scenarios. The format of 
the results from DyPASI allows for integration with the hazard identification 
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applicability of DyPASI from the preliminary hazard analysis to the detailed 
assessment of complex systems. 
3.2 Risk analysis 
Two different approaches may be adopted for dynamic risk analysis, which primarily 
focus on evaluation and update of accident frequency. Such approaches are generally 
based on either reactive or proactive assessment. Several dynamic risk analysis 
techniques are available in literature, but only two representative techniques are 
presented by this work: the reactive Bayesian Inference-based Dynamic Risk 
Assessment (BIDRA) technique and the proactive Risk Barometer technique. 
BIDRA is a methodology for dynamic risk assessment based on Bayesian inference 
and its objective is achieved by monitoring and processing data on incidents and near 
misses during the system lifetime (Khakzad et al. 2016). Its goal is to refine failure 
probabilities of safety barriers and consequently update potential accident frequency 
values. The updating of the prior probability 𝑃 of a safety barrier failure 𝜃 based on 
new evidence 𝐸 (where 𝐿(𝐸|𝜃) is the likelihood function of 𝜃), is performed as follows:  
 
                                             (1) 
 
 
Figure 2. Risk barometer aggregation of indicators 
 
The Risk Barometer is based on the definition and real-time monitoring of relevant 
indicators, in order to continuously assess the health of safety barriers and evaluate 
their probability of failure (Paltrinieri et al. 2016; Hauge et al. 2015). Such indicators 
monitor not only the technical performance of barriers, but also the associated 
operational and organizational systems. In this way, the Risk Barometer aims to capture 
early deviations within the organization, which may have the potential to facilitate 
barrier failure and accident occurrence. In order to aggregate the information expressed 
by the indicators and assess the performance of barrier systems, barrier functions and 
plant areas, the indicators are quantitatively weighted and combined by means of 
weighted summations (Figure 2). Weighting and quantification depend on input from 
subject matter experts. This process of calibration is carried out by means of a series of 
workshops, where validation with real data from the plant is advisable. However, 
continuous control and improvement of the indicators and the related weights should 
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3.3 Establishing the risk picture 
Visualization of risk assessed on a dynamic basis may represent an important support 
to decision making and allow overcome some of risk metric limitations. An example 
of this is represented by the Risk Barometer (Edwin et al. 2016; Hauge et al. 2015), 
where the barometer is used to visualize the real-time risk of a system (Figure 3). In 
addition, the risk trend over time can be visualized to evaluate positive or negative 
trends and compare the current risk with past values (Figure 3). The y-axis scale is 
coloured according to the risk tolerability/ acceptability levels used in the barometer. 
 
 
Figure 3. Generic Risk Barometer and risk trend. Adapted 
from (Edwin et al. 2016) 
 
The risk level is a function of the status and condition of the different barrier functions 
and associated barrier systems. Each barrier system is modelled and measured through 
a set of indicators. For this reason, drill-down capability should be enabled to move 
through the hierarchy of the model, from the area to the barrier and further to the 
indicator level (Figure 3). Information about the overall risk, its progression and 
underlying causes can be continuously traced, providing intuitive understanding of the 
causes of risk variations and supporting definition of priorities related to risk mitigation 
and control. Moreover, in order to improve decision-support in operations, the Risk 
Barometer visualizes a list of top risk contributors using real-time sensitivity measures. 
Such list highlights which barrier functions and associated barrier systems are 
contributing the most to the risk level at the given point in time. 
 
4. Discussion 
The ISO 31000 standard on risk management (ISO-International standardization 
organization 2009) assigns a pivotal role to knowledge by defining risk as “the effect 
of uncertainty on objectives”. Uncertainty is the driving force of dynamic risk analysis, 
demanding for continuous calibration of the risk picture and progressively filling lack 
of knowledge with new evidence and information. Moreover, awareness of the 
knowledge dimension, as theorized by Aven (Aven 2013) and Aven and Krohn (Aven 
& Krohn 2014), not only gives credit to dynamic risk analysis, but also improve its 
understanding.  
 
As discussed by Paltrinieri et al. (2013), the DyPASI technique not only addresses 
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identification identified by CCPS - Center for Chemical Process Safety (2000): 
completeness, reproducibility, inscrutability, relevance of experience and subjectivity. 
However, the possibility to capture atypical scenarios during the initial hazard 
identification phase heavily depends on the experience of the user. The DyPASI 
method was built to systematically approach the issue of critical event identification, 
screening and organizing available information. The systematic approach of DyPASI 
should limit the possibility of failing in the identification of some relevant accident 
scenario, so as to give the analyst a chance to obtain or update comprehensive results. 
Knowledge on when data is collected and risk is assessed in Dynamic Risk Analysis is 
also fundamental to understand the limits of such approach. In fact, the distinction 
between reactive and proactive approaches reflects different projections in time for the 
risk assessed. Reactive approaches respond to an event that is directly associated with 
the overall risk picture (e.g. failure or success of a technical safety system) and 
presumably closer in time to a potential accident – if not the accident itself. Whereas, 
proactive approaches include in the analysis also relevant early deviations from the 
optimal condition, which have a lower degree of causality on a potential accident (e.g. 
worsening or improvement of organizational factors). 
 
The BIDRA technique is based on sound statistical theories and falls under the 
definition of reactive approaches (Khakzad et al. 2016; Scarponi & Paltrinieri 2016). 
In fact, it updates the risk picture of the system considering information on past events 
indicating failure or success of safety barriers. For instance, the example of application 
proposed in the previous chapter shows how this technique can identify worsening in 
the safety system, or a negative drift towards risk conditions, through the registered 
failures in the regular tests of safety instrumented systems. Due to the specific 
characteristics of the data used as input to BIDRA, technical information on the 
performance of safety equipment is relatively more suitable. This performance may 
affect the probability of an accident on a higher degree than operational and 
organizational factors, because closer in the causality chain. However, not only 
incidents and near misses can be of input to BIDRA, but also results of regular technical 
tests, which would allow constant update with known lag. The main requirement for 
BIDRA inputs is a certain degree of objectivity allowing for distinction between 
success and failure of safety barriers, providing for relevant and critical basis for the 
analysis. 
 
The Risk Barometer is a recent technique (Paltrinieri et al. 2016; Hauge et al. 2015). It 
is relatively adaptable to the degree of available information present for the case. The 
evaluation of the relative importance of the system safety barriers (and the omission of 
parameters representing the little influential safety barriers) should be preferably 
performed based on previous risk and barrier analyses. In case pieces of information 
are not available, the evaluation may be based on expert judgment and subject to a 
higher level of uncertainty. Poor judgment may result in the exclusion of critical 
parameters. The indicators collected are heterogeneous and should be translated into 
mutually comparable scores. Their different nature affects the time lag with which risk 
is dynamically updated. In fact, they have different collection frequencies, which may 
alter the overall result. The Risk Barometer characteristic of proactivity resides in its 
capacity to consider and process also underlying operational and organizational factors, 
which may affect the performance of safety instrumented systems during operations. 
Such factors may be earlier in the causality chain than a technical failure and, for this 
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reason, are defined as early deviations in the sequence of events leading to an accident. 
Their link with the overall risk is not as direct as technical indicators and they are 
relatively challenging to define, which may lead to omission or double-counting. For 
this reason, the Risk Barometer accounts for the relative importance of indicators in 
respect of the overall risk by means of specific weights and weighted summations. Such 
weights are defined on the basis of expert judgment. This may be time-consuming and 
lead to new uncertainties.  
 
It is worth noticing that the terms “reactive” and “proactive” cannot be rigidly apply. 
In fact, BIDRA does not only collect information from previous events (near misses or 
incidents), but also consider the results of tests of safety instrumented systems, which 
provides a certain degree of proactivity in the analysis. Whereas, the Risk Barometer 
elaborates both reactive and proactive indicators and its applications have proved to be 
relying on the formers on a higher extent. For this reason, such classification may be 
reductive and the overlapping between the two techniques may turn considerable in 
some cases. 
 
Important differences between the techniques stand out concerning the risk updating 
process. BIDRA considers the components of the process at a rather superficial level. 
It may evaluate the current failure probability of a safety barrier based on its behaviour 
in the past. Such information may support maintenance planning and lead to corrective 
maintenance or risk management in general and lead to additional safety barriers. 
However, the technique does not allow investigating on the possible underlying causes 
of malfunctioning. On the other hand, the Risk Barometer provides a deeper insight of 
the causes. It focuses on factors affecting the general behaviour of the system. In this 
way, it makes possible the identification of a negative drift at an early stage of the cause 
consequence chain leading to an undesired event.  
 
The Risk Barometer represents a further development of BIDRA. In fact, the Risk 
Barometer takes into account underlying factors (addressing organization health and 
operations) in addition to the test results and past events considered by BIDRA. This 
provides more details to the overall risk picture and approximate assessment results to 
the real system conditions.  
 
Complementarity may reside in the potential of one technique to (partially) validate the 
other. Despite the possible uncertainty in the definition of variance, the mathematical 
model of BIDRA is more solid and it is based on definite events of technical success 
and failure. Whereas, the Risk Barometer uses relatively simple aggregation rules for 
heterogeneous indicators, organized in a hierarchical structure and weighted on the 
basis of their relative importance. The definition of this risk model is strongly affected 
by subjective judgment and experts should be consulted for most of the Risk Barometer 
steps. For this reason, BIDRA results may be compared with risk values from the Risk 
Barometer. However, such validation is solely related to the Risk Barometer capability 
of treating technical indicators, because, for the sake of consistency, the technique 
should be deprived of organizational and operational indicators.  
 
Finally, this work presents some solutions for dynamic risk visualization. Clear 
hierarchy should ordinate all the elements and allow the potential user to browse among 
the risk analysis results and drill down to the aggregated details. In fact, the ultimate 
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purpose for such visualization solutions is improving the support for critical decision-
makers, from risk managers to daily planners. In this case, the risk barometer aims to 
not only offering graphical user interfaces for risk communication, but also 
continuously updating the risk picture on a real-time basis and providing detailed 
information of the subsystems involved. 
5. Conclusions 
This contribution shows that risk analysis in the process industry is evolving. The 
concept of dynamicity has gone beyond time dependence and online monitoring. It now 
encompasses progressive calibration/ refinement of nonlinear repetitive processes, 
reacting and adapting to changes and new information flows. However, the main 
uncertainties are related to the process of available information. Proactive approach is 
desirable, but its reliability should not be compromised. Moreover, such tools should 
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Safety- and security (cyber) assessment of critical infrastructures is essential 
contribution to ensure robustness of urban water systems. In a risk management 
context, the quality of risk identification and risk evaluation processes are critical to 
achieve appropriate risk pictures for risk-reducing purposes. Cyber-attacks related to 
ICT systems in combination with physical safety aspects of water and waste water 
systems constitute an emergent threat landscape for water utilities and the society. 
Horizon scanning and related methods are suggested to improve awareness and 
collective sense-making capabilities in, and between water utilities, cooperating 
companies and stakeholders. Horizon scanning is a collective term of approaches 
capturing weak or early warning signals for use in political discourse and decision-
making. An initial literature review of approaches has been carried out, with a pre-
evaluation and discussion of the effectiveness of such to uncover types of hidden and 
emerging threats to water utilities. 
Keywords: Water utility, Horizon scanning, Cyber security, Risk management 
1. Introduction 
This paper deals with safety and security aspects (cyber) related to the control- and 
surveillance systems of water utilities. Cyber security can be described as elements of 
an emergent threat landscape. The paper discusses whether horizon scanning methods 
are possible means to sustain robust urban water systems. The main intention is to 
review the appropriateness of such approaches to water systems. Horizon scanning 
share similar challenges and opportunities with other foresight techniques. Here, we 
refer to horizon scanning as the processes of collecting and assessing varying sort of 
vague information, or early signals (warnings) about the future, and how this could be 
translated into useful knowledge for policy-, strategy-, or operational decision-making. 
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This work is based on an initial activity of the new-started EU-project STOP-IT14, for 
which the protection of water infrastructures from cyber-physical threats are addressed. 
A limited literature review of horizon scanning approaches is presented, followed by a 
discussion of the usability and appropriateness of approaches to water-supply and 
sewage systems (water utilities).  
 
Complexity and interconnectivity of socio-technical systems, the social development, 
and urbanization increases the vulnerability of important societal functions. Critical 
infrastructures, like water supply and sewage handling, are no exception in that respect. 
In a risk management context, the quality of risk identification and risk evaluation 
processes are most important to achieve accurate risk pictures for risk management 
purposes. Risk identification is typically regarded a 'static' task that takes place a few 
times during a system's life-time, e.g. in the early planning phases. It is crucial, on a 
more regular basis, to inform policy- and decision-makers about upcoming 
opportunities and threats by some other means, having them prepared or making them 
aware of possible changes and surprises/shocks (Anamatidou et al. 2012). A relevant 
approach for this purpose is horizon scanning, which is defined as: 
 
the systematic examination of potential (future) problems, threats, opportunities and 
likely future developments, including those at the margins of current thinking and 
planning. Horizon scanning may explore novel and unexpected issues, as well as 
persistent problems, trends and weak signals. (Van Rij, 2010). 
 
National horizon scanning activities have been carried out quite recently, e.g. in the 
UK, in the Netherlands and in Denmark (Van Rij, 2010). A national horizon scanning 
activity also took place in Singapore under a risk assessment- and horizon scanning 
programme. The programme led to continuous end-to-end capabilities to collect and 
classify data, analyse and understand relationships, and anticipate emerging issues that 
could have strategic impacts on Singapore. A relevant cyber-event example, is the 
Maroochy Shire cyber event from Australia, year 2000 (Abrams & Weiss, 2008). It 
was a targeted cyber-attack on a SCADA radio-controlled sewage system that caused 
800,000 litres of raw sewage spilling out into local parks, rivers and grounds. Marine 
life died, the creek water turned black and the stench was unbearable for residents. The 
main investigation report concluded that personnel were not trained in preventing, 
recognizing, or responding to any kinds of cyber-related attack at that time 
(Anamatidou et al. 2012). 
   
1.2 Objective 
The main objective of this paper is to demonstrate whether horizon scanning methods 
could fit in sensing emerging cyber-physical threats to water utilities. How, and to what 
degree would such methods enforce early warning capabilities, increase awareness and 
cooperation in the water sector as a means for policy- and strategic decision-making? 
 
                                                 
14 Strategic, Tactical, Operational Protection of water Infrastructure against cyber-physical Threats 
(STOP-IT), EU-project funded by H2020.  
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2. Description of water utilities with operational concerns 
In the following we will describe a typical Norwegian water utility, with the water- and 
waste water systems (Johnsen & Røstum, 2015). Water utilities involve both technical- 
and management systems, but also organizational and human cultures that will be 
elements in a holistic risk management. Figure 1 shows an example of water- and waste 
water routes, from the precipitation areas via the water treatment and distribution 
networks, to the waste water networks and systems. Critical systems or components are 
identified, e.g. the pumping stations with its control system. In addition to physical 
systems, information and communication technology (ICT) for system control- 
integration and communication are significant. ICT systems have become a central 
building block in every critical infrastructure. Systems are then highly dependent on 
the security, stability and integrity of these ICT systems. Thus, the attention of industry 
actors and policymakers towards critical infrastructure protection has grown 
remarkably (Alcaraz & Zeadally, 2015). 
 
 















Common infrastructure: ICT net (adm./technical net), links to the Internet, operational centre 
Figure 1. Context: Objects in a typical water and sewage 
utility, following water from the precipitation areas to 
recipients 
 
Figure 2 illustrates some of the process control and ICT administrative objects. 
Programmable logic control (PLC) systems are established for process control. Along 
with the ICT infrastructures, data network, operational control centre and adm. 
network, these objects constitute a totality. In addition, we have the organizational 
responsibilities of the company that also involve subcontractors, ICT departments and 
the individual employees with their specific knowledge and attitudes. 
 
Operational control system) Operational control centre Adm. systems El. power, cooling 
 
Figure 2. Example of process control, ICT and adm. 
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3. Horizon scanning as policy- strategic decision support 
The literature identified is based on a general search for articles on the subject horizon 
scanning through Google Scholar. We have also searched for articles that link scanning 
methods to the planning and operation of critical infrastructures such as the water 
supply and waste-water systems. 
 
The following description draws attention to horizon-scanning approaches and 
methods from this literature. The main concepts presented here are based on the 
previous SESTI project15 (Anamatidou et al. 2012). 
 
Horizon scanning implies a search process, which is extended at the margins of the 
known environment and possibly beyond it (Loveridge, 2009). Horizon scanning aims 
to identify emerging issues, signs, events or trends which may present themselves as 
threats or opportunities for the society and policy. Könnölä et al. (2012) regarded 
horizon scanning as a creative process of collective sense-making. Typically, it builds 
on concepts aimed for identification of weak, and/or early warning signals within 
frameworks of political discourse and decision-making. 
 
3.1 Kinds of scanning approaches 
There are different approaches which underpin the scanning process. One way to 
categorize the different approaches is to differentiate between exploratory and issue-
centred scanning (Anamatidou et al. 2012).  
 
3.1.1 Exploratory scanning 
The exploratory scanning approach concentrates on assembling potential emerging 
issues from a wide variety of data from different signal sources. The aim is to identify 
a long list of signals that are precursors for emerging issues, only demarcated by the 
policy domain selected (e.g. healthcare or energy). At the end, the long list of signals 
is clustered into potential emerging issues. Text-mining is an example of a tool that can 
be used to identify clusters. 
 
3.1.2 Issue-centred scanning 
In issue-centred scanning, a hypothesis is evaluated, i.e. a hypothesis of emerging 
issues. Preliminary descriptions of issues are used as a core to identify potential 
additional signals that could either confirm, or deny the real emergence of the issue. It 
starts from the wide range of existing and potential emerging issues (hypotheses) and 
searches for weak signals to strengthen, or question the specific hypotheses. As a 
starting point, a frame of reference is conceptualised for the chosen policy domains. 
Signals are then sought that give a full or substantial future narrative with high impact 
for a certain policy level. These signals are referred to as primary signals, which could 
appear in form of articles, presentations or videos. Only documented items with "full 
storylines", connecting factual findings or plausible assumptions in a logical way with 
a foreseen future high impact, are considered. These storylines usually imply, either 
implicit or explicit, elements that could be used as indicators for the realisation of the 
                                                 
15 The SESTI-project (Scanning for Emerging Science and Technology Issues) was funded by the EU 
commission through the seventh European Framework Programme.  
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storyline. It should be clear that issue-centred scanning does not predict any issues. 
Rather, it provides tools to alert for potential impact-rich issues that need policy 
attention. 
 
3.2 Methods and tools 
3.2.1 Sources of information and tools 
Both the exploratory and issue-centred scanning approaches use the internet as the 
main source of information. The SESTI-project utilized the following scanning tools: 
 Web-based search engines as Google, Google News, etc. 
 Timeline, Google Insight and Bing 
 Expert reviews and surveys 
 Visits to conferences and seminars 
 A special 'SESTI' wiki to evoke contributions to the scanning process 
 Active use of blogging and micro-blogging (Twitter) 
 Text-mining 
 Expert/stakeholder workshops 
 
Some of the methods above are suitable for obtaining specific information like the 
expert reviews, surveys and visits to conferences and seminars, while other tools like 
the initiation of a wiki and the active use of blogs and micro-blogging can encourage 
wider participation and dialogue. Methods could be grouped per various levels of 
participation and automation in identification, processing and analysis of weak signals 
and emerging issues. Such a grouping is shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
Figure 3. Grouping of methods with respect to level of 
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Focused expert reviews are based on internet scanning, which is performed by 
professional scanners.  
 
3.2.2 Scanning processes 
The main phases of the SESTI scanning process are (Anamatidou et al. 2012):  
 
Phase 1 Identification of weak signals. Emerging issues are usually formulated based 
on searches in different sources, and/or expert interviews.  
 
Phase 2 Processing of weak signals according to the following steps: 
- Step 1 Selection of the broader area where emerging issues will be examined 
- Step 2 Clustering of weak signals 
- Step 3 Assessing the significance of clustered weak signals 
- Step 4 Framing the connected weak signals into clustered topics 
- Step 5 Tentative modelling of signals/topics into possible emerging issues 
- Step 6 Identification of the most significant emerging issues 
 
Phase 3 Analysis and interpretation of emerging issues in policy-making. 
 
Rather than being antagonistic, the exploratory and issue-centred scanning approaches 
are complementary. Exploratory scanning mainly refers to the first scanning phase 
(identification of weak signals) while issue-centred scanning spans throughout both 
phases 1 and 2 of the SESTI-scanning process. The method of focused expert review 
could be used for the entire scanning process. Within the issue-centred approach it is a 
useful tool to identify potential emerging issues, like potential problems, threats, 
opportunities and likely future developments, in a fast and cost-efficient manner. It also 
enables identification of potential secondary signals that can be used to contextualise 
issues and to monitor their further development. Database tools that are connected to 
search engines such as Google News Timeline, Google Insight, Web of Science, etc. 
could be used for this purpose. As an assessment of the tools used in the scanning 
process in the SESTI project, the rates presented in Table I were given to each of the 
tools about their appropriateness and usefulness to the scanning phases.  
 
Table I: Comparison of tools for use in scanning (Anamatidou et al. 2012) 
Tool Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 
Focused expert review High High High 
Wiki Low Low Low 
Twitter High Low Low 
Surveys Low High High 
Conferences Low Medium High 
Text-mining Low Medium Medium 
 
3.2.3 Policy implications and decision criteria 
A proper assessment of weak signals should be translated into policy recommendations. 
At this stage, workshops should provide space for discussions between experts, as well 
as policy-makers about the findings on emerging issues.  
The main objective is to draw conclusions about possible implications of the week 
signals and clusters of such for policy, and/or strategic planning. 
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3.3 Assessing, combining and clustering information 
There is always a need to link the horizon scanning process more directly to strategic 
risk and uncertainty management in an organisation. To make it more a decision tool 
there has been an attempt to complement horizon scanning with strategic risk analysis 
(SRA) methods and techniques. This was a way to appropriately assess and prioritise 
the importance/likelihood and impact of emerging issues found on policy, strategy and 
delivery mechanisms (Pollard et al. 2004; Prpich et al. 2011, 2013). A further 
development of this is an approach that uses a qualitative weight of evidence (WOE) 
framework (like Linkov et al., 2009) to establish a more systematic process for filtering 
information (Garnett et al. 2016). As explained earlier, information is continuously 
retrieved from the web to capture ‘real-time’ data on the changing environment and 
policy landscape. This knowledge and information on emerging issues should be cross-
referenced with academic and non-academic literature and through expert reviews, 
using the WOE framework. It implies a comprehensive analysis of the external macro 
environment (big picture) to detect and understand the early (weak) signals of change. 
This is further distilled through informal and formal networks (e.g. within the water or 
food supply domain) to identify emerging trends and understand the broad, long-term 
implications on an area (e.g. water quality).  
 
3.3.1 Prioritisation methods 
Risk prioritisation methods, participatory workshops and consensus Delphi techniques 
could be used (Linstone and Turoff, 1975). Additional clustering methods such as 
network analysis (Konnola et al., 2012; Saritas and Miles, 2012) are relevant to capture 
cross-cutting issues and priorities to better inform decision-making. Another online 
collaborative tool, PearlTrees (Padoa et al., 2015; Licurse and Cook, 2014), was 
successfully used to assess the 'information landscape', to extract and categorise 
pertinent information per key factors. 
 
3.3.2 Expert reviews 
Collective intelligence from a wide range of domain experts to question and challenge 
current mind-sets is preferable. Stakeholder workshops are employed to engage widely 
and at all levels, reflecting a critical part of intelligence gathering. Active engagement 
of policy officials at workshops encourage buy-in and create opportunities for 
workshop outputs to inform/impact on policy development and other institutional 
change in the long-term. Finding the right mix of ‘experts’ to participate is crucial and 
should thus, include a wide range of stakeholder and interest groups, e.g. from the 
academia, industry, government and non-governmental organisations, and wider public 
entities. Claims of bias or poor representation of expertise in workshops may be 
challenging that de-legitimised outputs, resulting in dissatisfaction with the scanning 
processes and/or the outputs of such. Therefore, the selection of experts is critical to 
address concerns about bias.  
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The following factors have been considered important in selection of the review experts 
(Rathe et al. 2013): 
 Heterogeneous grouping - wide range of expertise defined by different value 
systems (e.g. coverage of broad range of interests, mix of sectors, type of 
organisation and demographics). 
 Expertise - internationally or nationally recognised expert (e.g. recognition in field; 
extensive/recent publications; recognised by professional or trade associations). 
 Interest, familiarity and commitment to process – individuals with a demonstrable 
interest in the topic, familiarity and commitment to the process (i.e. analytical, 
open-minded thinking among participants is encouraged, and effort is taken to 
eliminate candour or rejection of ideas based on participants' status or association 
with an organisation). 
 
4. An application - foresight capabilities in the water sector 
The following example from Scotland applies scanning approaches to reveal types of 
threats and opportunities affecting decisions in the water sector. More specific, it is 
about factors, like climate-change and land-use policy, and influences on the water 
quality (Dunn et al. 2014). Climate and land-use drivers were used to depict possible 
future climate- and land-use change scenarios, and evaluating their changing effect on 
the water quality risks. A simple approach for horizon scanning was thought of for the 
implications of these scenarios on the water quality.  
 
The objectives of the study were: 
 To identify key drivers of water quality in terms of broad characteristics of the 
climate that dominate hydro-chemical transport and qualitative relationships 
between different land uses and various pollutants. 
 To develop a qualitative spatial methodology to integrate these drivers. 
 To demonstrate the method by application of a simple set of climate and land-use 
scenarios for Scotland evaluating qualitative impacts on a range of key pollutants. 
 
Water quality is for sure affected by a broad range of factors in the environment. 
Examples of such are basic physical nature attributes like the soil type, geology and 
topography. Together with the climate, properties of these factors determine the natural 
chemistry of water draining from an area. Key drivers of the water quality may be the 
climate-change impacts on increased rainfall intensity, with implications on pollutant 
transport and bioavailability of the nature.  
 
Whilst climatic characteristics are primarily responsible for the transport of pollutants 
from the land to water bodies, it is the 'land use' and its management that largely 
determines the sources and availability of pollutants. In broad terms, different 
pollutants can be associated with different land uses, although detailed aspects of 
management and site situation can be extremely influential in determining the risk of 
pollutant losses. In the study of Dunn et al. (2014), five primary categories of land use 
in Scotland were identified: 1) arable, 2) grassland, 3) woodland, 4) semi-natural 
vegetation and, 5) urban/rural habitation.  
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As part of the methodology (Dunn et al. 2014) the impacts of climate and land use 
change are taken as interrelated, but a pragmatic distinction is adopted to the 
methodology to make it as simple and transparent as possible. The two key data sources 
required are the baseline and future climate, and land use. Two different sets of 
groupings linked to the climate change and land use change drivers together form the 
basis of a qualitative model of risk, and a series of matrices were developed to translate 
the various drivers into a set of pollutant responses. Three sets of transition matrices 
were developed, which described the relationships between: 
 Key climate change drivers and expected pollutant responses 
 Impacts of changing land use on pollutant responses 
 The relative importance of climate change drivers versus land use change drivers 
on pollutant responses 
 
A classification system was used within the matrices: 
 −2 refer to a large decrease, 
 −1 refer to a small decrease, 
 0 refer to neutral, 
 +1 refer to a small increase, 
 +2 refer to a large increase. 
 
For each pollutant group and driver, values from −2 to +2 were assigned to the matrix 
based on expert judgement, or developed from the literature and prior knowledge for 
the predominant rural land use groups in Scotland. This step was initially undertaken 
by kinds of scientists with expertise in the relevant disciplines. 
 
As indicated, changes in land use can have either a positive or negative impact on water 
quality. For example, a change from arable land to woodland would be expected to be 
primarily positive with respect to water quality. Similarly, whilst some small negative 
responses would be expected with a change from low intensity semi-natural habitat to 
coniferous woodland, a change to arable production is possibly the biggest negative 
change that could impact on water quality. As results, a set of maps are produced 
showing the pollutant responses to the specific (alternative) climate- and land use 
change scenarios. Reference is made to Dunn et al. (2014) for more details on how the 
metrics worked for the different scenarios.  
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5. Evaluation and discussion 
5.1 Scanning – challenges and gains  
The two examples described in Section 4 may be characterized as issue-centred 
scanning in the way the approaches substantiated the emerging issues. In exploratory 
scanning of potential problems, threats, opportunities and likely future developments, 
a somewhat broader basis is considered from the start, e.g. by internet search or text-
mining. One restriction seen from the use of internet scanning methods is the fact that 
professional scanners may have biases in their searches and interpretation of findings. 
These aspects are typically addressed in foresight approaches (Truffer et al. (2008). 
While processing of information or expectations depend on individual experiences, 
priorities and positions, they are at the same time the result of social interaction. Actors' 
expectations are shaped by their position, but also by the specific social discourses they 
are actively or passively taking part in, e.g. particular professional discourses or media 
discourses. Some expectations even become very widespread across different actor 
groups thereby becoming shared points of orientation. That is, for some actors they 
become taken-for-granted presumptions. But even if actors are more sceptical, they 
tend to take these widely-held expectations into account, because they know that others 
share these expectations. Thus, expectations can be subject to strong social dynamics.  
 
Teams of scanners with different backgrounds would help to overcome this kind of 
pitfall. Expert surveys can in fact be quite useful in the processing and analysis phases 
having an explicit focus on certain fields and issues. By comparing the SESTI 
experience with experiences from other horizon scanning processes, it seems that 
surveys are especially useful when areas are specified and the scanning starts from a 
well-defined field or sector, such as energy, water supply, or general science and policy 
(Czaplicka-Kolarz et al. 2009; Smith et al. 2010; Sutherland et al. 2010; 2011). 
Focusing on a specific field, surveys can deliver additional information on various side-
aspects related to the core issues.  
 
Timing is a general challenge with early signal analysis. Due to the novelty of issues 
the evidence basis at the beginning is rather weak while the impact may be tremendous. 
 
5.2 Evaluation criteria 
The evaluation of the different approaches and methods faces several challenges. First, 
each of the methods described above has advantages and disadvantages depending on 
the specific circumstances under which they are applied. Some methods are better for 
the initial phases of the scanning process, while others fit better into the analysis phase 
(Table 1). In this regard, an evaluation across the different approaches and methods is 
difficult as their success is highly contextual. However, common criteria can be 
identified reflecting the information needs and interests of policy-makers, and the 
degree to which they are met by the different tools and approaches. 
 
Some criteria were defined by Anamatidou et al. (2012):  
 Connections, clustering of weak signals and degree of relevance to a specific area 
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 Duration of weakness of signal, also associated with time at which signal is 
observed 
 Origin (stakeholder(s) behind them) and novelty of weak signals 
 Rising ethical, legal, societal or cultural issues 
 Existence of a strategy already concerned with specific weak signal(s) and 
emerging issues by a government or industry, political party or lobby, or 
international organisation 
 Positive and negative impacts and associated policy implications 
 Policy recommendations 
 
Following the framework of tools and methods presented in Figure 3, certain 
combinations of methods can be created to provide a complete evaluation along the 
scanning process. Three combinations defined by Anamatidou et al. (2012) are: 
 A) Twitter/wiki scanning which is complemented by processing of weak signals. 
 B) Focused expert review which is complemented by text-mining. 
 C) Focused expert review which is assisted by expert's survey, literature review and 
attending conferences. 
 
In Table II, two of the above criteria are combined with the different approaches, and 
their appropriateness is addressed.  
 
5.3 Societal contexts of scanning 
Horizon scanning is not merely about searching for signals and their factual evidence. 
It is also about analysing and understanding the societal contexts behind the entire 
process of initiation, communication, (r)evolution and dissemination of issues, as well 
as their early recognition and monitoring. That means, not only the evidence-based 
plausible storyline in the identified future narrative counts. It is also crucial to collect 
information about who initiated the signals or issues, who followed, who opposed them, 
when and why. Then we consider the interests, emotions and attitudes of the different 
stakeholders as well as experts. 
 
Overall, it can be said that the added value of emerging-issue scanning lies in the 
strategic combination of available tools to broaden the spectrum of possible signals and 
to interpret them in a functional way for decision-makers. In addition, the human 
intelligence is a valuable necessity, either as a collective, or single experts, especially 
for the alerting function of the horizon scanning process. 
 
Another interesting aspect is to see to what degree scanning results are considered by 
present policy-making processes compared to model-based forecasting. It seems that 
model-based forward-looking results are considered a bit more seriously than horizon 
scanning results, even though economic models completely failed to forecast the 
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financial crisis of 2007–2008. On the other hand, horizon scanning in the Netherlands 
and UK spotted the financial crisis two years before it started. 
 







Manual combined  
Comb. of methods A B C 
Policy implications 
assessment 
Medium High High 
 Associated policy 
implications of 
emerging issues are 
analysed by 
comparing emerging 
issues identified with 
topics in previous 
published 
thematic foresight 
reports and policy 
documents. 
Text-mining can show 
the policy related 
terms. In focused 
expert review 
narratives in the 
primary scanning, 
usually contain policy 
implications or even 
policy advice of the 
author.  
 
A secondary scanning 
usually gives ideas 
on elaboration of 
proposed policies or 
of critics. 
As reported in survey 
responses and in 
literature. As 
facilitated by 
narratives in focused 













Medium High High 
 Through discourses, 
networking, 
interaction 
with experts. Also via 
examination of 
relevant thematic 
foresight reports and 
recently published 
policy documents. 
Meta descriptions of 
issues can be discussed 
in workshops with 
experts and 
stakeholders, which 
usually lead to 
recommendations. 
As reported in survey 
responses and 
in literature. As 
facilitated by policy 
workshops. 
 
5.4 Impact on water utilities 
Horizon scanning as a strategic approach for single water utilities seems to be 
challenging of several reasons. Anyhow, it must be provided as an opportunity for the 
business, and resources must be allocated for the scanning process. In short of 
knowledge, resources and time in own organisation, it may be an idea for the water 
utilities to collaborate on this in sector-associations or similar. Another opportunity is 
to engage a third party for the data collection.  
 
Post-assessment of the information can however, take place in teams consisting of 
operating personnel from facilities in addition to the supporting personnel, relevant 
suppliers and others. Based on pre-assessments, the most relevant scanning methods 
seem to be expert reviews and surveys.  
 
As seen from Dunn et al. (2014), the analysis of data could be designed as a tool for 
interaction with stakeholders, e.g. for horizon scanning a range of different pollutants 
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under different scenarios. In this case, to obtain mapped outputs depicting the 
qualitative responses to pollutants. In the example, the pollutant responses were based 
on expert judgement both in terms of the key climate and land use change drivers, and 
the degree to which these drivers could influence the response. Similar approaches may 
be applied to other problem areas connected to water utilities as well. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In the present paper a description of approaches, and discussion of horizon scanning 
approaches related to cyber-physical threats to water utilities have been presented. 
Horizon scanning is generally seen as an instrument with two main functions: 1) the 
alerting function, and 2) the creative function. For the alerting function, comprehensive 
methods are needed to scan and assess early warning signals that may indicate potential 
emerging issues. The information origin span from a variety of published information, 
media and digital sources. For the more creative function, scanning methods need to be 
complemented with tools and participative processes that, on one hand, focus on 
clustering and synthesis of the scanned information and, on the other hand, human 
imagination and creativity. 
 
As explained, different approaches to scanning, identifying and assessing potential 
emerging issues exist. The issues found from scanning processes are however, highly 
dynamic, social constructs that are partly evidence-based, and partly the results of the 
imagination, thinking and debating that takes place within different organisations and 
segments of society. The applicability to the water sector is therefore a matter of 
organisational concern, the ability to play on some 'extended' knowledge and resources, 
both within and outside the operating business.  
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The present work deals with the development of a new Accident Precursors 
Management System, starting from the HFACS taxonomy and the Fuzzy Application 
Procedure – FAP, already devised for the industrial risk analysis. The methodology 
proposed is composed by a data collection procedure, carried out in situ and that 
requires a short interview to the personnel involved in the observed events. Afterward, 
a data analysis tool, based on the Fuzzy Logic Approach, allows to obtain the 
preventive measures suitable to cope with the accident precursors analysed. The 
methodology described is generic and it does not depend on the working site type. It 
has been tested in a real industrial workplace and the results obtained are shown. 
Occupational accident prevention has been historically approached by Safety 
Management using ex-post accident analysis in different working fields. This “learning 
from the experience” approach promotes different reporting and analysis systems for 
the accidents, as fundamental tools to identify causes and to help of planing the 
prevention measurement.  
Beside the Accident Analysis, several authors suggest to improve the risk prevention 
with an effective Near Miss. The “Zero Accidents Vision”, recently adopted especially 
by companies characterized by few occupational accidents, addressed the Safety 
Management activity to support the occupational accident analysis with the accident 
precursors identification and reporting. The accident precursors can be defined 
Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0) 
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referring to the accident definition of the Event Tree Analysis as a truncated accident 
sequence. According with this definition, the concept of accident precursors can 
include Near Miss event and both Unsafe Acts of personnel and Unsafe Conditions of 
working places. The difference between these three categories is the closeness to the 
complete accidental sequence. A full adoption of a Safety Management system, 
including precursors management, according with Zero Accidents Vision, allows a 
better control and reduction of occupational risk, meanwhile a careful control of the 
working conditions and personnel acts should prevent accidents and improve 
operational efficiency. 
Near Miss Management system could not be designed as a simple expansion of 
Occupational Accident Analysis System. The number of Near Misses is higher than 
accidents, and their hidden nature requires a different skill of identification compared 
to an accident that shows evident consequences. These factors suggest that a Near Miss 
Management system requires higher resources displacement to be reported and 
analyzed due to the large number of data. Initially, the Near Miss Management system 
has been developed in process industry and medical sector, then the system has been 
extended to the construction field and the manufacturing industry. Near Miss 
Management system usually is characterized by four steps:  
 NM identification; 
 Assessment and Prevention measurement planning; 
 Prevention measurement application; 
 Feedback. 
 This structure is, generally, adopted with two possible approaches: such as the 
bottom up approach and the centralized approach. The first approach entails that 
the Near Misses from a plant are reported by the onsite workers and supervisors, 
while the Health and Safety office may help in analysis and feedback activities. In 
the centralized approach, instead, the Near Misses are reported by the Health and 
Safety personnel or by external personnel that manage all the activities. 
 In this work, a new Accident Precursors Management system has been developed 
starting from the structure of the Near Miss Management system based on the 
centralized approach. The Accident Precursors Management system has been 
developed as a general method for detecting and reporting accident precursors in a 
wide range of working activities. It has been designed as a decisional supporting 
tool for the HSE service, and it is based on the following structure: 
1 Occupational accident precursors identification and reporting (Unsafe Acts 
and Conditions and Near Misses);  
2 Data analysis;  
3 Prevention measurement planning and application;  
4 Feedback.  
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The first step is performed as a collection of data supported by a methodology based 
on the specific taxonomy (HFACS) applied to external personnel and requires also a 
short interview to the workers involved. This interview has to be performed in order to 
identify, as soon as possible, the root causes of the accident precursor observed and it 
is completed by a preliminary assessment (classification) of the event. The second step 
is based on the Fuzzy Logic Approach: a tool initially developed for the occupational 
accident risk assessment that has been modified to be used in case of the accident 
precursor analysis. It allows an aggregate approach to the accident precursor 
assessment and leads to the preventive measurement planning in accordance with the 
HSE service. The last two steps have to be designed case by case, as they are strongly 
dependent on the characteristics of the workplace. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: a first a description of the data collection 
methodology and of the data analysis with Fuzzy Logic Approach is given, then a case 
study application is presented and results are discussed. 
Keywords: Accident precursors; workplace risk management; preventive measures; 
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We present a novel framework to enhance safety imagination in socio-technical 
systems with gamification and computational creativity. This relies on the usage of the 
Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) for systemic analysis of socio-
technical system. In our proposal information on the system structure and organization 
both as-imagined and as-actually done is elicited from sharp-end operators by means 
of a gamified and participatory approach and through an iOS app. Then such 
knowledge is organized as a domain ontology compliant with FRAM and is used to feed 
a computational creativity system (i.e. Creativity Machine) and to support the analyst 
in conceiving FRAM models. Even if the approach is general, here we address a case 
study concerning healthcare and, in particular, an accident happened during an 
abdominal surgery.  
Keywords: Safety, FRAM, participatory modelling, healthcare, ontology. 
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1. Introduction 
Analytical methods for safety analysis of socio-technical systems require the definition 
of models representing the relevant aspects of the system to be analysed. An example 
is the Functional Resonance Analysis Method (FRAM) (Hollnagel 2012), a recently 
developed method for systemic analysis of socio-technical system, where models 
represent the functional relationships among the various system’s elements. In case of 
large systems, e.g. systems with many human-based activities, technological artefacts, 
and procedures, building these models can be demanding in terms of having a clear and 
complete understanding of the system structure and organization both as-imagined and 
as-actually done. In particular, for understanding work-as-done, information is usually 
gathered from informal or structured interviews, observations or other interaction 
means. These activities imply the collaboration of various systems stakeholders, 
including sharp-end operators, who generally have limited time to be involved in a 
strenuous knowledge elicitation project and may not be enough stimulated to 
collaboration. On the other hand, subjective interpretation of the gathered information 
could be error prone or lead to incomplete descriptions. 
To deal with these problems, we propose the FRAMboICE (FRAM-based ontology for 
safety Imagination through Collaborative Environment) framework consisting of a 
gamified and participatory knowledge gathering approach to boost engagement of 
systems stakeholders and of a formal semantic repository to organize the collected 
information, upon which performing automatic reasoning to support users in thinking 
unimagined situations that may occur and that are relevant to safety analysts. 
Indeed, gamification, intended as the use of game design elements in non-game 
contexts, aims at increasing users activity and creativity and it is being used in various 
contexts, such as training in enterprises and open innovation. The second aspect of the 
approach refers to the capability to generate coherent conceptual representations of the 
users information concerning systems functions and their inter-dependencies (e.g., 
couplings in the FRAM notation), including unexpected situations, at various levels of 
abstraction, taking advantage of a FRAM-based domain-specific ontology and of 
semantics techniques. 
The approach is supported by the FRAMboICE mobile app to manage the gamified 
information collection process from the users and by a novel software application, 
named Creativity Machine (Coletti, De Nicola, & Villani, 2017) implementing 
computational creativity techniques to automatically suggest concepts describing 
FRAM functions and realistic situations affecting their performance, selected from the 
FRAM-based ontology. This approach is discussed through a healthcare case study, 
adopting a safety-oriented perspective. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the FRAM 
method for safety analysis. Section 3 describes the healthcare case study. Section 4 
presents an overview of the safety imagination framework and its components. Finally 
Section 5 closes the paper with some considerations on the safety imagination problem 
and some future research directions. 
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2. FRAM for Safety Analysis 
FRAM is a systemic method to analyse complex socio-technical systems. The aim of 
FRAM consists in describing the work-as-done in everyday practices as a means to 
manage the complexity and understand where potential criticalities may emerge. Since 
the FRAM is a method rather than a model, its first stage of application consists in 
developing a model of the specific activity that is the focus of the analysis. Once 
developed the model, the second stage consists in developing instantiations of the 
activity for the analysis of the complexity itself. 
 
2.1 FRAM principles and building steps 
The FRAM relies on four principles, which acknowledge the need to manage - rather 
than reduce – the complexity of work domain, in line with Safety-II and Resilience 
Engineering (Hollnagel 2012). 
 Equivalence of failures and successes. Failures and successes emerge from a 
common source, i.e. everyday performance variability. The variability is what 
allows both things go right and things go wrong, depending on local and global 
interactions among system’s components.  
 Principle of approximate adjustments. Human beings as individuals, groups (or 
even organizations) adjust their performance to deal with the complexity of the 
operating scenario. These adjustments become usually unavoidable, due to the 
variability of work conditions, partly intractable and underspecified. 
 Principle of emergence. In complex systems, it is not always possible to link one 
(or multiple) linear static causes to effects. More specifically, many events are 
emergent rather than resultant from a specific combination of fixed conditions. 
Transient combinations of factors might not leave detectable traces for a posteriori 
analysis.  
 Functional resonance. The functional resonance represents the detectable signal 
emerging from the unintended interaction of multiple signals. This variability is not 
random at all, but it often depends on recognizable behaviours of the agents 
involved in the analysis, which act dynamically, based on local rationality. 
A FRAM model is generally developed following four steps (Hollnagel 2012): 
 Step 1: define the functions of interest, adopting a functional perspective. In FRAM, 
a function represents an activity necessary to produce a certain outcome. The 
outcome of this step consists in describing what an agent (individual, group, 
equipment, organization) does, by means of FRAMs’ fundamental aspects, i.e. 
Input (I), Output (O), Time (T), Control (C), Precondition (P), Resource (R), see 
Figure 1. 
 Step 2: identify function variability. Each function has to be explored in terms of 
its variability, which can be endogenous, exogenous and/or deriving from 
upstream–downstream coupling (discussed in detail in Step 3). The description of 
variability can be expressed by means of different phenotypes (e.g. timing, 
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precision, speed) depending on the specific function. The outcome of this step is 
the basis for characterising the expected (potential) variability of the activity as 
carried out in the everyday work environment (see Step 3). 
 
 
Figure 1. A FRAM function represented as a 
hexagon. 
 
 Step 3: aggregate the variability. This step aims at understanding how system 
performance affects and is affected by the coupling variability. The upstream– 
downstream interaction is described exploring the model paths identified by actual 
or hypothetical events. For this step, it is possible to use information gathered from 
real case situations (e.g. an accident analysis), as a means to suggest one or more 
instantiations of the model, i.e. potential aggregation of variability in a specific 
scenario. These instantiations can be analysed to find an explanation of why 
something happened (as in accident analysis) or a plausible scenario of what may 
happen (as in risk assessment) 
 Step 4: manage the variability. Acknowledging the need for a portion of variability 
in complex socio-technical systems, this step aims at understanding the most 
effective way to manage it, rather than simply eliminating it, as for traditional 
approach labelled as Safety-I approaches. Depending on the specific scenario, 
variability can be damped, amplified or just monitored, addressing the need to add 
a safety-related indicator. 
 
2.2 Gathering data from developing a FRAM model 
Since the FRAM aims to understand the variability of everyday work, it is necessary to 
explore the nitty-gritty of work, developing the analysis in strict relationship with 
sharp-end operators. On this path, observational studies represent a commonly used 
technique for acquiring knowledge of a naturalistic context. In particular, for FRAM-
oriented analyses, open-ended naturalistic observations, i.e. pure observations, are 
adopted frequently to observe work without any preconception as an approach for 
informal conversation with practitioners (Patton, 2002). In addition, for developing a 
FRAM model, conversational or semi-structured interviews are used frequently (or 
complementary to observational studies), even if they require an expert interviewer 
able to ask open-ended questions (Hackos and Redish, 1998). However, even if these 
kinds of data collection techniques are used in FRAM model development, they require 
efforts, which usually become time-consuming. It is also necessary to underline the 
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central role of the observer/interviewer, who must have fresh-eyes to inspect a work 
domain with limited bias, and interviewing skills to steer the discussion in a convenient 
and meaningful direction. For these reasons, developing an automatic or semi-
automatic technique for data collection in collaboration with sharp-end operators would 
generate relevant benefits in terms of model development. 
3. Case Study: Safety Imagination in Healthcare 
New challenges constantly affect healthcare practices, mainly due to the instrumental, 
procedural and organizational innovations of recent years (Woods and Cook, 2002). 
Furthermore, in everyday activities, work conditions are underspecified, as well as 
functioning principles, due to scenario’s variability (e.g., individual patient state, need 
for specific resources, unique case presentation) (Hernan et al., 2015).  For all these 
reasons, even a simple practice in healthcare is not that simple, and consequently 
neither its representation. When the purpose is to describe meaningfully a hospital’s 
dynamic relationships, variabilities and agents it is not enough to simply make 
unstructured content and data analysis available, rather they must be previously adapted 
to a common ontological layer. This latter allows the analyst to gather, understand and 
eventually rearrange those relationships, variabilities and data belonging to the 
healthcare domain.  
For example, considering the process of administering drug, there are several types of 
drugs, different for primary goal (e.g., antibiotic, sedative, metabolic…), methods of 
administration, side effects, and so on. In addition, different healthcare operators 
interact with the same drug in a different way, i.e. transferring it, preparing it, 
administering it, checking its state. Since one solution might be understanding 
ontologically different data under the lens of FRAM, we must build an ontology based 
on the FRAM method’s structure.  
For the purpose to explore this possibility, we propose a taxonomy built from a simple 
pilot case study: an abdominal surgery, in which disposable materials might be 
forgotten in patient's body. This scenario may represent a typical accident, and thus it 
is a valuable candidate as a seed from which developing a base ontology. This 
paragraph summarizes a case study following an example presented in the FRAM 
handbook (Hollnagel 2012).   
As reported, the team included two specialist surgeons: main – who knew well the 
procedure – and assistant surgeon. Both agreed with the personnel management to 
operate simultaneously on more than one intervention (event that occurs occasionally 
when the facility is short of staff). In this case, the main surgeon had to leave after the 
suture completion to execute another operation. Akin to the main surgeon, the assistant 
had to leave the ongoing surgery twice – first after a tissue sample removal, and second 
after stopping an haemorrage. Since during the procedure the bleeding had been 
problematic, stopping it had required a multitude of sponges. The scrub nurse always 
counts all the instruments and material used, but this time had missed a sponge and a 
disarp still in the patient’s abdomen, and had did not signal it to the surgeon. Since the 
patient was participating in a study, the scrub administered a special analgesic to him. 
Once the assistant surgeon had removed the disarp. He asked the main surgeon to suture 
the wound by himself, and left the operating room for the second time. At this point, 
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the main surgeon was awaited in another operating room, and in hurry. He started 
suturing the patient assisted by the scrub nurse, but no one checked materials. During 
this, after checked the study's papers, the supervising nurse realized that the analgesic 
prepared was wrong. The three present nurses discoursed about which analgesic to use. 
After that the scrub nurse prepared a new syringe with the right analgesic. The 
operating room’s phone rang to notify to the main surgeon he had to leave. Supervising 
and scrub nurses did a final check of the instruments and realized that a sponge and a 
disarp were missing. Everyone was summoned again and the patient, already extubated 
and whom wound had been suturated, had undergo to a new surgical operation. 
Fortunately, after all those mischievous episodes the patient remained unharmed.  
The FRAM analysis is continued by describing each aspect of each function identified 
above. When the output description of a function corresponds to the description of one 
of the five left over aspects of another function a coupling is established among these 
two functions, thus the order in which is done does not matter, only completeness does. 
The counting of instruments and materials happens twice in the example, one before 
and one after the suturing, thus two distinct functions are needed. As depicted in Figure 
2, some functions are grey, representing the boundaries of the analysis, they are so-
called “background functions”. For ours aims background functions can be used as 
placeholders to expand incrementally the underlying ontological framework, and thus, 
the taxonomized model. 
 
Figure 2. A simplified FRAM instantiation of an 
accident in healthcare; a valuable starting point to 
develop an ontology. 
 
While other techniques and tools may be used to build a FRAM instantiation, sharp-
end operators’ reluctance for reporting about their job activities cannot be overlooked. 
This problem arises specifically in healthcare, and thus could be overcome through a 
gamified data gathering by means of healthcare operators’ mobile devices.  
The check of model’s consistency and completeness is a time-expensive issue of 
FRAM method, that with the FRAMboICE app can be solved letting each of human 
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(i.e., healthcare operators, ontology master, FRAM analyst) and artificial (i.e., FRAM-
based ontology, FRAM designer) agents doing it autonomously repeatedly at several 
different points of the model development process. The consistency is ensured 
checking that aspects are described using the same names over the distinct functions. 
On the other hand, the completeness is checked spanning through each function one at 
time assuring that all aspects described in the instantiation can be found at least in two 
functions, is to say that no dangling aspect can exist. 
4. A Safety Imagination Framework based on FRAM Semantics 
Here we present the safety imagination framework aiming at supporting the FRAM 
model definition process from the elicitation of knowledge from sharp-end operators 
(e.g. healthcare personnel) to the design of a FRAM model. The framework includes a 
FRAM-based ontology, the FRAMboICE iOS app, and the creativity machine. The 
ontology, which is a formal specification of a shared conceptualization (Borst, 1997) 
(Gruber, 1993), gathers concepts and their relationships modelling an application 
domain, as the healthcare. 
Figure 3 depicts the whole process for the healthcare case study. The healthcare 
personnel provide information about their domain of interest by using the FRAMboICE 
app, which leverages a gamification approach. This relies on the upper model of the 
FRAM-based ontology and is fed by predefined ontology concepts (step 0 and step 4). 
By means of the FRAMboICE app, FRAM functions are described (step 1) and 
collected in a repository (step 2). Then the ontology master (De Nicola & Missikoff, 
2016), an ontology engineer with decisional role, reviews the functions and updates the 
ontology (step 3). Finally, the FRAM analyst builds FRAM models (step 7) by 
accessing the ontology with semantic queries (step 5) conceived to support creative 
activities (step 6), as combination or transformation of functions and their aspects and 
similarity reasoning on function aspects. 
4.1 FRAM-based ontology for healthcare systems 
The FRAM-based ontology for healthcare systems aims at representing knowledge 
concerning the healthcare domain structured according to an upper model derived from 
the FRAM method. To this purpose we identified the FRAM Upper-level Model 
(FUM) representing the most relevant FRAM concepts and the ontological 
relationships linking them. A FRAM-based ontology is obtained by extending FUM 
with domain-specific concepts. With respect to other existing upper level ontologies, 
as SUMO (Niles & Pease, 2001) and DOLCE (Gangemi, Guarino, Masolo, Oltramari, 
& Schneider, 2002), FUM is not general purpose and is conceived to support 
engineering of FRAM-based ontologies to be used to support the process of designing 
FRAM models. 
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Figure 3. Safety imagination framework based on FRAM 
semantics. The numbers represent the sequencing of 
activities needed to define FRAM models. 
 
The FUM upper level concepts are derived from the FRAM modelling entities. Among 
them, FRAM_Element is the generic concept that is specialized in Agent, Aspect, 
Function, and Phenotype. Then Coupling allows representing how two different 
functions link together and Coupling_effect models the corresponding effect, which 
could be Amplifying, Damping and No_effect. 
 
The FUM relationships are modelled in the ontology as object properties. The 
hasAspect object property relates two Aspects. It is specialized in the hasControl, 
hasInput, hasOutput, hasPrecondition, hasResource, and hasTime object properties. 
hasFunction is the inverse relationship of hasAspect. The hasPhenotype object 
property relates an Output with its Phenotype. The hasDownstreamAspect object 
property between Coupling and Input and hasUpstreamAspect object property between 
Coupling and Output allow to specify the role of the aspects in a coupling. Finally the 
hasEffect object property relates the Coupling concept with the corresponding 
CouplingEffect. 
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Figure 4 shows an excerpt of the Function concept specialization hierarchy for the 
healthcare case study. This is depicted by using the OWLViz plugin of the protégé 
ontology management system (Stanford, 2016).  
 
 
Figure 4. An excerpt of the function taxonomy for the 
healthcare case study. 
 
4.2 A gamified app for elicitation of sharp-end operator knowledge 
Our proposal is based on the assumption that sharp-end operators participate in the 
process of collecting knowledge on a specific domain of interest, as the healthcare. This 
is rarely the case as this process could be seen as a strenuous, time-consuming and 
annoying activity. Hence our objective is to increase engagement of experts by means 
of a gamification approach supported by a software application where game elements  
(Reeves & Read, 2009) are introduced to support knowledge elicitation. We deem that 
a gamified application used in a non-entertainment context could unleash a broader 
participation of experts and an increased capacity in collecting knowledge. This would 
lead to safety, security and economic benefits. To this aim we selected seven game 
elements and we adopted them in a knowledge elicitation workflow. These are: (1) 
avatars, (2) points and leaderboards, (3) feedback, (4) rules, (5) teams, (6) parallel 
communication systems, and (7) time pressure. 
In the following we describe the game mechanics supported by the FRAMboICE app. 
We envisage three different roles: the coordinator, the FRAM function proposer, and 
the FRAM function contributor (for the sake of concision we refer to them in the 
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following as contributor and proposer). The coordinator is in charge of starting and 
ending the FRAM functions harvesting activity, and/or may decide its duration. Indeed, 
the FRAMboICE app provides flexibility to organize a game session lasting a few 
hours, as in the case of traditional participative FRAM assessment workshops, or 
days/weeks to give participants more time to define the functions, or even an indefinite 
time, until the coordinator decides to close the activity. The coordinator is also in 
charge of deciding whether a FRAM function should be accepted or rejected. As this 
decision affects assignment of points to the participants, this role should be given to a 
participant trusted by the community of experts. All the participants can be both 
proposer and contributor. 
The coordinator starts the process by initiating FRAM functions harvesting. Hence, 
proposers create FRAM functions by means of the ICE app. Other participants can read 
the proposed FRAM functions and decide to contribute by modifying one of them or, 
simply, accepting it. In case of modification, the corresponding proposer can decide to 
accept or reject the update. Once the proposer deems that his FRAM function is 
valuable, he sends it to the coordinator who may decide to reject it or to use it to update 
the collection of FRAM functions. It should be noted that, to perform this decisional 
activity, the coordinator can be supported by a committee of experts (if available). Once 
the FRAM function is accepted, contributors can still decide to endorse it.  
Both proposers and contributors of the FRAM functions harvesting process win points 
by performing the above-mentioned activities. The idea is that participation is rewarded 
and that the larger the participation on defining a FRAM function the more points are 
collected by the team members.  
Figure 5 shows the interface of the FRAMboICE mobile app. 
 
Figure 5. User interface of the FRAMboICE mobile app. 
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4.3 Computational creativity support 
The FRAM-based ontology for healthcare systems collects semantic descriptions of 
potential functions that an analyst may define when designing FRAM models for 
specific healthcare safety analysis problems. The FRAM-based ontology allows 
organizing such function descriptions in a knowledge base that can be used by the 
analyst to search information through semantics-based query functions. More 
interestingly, such formalized knowledge may suggest input parameters for FRAM 
models leveraging automatic reasoning methods, such as concepts/function models 
subsumption relations and similarity/dissimilarity metrics, as well as contextual or 
design related constraints. This task is accomplished by the Creativity Machine 
component of the safety imagination framework that implements methods of 
computational creativity, a subfield of Artificial Intelligence aiming at defining 
computational systems that create artifacts and ideas (Colton & Wiggins, 2012).  
 
Generally, computational creativity methods address the problem of thinking 
something new, e.g., a risk situation, by varying and/or combining one or more aspects 
of what already exists, e.g., old experiences of incidents or normal situations. For our 
application, we initially focus on the following methods: the transformation method, 
defined as the process that modifies the form of some particular features of an existing 
design; and the analogy method, defined as the process where specific aspects of the 
conceptual structure of one problem or domain are matched with and transferred to 
another problem or domain. In particular, we apply these definitions to the design of a 
FRAM function and of its couplings.  
 
Given a collection of “ground-level” function semantic descriptions, a task of the safety 
analyst is to identify all the functions to include in a model, to define the aspects of 
each FRAM function and its couplings with the other functions. Indeed, the information 
from the healthcare personnel could be incomplete, and they could miss unusual or 
abnormal situations that are relevant to the FRAM analysis.  
Thus, following the analogy method, support to specify aspects of a given FRAM 
function can be provided, for example, by showing to the analyst the aspects of similar 
functions. The description of the function “administer special analgesic” in the 
abdominal surgery model of Figure 2, with details like the choice/availability of the 
right analgesic as in the case study, could suggest aspects for “administer epidural 
anesthetic” function while analyzing labor for childbirth process. 
 
As a FRAM coupling is automatically realized by identifying pair of aspects of 
different functions addressed by the same name, whenever two aspects refer to concepts 
that are in a subsumption relation in the FRAM-based healthcare ontology (i.e., they 
belong to the same taxonomy), the system may suggest the FRAM analyst a coupling 
between the two functions, or to abstract/further detail one of the two aspects/functions.   
 
The transformation method can be implemented by suggesting changes to function 
aspects or to couplings. In the example of Figure 2, “count instruments and materials 
before suturing” could be de-coupled from “suturing the wound” to suggest the analyst 
a situation that may occur that could be taken into account in the analysis, like that task 
is forgotten by distraction and not reported, as described in the case study. 
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5. Conclusion 
Foresight is the process of inferring new knowledge from pre-existing one. Enhancing 
the knowledge gathering process should be considered as a precondition to improve 
existing foresight methods. In this context we presented a novel framework with two 
objectives. The former is to increase engagement of sharp-end operators by means of a 
gamification approach and of the FRAM method. The latter is to use elicited knowledge 
and computational creativity methods to support safety analyst in thinking out of the 
box and in conceiving unimagined situations relevant to safety analysis.  
 
The concrete example of application of this framework in the healthcare sector and a 
first positive feedback from safety analysts demonstrate, from one side, the need of 
novel more engaging approaches to collect expert knowledge and, from the other, the 
need to further increase the computational creativity support of our framework.  
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The European Union Agency for Railways is an Agency of the European Union, which 
roles and responsibilities have just been modified by the new Regulation (EU) 
2016/796. 
The Agency is moving from being essentially a technical body supporting the European 
Commission and, to a certain extent, the railway sector, to being an active player in 
the railway system dealing with certification and authorisation processes.  
The Agency is in fact becoming an authority.  
In the past years, the Agency developed several pieces of legislation aiming at 
harmonizing safety management in Europe and trying to support operators and 
countries in improving their safety performances. Those regulations were all 
supporting a proactive and predictive safety management combined with an approach 
based on learning on experience. 
 A specific regulation on risk evaluation and assessment;  
 A specific regulation on monitoring safety management systems, requiring also the 
use of leading indicators; 
 
Today, carrying the responsibilities of its new tasks the Safety Unit of the Agency has 
invested human and financial resources in developing projects to push the railway 
industry towards a more proactive and predictive safety management by: 
 
1. Better understanding of the operational contributing factors:  
a. Deeper analysis of the causes of accidents and incidents, by analysing 
the work done by the National Investigation Bodies; 
b. More data/information sharing: 
i. Safety Alert IT tool 
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ii. Safety Information System  
 
iii. Common Occurrence Reporting – Safety Management Data 
sharing 
c. Identification of performance shaping factors in accidents and 
incidents. 
2. Better understanding on the decision making process at national level by 
monitoring the National Safety Authorities and supporting the peer review of 
the National Investigation Bodies; 
3. Improving competence and ability in evaluating and assessing risks arising 
from organisational, operational and technical systems: 
a. Develop expertise in the field or railway risk assessment by starting a 
collaboration with universities and railway operators; 
b. Improving support for assessing and evaluating risks arising from the 
Transport of Dangerous Goods. 
4. Creating a specific framework on Safety Culture and Human and 
Organisational Factors; 
5. Investigate the use of data and analytics techniques in railways to support 
better management of the risk of accident (aka big-data study). 
 
The study mentioned at point 5 is still on-going and it is supposed to finish by the end 
of April 2018. Currently it is still too early to draw conclusions but, from the first 
results it is possible to state that a “silo approach” adopted in developing IT systems 
and platforms in the railway sector is limiting the possibility to combine data and to 
use it for an extensive automatic accidents modelling. The same issue is undermining 
a systemic use of data for risk profiling and prediction of accidents. The Agency is 
considering potential solutions to address the previously identified problems. 
 
It is also possible to report that some big-data projects - promoted under the initiative 
of single companies-  are being stopped/hold due to the insufficient critical data volume 
to provide reliable results. A possible solution to this issue is to improve data sharing. 
This approach is in line with what the Agency is trying to do.  
 
For the future, the Agency will definitely try to support data sharing and 
harmonisation, including all data type which are not traditionally considered as 
“safety relevant” despite a difficult start we still believe that, with an appropriate 
support and cultural change, the railway industry can address a “foresight revolution” 
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Safety interventions suggested as a result of a foresight process are more likely to be 
related to non-urgent issues, and be affected by a greater level of uncertainty, than 
interventions suggested by experience feedback or by regulatory changes. By analyzing 
a number of accident cases where proactive foresight-based suggestions were not 
implemented before the accident, we assess whether the uncertain and long-term 
nature of the predictions had a negative effect on the implementation of the 
interventions suggested. 
Keywords: foresight, uncertainty, short-termism, justification, decision-making 
1. Introduction 
Classically, the prioritization of safety interventions (investment in new technical or 
organizational barriers, implementation of organizational or cross-organizational 
changes) is mainly driven by two processes: 
 Risk analysis: risks are assessed, fed in part by operational experience feedback, 
the effectiveness and cost of possible safety barriers is estimated, and budgets are 
allocated, often with input from expert opinion and decision-support tools such as 
cost-benefit analysis. 
 Updates to industry standards or obligations imposed by the regulator, possibly in 
reaction to recent accidents.  
The implementation of foresight-based methods for safety analysis (which we will 
define for the purposes of this article as the proactive identification and assessment of 
medium-term threats, based on the idea of plausibility rather than that of probability) 
introduces a third source of safety interventions. The threats to safety identified using 
these methods are likely to be related to longer-term issues and their characterization 
is affected by a greater level of uncertainty. 
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Research hypothesis. The hypothesis examined in this paper is that safety 
interventions suggested via foresight processes will often be ignored, with decision-
makers citing lack of evidence, or uncertainty concerning the effects, to justify the 
associated financial or organizational effort. Indeed, decision-makers are known to 
prioritize short-term issues over long-term threats, and managers in industry who 
regularly change job position are unlikely to be immune to this bias. Furthermore, the 
presence of uncertainty can be used as a justification for prioritizing short-term risks 
and operational performance over actions to reduce hypothetical medium-term risks. 
Method. We analyze findings from past accident investigations to check for the 
presence of ignored safety foresight. We analyze who produces future-oriented safety 
concerns and how these concerns have been received in the cases studied. 
From a methodological point of view, our case-based approach which focuses on 
accidents (inevitably introducing hindsight bias (Fischhoff 2003)) does not allow us to 
obtain a general picture of decision-making with respect to foresight-based 
interventions. By analyzing different cases where the argument put forward based on 
foresight analysis seems to have been strikingly strong, we hope to identify some 
common patterns that may also appear, though less vividly, in other decisions on safety 
management. 
2. Theory 
There are a variety of cognitive and motivational barriers to adopting a long-term 
perspective and to spending now on uncertain threats that may possibly occur many 
years from today: 
 short-termism, or placing more weight on certain upfront costs than on uncertain 
and delayed benefits, even if the potential benefits are large. There is a well-known 
conflict between short-term and long-term decision-making, which leads 
decision-makers to sacrifice longer-term objectives through excessive focus on 
short-term goals. For instance, research shows that decision-makers find it 
difficult to take decisions with respect to long-term threats such as climate change. 
Part of the explanation is that decision-makers discount future benefits in a quasi-
hyperbolic manner (Laibson 1997), so benefits in 10 years are perceived to have 
little value compared with benefits next week. A decision-maker who is a manager 
may also adopt a very limited time horizon, such as the number of years until they 
expect to change job position, when assessing future benefits, whereas significant 
organizational or technical safety interventions generally require a much longer 
time horizon to see a return on investment. 
 loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), the observation that people tend to 
be more averse to perceived costs (for example of safety investments) than to 
foregone benefits (such as averted accidents). 
 regret aversion: decision-makers tend to avoid taking actions due to the fear that 
it may later turn out to have been the worse option (Bell 1982). This leads to a 
bias in favour of the status quo. 
 ambiguity-driven indecisiveness: an individual may be indecisive between some 
options when she does not know the probability distributions over outcomes. 
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Recent research in experimental economics (Sautua 2017) suggests that regret 
aversion and ambiguity-driven indecisiveness are equally important (in a 
laboratory setting) in generating status quo bias in the presence of uncertainty. 
 dilution of responsibility in case of major accidents: if a large accident does 
eventually appear, it is likely (in the generally safe systems we are familiar with 
today) to have resulted from a combination of unusual factors, so accountability 
for the accident is likely to be spread across multiple individuals. In contrast, the 
responsibility for defending an investment in equipment or the organizational 
effort involved in a change in the organization is focused on the person arguing in 
favour of the intervention. 
We will analyze a number of cases where these characteristics of decision-makers 
appear to have been combined with multiple and partially inconsistent organizational 
goals and incomplete or ambiguous information, generating unfortunate outcomes. 
 
3. Case studies 
We have selected a number of accident cases which are well documented, and where 
decision-makers appear, with hindsight, to have been fairly well informed about the 
risks present in their system, on the basis of proactive foresight-based analyses. These 
analyses pointed to uncertain, medium-term threats to safety. 
3.1 Fire at Grenfell Tower 
In June 2017, a fire in the 24-storey Grenfell Tower block of flats killed approximately 
80 people. The tower had been renovated in 2016, with the addition of thermal 
insulation on the outside of the concrete structure covered by aluminium composite 
cladding. The fire, which started due to a faulty fridge on one of the lower floors, spread 
very rapidly to the entire building via the external insulation and cladding. The material 
used for the cladding, which includes a polyethylene core, is very flammable, and is 
banned for use in high-rise buildings in many parts of the world. There is ongoing 
debate as to whether the insulation and cladding used on the tower are allowed by UK 
building regulations, which are somewhat ambiguous on the matter16. Fire protection 
in the building was also lower than in many similar buildings elsewhere in the world 
due to the lack of sprinkler systems and the single staircase. 
A significant number of reports preceding the fire could have generated foresight on 
the risks posed by the building. After a 1999 fire in Irvine, Scotland, in which fire also 
spread via external cladding, a committee specialized in fire safety engineering had 
warned the UK Parliament that building regulations needed updating to deal with new 
flammable cladding materials. Similar fires in high-rise buildings with exterior 
                                                 
16  The regulations do not specifically ban the use of this material (which is cheaper than the fire-
resistant alternative, and led to a 340k€ saving for this building) for high-rise buildings. Building 
regulations specify three routes to conformity concerning external insulation and cladding, the first being 
the use only of limited-combustibility materials, the second being a fire test on a mock-up of the proposed 
design in which the elements are assembled in the same manner as in the planned work, and the third a 
comparison with previous accepted designs. It appears that the two latter routes were not used for the 
refurbishment of Grenfell Tower, which was certified as “conforming to the relevant provisions” by the 
local government authority that owned the building. 
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cladding occurred in Shanghai in 2010, Melbourne in 2014, in Dubai on New Year’s 
Eve 2015, with many fatalities (White and Delichatsios 2014). A parliamentary group17 
had sent letters to four ministers from the Department for Communities and Local 
Government recommending change18 to building regulations. One of the ministers 
replied stating “I have neither seen nor heard anything that would suggest that 
consideration of these specific potential changes is urgent and I am not willing to 
disrupt the work of this department by asking that these matters are brought forward.” 
The parliamentary group responded “As a consequence the group wishes to point out 
to you that should a major fire tragedy, with loss of life, occur between now and 2017 
in, for example, a residential care facility or a purpose built block of flats, where the 
matters which had been raised here, were found to be contributory to the outcome, then 
the group would be bound to bring this to others’ attention”. 
In this case, the strongly-worded warnings from experts and the numerous accidents 
elsewhere in the world illustrating the reality of the hazard were not sufficient to push 
ministers to amend building regulations. They did not help the local government choose 
the safer, but more expensive, option for refurbishing the building, nor install sprinklers 
during the work on the building. They did not allow the building inspector to request 
stronger evidence that the cladding and insulation system was safe for a high-rise 
building. 
3.2 Air France flight 447 
Air France flight 447 was a scheduled passenger flight from Rio de Janeiro, Brazil to 
Paris, France, which crashed in 2009. The Airbus A330 entered an aerodynamic stall 
from which it did not recover, crashing into the Atlantic Ocean, killing all 228 
passengers and crew aboard the aircraft. 
The crew flew into a line of thunderstorms in the intertropical convergence zone north 
of Brazil, making little effort to deviate around it. The aircraft’s three pitot tubes iced 
up in the thunderstorm, causing the loss of accurate airspeed indications. The 
atmospheric conditions exceeded the pitot tubes’ capacity to deal with the obstruction 
for about 40 seconds. The loss of airspeed indications caused the autopilot, flight 
director, and autothrust to disconnect, as they require airspeed information to operate. 
The airplane’s handling characteristics also changed, as the airplane’s fly-by-wire 
flight controls degraded from its Normal to Alternate law. This led to the loss of many 
automatic protection mechanisms built into Normal law, including stall protection. The 
pilot operating the controls struggled to understand the situation and maintain aircraft 
control, in the process climbing nearly 3000 feet and losing critical airspeed. The 
airplane’s stall warning (an audio alarm) went off for over 50 seconds, but the pilots 
were poorly trained on how to handle such an event at high altitude and seem not to 
have heard or interpreted this alarm correctly. They responded by applying full power, 
as their low-altitude stall training had taught them, but little additional power was 
available. The airplane became deeply stalled and descended at high speed into the 
                                                 
17  The All-Party Parliamentary Fire Safety and Rescue Group. 
18  The group wrote in 2014 “Surely however when you already have credible evidence in 2012 to 
justify updating a small but important part of the guidance in the Approved Document, which will lead 
to saving of lives, you don’t need to wait another three years in addition to the two already spent since 
the research findings were updated, in order to take action?”. 
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ocean. The plane was fully functional as it was crashed into the ocean by pilots who 
did not understand how they had lost control so abruptly. 
Significant media attention after the accident was paid to the faulty pitot tubes, whose 
icing triggered the accident. This issue had in fact been detected on previous flights, 
and analyzed by the aviation authorities (EASA in Europe), by the aircraft 
manufacturer and by the operating company. These pitot tubes were progressively 
being replaced across Air France’s A330 fleet by an alternative model, but the change 
had not yet been made on this aircraft. It had not at the time been made mandatory by 
EASA (but did become an obligation after the accident). Less media attention has been 
paid to a more sensitive topic, the general airmanship skills of pilots and their training 
of pilots on upset recovery, including when the aircraft protection mechanisms are 
disabled. The pilots on this flight, despite significant number of flight hours on this 
type of aircraft, did not understand the situation that they encountered, and reacted very 
poorly to the situation. Whereas in past decades, most pilots had significant manual 
flying experience either due to their previous military experience or to personal 
experience flying small planes, newer generations of pilots of passenger jets tend to 
have little experience in manual flying. Increasingly sophisticated automation on 
modern aircraft have changed the nature of pilots’ work, with many flight phases 
undertaken on autopilot. The automatic protection systems in Airbus aircraft prevent 
many pilot actions that could lead to loss of control, and pilot training includes little 
exposure to loss-of-control situations19 (indeed, the reduced training costs for pilots 
due to the automation is a commercial argument for Airbus). Sessions on a simulator 
are fairly predictable for pilots, who are familiar with the list of events that may arise 
in training. Simulator training does not help prepare them for the “startle effect” 
triggered by a new and unusual situation for which they have not been previously 
trained20. 
The BEA report into the AF447 accident states “The training regime for pilots is not 
designed to compensate for a lack of manual high-altitude flying skills, or for a lack of 
experience on conventional aircraft. It also limits the ability of pilots to acquire or 
maintain basic airmanship skills.” (BEA 2012). The report includes a recommendation 
to increase the amount of manual flying in pilot training, to improve training on basic 
airmanship skills, to add simulator training on abnormal flight modes, and to develop 
training scenarios that expose pilots to the “startle effect” and to situations with a high 
emotional load21. 
Air France had identified in an internal report that the airmanship skills of some of its 
long-courier pilots were weak, and that there was a generalized loss of common sense 
and general flying knowledge among its pilots, and that pilots often had trouble in 
                                                 
19  In particular, the Airbus flight crew training manual indicates that it is not necessary to train 
pilots on recovery from stall at unusual attitudes, the hypothesis being that the aircraft protection 
mechanisms will prevent the entry of such states. 
20  For instance, it seems that the pilots were not familiar with the aural stall warning alarm, which 
sounded more than 70 times in the minutes before the crash. 
21  Recommendations numbered FRAN-2012-041, FRAN-2012-045 and FRAN-2012-046 in the 
BEA investigation report. 
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sensemaking after an equipment failure (identifying the fault, assessing its level of 
severity and possible consequences) (BEA 2012, p. 199). 
The industry has made some limited changes to the training regime for pilots to increase 
their ability to respond appropriately in unusual situations. For instance, Air France has 
added specific training on stalls and upset recovery. EASA launched rulemaking tasks 
concerning pilot’s theoretical airmanship skills22 and the fidelity of aircraft simulators 
in non-nominal situations. The FAA has issued an advisory circular pointing out good 
practice on stall training23, with some related improvements concerning the prevention, 
recognition and recovery from stalls. However, it is not evident that the associated 
actions are sufficiently far-reaching to make significant changes to a fairly deep-seated 
situation of poor basic airmanship skills, deskilling due to the increasing role of 
automation on the flight deck, and limited ability to recover from a loss of control. 
This case illustrates both a classical risk analysis process which led to a good decision 
(experience feedback leading to the decision to change the pitot tubes, even if this 
change was not rolled out sufficiently quickly to prevent the accident) and apparent 
lack of foresight concerning the impact of automation on pilot skills. 
3.3 Xynthia windstorm 
In February 2010, a large windstorm named Xynthia struck the west coast of France 
during a high-tide period, killing 59 people and causing more than 2M€ in damage. The 
mayor of La Faute-sur-Mer, a small coastal town that saw the largest number of victims 
from the storm after a protective dike failed, was found guilty on appeal in 2016 of 
involuntary homicide and condemned to a suspended sentence of two years 
imprisonment24. 
Under French law, the mayor is responsible for informing the local population of flood 
risks, for preparing a local emergency plan, and for approving building permits which 
did not include obligatory protective measures for flood zones. The mayor of this 
locality was found guilty of approving numerous building permits in a flood zone and 
not establishing an emergency plan. Over a 12-year period, the mayor had received 
more than 40 different documents describing the flood risk and explaining the 
consequences in terms of urban development (Cour des comptes 2012). Some of these 
letters described precisely the scenario that played out during the storm, with high sea 
levels caused by low atmospheric pressure and wind leading to dike failure25 and the 
flooding of areas behind the dike that lie below the sea level. Over the past 100 years, 
                                                 
22  EASA rulemaking tasks RMT.0581 & RMT.0582. 
23  FAA Advisory Circular AC120-STALL. Advisory circulars are not binding regulatory texts. 
24  The first trial in 2014 found him guilty of involuntary homicide and endangerment, with a 
sentence of 4 years’ jail. The findings of the first trial were very severe, stating [author’s translation] 
“The tragic consequences of Xynthia are not the result of bad luck. [The accused] have intentionally 
concealed the risk in order to preserve the benefits of this small piece of heaven which provided them 
with power and money. They have lied to their constituents, have put their lives in danger, have 
considered them as negligible objects, stewing in their obsolete certainties. They have gambled that the 
known risk would not be realized, but the seed money for their gamble was the physical integrity of the 
inhabitants of La Faute-sur-Mer.” 
25  The dike that protected a part of the village was known to be weak, and several official reports 
since 2001 had warned of risks of submersion, internal and external erosion, and general instability. 
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5 storms had led to flooding in the area. The mayor had ignored several orders from 
the Préfet (a regional representative of the national government) to inform inhabitants 
of the risks they were exposed to. He did not distribute to inhabitants an information 
leaflet produced by the regional government describing the flooding risk. He also 
ignored alerts sent by the Préfet to his mobile phone and email in the hours before the 
storm, warning of severe flood risk. 
A regional government official testified during the trial that in a meeting with the mayor 
concerning the establishment of a flood-prevention plan, he had explained the flooding 
risks again and stated, speaking as a former judge, that he hoped there was no major 
flooding in the future, as otherwise they would be called assassins. 
The mayor’s legal defense invoked the notion of force majeure related to the 
unpredictable nature of such a severe hazardous event. The judges stated that “the 
exceptional intensity of Xynthia […] does not change the predictability of a major 
accident hazard, whose potential contours were perfectly identified. The statistically 
low frequency of an extreme natural phenomenon does not imply that such an event 
will never occur.” 
It seems clear that the uncertainty concerning the likelihood of such an extreme 
flooding event occurring during his mandate played a significant role in the mayor’s 
apparent decision to ignore this risk. 
3.4 BP Texas City refinery explosion 
In 2005, an explosion on the Texas City refinery in Texas killed 15 workers and injured 
more than 170 others. The explosion occurred when a hydrocarbon vapour cloud was 
released during startup the isomeration process unit. The level of liquid inside a splitter 
tower overflowed, due to an erroneous level transmitter, a defective high-level alarm 
in the tower and a faulty relief valve. BP had acquired the Texas City refinery, the third-
largest in the USA, as part of its merger with Amoco in 1999. 
The US CSB investigation into the accident identified a large number of safety 
management failings on the refinery. Process equipment was not compatible with 
current state of practice, due to long-term underinvestment (in particular, the use of 
blowdown drums for emergency discharges that vent directly to the atmosphere has 
long been replaced by discharge to a flare system). Several safety-critical 
instrumentation and control elements on the tower were faulty. Operators did not follow 
the official startup procedure for the unit, because they were under pressure to start the 
unit quickly to avoid production problems. A supervisor was not present during the 
startup operations, and during the preceding shift transfer communication between the 
two teams was poor. Finally, numerous portable sheds were in use by workers (many 
of whom were killed by the explosion) close to the process hazard, contrary to industry 
guidelines and to BP’s own regulations26. 
                                                 
26  To illustrate the level of non-conformity of the site, after the accident BP paid a fine of 21.3M 
USD to resolve more than 300 separate alleged violations of OSHA regulations and allocated 1 billion 
USD to upgrade the site equipment over 5 years. 
Enhancing Safety: the Challenge of Foresight 
 182 
A 2001 presentation titled “Texas City Refinery Safety Challenge” written by refinery 
managers stated that without a significant improvement in performance, a worker 
would be killed in the next three to four years (USCSB 2007, 154). A 2002 report 
requested by the regional BP manager stated that the Texas City refinery process units 
and infrastructure were vulnerable, with findings that were “urgent and far-reaching 
with important implications for the site, including the integrity of on-going site 
operations”. It also stated that there were “serious concerns about the potential for a 
major site incident due to the large number of hydrocarbon releases” (USCSB 2007, 
156). The leadership culture at the refinery was described as “can’t finish” as regards 
the implementation of necessary changes, and the report recommended a “major 
overhaul of the basics” and increases in maintenance spending of 235M USD. A 
followup report later in the same year stated that “the current integrity and reliability 
issues at [the refinery] are clearly linked to the reduction in maintenance spending 
over the last decade” and noted that “The prevailing culture at the Texas City refinery 
was to accept cost reductions without challenge and to raise concerns when 
operational integrity was compromised.” 
A BP group-level strategy document27 explicitly aimed to “limit the amount of capital 
allocated in the Refining SPU due to its volatility”. This budget restriction made it 
difficult for the Texas City refinery to obtain the investments necessary to upgrade its 
aging infrastructure. When considering the possibility of connecting the isomeration 
unit to the flare system of a newly built unit in 2002, the manager of the refinery chose 
to avoid the cost of connection, and “bank the savings in 99.999 percent of the cases” 
(USCSB 2007, 115). A 2003 BP report found that “most action items were not 
implemented because of budget constraints.” (USCSB 2007, 160). A 2004 safety 
culture report made by external consultants found that “The pressure for production, 
time pressure, and understaffing are the major causes of accidents at Texas City” and 
“There is an exceptional degree of fear of catastrophic incidents at Texas City”. The 
2005 health and safety plan for the site warned that the refinery would “kill someone in 
the next 12-18 months”. 
All these observations, with many more reported in the CSB report into the accident, 
paint a picture of site-level and regional managers who were well aware of serious 
process safety deficiencies on the refinery, and of the detrimental impact of budget cuts 
on the mechanical integrity of their process equipment, who had action plans available 
for improving the situation, but who did not push back at the corporate cost-reduction 
targets that prevented them from implementing the plans. Corporate (board-level) 
directors had a “short-term focus”28, lacked safety expertise, were poorly informed of 
the safety situation at Texas City29 and did not appreciate the impact of their cost-
cutting measures on safety. 
                                                 
27  The BP “Management Framework” describing the company’s corporate governance system, 
dated 2003. 
28  BP Baker Panel report, page xii. 
29  Safety was monitored at the board level using the recordable injury rate, a metric which concerns 
(mostly low-severity) occupational accidents and which is notorious for not providing information on 
process safety. Furthermore, internal reports on risk at the refinery sent to the CEO did not mention 
accidents and fatalities that occurred on the site. 
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3.5 Ladbroke Grove train collision 
A head-on collision between two passenger trains at Ladbroke Grove in London in 
1999 killed 31 people and injured more than 400. One of the trains passed through a 
red “stop” signal, which was preceded by a yellow “prepare for red” signal. The red 
signal that was not respected by one of the trains was known to be dangerous due to its 
poor visibility, having been passed eight times in the previous six years; the inquiry 
into the accident found that the train driver, who was inexperienced, most likely had 
not seen or had misinterpreted the signal30. Factors that contributed to the accident 
include inadequate training for one of the train drivers, poor visibility of the signal 
compounded by blinding light from the sun at the time of the accident, and inadequate 
response from the railway control center. The accident could also have been prevented 
by the system-wide installation of an automatic train protection system. A cost-benefit 
analysis had concluded that the safety benefits of such a system did not justify its high 
cost (the cost per statistical life saved was estimated at 4M€, compared with the 1.4M€ 
threshold used at the time). A post-accident analysis confirmed the numbers used in the 
study31. 
The signal passed in the accident was known to be dangerous, and the rate of signals 
passed at danger in the area was known to be “exceptionally high”32, but no work had 
been planned by the railway infrastructure company to improve its visibility. A report 
indicated that the signal was located in a curve, was partially obscured and 
intermittently visible to a driver. An HSE33 report indicated that the signal was partially 
obscured by overhead power lines, that a nearby bridge could produce dazzle, and that 
the signal was “susceptible to swamping from bright sunlight”. An expert review of 
the visibility of signals had not been undertaken by the infrastructure company for 
several years in the area, despite several requests for such a risk assessment. The 
operations and safety director of one railway operating company, Ms Foster, wrote 
several letters to the railway infrastructure company concerning signaling in the 
Paddington area and the specific signal involved in the collision. One letter in 1998 
stated “I should be grateful if you would advise me, as a matter of urgency, what action 
you intend to take to mitigate against this high risk signal”. A subsequent letter in 1999 
(which received no reply) stated “This is clearly not the manner in which to manage 
risk and an approach to which I am strongly opposed. Therefore, I suggest that an 
holistic approach is taken to SPAD management in the Paddington area and all 
changes to infrastructure or methods of working are properly risk assessed.” The 
inquiry into the accident found that the Paddington area was characterized by an 
“endemic culture of complacency and inaction” (Cullen 2001, 137). 
The British railway system had seen large organizational changes in the past few years, 
following the privatization of British Rail and its separation into more than 100 separate 
                                                 
30  The area around Paddington where the collision occurred sees significant amounts of high speed 
and bidirectional rail traffic, and the signals are some of the most complicated in the UK. The signals 
were further obscured by a bridge and by recently installed overhead electrical systems (Cullen 2001). 
During the Cullen inquiry, a former operations manager with British Rail stated that “In over 45 years 
in the industry, I have never seen such a confusing set of options to a driver”. 
31  However, a less expensive system called Train Protection & Warning System was implemented 
in the UK from 2000 onwards. 
32  Report by the railway infrastructure company in 1993. 
33  The UK Health and Safety Executive was at the time the safety authority for railways. 
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companies. The resulting inter-organizational complexity seems to have contributed to 
the accident. The infrastructure company, responsible for the design and visibility of 
signals, has an incentive to consider signals passed at danger as a driver error issue, 
rather than digging into contributing factors such as signal design. During the inquiry, 
the infrastructure company defended the design of the signal, indicating that though the 
approach was complex, its location should be known to all train drivers. The railway 
infrastructure company did not respond to urgent and repeated requests from a highly-
ranked representative of an operating company to improve the safety of a dangerous 
signal. The accident, which occurred in close succession with two other railway 
accidents, led to major changes in the formal responsibilities for management and 
regulation of safety of UK rail transport. 
4.  Discussion 
Going over the different cases described, we can identify a certain number of common 
features that seem to34have led to safety foresight being ignored: 
 Competing priorities, such as production pressure and profit: organizations 
pursue multiple goals, and safety is never the primary reason for existence of 
industrial activity. The impact of goal conflicts is seen in the decision to use lower-
cost cladding at Grenfell Tower, to allow building permits without flood 
mitigation measures at La Faute-sur-Mer, to fly through the thunderstorms on the 
Rio-Paris flight instead of avoiding them as most other flights did, and in BP’s 
decision to cut maintenance spending without assessing the impact on safety. 
Rasmussen’s migration model (Rasmussen 1997) provides some context for the 
effect of production pressure and cost-cutting on safety margins. 
 Lack of explicit decision-making on the safety issue or proposed intervention. 
In some of the cases studied, a formal decision was made not to implement a 
proposed safety intervention: a formal decision was made not to install automatic 
train protection systems that would have prevented (at a high financial cost) the 
Ladbroke Grove accident, and a minister in the Grenfell Tower case explicitly 
decided not to request a reassessment of building regulations. Other cases in the 
safety literature of explicit decisions not to implement a safety mechanism (later 
highlighted by accidents) include the decision not to redesign the Ford Pinto 
gasoline reservoir (Birsch and Fielder 1994) and Boeing’s decision not to redesign 
the central fuel tanks of the 747 prior to the crash of flight TWA 800 in 1996 
(Negroni 2000). In the AF447 case, an explicit decision was made by Air France 
to progressively change the pitot tubes on their A330 aircraft, as parts became 
available, and EASA made an explicit decision not to make the change mandatory 
for airlines. In most of the cases we have described, however, no formal decision-
making process is recorded as having taken place, with instead letters of concern 
not receiving any answer (Ladbroke Grove), or acceptance that no budget was 
available to address severely degraded equipment (Texas City), or repeated 
brushing away of concerns raised (La Faute-sur-Mer). 
                                                 
34  Our analysis is based only on the analysis of secondary sources, with no direct interviews of the 
people involved in the decisions, making it impossible to assert precisely which factors were most 
influential in the decisions or indecisions. 
Enhancing Safety: the Challenge of Foresight 
 185 
 Status quo bias, or inertia in individual decision-making, is a well documented 
phenomenon in experimental economics35. It seems to have contributed to the 
resistance to change and the lack of a sense of urgency seen in the Grenfell Tower 
case and Ladbroke Grove. 
 Difficulty for decision-makers to understand the safety implications of their 
decisions, due to lack of knowledge or lack of information: this weakness was 
present at BP (board-level decision to reduce maintenance, misunderstanding of 
the relevance of occupational safety metrics). 
 The effect of the complexity of bureaucratic organisations on safety 
management and decision-making (Vaughan 1999) seems to have played a role in 
the Ladbroke Grove accident, where recent privatization of the railway sector and 
separation of a previously integrated entity into multiple operating companies and 
an infrastructure operator had introduced numerous changes to the organization. 
A number of factors frequently identified in the safety literature as contributing to poor 
decision-making do not appear to have played a role in the cases studied: 
 Difficulty for safety professionals to communicate risk to decision-makers: the 
cases studied are perhaps most striking for the great clarity of the messages 
delivered to decision-makers on the importance of changing the status quo. 
 The suppression of minority viewpoints, or lack of psychological safety. 
 Group-think, in which a group of people arrives at a decision that would not have 
been reached by any member acting individually. 
Our analysis of medium-term decisions focuses our attention on “blunt-end” decision-
making (removed from the hazard source), rather than on sharp-end activity. A range 
of levels of authority of the decision-making actors can be observed, with regional-area 
managers (Ladbroke Grove), site-level and corporate-level managers (BP Texas City), 
local government officials (La Faute-sur-Mer), regulators and safety authorities 
(Grenfell Tower, EASA) and legislators (Grenfell Tower). Adopting a categorization 
suggested by (Rosness et al. 2010), the (in)decisions analyzed are political, managerial 
and analytical. 
                                                 
35  For example, the legal default in organ donation has a strong effect on people’s decision (Johnson 
and Goldstein 2003), and the default level of savings proposed in retirement investment forms has a 
significant impact on their level of saving (Cronqvist and Thaler 2004). 
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Figure 1. Classes of decision-processes, from (Rosness et 
al. 2010) 
 
Our research hypothesis was that safety interventions suggested via foresight processes 
are often ignored, with decision-makers citing lack of evidence to justify the associated 
financial or organizational effort. Our first observation is that in many of the cases, we 
cannot identify a formal “decision” made not to adopt a specific safety intervention. 
Indeed, in most of the cases no safety intervention was developed because the risk was 
not taken on board, or put on the agenda, before this stage. In the cases where formal 
decisions were made, it does seem that lack of evidence of the immediate or certain 
nature of the hazard played a role in allowing the decision-makers not to implement 
risk treatment measures. 
5.  Conclusion 
In the area of financial decision-making, researchers have suggested (Kunreuther and 
Weber 2014) the implementation of mechanisms that create short-term incentives for 
long-term thinking. For example, home-owners in flood-exposed areas could be 
provided with loans to help them implement flood-proofing measures, with the cost of 
the loan offset by reduced insurance premiums. The literature on the role of 
whistleblowers in raising safety concerns is also very relevant to situations where 
decision-makers refuse to put risks on the agenda or to allocate the monetary or 
organizational resources necessary for risk treatment. 
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Some industrial accidents show that before their occurrence some persons, called 
whistle-blowers, raised concerns about the level of safety. Unfortunately they were not 
listened and even sometimes isolated or bullied. From analysis of cases of 
whistleblowing, we will figure out features of alerts and whistle-bowers and how to 
take them into account in safety prevention process. 
Keywords: whistleblowing, Whistle-blowers, Process Safety Alerts, Warnings. 
“O monstrous world! Take note, take note, o world  
to be direct and honest is not safe!” 
Shakespeare, Othello, III, iii 
1 Introduction 
Current, relevant and interesting debates about (industrial) safety call into question the 
relevance of some concepts whose definitions and approaches have seemed, so far, to 
be widely shared. One such concept is that of safety. Does safety mean avoiding things 
that could go wrong or ensuring that things go right? Are causes of events to be found 
in failures, errors and malfunctions – the operational dark side – or should we consider 
that both expected and unwanted outcomes occur in the same way (Hollnagel, undated; 
Hollnagel, 2014)? 
 
In many of these discussions, the focus of safety approaches is still mainly on the 
avoidance of adverse events. In spite of undeniable progress in recent decades, many 
experts share the view that safety has reached an asymptote (Frantzen, 2004). Facing 
this problem, practitioners are trying to find new ways in order to improve safety 
management. 
 
In this article, we will analyse if taking account of whistleblowing could be one path 
for improvement. First, we will raise the issue and give a first definition of whistle 
blowers. Then, we will give a few examples of “whistle blowers”. From the examples, 
we will draw up features of whistle blowers and see what is the attitude of their 
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organisations (companies) towards them. For concluding, we will see what is the added 
value of whistleblowing in terms of safety. 
 
Because this article aims at the industrial sector, it will not address the societal domain 
which could have been exemplified whistleblowing cases such as the following: 
 
 Edward Snowden, an American computer scientist who worked at the National 
Security Agency (NSA) and who disclosed in 2013 numerous classified 
documents which proved existence of programs for global (illegal) surveillance 
of people; 
 Dr Irène Frachon, a French pulmonologist who warned in 2007 against a widely 
prescribed medicinal product which had side effects on cardiac valves. Thanks 
to her tough “struggle”, especially with pharmaceutical company producing it, 
drug was withdrawn in France in November 200936.  
 In April 2016, someone leaked the so-called Panama Papers, 11 million 
documents leaked from one law firm, Mossack Fonseca, which showed how 
some of the world’s wealthiest individuals and businesses had been able to 
shelter their money away from the tax man.   
 More recently, another whistle-blower, from Appleby, an offshore law firm 
based in Bermuda company, has leaked 13.4 million documents, the so-called 
Paradise Papers, to the German newspaper, Süddeutsche Zeitung, which, with 
the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, is leading 95 
newspapers in exposing how the rich have been hiding their money, with the 
consequence that tax burden falls on the rest of us.  
Furthermore, the article will not tackle subject of whistle-blowers’ legal and judicial 
protection. 
 
2 The Issue 
Current industrial safety approaches and practices mainly rely on two pillars: risk 
analysis and learning from experience. 
Risk analysis can be broadly described as the process of risk identification and 
measurement. In that case, risk mitigation is a means to avoid unwanted events or to 
minimize the impacts of their occurrence. Quantitative risk analysis seeks answers to 
questions such as the following: 
 
 What are the events, with negative safety impacts, that could occur? 
 What are their likelihood? 
 What would be consequences of their occurrence? 37 
Risk analysis allows us to define the “notionally normal starting points” of the 
industrial process, meaning (i) “initial culturally accepted beliefs about the world and 
its hazards” and (ii) “associated precautionary norms set out in laws, codes of practice, 
                                                 
36 In 2011, Irène Frachon received a “Citizens Whistle-Blower” award. 
37 Qualitative risk analysis uses words or colours to identify and evaluate risks or presents a written description of the risk.
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mores and folkways”38 (Turner and Pidgeon, 1997, p. 72). Because theoretical 
knowledge evolves with time, analysing risks is a continuous process. 
 
In spite of substantial efforts in terms of methodology and successes in terms of results 
due to risk analysis, some events happen during production. These events are analysed 
in order to figure out causes of their occurrence and to determine and implement 
improvement(s). Industries, especially high-risk industries, have set up operating 
feedback systems for learning from experience. It is the second pillar of industrial 
safety approaches. Unfortunately, it seems that industries have reached a limit in terms 
of results. They hardly progress, they are ‘‘dancing a tango on asymptote’’ (Frantzen, 
2004), meaning that, from year to year, numbers of safety records are more or less the 
same (either slightly higher or slightly lower). Does it mean that “learning from 
experience” is in a state of persistent deadlock? 
 
Occurrence of an event can be described from two different points of view. On the one 
hand, the operating feedback system is responsive (the conventional approach):, that 
is, an event is seen as a surprise, as an “exceptional set of unfortunate circumstances” 
(Finn, 2002). Nowadays, safety is more foresight-oriented, considering a situation as 
“an accident waiting to happen”, i.e., when we are living during the “incubation 
period”39 of an event. Indeed, “[a]ny event is generated by direct or immediate causes 
(such as a technical failure or “human error”). Nevertheless, its occurrence and/or its 
development is considered to be induced, facilitated or accelerated by underlying 
organizational conditions (complex factors) and some warning signals exist prior to 
the event” (Dien, 2006, p. 148). So, goal becomes to assess degradation of the safety 
level in detecting the warning signals, near-misses, and weak signals… In that sense, 
our operating feedback systems need to become proactive. 
 
The concept of weak signals exists in several areas such as history, geology, medicine, 
acoustics… It was more recently coined by Vaughan (1996) in the domain of industrial 
safety after the space shuttle Challenger disaster: “A weak signal is one conveyed by 
information that is informal and/or ambiguous, so that its significance […] is not 
clear” (Vaughan, 1996, p. 355). Essentially, a weak signal is a symptom of degradation 
of the production system. 
 
Turner and Pidgeon (1997) describe these kinds of signals, “visible” during the 
incubation period, as a “set of events”. They observed that these events go unnoticed. 
Indeed, unfortunately, even if detection and treatment of weak signals seems a 
promising way to go, it appears quite difficult to precisely define what a weak signal 
is. Its features are (Vaughan 1996): 
 
 Qualitative (in contrast with quantitative); 
 Subjective; 
 Inconclusive; 
 Giving partial information; 
                                                 
38 Emphasis added. 
39 “Accumulation of an unnoticed set of events which are at odds with the accepted beliefs about hazards 
and the norms for their avoidance” (Turner and Pidgeon, 1997, p. 72). 
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 Ambiguous, meaning several interpretations are potentially possible. 
Furthermore, weak signals could be repetitive. In that case, repeatability itself is the 
criterion for identification. 
 
Detection of a weak signal relies on an engineer’s feelings, intuition, perceptions rather 
than rational and scientific demonstration. In that sense, a weak signal is not in line 
with, “the norms of quantitative, scientific positivism”40 (Vaughan, 1996, p. 355). 
Indeed, it may even be in conflict with such norms. 
 
Furthermore, often, in terms of safety, a signal makes sense only after an event has 
occurred. In other words, the meaning of signs related to safety is not obvious, and 
organisations put in place systems for collecting and gathering signs that they do not 
really know what to do with except compiling statistics on accumulated data. 
Furthermore, companies have to cope with two concerns: 
 
 Taking into account and treating a “wrong” signal (i.e., a signal that did not 
impact safety), which would lead to waste resources and time;  
 Not detecting a relevant signal, which would be symptomatic of poor safety 
management and could lead to a major event.  
So: here is a key question: Is it worth investing in the collection and treatment of weak 
signals, especially if we do not even recognise the weak signal? And here is another 
question: How should we define the relevant and accurate features of a weak signal?  
The analysis of major events often shows that, in many cases, they were preceded by 
alerts, warnings launched by persons close to (or knowing) how a system functions 
technically.  
 
Organisations are generally not a monolithic whole, a homogenous entity. Sometimes, 
within the midst of the organisation, some dissident voices alert the powers about 
potential safety problems. Could these persons, whom we call “whistle-blowers”, help 
to improve levels of safety? Could they help to meet the challenge of foresight for 
safety? 
 
3 Definition of “Whistle-Blowers” 
Before proceeding further, let’s define the term “whistle-blower” (or whistleblowing). 
The implied definition mainly refers to the societal domain. 
 
For Wikipedia, a “whistle-blower (also written as whistle-blower or whistle blower) is 
a person who exposes any kind of information or activity that is deemed illegal, 
unethical, or not correct within an organization that is either private or public”.41 
                                                 
40 Let’s remember that when engineers of the space shuttle O ring manufacturer raised an alert 
concerning the performance of seals in cold temperatures, the NASA decision-makers challenged them 
to prove it by quantifying their concerns!! (Vaughan, 1996). 
41 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Whistleblower. 
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The Council of Europe (2014) considers that a whistle-blower is “any person who 
reports or discloses information on a threat or harm to the public interest in the context 
of their work-based relationship, whether it be in the public or private sector”. 
ADIE (2008) added a notion explaining that a “whistle-blower is anyone who discloses 
or helps to disclose fraud, irregularities and similar problems”. So a whistle-blower is 
not only the one who acts, but also the one who supports. 
Chateauraynaud and Torny42 (1999) make a distinction between “prophets” whose 
message is future dedicated and “whistle-blowers” (denouncers) who condemn past 
and ongoing events. Nevertheless, in both cases, the aim is to avoid occurrence of 
unwanted events and/or negative outcomes. 
 
4 Some Whistle-Blowers 
Whistleblowing is a quite recent concept. Nevertheless, if we immerse ourselves in 
mythology, we already may find, in tales of ancient Greece, persons who warned their 
compatriots. Perhaps the most famous was Cassandra, Princess of Troy, daughter of 
King Priam and Queen Hecuba, who spoke true prophecies. Unfortunately, a curse 
struck by Apollo had the consequence that her true prophetic statements would never 
be believed. 
But she was not alone. Laocoön, a Trojan priest, was not convinced by the story told 
by Sinon, an undercover Achaean Greek soldier, about the great wooden horse left by 
the Achaean Greek soldiers after they lifted the siege. It was supposed to be an offering 
to Poseidon for safe sailing back home. Laocoön thought the horse was full of soldiers 
and cautioned against moving the horse into the city of Troy. He recommended burning 
the horse. Alas, no one followed his advice. 
4.1 A Committed Nuclear Engineer  
Let’s return to our times, where I wish to draw your attention to a decision made in 
January 1996 by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)43, to put the three 
units at the Millstone nuclear power plant (NPP) in Connecticut on the Watch List. This 
action allows the NRC to order the shutdown of a unit and to authorize its restart only 
under certain conditions. 
 
This decision was motivated by serious unsafe practices in the operation of the plant 
(during the refuelling process). It was not the consequence of an incident nor did it 
result from an investigation or an audit carried out by the Safety Authority. It was the 
result of determined, voluntary and pugnacious action by a NPP senior engineer, named 
George Galatis. As early as 1992, he became concerned about the management of spent 
fuel that did not comply with regulatory safety requirements. He warned his hierarchy 
but they did not take his alert into account. In the next two years, nothing changed, 
except that Galatis was isolated and bullied within the plant. In 1994, he took the 
initiative to directly alert the NRC, knowing that the NRC had been aware of the plant 
practices for the previous 10 years and had not taken any corrective action. Faced with 
                                                 
42 They were the first French scholars who tackled this issue. The French concept is “lanceur d’alerte” 
which means in a word-for-word translation “alert launcher”1 
43 American Nuclear Safety Authority. 
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the persistent apathy of the NRC, Galatis decided, in August 1995, and in connection 
with a NGO, to petition the NRC to suspend the Millstone I licence for 60 days and 
deny the company's request for an amendment of the regulatory requirements 
concerning fuel unloading. (Miller, 1995; Pooley, 1996). The pressure on Galatis 
redoubled, but the case became public, and the NRC was forced to react. 
 
The “stubborn crusade” of this engineer earned him a long article and the cover of the 
American magazine TIME. 
 
4.2 A Product Engineer Involved in Safety 
On 3 March 1974, the Turkish Airlines Flight 981 crashed over the Ermenonville 
Forest, north of Paris, few minutes after its taking off from Orly airport. The 346 people 
on board of the DC-10 airplane died. 
 
The direct cause of the accident an explosive decompression, due to a broken cargo 
door at the rear of the plane. It led to a collapse of the passenger compartment floor that 
cut all wires necessary to control the aircraft. The plane became uncontrollable and 
crashed to the ground. 
 
A similar event had happened two years before. On 12 June 1972, the rear cargo door 
of American Airlines Flight 96 DC-10 blew off while flying over Windsor, Canada. 
Because they were fewer passengers (67 persons), decompression led to (only!) a 
partial collapse of the compartment floor with (only!) a partial restriction of the 
controls. In spite of the situation, the pilot was able to land safely. 
 
Fifteen days after this event, Dan Applegate, Director of product engineering for 
Convair, a McDonnell Douglas subcontractor involved in the DC-10 design, wrote a 
document known as the “Applegate Memorandum”. Applegate gave it to his immediate 
supervisor. In the memo, he mentioned some concerns. The long memo stated (among 
other things: 
 
“The potential for long term Convair liability has been causing me increasing concern 
for several reasons: 
 
1 The fundamental safety of the cargo door latching system has been progressively 
degraded since the program began in 1968. 
2 The airplane demonstrated an inherent susceptibility to catastrophic failure when 
exposed to explosive decompression of the cargo compartment in 1970 ground 
tests. 
[…] 
“Since Murphy's Law being what it is, cargo doors will come open sometime during 
the twenty-plus years of use ahead for the DC-10” 
[…] 
I would expect this to usually result in the loss of the aircraft” 
[…] 
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“it seems to me inevitable that, in the twenty years ahead of us, DC-10 cargo doors 
will come open and I would expect this to usually result in the loss of the airplane”44 
(Eddy et al., 1976, pp. 183-185) 
 
Applegate's supervisor considered that it was needed to “look the "other of the coin"” 
(Eddy et al., 1976, p. 186). 
 
Convair vice-president in charge of the DC-10 project convened a meeting to decide 
the company's policy regarding this issue. Convair management thought that changes 
requested from the memo would be costly and it was not sure which company would 
pay the bill (Convair or McDonnell Douglas). During this meeting, it was 
acknowledged that Applegate was closer than his supervisor to the engineering of the 
DC-10. Nevertheless, the reasoning of the supervisor was preferred and the 
“"interesting legal and moral problem"” was resolved “by deciding that Convair must 
not risk an approach to Douglas”. […] most of the statements made by Applegate were 
considered to be well-known to Douglas and there were nothing new that was not 
known to Douglas (Eddy et al., 1976, p. 187). So Douglas was never officially informed 
about Applegate’s concerns. 
 
4.3 A Field Journalist 
On the night of 2 - 3 December 1984, a toxic cloud of methyl isocyanate (MIC) spread 
over the city of Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, 600 kilometres south of Delhi. The cloud 
made its way especially into and around the shanty towns located near the Union 
Carbide India Limited (UCIL) pesticide plant. The disaster eventually created about 
600,000 victims, including more than 12,000 deaths. 
 
The cause of the disaster is still under debate. Nevertheless, we could assume that slack 
management leading, among other things, to deferred maintenance created a situation 
where routine pipe maintenance caused a backflow of water into a MIC tank, triggering 
the accident45. Before the accident, the plant was idling with reduced staff (Shrivastava, 
1992; Lapierre & Moro, 2001). 
 
Several serious events preceded the catastrophe. On 23 December 1981, a phosgene 
(toxic gas) leak occurred during a maintenance shutdown and caused the death of 
Mohammed Ashraf, foreman of the plant. Union Carbide concluded that the causes of 
the accident were two human errors. However, the trade unions claimed that the 
accident resulted from a deterioration of the plant’s safety levels since the rules of 
procedure prohibited the storage of phosgene when the treatment unit was out of 
service. On 10 February 1982, a new gas leak occurred on a phosgene pump: 25 people 
were intoxicated46. Factory workers launched a strike. 
 
                                                 
44 Emphasis added by authors Eddy et al. 
45 Union Carbide Corporation, owner of the plant at the time of the accident, claimed it was due to 
sabotage. 
46 Six other serious incidents, which led to a dozen victims (dead and wounded), occurred before the 
disaster. Some of these events were in connection with the MIC. 
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Rajkumar Keswani, owner of and reporter for the local newspaper, the “Rapat 
Weekly”, was an acquaintance of Mr. Ashraf. He wanted to know if his death was an 
accident or the consequence of internal failures at the pesticide plant. With the 
collaboration of plant workers, he was able to visit it illegally. After consulting 
scientific books, he came to the conclusion that “tragedy was only a matter of time” 
(Lapierre and Moro, 2001, p. 264). He also obtained results of an audit carried out in 
May 1982 by three engineers from the technical centre of the parent company in the 
United States. Its conclusions concerning safety of the plant were alarming. The audit 
report revealed hundreds of deviations from both operational and safety rules. He also 
underlined the high staff turnover, the lack of training and insufficient operating 
procedures. 
 
With this information at the end of his investigation, Keswani tried to alert the public 
by writing a series of articles with prophetic titles: 
 
 “Please, spare our city”, on 17 September 1982. In this article, he warned: “If 
one day misfortune happens, do not say you did not know.” 
 “Bhopal: “we are all sitting on the crater of a volcano”, on 30 September 1982. 
 “If you refuse to understand, you will be reduced to ashes”, on 7 October 1982. 
Keswani became a modern-day Cassandra. His articles gave rise to indifference and at 
worst to denial. Thus, the Madhya Pradesh State Minister of Labour said: “There is no 
reason to worry about the presence of Carbide because the phosgene it makes is not a 
toxic gas” (Lapierre and Moro, 2001, p. 266-269). 
 
Bored by the attitude of his fellow citizens, the journalist left Bhopal shortly after, but 
before the tragedy of December 1984. 
 
4.4 A Conscientious Operations and Safety Director 
On 5 October 1999, two trains on the same track collided head-on at the Ladbroke 
Grove Junction a few kilometres west of Paddington Station, London. The accident 
cost 31 lives and injured more than 400 people. 
 
A Public Inquiry was launched after the accident and the Investigation Commission 
chaired by Lord Cullen conducted a detailed and thorough analysis of the event. The 
immediate and direct cause of the accident was a signal (SN 109) passed when it was 
red. It brought to light that beyond the direct cause, the accident was rooted in the 
shortcomings of organisation and poor management of safety in this railway sector 
(Cullen, 2000). 
The investigation showed in particular that the SN 109 signal had been passed eight 
times when it was red in the six years preceding the accident47. During this same period, 
46 cases of signal passed at red were recorded in the railway zone of the accident. 
 
                                                 
47 It means that with this single signal, there is an annual risk of collision of 7.2%, that is to say, the risk 
of a collision every 14 years. It seems that, sometimes, even “scientific” data are not enough for an 
organisation to make the (right) decisions! 
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The Commission of Inquiry noted the existence of a whistle-blower in the person of 
Mrs. Forster. She was the Operations and Safety Director of the rail company operating 
at Paddington. In February 1998, a train of her company passed the SN 109 signal when 
it was red. She was informed that a train from another company had also passed the 
same red signal in early August. 
This information worried her. So, she wrote at the end of August to the chairman of a 
working group in charge of proposals for improvements in signal safety. She shared 
her concerns about the SN 109 signal and she asked what action could be taken “to 
mitigate against this high-risk signal”? In view of the dilatory response48 of the 
chairman and his move to another position, she wrote to his successor to reiterate her 
concerns about “a serious problem with drivers misreading signals” in the Ladbroke 
Grove zone. The new chairman promised her “a full risk assessment” through a future 
study that a consulting firm would have to carry out. No contract was ever signed on 
the subject and the “new” chairman of the working group left office. Mrs. Foster wrote 
again to the third chairman four months before the accident. Her letter remained 
unanswered, the addressee confessing after the accident that “he was not aware of the 
remit which had been given” to the working group (Cullen, 2000, p. 117-118). 
 
4.5 A Seismologist Warning about Tsunami 
On 11 March 2011, a powerful earthquake struck Japan, triggering a tsunami and a 
nuclear accident. It was an earthquake with a magnitude of 9.0 on the Richter scale. 
The tsunami, with waves more than 10 meters, impacted a wide area of the Japanese 
north-eastern coast. It caused huge damage to buildings and infrastructure. The 
earthquake and tsunami caused great loss of life and widespread devastation in Japan. 
More than 15,000 people were killed, more than 6,000 were injured and, at the time of 
writing of this report, about 2,500 people were still reported to be missing. 
 
The tsunami specially impacted 3 NPPs: From north cost to south, it was Onagawa 
NPP (3 reactors), Fukushima Daini NPP (4 reactors) and Fukushima Daiichi NPP (6 
reactors). The antitsunami seawall of Fukushima Daiichi NPP (called Fukushima in the 
rest of the section) was 10 meters high, with about 6 meters above the sea level. The 
15 meters high waves of the tsunami submerged the seawall. Waves flooded and totally 
destroyed the emergency diesel generators and every other power generation systems 
of the plant. The loss of electricity led to an insufficient cooling of the reactors and 
nuclear meltdowns in Units 1, 2, and 3 (from 12 March to 15 March). Loss of cooling 
also caused the pool for storing spent fuel from Reactor 4 to overheat (15 March). It is 
difficult to assess consequences of the nuclear disaster. Indeed, ionizing radiations and 
life of radioactive elements are a continuous (endless) process. 
 
In 2009, the NISA49 hold meetings with panel of experts to discuss the safety needs of 
the Japanese NPPs. During the meetings, issue of tsunamis was never on the agenda. 
In 2007, an earthquake with a magnitude of 6.6 impacted the west cost of Japan. It 
caused radioactive leaks at Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP, owned and operated by 
                                                 
48 “I have commissioned a special study to determine what causes can be identified which contribute… 
I expect a report in the near future and this will ensure that effective solutions are identified for early 
implementation…” However, no such report was ever produced. 
49 Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency, the Japanese Safety Authorities. 
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TEPCO50, as Fukushima, and water from a pool of nuclear wastes entered the Sea of 
Japan. When case of Fukushima NPP was addressed, the panel focused on earthquake. 
Dr Yukinobu Okamura, a respected seismologist, was invited to a meeting in order to 
present its findings. It was concerned because NISA did not see tsunamis as likely 
enough to be considered in the Fukushima area. Data used for preventing effect of 
earthquake were taken from the largest earthquake recorded in 1938 with a magnitude 
of 7.9. It caused a small tsunami and TEPCO had built a seawall able to stop this kind 
of tsunami. Okamura explained to the panel that this earthquake was no the biggest. An 
earthquake that occurred in year 869 was more important and Okamura did not 
understand why it was not mentioned. The TEPCO representative said that it did not 
cause much damage. Okamura disagreed and said that damage had been severe. 
Discussion were focus on earthquakes, not on tsunamis. Furthermore, for TEPCO the 
869 earthquake was simply “historical” with not certified data. Eventually, the safety 
report for Fukushima was approved. It did not consider the 869 earthquake in model 
used for updating Fukushima safety guidelines (Clarke and Eddy, 2017). 
 
We note that Okamura was not the only person raising concerns. For instance, a 
geologist, Masanobu Shishikura told the government before the Fukushima disaster, 
that north-eastern Japan was overdue for a huge wave (McKie, 2011). 
 
4.6 Remarks about cases documentation 
The role and importance of whistle-blowers in the domain of safety is not yet fully 
acknowledged51. For instance, Rajkumar Keswani (see §4.3) is not cited in the accident 
analysis seen as a reference by scholars (Shrivastava, 1992). His action is “only” 
described in a general audience book (Lapierre and Moro, 2001). You could not find 
the name of Dan Applegate (see §4.3) in the official accident report (Secrétariat d’État 
aux Transports, 1976): to know the existence of his warning, you must read a book 
written by journalists (Eddy et al., 1976). The same story has happened to the alert 
launched by Carlyle Michelson (see §5): it is expressed in a technical report drafted for 
the NRC (Rogovin and Frampton, 1980) and not in the “official” report of the 
President’s Commission on the accident (Kemeny et al., 1979). 
 
We have also to note that it is difficult to find documentation about cases for which a 
warning was successfully listened and treated. 
 
Taking whistleblowing into account does not belong to a statistical or probabilistic 
paradigm. Event occurrence and whistle-blowers belong to the domain of “outliers of 
the curve” treatment. It takes effort to dig as deep as possible during an event analysis 
to highlight the existence of whistle-blower(s). We assume that the game is worth the 
candle because events would be analysed in a more systematic way and it would allow 
us to define more precisely features or alerts of whistle-blowers. 
 
                                                 
50 Tokyo Electric Power COmpany. 
51 One reason could be because event reports are anonymous (people are not named), disembodied. It 
seems that no human being with flesh and blood were present at the time of the event! 
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5 Features of whistle-blowers and of whistleblowing 
In the paper, we addressed only few cases. 
We could have talked about Carlyle Michelson, a nuclear engineer who worked part-
time for the NRC and who took, in 1977, the initiative to study behaviour of the process 
in case of a small break in a specific location of the reactor primary circuit (top of the 
pressurizer). Results were far beyond design (designers) assumptions, yet few people 
read about them. A reviewer in NRC prepared a memo based on Michelson's concerns 
and based on a previous incident that occurred at Davis Besse NPP (Ohio). Michelson’s 
study and the memo did not circulate widely because the issue was not identified as a 
generic safety problem for operating plants. Eventually the memo was filed away 
(Rogovin, 1980). About one year later, a major accident occurred at the Three Mile 
Island NPP (Pennsylvania). The scenario was similar to that imagined by Michelson. 
We could also have told about the story of Roger Boisjoly, one of the most well-known 
whistle-blowers in the “history” of industrial safety. He was a mechanical engineer at 
Morton Thiokol, the manufacturer of the solid rocket boosters for the Space Shuttle 
program. In July 1985, he wrote a first memo about their weaknesses, arguing that if, 
unfixed, it could lead to a catastrophe. He wrote several other memos on that matter, 
but no action was taken. On the eve of the launch of the 25th Space Shuttle flight, on 
28 January 1986, he tried with some colleagues to convince the NASA management to 
postpone the flight because of the cold temperature. They felt that this would jeopardize 
the safety of the mission, and potentially lose the shuttle. No one listened to them. The 
Space Shuttle exploded 73 seconds after liftoff, killing the seven astronauts on board 
(Vaughan, 1996).  
 
Even if the search for whistle-blowers is not yet a major concern of event analysists, 
we could still provide an outline of whistle-blowers and of whistleblowing features: 
 Whistleblowing deals with degradation of safety and could prevent occurrence of 
some events; 
 Duration of an alert is variable: It can last days, months or years; 
 A whistle-blower is either inside or outside the organisation (company / plant), but 
he / she is always close to the technics; 
 The position of a whistle-blower in the organisation could be from the bottom (e.g., 
a field operator) to the top (e.g., a manager) and expertise. The whistle-blower has 
the power of influence, but is not a decision-maker regarding the alert launched; 
 For informing about the alert, the whistle-blower uses internal channels (within 
organisation), or (often then) the Safety Authorities, or the media, or NGOs; 
 Alerts are technically oriented and safety oriented and they can be repeated, 
sometimes in different ways; 
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 Most of the time, alerts are issued by people close to the technical field, or having 
information from field personnel. 
 We have to stress that alerts are not an “expert opinion”, since a whistle-blower is 
personally involved and committed. Typically, an alert is not a simple denunciation 
since the alert is developing. This is not a prediction because an alert relates to the 
symptoms of deterioration of safety. 
 This first set of features might help to make a difference between alerts and 
background noise, i.e., to figure out relevant safety alerts among the numerous 
alerts that are launched. 
 
6 Position of the organisation 
As we saw, very often, organisations do not listen to whistle-blowers52. The two 
reasons that lead to this result are on the one hand the inability to identify the relevance 
of alert, and on the other hand, the will not to detect or to identify the alert. 
When an organisation is unable to identify or accept the alert, it will have an attitude 
of denial in claiming that whistle-blowers are dissatisfied or displeased. The 
organisation will deny the risk (e.g., Keswani, Okamura) or engage in delaying tactics 
(e.g., Forster). 
When an organisation does not want to identify an alert, it becomes obstructive in 
isolating or bullying the whistle-blower (e.g. Galatis). 
 
In every case, the implicit message is that organisation denies the expertise and 
competence of the whistle-blowers. 
 
We also note that in some cases whistle-blowers are isolated by their colleagues who 
consider them as “traitors” (e.g. Galatis, Boisjoly). 
 
7 Conclusion 
It turns out that listening to whistle-blowers is a way to detect major degradation of 
safety level and, so, potentially to prevent major events. Nevertheless, to listen to 
whistle-blowers does not mean to agree with them. However, listening to them should 
lead to open debates about safety and its current and actual practices. Debates about 
safety could naturally, not to say mechanically, lead to an increase in safety because 
the organisation mindset would change. 
 
Taking account of whistleblowing requires the adoption of a new paradigm: to see 
beyond quantitative approaches and to leave room for “alternative voices” and field 
expertise, which is one feature of highly reliable organisations53 (Weick and Sutcliffe, 
2001). 
 
                                                 
52 Unfortunately, as we already said, we do not have enough data concerning alerts listened and treated. 
53 For differences between “reliability” and “safety”, see Llory and Dien, 2006. 
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The solution goes through a bottom-up approach (i.e., decision-makers listening to the 
technical experts) to complement the top-down approach (i.e., decision-makers asking 
questions), recommended, for instance, by Conklin (2012). 
 
Whistle-blowers cannot be an official position, a box of the organization chart. To be 
a whistle-blower is a specific moment in a professional career. 
 
The entire safety burden cannot be carried by whistle-blowers. Listening to whistle-
blowers seems a necessary but not sufficient condition for maintaining and increasing 
safety. Whistle-blowing must just be one (more) tool in the toolbox for prevention. 
Every sign or event, near-miss… must continue to be treated in order to increase safety. 
For instance, in the six months preceding the accident, 1,000 incidents related to the 
cargo door were reported (it means about 10 incidents by DC-10 aircraft in service in 
the USA). It seems to “sign” a poor safety culture and safety flawed approaches in the 
aviation domain at that time So, it is not a big surprise that warning of Dan Applegate 
was lost in an “ocean of indifference”, not to say an “ocean of denial” to safety. The 
curse of Casandra lives on. 
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From maritime multi-sensorial data acquisition systems to the 
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Multi-sensor based ship tracking  
 EMSA operates, along with the Member States of the European Union, the SafeSeaNet, 
the vessel traffic monitoring and information system covering the waters in and around 
Europe. The platform enables for maritime data exchange across the Union’s competent 
authorities. VHF radio signals are captured from Automatic Identification System (AIS) 
which are installed aboard the circa 17,000 vessels which operate in and around EU 
waters. By tracking ships using AIS signals, the system gathers also identity details, latest 
positions and other status information in near-real-time.  
 Data acquired through this channel are correlated and enriched with additional details, 
such as the presence of hazardous goods and the number of people aboard, or the ship 
track in a given timespan. It can also inform about estimated or actual arrival and 
departure times in ports, and to highlight ships with high risk profiles or those that were 
involved in accidents and incidents.  
 Long-Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) and satellite-based AIS technologies are 
exploited to track vessels outside the range of AIS coastal networks. This extends the 
system to a worldwide coverage.  
The European Marine Casualty Information Platform (EMCIP)  
 The European Marine Casualty Information Platform (EMCIP) is a database application 
that provides the means to store data and information related to marine casualties 
involving all types of ships and occupational accidents. It also enables the production of 
statistics and analysis of the technical, human, environmental and organisational factors 
involved in accidents at sea.   
  
  Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-SA 4.0) 
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The database taxonomy has been developed by EMSA in consultation with the Member 
States, on the basis of European research and international recommended practice and 
procedures. EMSA and the national competent authorities operate the system within a 
culture of 'no blame, no liability' and personal data protection.    
 From reactive to preventive measures  
 In the course of a technical enquiry into a marine casualty, investigators need to 
reconstruct the events that led, or contributed to an occurrence. This often implies the 
need to know the whereabouts of the vessel that was involved in the casualty, or of other 
vessels that may hold important information about the occurrence.  Vessels’ position and 
voyage data have been already used to this end, and has enabled investigators to identify 
and understand the peculiar circumstances which very serious or catastrophic accidents 
have developed in.   
 Recent developments have brought to life additional services, like the vessels’ behaviour 
monitoring tools or other automatic alerting features which may be the precursors of 
future intelligent and smart agents for the prevention of accidents, rather than for the 
mitigation of existing risky conditions or threats.   
 Kinematic data could be streamed directly form onboard sensors and crew’s biological 
parameters captured from wearables devices. Big-data dynamic algorithms may be used 
to get the foresight of critical conditions and of dangerous situations and to warn users in 
real-time. Multidimensional and multisensorial dataacquisition is already a reality in the 





Enhancing Safety: the Challenge of Foresight 
207 
 
Evolution of remote performance monitoring in ship’s safety 
decision making reinforced by Analytic Hierarchy Process 
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Abstract  
 
Among the objectives of shipping industry are to maintain safety. Also the measuring of 
safety in relation to the application of evolutions in operational management of ship's and 
developing strategies to avoid future accidents is crucial. So recognizing signals before 
an accident occurs and by enhancing with the right decisions any operational procedure 
is offered the possibility for improving safety. 
In this paper, we address the challenge to evaluate the Remote Performance Monitoring 
by identify and scrutinize features which may affect the ships safety and must take into 
consideration of the decision makers during its implementation. The evaluation performed 
by using the Analytic Hierarchy Process and answers the question, how remote 
performance monitoring using internet of things and big data, leads in further 
improvement in terms of machines performance with safety. The implementation of 
method for ship’s safety decision support will be presented and analysed with real world 
case studies. 
Keywords: AHP, Remote Performance Monitoring, Threat Attack, Shipping Safety. 
1. Introduction 
The shipping industry is on the verge of a new frontier where innovative ideas, 
sophisticated approaches and technologies are emerging for ship's performance planning 
and verification methods. Also new challenges are faced such as the significant increase 
in transport volumes, the growing environmental requirements and a shortage of seafarers 
in the future. The continued high oil prices and the burden of increasing regulatory 
compliance make the development of energy management strategy crucial to fleet owners 
worldwide, with continued innovations and the sustainability to be at the heart of the new 
targets in the shipping industry. The new objectives focus on improving energy efficiency, 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions and other emissions as well as the safety which 
resulted as the aim of ship’s new innovative operational modes. 
  Attribution-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-ND 4.0) 
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The overall composition of a comprehensive maritime lane of the future includes 
ambitious plans to develop, refine and implement progressive policies in key areas of 
sustainable performance, such as environmental, social and economic. 
Global shipping to become viable should organize ships and any other shipping sector in 
relation to effective management and operation principles. This will require the adoption 
of new techniques and conversions in companies, ships, systems and management 
practices. Overall, the ships quality will simultaneously focus on broad and profound 
developments such as: 
 Efficiency of logistics and networks, optimizing networks, capacity and speed. 
 Efficiency with optimized the vessel operations, like the performance tracking, 
economic speed etc. 
 Jurisdiction and awareness. 
 Technologies, with innovative components and systems that enhance ship's 
operation. 
 Contracts and partnerships that representing NewBuilding, charter parties, 
innovation with suppliers etc. 
 
So, the choice of marine equipment and the optimization of marine systems focus on 
factors such as the ship's control and continuous monitoring, low energy consumption, 
low pollution, high efficiency, e.g. when assessing the technical index of ships, a high 
emphasis should be placed on the ratio of the load factor of the main engine, generator, 
boiler etc. as well the effective control of harmful emissions, vibration and noise. Also, a 
full control of the ship can be reached from the bridge position, while the propulsion and 
auxiliary plants can run from the bridge, giving to the crew full picture of entire ship. This 
is consequence due development, because the coming age of ubiquitous computing 
promises to change allot of activities in significant ways. As we will see in near future 
everyday objects, cars, train tracks and traffic lights, homes (thermostats and voice 
activated appliances), and of course consumer goods such as phones, wearables, and more, 
will become “smart" and will contain embedded processors; they might monitor behaviour 
or operational conditions, react and adapt their functionality to the preferences of the user. 
The same happens in some cases today and will happen in more extent in the future on 
ships, where monitoring sensors adjust the machine and machinery condition in order to 
achieve its effective operation. These integrated automation systems could be managed 
far away from the ship with data transition through internet implementation, since future 
of technology lies in data transmission and its analysis. 
But the data itself does not produce these objectives that needed for improve the 
performance. Solutions can arise from analyzing by combine Internet of Things (IoT) and 
the Big Data [1, 2]. The term IoT refers to the networked interconnection of everyday 
objects, which are often equipped with ubiquitous intelligence. This increase the ubiquity 
of the Internet by integrating every object for interaction via embedded systems, which 
leads to a highly distributed network of devices communicating with human beings as 
well as other devices. On the other hand, the term big data refers to extremely large data 
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sets that may be analyzed computationally to reveal patterns, trends, and associations, 
relating to human behaviour and interactions as well data that can be analyzed for insights 
that lead to better decisions and strategic business moves. So its combination will lead in 
integrated systems with ability in use for improve the effectiveness of vessels like SCADA 
[3]. 
In this paper, the challenge to evaluate the remote performance monitoring (RPM) is 
considered by identify and scrutinize features, which may affect the ships safety, and must 
take into consideration of the decision makers. The application of RPM is facilitated by 
recent technological improvements in big data and ship’s connectivity.  The evaluation 
performed by using the Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP), a multi-criteria methodology 
which is used for a wide variety of decision and other applications. The AHP selected 
because the evaluation of remote performance monitoring characterized by structure 
complexity and the method is capable to handle measurements on a ratio scale. The 
evaluation answers the question, how remote performance monitoring using internet of 
things and big data, leads in further improvement in terms of machines performance, 
energy efficiency in ship operation, the environmental management of ships and all these 
with safety. The AHP implementation for ship’s safety decision support will be presented 
and analyzed with real world case study based on experts’ opinion. 
2. Vessel's performance monitoring and maintenances 
The IMO (International Maritime Organization), responsible for standardized regulations 
covering all aspects of marine safety, has Special classifications for providing information 
on whether the hull and technical equipment of a ship are perfectly seaworthy in all 
respects. These strict international guidelines refer to the construction and running of a 
ship – but also to its maintenance and the conditions that have to be met. Against this 
background the reliability of all systems onboard is gaining in importance, and makes it 
easy to see why intelligent automation solutions are indispensable aboard modern ships. 
In respect to maintenance and performance monitoring model that shipping companies 
follow today for their ships and it is defined by international regulations, the engine 
components as well the machinery parts which have a certain operation life cycle, at least 
the critical based on manufactures’ specifications, must be replaced after a specific period. 
This must be done irrespective from their actual condition and their ability for further 
usage. That means even if a specific part be in an acceptable condition and can be used 
without a failure risk of vessel's operations or affect the availability of machinery it must 
be replaced with a new one. 
In accordance the previous model of inspection and information flow about ship's 
machinery, engines and other parts of the ship that inspected are followed maintenance 
models like preventive or condition based. On those models very considerable is the 
presence of human factor, since various reports based on data that the vessel crew 
recording. Also it is notable that the communication between the fleet manager and the 
engineers is not direct and presents problems. These problems can summarized at the 
scheduled inspections and the results which are not always accurate due to sensors fault 
or false measurements by the crew. Hence, the fleet manager has periodical indirect 
communication with the captain and the description of  each case may lack in accuracy 
because it depended on captain's approach. That results that the decisions  to be taken for 
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determination of repair actions and maintenance by the engineering team on the ship and 
the suggestions of engineer's department in the company office are not based on actual 
and real-time data, but on incomplete and unreliable data. Moreover, this communication 
and correction mode creates confusion because is difficult to measure the effect of 
implementation of various actions. 
The consequence of the maintenance models mentioned above are disadvantages like high 
cost of spare parts and sometimes incorrect maintenance procedures as well incomplete 
technical reports, which offer limited or unreliable data and cause difficulties in decision 
making. Moreover, in most vessel's that sails today, except the very synchronous, the 
monitoring of engine performance either the fuel and oil consumption compared to the 
vessel instantaneous performance are absented or it depends on human observation, 
something that in many occasions is dubious. So a common policy to manage the ship and 
monitoring the performance in order to make the correct decision is difficult to be 
determined. Furthermore, the absence of a prognosis system causes difficulties to 
prevention of breakdowns and provokes high cost and time-consuming repair procedures. 
Hence the research experience and operation analysis of maritime companies indicates 
problematic issues due the absence of a complete remote monitoring system of the fleets, 
which additionally affects the environmental consequences of vessels operation. 
Hence as the maritime industry in our days faces the limited crews number, low technical 
quality of the crew due the rapidly innovation which grows by technologies, the big 
competition in rates, along with the increasing limitations from regulations, in order to 
operate safely the vessels, the necessity of integrated systems is obvious. Moreover, it is 
needed to enhance the reliability through right monitoring of vessel performance and 
reduce the environmental impact that a vessel creates due to its inherent operation. These 
are the basic reasons for adopt monitoring systems, capable of improving decision-making 
based on integrated information resulting from automated systems and that are met by 
new technological applications. 
These applications arise from the advances in wireless communications, digital 
electronics, MEMS (microelectromechanical) technology, miniaturization, low power 
circuit design and computing enhanced the effort of developing sensor nodes that are small 
size, lightweight, compact, autonomous, rather cheap, have low power needs, 
communicate wirelessly and can process and store the sensor data locally [4, 5]. Those 
systems inherent compactness, that can operate efficiently, with low power consumption, 
and ability to big data processing and adequate storing capability, which can 
communicating by wiring and wireless on board and out of board, provide a great leap to 
shipping industry for an effective monitoring operation of vessels. 
Such system implementation of open architecture for ship's control, alarm and 
performance monitoring is the Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA). It is 
met in modern ships and is an automatic system control that includes control, alarm and 
monitoring system that have access to all process, control stations and can monitoring 
them. 
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3. Typical SCADA system and its benefit 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are used to monitor and 
control plants or equipments in industries such as energy, oil, telecommunications, gas 
refining and transportation.  
In the environment of a marine plant many parameters need to be controlled or monitored 
that includes temperatures, speed, torque control, voltage, current, machinery status (if it 
is on or off), equipment status (open or closed), pressure, level, flow control, and fuels 
viscosity. The control of these parameters on ships in the past was responsibility of the 
watch keeping engineers which observe and control the machinery plant. This was 
achieved by periodically controls in the engine room and manually inspection of the 
condition each running machinery. Often the engineers were totally dependent of their 
natural senses and frequently supported by distributed simple monitoring devices [6, 7, 
8]. 
Today, with SCADA implementation ship engineers and operators be able to use different 
number of screens, with different types of man machine interface such that it can display 
and control different sensor or system status. These sensors can be voyage data recorder, 
wind speed, direction GPS, hull opening, hull stress, radar, ship speed, tank fuel level, fuel 
and machinery temperature, consumption of engines, propulsion engine condition and 
performance, fire doors control station, etc. 
This is achieved because a typical SCADA system consists of one field data interface 
devices usually RTUs (Remote Terminal Units) and/or PLCs (Programmable Logic 
Controllers) which interfaces to field sensing devices, local control switch boxes and valve 
actuators. Moreover, a communication system is used to transfer the data among field data 
interface devices the control units and computers in the SCADA central host which is a 
host server or more servers [9]. A collection of standard and/or custom software, 
sometimes called HMI (Human Machine Interface) software, is used to provide the 
SCADA central host and operator terminal application, supporting the communication 
system, monitor and control remotely located field data interface devices. Devices such 
as temperature transmitters, power consumption meters, pressure gauges, level meters, 
flow meters, and valve position transmitters, provide all necessary information’s that can 
inform an experienced operator how effective the system is performed. 
The benefits of SCADA systems provide immediate knowledge of system performance, 
improvement on system efficiency and performance, operational cost reduction, increase 
equipment operational life, reduction of repair cost, reduction of man‐hours required for 
troubleshooting or maintenances, expediting compliance with regulatory requirements 
through automated report generating. 
Taking into account the structure of the system that transmit the data which will enhance 
the effective management of the ship, typical systems that provide connectivity to the 
respective corporate IT and SCADA systems onboard vessels are satellite networks, 
onboard Wi-Fi and Internet access (which can be used by crew), Radar, Simplex Teletype 
Over Radio (SITOR), NAVTEX, satellite telephones and other ship-to-shore 
telecommunications systems and voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) telephony. 
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SCADA systems have been engineered for monitoring performance, enhance reliability, 
flexibility and safety, but due to the structure of data transfer of the system as mentioned 
above, security of the ship must be considered, since may disrupted against most advanced 
and persistent threats which take place at corporate and industrial networks. Security 
threat of any suspicious act or circumstance that could threats the security of the vessel, 
marine facility, port administration or interfaces between vessels or between a vessel and 
the marine facility. 
4. Scenario of cyber attack and evaluation methodology 
The importance of SCADA systems as mentioned is the automation. This allows to the 
vessel managers a carefully study and anticipate the optimal response to measured 
conditions and execute those responses automatically every time. Relying on precise 
machine control for monitoring equipment and processes virtually eliminates human error. 
More importantly, it automates common, tedious, routine tasks once performed by human, 
which further increases productivity, improves management of critical machine failure in 
real-time, and minimizes the possibility of failures. In addition, SCADA systems monitor 
and control a large number of parameters where a vessel may not have enough manpower 
to cover. Thus, reliable communication and operability of all aspects is critical to safety 
and profitability. 
Hence, a virtual failure caused by cyber attack on vessel performance monitoring system 
SCADA is a serious situation that must be considered since affects the safety of the vessel 
the crew and the environment. 
The scenario that is presented in this paper is related to a failure alarm for high lube oil 
temperature of propulsion engine, which affects the propulsion engine operation and its 
availability. So the actions that must be taken include the stopping of propulsion engine, 
the reduction of speed or to maintain a constant/full speed.  These could be the major 
alternatives that can a decision maker take in order to avoid unwanted consequences. In 
addition, the ship might sail in a restricted area, e.g. a Traffic Separation Scheme where 
the ship must keep its operability or in an area where high risk may occur due to pirate 
activity or a combination of this two. So, each one of decisions affect in different way the 
overall attitude against the risk and the safety of the ship. If this risk includes the safety of 
the crew, the ship's machinery operability since such failure may cause further damages, 
and the cargo safety. 
Further definitions about lube oil high temperature failure alarm is that it relates and 
affects the operation of the engine and its occurrence is liable to cause serious damage and 
shut down the propulsion engine operation. The extent of the damage can lead the ship to 
a shipyard for further repairs, which means expenses for ship owners as well as losses of 
profits. Moreover, taking into account the area where the ship is sailing, the vessel meet 
risks associated with maritime safety and the likelihood that the ship and cargo will 
captured by pirates with all the unpleasant consequences. So, in any case, technicians of 
technical department and managers of the shipping company in cooperation with the ship's 
crew will have to decide on actions that must be taken in accordance with several 
parameters. One of these parameters is the possibility of the recorded failure to be result 
of malfunctioning of the automated SCADA control system due a cyber attack. 
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In order to evaluate and enhance the decision makers in the possibility of a threat attack 
during data transition of vessel’s monitoring performance, which relates to the SCADA 
system operation, a comprehensive support tool is presented. This tool is the multi-criteria 
method AHP and was implemented to evaluate different alternatives with specific criteria 
in a scenario with a ship which sails in restricted sea and face a possible cyber attack in 
monitoring performance transition system, where the lube oil high temperature failure 
alarm belonging. 
In accordance with the previous paragraphs scenario presented, briefly, the three 
alternatives for decisions against threat attack on SCADA system data transmission 
evaluated by AHP in this study are the following: 
 stopping the engine and patching the SCADA system in order to fix any threat. In a 
landmark study of the Patching for post-release bugs in software, [10] showed that 
between 14.8% and 24.4% of all fixes are incorrect and directly impact the end user. 
And if that’s not bad enough, 43% of these faulty ‘fixes’ resulted in crashes, hangs, 
data corruption or additional security problems. Furthermore, patches don’t always 
solve the security issues they were designed to address. Also the patching in SCADA 
must be performed by an authorized person and a stopped vessel is sensitive in weather 
contrition’s, piracy threats. 
 reduction the vessel speed with slowing the engine till it reaches a safe area. This 
alternative may set the ship in danger in relation to pirate actions or potential create 
dangerous operating conditions in relation to other ships sailing in the area but allows 
the crew without stopping completely the propulsion engine maintain the ship's control 
and further investigate the cause of failure alarm.  
 constant/full speed till the vessel reaches an safe area. This alternative eliminates the 
piracy actions threat and weather condition undesirable situations but endangers the 
ship and its machinery in case the failure alarm is real. 
 
5. The Analytic Hierarchy Process 
The AHP was developed at the Wharton School of Business by Thomas Saaty. It’s a 
powerful and flexible multi-criteria decision-making tool and allows decision makers to 
model complex problems where both qualitative and quantitative aspects need to be 
considered [11, 12]. The AHP helps the decision makers to organize the critical aspects 
of a problem into a hierarchical structure similar to a chart of components depicted in 
boxes. The top box of chart represents the goal of the decision problem, and then is 
splitting in lower levels boxes which represent an objective contributing to the goal. Each 
box can then be further decomposed into lower level boxes, which represent sub-
objectives, and so on. Finally, boxes corresponding to the lowest level sub-objectives are 
broken down into alternative boxes, where each alternative box represents how much the 
alternative contributes to that sub-objective. By reducing complex decisions to a series of 
simple comparisons and rankings, then synthesising the results, the AHP not only helps 
the decision makers to achieve the best decision, but provides also a clear rational for the 
choices made. 
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Step-by-step the use of AHP procedure is the following: First the decision criteria in a 
form of objectives hierarchy are defined. The hierarchy structured on different levels from 
the top (i.e. the goal) down to intermediate levels (criteria and sub-criteria on which 
subsequent levels depend) and then to the lowest level (i.e. the alternatives). 
Then criteria, sub-criteria and alternatives weighted as a function of their importance for 
the corresponding element of the higher level. For this purpose, AHP use simple pairwise 
comparisons to determine weights and ratings, so that the analyst can concentrate on just 
two factors at one time. One of the questions which arise when using a pairwise 
comparison in this paper is: how important is the “Ship's Safety” factor with respect to the 
“decision against threat attack applicability” attribute, in terms of the “decision selection 
against threat attack” (i.e. the problem goal)? The answer may be “equally important”, 
“weakly more important”, etc. The verbal responses are then quantified and translated into 
a score via the use of discrete 9-point scales (with 1 ranking when a criterion i and criterion 
j are of equal importance, and 9 when criterion i is absolutely more important than 
criterion j). After a judgement matrix has been developed, a priority vector to weight the 
elements of the matrix is calculated. This is the normalised eigenvector of the matrix. 
Since the priorities of the Criteria with respect to the Goal and the priorities of the 
Alternatives with respect to the Criteria are known, we can calculate the priorities of 
Alternatives with respect to the Goal and finally synthesize the final priorities. This is a 
straightforward matter of multiplying and adding, carried out over the whole of the 
hierarchy and the results give to us the overall priorities and the solution for making the 
decision. 
6. Hierarchical Decision Model Development 
When the AHP hierarchical boxes chart develops, the aim is to develop a general 
framework that satisfies the needs of the decision makers to solve the selection problem 
of the best decision against threat attack during data transmission of SCADA system. The 
AHP as described above starts by breaking down a complex multi-criteria problem into a 
hierarchy, where each level comprises a few manageable elements which then analyzed 
in another set of elements (Fig. 1). Considering the critical aspect of this step for AHP, 
the structure has been created by experts' suggestions in relevant strategies followed by 
working staff in shipping companies. Then to studied the problem in this case the AHP 
hierarchy is developed in three levels. The first level represents the main goal of best 
decision against threat attack selection and the lowest level comprises the alternatives 
against threat attack. The evaluation criteria that influence the primary goal are included 
at the second level and are related to four different risk aspects: Ship's Safety, Operational 
conditions, Weather conditions, and the Type of Ship (Fig. 1). These criteria then could 
break down into several sub-criteria. 
The circumscription of the hierarchy methodology that is described above has been 
developed using a brainstorming process [13] with expert's support. Also the judgements 
of all the people concerned with failure alarms on board and onshore are included. In 
particular, in this study we include the opinions of maintenance engineering personnel, 
On Ship and On Shore who perform the analyses of monitoring performance and develop 
the strategies to improve procedures against failures, the operation personnel who 
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manages the failures in order to improve the ship operations and the safety personnel who 
performs the analysis of factors related to safety. 
The relevant factors defining the Ship's Safety and Weather conditions criteria are 
identified as the loss of propulsion power, the possibility of pirates to attack and the 
unexpected consequences of bad weather conditions. These are related to the operational 
reliability of the ship, the damage to environment due to collision etc, the influence to 
personnel safety, and to the company’s reputation. The Operational conditions are linked 
to the ship’s availability downtime derived from a failure, the time required for detection, 
repair or restoration to operating condition and re-starting. The risk concerning the type 
of ship factor, relate to the age of the ship, its size, the hazards of cargo, parameters which 
need special handling. 
7. AHP implementation 
Once the hierarchy structure of the most preferred strategy against threat attack problem 
is defined, every available data is imported. Then the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) 
mathematical solver runs to synthesize the results and normalize the values. The priorities 
for the alternatives specified in respect to each of the decision criteria, and priorities for 
each of the criteria with respect to their importance to reaching the goal calculated by use 
pairwise comparisons. 
Then the transfer of the experts’ judgments in Table I (one example of alternatives) to an 
AHP matrix, and the processing with software yields the result for the Alternatives with 
respect to ships safety and the priority results shown in Table II. 
Table I: Alternatives compared with respect to Ship’s Safety. 
Stop the Ship 
1 Speed 
Reduction 
7 Speed Reduction is very strongly important than 
criterion to Stop the Ship. Weight: 7 
Stop the Ship 1 Keeping 
constant/full 
speed 
4 Stop the Ship is weakly more important to 
Keeping constant/full speed. Weight: 4 
Speed Reduction 9 Keeping 
constant/full 
speed 
1 Speed Reduction is absolutely more important to 
Keeping constant/full speed. Weight: 9 
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Table II: The transfer of weights to the matrix. 
Safety of the 
Ship 




Stop the Ship 1 1/7 1/4 0.0649 
Speed 
Reduction 




4 1/9 1 0.1505 
 
The next steps are the pairs’ comparison of alternatives with respect to ship operational 
conditions, Weather conditions and Type of Ship. The weights transferred into the 
matrixes and solve the AHP. Then the criteria compared with respect to reaching the goal 
and with pairwise comparisons take the higher-ranking criterion to achieving the goal. 














Stop the Ship 0.0390 0.0100 0.0245 0.0089 0.0824 
Speed 
Reduction 




0.0904 0.0252 0.0895 0.0260 0.2320 
Totals 0.6005 0.17811 0.1256 0.0958 1.0000 
 
In Table III shows the final ranking in decisions rank for lube oil high temperature failure 
alarm in SCADA monitoring system.  




Figure 1. The AHP development and the global priority 
indices 
. 
Based on the expert's choice of decision criteria, on their judgments about the relative 
importance of each one and on their judgments about best decision against threat attack 
in data transmission with respect to each of the criteria, Speed Reduction, with a priority 
of 0.6866, is by far the most preferable strategy against threat attack in performance 
monitoring SCADA system. The decision to Keeping constant/full speed with 0.2311 
priority is second in decision and finally the Stop of the Ship at 0.0824 is that with lowest 
rank. 
8. Conclusions 
This paper describes one approach for Risk Evaluation during data transmission in 
SCADA system due a cyber attack in seagoing ships. The application of the AHP method 
has enabled modelling of various risk aspects that influence total risk of a ship that faces 
a threat attack. In the model, each risk criterion had weighting based on experts’ opinion 
and introduced in a matrix where calculated and synthesized with pairwise comparisons. 
The results of ranking of risk elements provides support to making decisions in order to 
prevent the influence of an improper decision during a possible cyber attack of a certain 
risk during vessel's voyage. 
The results and satisfaction from choosing a decision against threat attack in SCADA 
system derived by using the AHP method and confirms that it can improved and represents 
an effective approach to arrive at making decisions. Through the method implementation 
the decision maker could found a tool to enhancing their decisions in order to be able to 
eliminate the impact of a possible attack on a monitoring control system as their 








Atzori, L., Iera, A., & Morabito, G. (2010). The internet of things: A survey. Computer 
networks, 54(15), 2787-2805.  
Gubbi, J., Buyya, R., Marusic, S., & Palaniswami, M. (2013). Internet of Things (IoT): A 
vision, architectural elements, and future directions. Future generation computer systems, 
29(7), 1645-1660. 
Cagalaban, G., Kim, T., & Kim, S. (2010, May). Improving SCADA control systems 
security with software vulnerability analysis. In Proceedings of the 12th WSEAS 
international conference on Automatic control, modelling & (Vol. 38, pp. 409-414). 
Kopke, A., Willig, A., & Karl, H. (2003, March). Chaotic maps as parsimonious bit error 
models of wireless channels. In INFOCOM 2003. Twenty-Second Annual Joint 
Conference of the IEEE Computer and Communications. IEEE Societies (Vol. 1, 
pp. 513-523). IEEE. 
Akyildiz, I. F., Su, W., Sankarasubramaniam, Y., & Cayirci, E. (2002). Wireless sensor 
networks: a survey. Computer networks, 38(4), 393-422. 
Sitao, W., & Qingquan, Q. (2000). Using device driver software in SCADA systems. In 
Power Engineering Society Winter Meeting, 2000. IEEE (Vol. 3, pp. 2046-2049). 
IEEE . 
Hahn, A., Kregel, B., Govindarasu, M., Fitzpatrick, J., Adnan, R., Sridhar, S., & Higdon, 
M. (2010, April). Development of the PowerCyber SCADA security testbed. In 
Proceedings of the sixth annual workshop on cyber security and information 
intelligence research (p. 21). ACM. 
Katsikas, S., Dimas, D., Defigos, A., Routzomanis, A., & Mermikli, K. (2014). Wireless 
Modular System for Vessel Engines Monitoring, Condition Based Maintenance and 
Vessel’s Performance Analysis. In Proc. of the 2nd European Conference of the 
Prognostics and Health Management Society (PHME’14) (pp. 1-10). 
Zaghloul, M. S. (2014). Online Ship Control System Using Supervisory Control and Data 
Acquisition (SCADA).International Journal of Computer Science and Application. 
Yin, Z., Yuan, D., Zhou, Y., Pasupathy, S., & Bairavasundaram, L. (2011). How do fixes 
become bugs?. In Proceedings of the 19th ACM SIGSOFT symposium and the 13th 
European conference on Foundations of software engineering (pp. 26-36). 
Saaty, T.L. (1980). The analytic hierarchy process. New York: McGraw-Hill 
International.  
Saaty, T.L. (2008). Relative Measurement and Its Generalization in Decision Making Why 
Pairwise Comparisons are Central in Mathematics for the Measurement of 
Intangible Factors The Analytic Hierarchy/Network Process. Rev. R. Acad. Cien. 
Serie A. Mat. VOL. 102 (2), pp. 251–318.Almeida AT, Bohoris GA. (1995). 
Decision theory in maintenance decision making. Journal of Quality in Maintenance 
Engineering;1 (1):39–45. 
Almeida AT, Bohoris GA. (1995). Decision theory in maintenance decision making. 
Journal of Quality in Maintenance Engineering;1 (1):39–45. 
 
  
Enhancing Safety: the Challenge of Foresight 
219 
 




H.C. Wels, DEKRA Material Testing & Inspection 
Meander 1051, 6825 MJ ARNHEM , the Netherlands 
T. Slot, DNV GL Netherlands B.V. 




Electrical production must be equal to electrical demand in order to maintain a precise 
frequency. When a power plant fails unexpectedly, other plants take up the load as 
normally there is reserve power available to counteract forced unavailability of plants. 
Insufficient reserve leads to potential overload of generators which is prevented by 
shutting down load to areas, if not a blackout on the electrical grid may occur. Forced 
unavailability of power plants may increase due to the present low electricity prices which 
are especially low when large wind and sun generation is input in the grid. Such 
economical conditions result in minimal maintenance of fossil plants as well as a potential 
increase in failures due to changing operating conditions. The increase is expected to be 
especially present at vintage coal fired plant that was not designed for cycling but it can 
also be present in other types of plants. Minimal maintenance is expected for every plant 
at too low electricity prices. Numerical data in the Netherlands as well as from the VGB's 
KISSY database show the presence of such effects, however the effect of changing 
operating conditions is not so clear as plants operate less (reduced exposure to for 
instance creep) but start more often (increased exposure to low cycle fatigue). These 
effects are not taken into account when assessing the probability of grid blackouts by 
authorities and grid operators, as well as possible effects due to imperfect mothballing 
causing teething problems when de-mothballing,  
Keywords: Reliability, Security of supply, Power failure 
1. Introduction 
Reserve power that can instantly be delivered to the grid, for example reserve power plants 
in operation (“operating reserve”) for which the power can be increased some 10 %, must 
be present to keep the frequency precisely at the defined value (50 Hz or 60 Hz). If an 
incident occurs that causes forced unavailability of a plant in the system and such reserve 
is not present, electrical load must be reduced by curtailing the demand of customers. If 
not, generators will shutdown (trip) because of their protection systems and cascade 
 Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) 
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effects may cause a blackout. While forced unavailability of a plant is a daily occurrence 
in a moderate to large system, the probability of a demand curtailment is much lower and 
a curtailment when it occurs is generally not noticeable to the general public. It is known 
that parties have contracts allowing such curtailment (as they have own production 
facilities for which production may be more costly than the grid) have experienced such 
events. The general public in the Netherlands probably does not remember the blackout 
event of 23-6-1997. A cascade effect caused forced outage of several power plants that 
resulted in having the province of Utrecht without electrical power. Prolonged blackouts 
may result in unwanted social behaviour (plundering) and causes financial losses the least. 
This event happened at a total installed power to peak demand factor of about 1.3 and can 
be regarded as an incident. 
Market liberalization in the Netherlands has led to major overcapacity with many old and 
new combined cycle plants and new coal fired power installed, therefore the probability 
of such events in the past has been low. However, due to the so called Energie Akkoord 
(Energy Agreement) for climate reasons, old coal power has been decommissioned 
recently, discussion on mid-life and new coal power is ongoing and many combined 
cycles have been mothballed for economic reasons. The market is assumed to solve any 
future shortages in capacity. If due to a low electricity production market price (even so-
called negative prices have occurred with much wind and fossil power unable to stop 
production delivering steam to industry, district heating, contract obligations), costs must 
be cut further. Maintenance costs are a prime target for cost reduction as there is no 
directly felt effect of maintenance cost reduction to operations. Machines will react later 
on in time (in the order of months to years). We have found in the Netherlands that in the 
last years of operation of plants, forced unavailability of such to-be-decommissioned 
plants increased to 20 – 30 % of time due to cuts on maintenance. 
Now, if the forced unavailability of power plants rises due to cycling and economic 
conditions, with plants that are still mothballed because of prices, and renewables such as 
sun and wind are missing (at night, prolonged high pressure zone in Europe), curtailing of 
demand becomes probable. 
The paper is set up as follows. At first the signal is given that forced unavailability rises 
abroad. It is probable that this may also be the case for the Netherlands as the reasons are 
the same. The amount of rise might be different though as the production plant types differ 
from abroad. Reasons for forced unavailability are given, one of which is a change in 
operating conditions in combination with minimal maintenance. These influence factors 
are benign yet as the fraction of renewables in the Dutch grid is relatively small (it is much 
smaller than in Germany). It is clear the even new combined cycles will be forced to start 
and stop every day. In principle this causes additional stress to its components. From the 
point of security of electrical supply it is unwanted that combined cycles will stay 
mothballed with old coal power decommissioned due to the Energie Akkoord causing less 
reserve. The effect of the different influence factors is quantified using simple models and 
compared with Tennet’s Monitoring Report and calculations with the extensive DNV-GL 
European PLEXOS model. 
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2. Forced power unavailable before liberalization  
From 1976 up to 1996 all forced unavailability data from practically every plant delivering 
power to the grid were sent both to Sep54  and KEMA55  in a long-duration project to lower 
forced unavailability. By simple addition of these data the total forced unavailable power 
can be calculated. An example is given in figure 1.  
The figure shows that in the years before liberalization, total unavailable power varied 
between 500 MW and 2500 MW on a system peak demand of about 13000 MW with 
about 50 power plants present. On average, about 1600 MW was forced unavailable which 
is 12 % of peak demand. This fraction is somewhat high compared with the forced 
unavailability of a plant which normally is less than 10 %. However, cycling and reserve 
plants are not needed all the time and therefore repair time outside the window of need 
should not be regarded. Therefore the order of magnitude is comparable. The percentages 
indicate that with a reserve factor lower than 10% – 12% measures are necessary in order 
to prevent load curtailment. 
 
Figure 1. Total power in the Netherland being forced 
unavailable 
                                                 
54 Sep = Joint Electricity Producers 
55 KEMA = research institute for Electricity, with electricity production and distribution companies as its 
shareholders 




Figure 2. Total forced power unavailable from 1976 – 1996 
 
Figure 2 shows the trend in total forced power unavailable up to 1996. The decrease after 
1988 possibly is due to the benign effects of the Sep and KEMA R&D project to 
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systematically gather and analyze failure data at plants. The increase after 1991 possibly 
is the effect of taking over of companies and a change in mind set from a public utility to 
a commercial production company. Since, large amounts of data were made available to 
the general public (the so-called Transparency Data) but it can be shown that data quality 
has decreased with the amount of data increasing. 
 
3. Development of demand 
Any analysis of the security of supply must regard demand. The Dutch have up to 1998 
presented the demand predictions in the so called Electricity Plan. Until liberalization the 
total installed power was coordinated by Sep. In the early days a yearly increase in % was 
assumed that resulted in very high (exponentially rising) demand curves as shown in 
figure 3. The figure shows that factual demand always has been lower the prognosticated 
central or total demand. This appears to be a general tendency also for many projects 
today. During liberalization installed power increased appreciably due to large coal fired 
plants. However, the economical crisis has led to stabilization of the peak demand at about 
15.000 MW. Furthermore, due to the increase in wind and solar power in Germany being 
supplied to neighbouring countries over the grid, and the low coal price because of the US 
shale gas, overcapacity led electricity producing companies to mothballing of Dutch 
plants, even for district heating plants nowadays supplying their customers with auxiliary 
boiler heat only. It is to be expected that the peak demand will not be much higher in the 
near future unless the demand from electrical automobiles or other new users will 
substantially contribute to the peak demand. 
 
Figure 3. Historical peak demand prediction 
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4. Present production situation 
In 2012 the Dutch “Energie Akkoord” between a large number of parties was ratified. 
Amongst the measures to take it was decided to decommissioning older coal fired power 
plants. In accordance with the “Akkoord” the units BS12 (392 MW), G-13( 603 MW), A-
81 (645 MW) and MV-1 and MV-2 (each 520 MW) were decommissioned. Targets for 
renewable energy and consumption reduction have not been met yet56 . 
The present generation situation as per Tennet publicly available files is shown in figure 
4. In the Netherlands a system exists in which producers and grid operators sent the day-
ahead power to Tennet in the so called Tprog with Tennet further scheduling generation 
and balancing the grid. Figure 4 shows the load duration curve for 2015. Peak demand is 
about 18000 MW. Small producers (say less than 50 MW) are not included as they are 
present on lower (< 110 kV) voltage grids. Base load, the minimum demand that is always 
to be produced centrally, is about 4000 MW. Evidently, there is a difference between 
scheduled and realized (actual) generation. Also, as figures 5 and 6 show, the difference 
between scheduled and Tprog becomes higher at low demands (for reasons unknown to 
the authors) and the difference between realized and scheduled ranges between -30 % and 
+ 30 % (thought to be the effects of unavailability of plants, balancing, etc.) 
 
 
Figure 4. Load duration curve 
                                                 
56 Progress report 2016 




Figure 5. Difference scheduled generation and day-ahead production needs 
 
 
Figure 6. Difference realized and scheduled generation 
 
By estimating a merit order for the generation of power based on expected variable 
production cost and projecting the cumulative power on the load duration curve, the 
fraction of time that a plant will be operating is derived. Coal power and gas from steel 
factories57 have the lowest cost per MJ despite the lower efficiencies of these plants 
compared to modern combined cycles (< 40 % for midlife plants compared to >60 % for 
new combined cycles). In the Netherlands there is only one nuclear power plant that is 
expected to continue operation in base load. Implicit in this model is that when a plant 
operates, it operates at more or less constant name plate power. Nowadays even for base 
load this is not really the case and average power is significantly less than name plate. 
Also, maintenance costs may be larger for new gas turbine types having exotic materials 
                                                 
57 Fired at a low cost price as flaring is on the only other option 
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compared to older gas turbines, gas contracts may result in gas prices different from 
market conditions58 , etc. 
If we look at operating time derived from the merit order in 2015 with old coal power still 
in operation, figure 7 shows that much gas power is in reserve and therefore was logically 
mothballed. With ageing coal out of operation and gas power mothballed according to 
figure 8 there appears to be a shortage of supply. With large gas power de-mothballed in 
figure 9, gas power will be in weekend stop (especially plant supplying district heating), 
cycling and in reserve. For the future, large wind parks will aid in installed power however 
it is well known that for each MW installed, on average only 30 % – 40 % is available as 
generated power is a function of wind speed to the power of 3 and wind speed is not a 
constant. Now, many smaller district heating combined cycle plants are expected not be 
started again being mothballed with none to minor conservation measures. Larger 
combined cycle plants were mothballed with optimized conservation measures for a long 
time. One wonders if strategic decision making to increase price may be applicable, 
however it takes time to de-mothball also (up to a year for deep mothballing) and prices 
are volatile. 
  
Figure 7. Fraction of time operating with ageing and new coal 
in operation, major gas plants mothballed 
                                                 
58 For the Eems EC3-7 combined cycles a 1995 Sep-Statoil take-or-pay gas contract (“gas for the price of 
coal”) was signed for a 20 year duration 




Figure 8. Fraction of time operating with ageing coal phased 
out, gas plant mothballed 
 
Figure 9. Fraction of time operating with ageing coal phased 
out, gas plant de-mothballed 
 
5. Emergency power called for 
Potential shortages have led to a market for emergency power. Figure 10 shows the 
development in the application of such power, generally for 1 – 2 hours per event at an 
average size of 80 – 150 MW. With sufficient installed power, the companies of plants 
having forced outages are able to buy replacement power limiting the duration of them 
having to pay for unbalance in the grid requiring Tennet to schedule and operate reserve 
power. In past times, during such periods prices increased to over 1000 EUR/MWhr, 
however over the years markets have become more stable. It is thought that this is also the 
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effect of grid connections with abroad. Figure 10 shows an increase in the application of 
emergency power as a function of time. According to Energia, for 2014 and 2015 Tennet 
explained this by the commissioning of new large coal fired power (Uniper, Engie, RWE) 
during which teething problems occurred. Yet, a light increase since 2008 seems to be 
present. 
 
Figure 10. Application of emergency power per year 
 
6. General model for forced unavailability of power units 
Forced unavailability is partly caused by technical factors and partly by human factors. 
Examples of technical factors are teething problems with new types of equipment, cycling 
operation causing high stress on components and worsening of the condition of 
components by the processes that are inside (for example failures of GT coating, thick 
steam chests). Examples of human factors are management decisions with regard to 
minimal maintenance and cost reduction, effects of operator experience, etc.  
If one looks at FOR as a time series, the series can be divided into so called High Impact 
Low Probability (HILP) failures and “normal” failures.  
HILP failures are failures with duration of over a month, sometimes in the order of half a 
year. Such long duration failures occur once or twice over the life of a production unit. A 
description based on an average value per year is therefore not optimum, HILPs can result 
in sudden increases in the yearly average FOR of a power unit. HILP failures can occur 
at many components of a production unit, are difficult to predict and are therefore difficult 
to fight. HILP failures can be managed up to some extend by carrying out a Failure Mode 
Effect & Criticality Analysis (FMECA) and making sure that the actions in this FMECA 
to counteract the HILPs are taken. HILPs cannot be totally prevented however. 
“Normal” failures for a power production unit show a typical bathtub curve as a function 
of time. After a period with teething troubles, the bottom of the bathtub should be in the 
order of less than 10 failures on a yearly basis and less than 10 % FOR at well performing 
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plant. Not all failures are full outages. Average repair times are in the order of 40 hrs. 
Now, while these values are averages, one strives for 0 failures and, without massive 
financial investments in the technical and human area, power plants in base load have 
shown 0 failures for 1 or 2 years in a row. It takes however human investments to arrive 
at such low values!   Forced unavailability FOR of less than 5 % is considered a “good” 
value for coal fired plant, for combined cycles this should be even lower. Generally, the 
number of failures per year stays constant or is getting lower each year even up to 25 years 
of operation due to betterment projects, operator and maintenance actions unless 
minimum maintenance is applied or the way of operating is changed. 
When one studies the pattern of failures, one finds that a fraction of the failures is of a 
repetitive nature.  For some components, it can be shown that 30 % of the failures, with 
per definition moderate outage times, is on average repeated within 1 week.  
Large differences in mean time between failures can occur between units that are 
contributable to differences in geometry and systems (older types of combustion 
chambers, teething problems with advanced Low Nox burners, etc.).  
These influence factors are detailed in the next chapters. International as well as plant 
specific failure data allow modelling the patterns developing in the generation portfolio 
both from teething problems as well as ageing. 
 
7. Planned unavailability 
Maintenance costs, planned unavailability and forced unavailability (FOR) are not 
independent. Planned unavailability (overhauls, inspections) is carried out in order to limit 
and, if possible, eliminate FOR. It is possible to reduce both and find a cost minimum. 
Several sources of information show a (irregular) picture of both lower forced 
unavailability and lower planned unavailability (as a proxy for maintenance costs). 
Examples are shown in Figure 11. 
  




Figure 11. Semi-random walk for planned versus unplanned 
unavailability 
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The classical relation “less planned maintenance (planned unavailability) results in more 
unplanned maintenance (forced unavailability)” appears to be a generalization only. It is 
known however that without or with minimum maintenance in 3 – 5 years the forced 
unavailability will easily reach 20 – 30 %. 
 In the Sep period planned unavailability was scheduled in the summer window in such a 
way that LOLE59 did not vary too much over the year. It is not known whether Tennet still 
coordinates in such a way. The author understands from German colleagues as well as 
from a Tennet meeting that a plan is to be submitted against which the grid operator may 
object.  
In the simple load duration curve used to assess the fraction of time plants are operating 
it is assumed that planned unavailability should be taken into account for base load only, 
as cycling plants should be able to shift operation to periods with lower demand. Also for 
LOLE calculations based on simple modelling for weekend stop and cycling, planned 
unavailability can be shifted to favourable periods and is therefore not taken into account. 
8. Modelling FOR to take account of differences in plant type 
On the level of components given by 3 letters KKS-code (let’s call this a super-
component) the forced unavailability FOR can be described by a bathtub curve for the 
expected number of failures per operating hr together with an average downtime. The 
FOR will be different per phase (teething troubles, bottom of the curve, ageing period), as 
conceptually shown in figure 12. Super-components result in an effective description 
given the differences in failure characteristics: 
1. The boiler especially that of a coal fired unit, especially when fans & auxiliaries 
are included, causes normally a significant number of failures for a production 
unit. However, not all failures are full outages. The heat recovery boiler of a 
STAG60  plant normally has fewer failures than a conventional boiler. 
2. A steam turbine normally has significantly less failures than a boiler, while 
planned maintenance is carried out at larger intervals. The failure parameters of a 
generator are similar to that of a steam turbine, but a generator failure compared 
to a steam turbine failure is expected to show a more gradual degradation 
behaviour before occurrence of the failure. 
3. A gas turbine normally has the largest number of failures per unit operating time 
for a production unit. Especially for gas turbines, teething troubles in a new design 
may be present. 
4. Steam turbines, generators and gas turbines (blade failures) are susceptible to 
HILP type of failures.  
                                                 
59 LOLE: Loss of Load Expectation in hrs / year 
60 A STAG plant is built from one or more gas turbines, heat recovery boilers, a steam turbine and one or 
more generators. A conventional gas or coal fired plant is not equipped with a gas turbine except in a few 
cases for feedwater heating. The boiler is much larger and of other construction than that of a STAG 
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Super-component characteristics can be inserted into more detailed reliability analysis 
taking redundancy, common cause failures and failure mechanisms in account in order to 
model a power plant as precisely as possible. Reliability block diagrams as shown in figure 
13 allow modelling for example differences in feedwater pump configuration, gas turbine 
configurations (1 GT, 2 GTs, effect of # of generators, etc.). 
For (large) STAG plants the failure characteristics of a steam turbine and generator are 
not different from coal fired plants, however the boiler is certainly different. Therefore, if 
one notes an increased FOR for coal fired plants this certainly cannot be directly copied 
to STAG plants. As stated before, the majority of the portfolio in the Netherlands is STAG 
with aged coal plant phased out. 
  
Figure 12. Bathtub curve for super-components 





Figure 13. Part of detailed reliability block diagram for a 
power plant (feedwater system) 
 
9. Operating conditions 
A base-load unit is most easy to describe: operating hours are all calendar hours in which 
no planned availability or FOR as a result of full forced outages is present. The FOR 
description for non-base load plants is preferably extended by assessing the postponement 
of repairs to periods with lower unavailability costs, for instance the weekend or the night 
and not counting any repair hours outside the window of need of the plant. Postponement 
of repairs is especially applicable for cycling units although especially for new plant 
postponement is less than for old plant due to automatic tripping. However, cycling 
induces additional loads on components (for instance thermal fatigue) causing a higher 
number of failures per operating hour. Also, a failure probability per start should be 
included, the effect of which for a base load unit on a yearly basis is negligible since base-
load plant only starts after an overhaul or after a FOR event. For cycling units with 
sufficient operating hours, the effect of calendar time (for instance due to corrosion) on 
failures is expected to be minor compared to the effect of operating time (for instance due 
to high temperature creep). However, it has already been found that there is a change in 
components that are dominant in FOR (for instance dominancy of LP preheaters was 
found for one plant operating as a reserve plant, which is somewhat unusual). 
Forced unavailability can be split into FOR during which the unit is necessary and FOR 
during which the unit is not necessary given its windows of opportunity. Billington and 
Allan (1984) already presented the IEEE 4 state analytical model on the basis of Markov 
analysis. One is inclined to use Monte Carlo simulation given the ease in modeling and 
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the ability to see the spread in values next to the average. However an analytical model is 
decidedly faster than Monte Carlo although it usually only shows averages. Using the 
IEEE 4 state model as per chapter 14, the modelling parameters are extended with 
operating hours per year, starts per year and only a fraction of repair time which results in 
unavailability costs. By assuming the different failure mechanisms to be dominantly 
dependant either on starts, operating time, calendar time or combinations, one arrives at 
FOR as a function of operating conditions. 
10. Life extension 
It has become customary to operate old plants longer than say 25 years as there is margin 
in the technical life of components and because power companies try to avoid large 
investments due to uncertain market circumstances. Experience has shown that with 
modest investments one can operate such plants longer without excessive rise of neither 
unavailability nor safety consequences. Failure data analysis shows which components to 
investigate when intending to operate a power plant longer than say 25 years. 
On the basis of Reliability Block diagrams (RBD), the failure rate, average repair time 
and forced unavailability was calculated for sister plants A1 and A2 for a set of Life 
Extension investment scenarios. The RBD’s were based on P&I diagrams, interviews and 
failure data gathered since the start of operation of these plants. A reference model for the 
‘bottom of the bathtub curve” with historic failure data resembled realized forced 
unavailability well, with a low 2.5 % equivalent forced unavailability (EFOR)61. A model 
with historical failures extrapolated to the future without investment indicated EFOR in 
the range of 24 %. The reference model EFOR as well as historic EFOR is shown in figure 
14. Please note the appearance of High Impact Low Probability (HILP) failures with the 
reference model only showing the average expected EFOR. Over the years before the 
investment scenarios, FOR increased due to minimal maintenance in combination with 




Figure 14. Reference model compared with Unit A1 and A2 
historic realization 
Failure data were derived from plant records over a period of 23 years as well as from the 
VGB KISSY database and discussed with plant experts. Components not present in either 
                                                 
61 The gap in the data in figure 14 is caused by a management decision for this plant to no longer to gather 
data as end-of-life appeared imminent 
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database were estimated using DEKRA databases. Trend analysis of G1 and G2 
unavailability records showed that for these plants only for a few components ageing in 
terms of an increase in the number of failures per unit time was present. Minimal 
maintenance was, despite the age of the plant, certainly no applied due to the need for the 
DH grid. 
The unplanned forced unavailability FOR as a function of time was forecasted for the 
scenarios 1) DO NOTHING on LTE but continue with maintenance as usual and  2) carry 
out LTE as per planned measures. The result is shown in figure 15, clearly showing the 
time behaviour both in the historical data as well in the modelling.  
The results show that ageing can be efficiently counteracted by investment in certain 
components. It was however assumed that such investment leaves only 10 % remaining 
failures for these components. 
 
 
Figure 16. Result for yearly expected forced unavailability as 
a function of time 
 
11. Failure patterns in practice 
Finally, to make clear that during the life phase of plants typical patterns are existing in 
practice, figures 16-21 show some theses failure patterns for 3 power plants as a function 
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of time from the start of operating in the 70-ties until decommissioning. It is thought that 
such patterns will also exist today. All plants are combined cycles (hot windbox 
repowering) from the same company with well known historical information. Units Y1 
and Y2 are identical with 2 Frame Type gas turbines each. Unit X has 1 larger Frame Type 
gas turbine. The figures show clearly: 
a) teething problems for all plants after newbuilding (figure 16) 
b) teething problems for all plants after the hot windbox repowering (figure 17) 
c) High Impact Low Probability problems HILP after a design error (figure 18) 
d) High Impact Low Probability problems HILP also without this error, for example 
due to GT blade problems (figure 19) 
e) The effects of cycling unit X, units Y1 and Y2 are not cycling. Unit X is also subject 
to minimal maintenance (figure 20) 
f) All units have less operating hours per year and show less failures because of the 
low hours (figure 21) 
It would be interesting to see if teething problems are present after (long duration) 
mothballing. Reasons could be corrosion at unexpected places or difficulties finding an 
experienced crew. 
 
Figure 16. Unavailability of units: teething problems 




Figure 17. Unavailability of units: teething problems 
 
 
Figure 18. Unavailability of units: HILP design error 
 
 
Figure 19. Unavailability of units: HILP failures 




Figure 20. Unavailability of units: cycling operation and minimal maintenance 
 
 
Figure 21. Unavailability of units: reserve 
 
12. VGB KISSY database availability module 
VGB operates 2 databases to gather the unavailabilities of power plants, known as KISSY 
= Kraftwerksinformationssystem. Part A, the so-called Availability module contains the 
planned and unplanned unavailabilities, fraction of the time operating, etc. for a large 
number of plants on a yearly basis. In the last decade many international plants entered 
the module therefore it should not be regarded as German only. Part B, the so-called 
Unavailability module contains the planned and unplanned unavailability as events with 
KKS = Kraftwerk-Kennzeichensystem component coding. Evidently for the plants in 
module B total unavailability can be calculated and compared with module A if present 
there also. As not every plant due to age or because of internal company coding uses KKS, 
module B contains fewer plants and relatively has a larger number of German plants. Both 
modules are operated with stringent coding instructions for example to define planned 
versus unplanned (planned if known 4 weeks before the outage). The different plants in 
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different countries involved can lead to different failure patterns and may explain that the 
A module clearly shows a systematic increase in forced unavailability in time while the B 
module does not show such systematic increase clearly. 
For the paper we have used the most recent (2016) type A data from the yearly report that 
is available from VGB. Figure 22 shows clearly that on average the forced unavailability, 
especially the non-postponable part, has risen from an all-time low in 1996-1997 of 3 % 
to values above 10 % in 2015-2016. 
  
 
Figure 22. VGB KISSY availability data 
  
The same pattern appears to be present for other subsets of the database, especially for the 
coal fired plant “workhorses “ in the 200 – 600 MW size. However, for the Dutch 
portfolio,  combined cycles are important as they supply mid—merit order power. The 
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KISSY availability data are given in figure 23  also for combined cycles. The forced 
unavailability rises from about 2 % in 2013 to about 7 % in 2015. The value of 9 % in 
2009 is caused by some outage extensions, which under the VGB KISSY definitions are 
unplanned (if known less than 4 weeks before the actual outage). The problem here is that 
the number of plants in the category combined cycle is international and diverse62, 
therefore the agregate data should not be used without care. 
 
13. VGB KISSY database unavailability module 
Using data from the part B unavailability module, a Research Project63 was carried out in 
2014 to directly arrive at reliability indicators using the layout of every plant in the 
database as for instance the failure rate = failures per operating hour for generators should 
be corrected for the number of generators in the plant, which is not necessarily 1 in a 
Combined cycle plant. The data from this Research Project were used to assess ageing in 
the components of STAGs based on KKS-coding (Kraftwerk- Kennzeichensystem). The 
level of detail shown in figure 24 is 2 letters KKS pinpointing major systems64. Each data 
point in figure 24 generally is representing 10 years of operation. The figure shows: 
MB = gas turbine. Trend shows ageing, however it is known that the plants that were over 
20 years had difficulty in acquiring the spare parts for the aero-derivative gas turbines. 
From other projects it is known that given spare parts and proper maintenance, no ageing 
should be visible in the data 
MK= generator. Trend shows ageing however this is fully caused by a HILP type failure 
at one of the plants (2100 hrs outage). 
HA = heat recovery boiler. Trend shows ageing with an appreciable amount of spread.  
MA = steam turbine including condenser. Trend shows ageing, again with an appreciable 
amount of spread.  
 
                                                 
62 Plants that have a gas turbine in the feedwater system, hot windbox repowerings and STAG plants all are 
called combined cycles 
63 Reliability Indicators with KISSY – VGB Research Project 361, ISBN 978-3-86875-751-4 
64 We are able to calculate failure rate, average repair time, unavailability, postponement, trips, etc. to a 
level of 3 letters KKS which is sufficient to consistently model differences between plants 




Figure 23. KISSY Combined cycle data 
 







Figure24. Failure rate (per operating hour) and forced unavailability (calendar hours) 
  
14. IEEE 4-state model 
 
It is customary to present forced unavailability on the basis of calendar hours. However 
forced unavailability should be defined in such a way that it is the probability that the 
plant is not there when needed. A first approximation is a simple 2-state model (the plant 
is either operating or unavailable) however for plants in reserve this is too conservative. 
The IEEE 4-state model already given in Billington and Allan (1984) 65 is more 
                                                 
65 Reliability Evaluation of Power Systems, Billington & Allan, 1984 
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appropriate however it needs as additional parameters the frequency per hr that the plant 
is needed and average duration of that need in order to assess the fraction of repair time 
that is outside the period of need. 
hr)calendar  (duration repair  average
failuresbetween  mean time1/  MTBF
hr) operating(/  rate failure
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A series of test calculations was carried out with the KISSY plants present in the VGB 
Research Project 361 data to estimate the effect. The results show that the difference 
between forced unavailability on a calendar time basis and on operating time basis in 
either the 2 or 4 state model is important for Combi plants. The STAGs within the total 
subset of Combi plants are comparable to the STAGs in the Dutch portfolio that will 
operate in cycling mode more and more as the result of renewable generation in the grid. 
It was proposed to VGB to further analyse the 4-state model for the large number of plants 
in the KISSY Availability database (type A), a decision on this proposal is pending. As 
shown in figure 25, evidently the difference between the models disappears for base load 
and is the most important for reserve type single cycle gas turbines. 
  




Figure 25. Four state versus two state model 
 
15. Loss of load expectation 
Again, when too many power plants are forced unavailable, load has to be reduced. If not, 
cascade effects may result in blackouts.  
In Billington and Allan (1984) a method (originally from Schenk and Rau) is given based 
on a Fourier transform method to calculate the loss of load expectation (LOLE). This 
method appears to be valid when the distribution of capacity outages can be approximated 
by a normal distribution. For the Dutch system with 50 + production units over the period 
1978 -1986 this appeared to be the case despite varying sizes of production units between 
about 15 MW and about 700 MW. The distribution of power plant size however is not a 
normal distribution, with average size about 240 MW but with some large units > 600 
MW. It is quite common that both average size and size of largest power plants increases 
over time therefore it is expected that the normality requirement is still met today. 




Figure 26. Results of simple LOLE calculations 
 
The results of the LOLE calculations are shown in figure 26. The relevant results are given 
in column E of figure 26 with only forced unavailability taken into account. The results 
indicate that as long as the forced unavailability of the power plants stays as per typical 
historical values, LOLE is less than the 4 hrs per hr that has been defined as acceptable by 
Tennet. However, when large forced unavailability occurs (for example due to economic 
conditions as per figure 27), the LOLE rises appreciably. The results in column D indicate 
that it is really necessary to centrally coordinate planned outages in order to keep LOLE 
to acceptable values.  
What does a LOLE of 4 hrs per year really mean? Essentially it is a probability having 
both a frequency component as well as a duration component. An average frequency of 
once per 10 years with an average duration of 40 hrs leads to the same LOLE as a each 
year on average 4 yrs or 4 times per year 1 hr. Evidently the last LOLE is less acceptable. 
However, the frequency is not defined by Tennet. When such an acceptable frequency 
would be defined we would like to refer to the age-old “100 year wave” that the old 
shipbuilders used as input to define the strength of their ships on. The expected frequency 
of blackouts should be such that during a professional career one should at maximum have 
had this experience once. Please note that a nuclear incident target frequency is defined 
as once per hundred thousand years up to once in a million years per plant operating year 
which is much lower. 
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16. PLEXOS calculations 
As suggested by DEKRA, DNV GL has tentatively investigated the impact of increased 
forced outage rate on the generation adequacy of the Netherlands using its PLEXOS 
model for the European electricity market model for single deterministic simulation runs 
of 2018.  
The European market model contains detailed representation of the generation, 
transmission, demand and reserves. Generation capacities in the core countries are 
modelled on individual basis with detailed techno-economic characteristics (e.g. 
flexibility parameters, combined heat and power characteristics, bid curves, renewable 
availability profiles). Renewable generation takes volatility into account through the use 
of historical or re-analysed time-series of e.g. wind-speeds and solar-irradiation data for 
different locations. It contains a flexible division of detailed core countries and an 
aggregated representation of remaining European countries. 
Two market simulations have been performed: one with the traditional forced outage 
fraction assumptions and one with higher forced outage fractions. The combined cycles 
already mothballed in 2017, based on the so-called “Transparancy” data, were kept 
mothballed. All aged coal fired plants in the Netherlands are out of operation in 2018. 
Based on these two simulations, a comparison is made between the hourly reserve 
margins. The forced outage fractions used are given in figure 27. 
 
Figure 27. Force outage fractions used in the PLEXOS runs 
 
The hourly reserve margin is defined as the total hourly available generation capacity 
minus the hourly electricity demand. The total hourly available generation capacity 
includes wind and solar-PV that is adjusted for their availability, but excludes generation 
capacity that is in maintenance or in forced outage event. The available generation 
capacity does not distinguish between dispatched capacity and not-dispatched capacity.  
The results for the hourly reserve margin are given in figure 28. 




Figure 28. Hourly reserve margin in PLEXOS runs 
 
In addition, the impact on the import-export balance of the Netherlands and the amount 
of hours with unserved energy is assessed. 
Taking into account the higher forced outage rate66, reduces the total available capacity 
by on average 800 MW. This lower total available capacity reduces the hourly reserve 
margin. In the case of higher forced outage rates, the number of hours with 1GW or less 
increased from 2 hours to 26 hours. Note that in both cases of traditional and higher forced 
outage rates, there occurred no hours with unserved energy in the Netherlands in the single 
deterministic run. Incorporating a higher forced outage rate Europe-wide, reduces the net 
import position of the Netherlands by 7 TWh (30%), that is: the Dutch are more dependent 
on the grid connection to abroad that however that is able to deliver less. 
The exact number of hours depends on the maintenance schedules, timing of forced outage 
events and renewable patterns. Forced outage events preferably are calculated using a 
                                                 
66 Forced outage rate actually is not a rate (frequency) but the equivalent fraction of time a plant is 
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large number of Monte Carlo runs, however as a single deterministic run for the European 
model already takes about 4 hrs, for the present modelling this was not feasible. 
. 
17. Comparison with Tennet’s Monitoring report 
Each year since 2006 Tennet presents the so called monitoring report that shows the risk 
on insufficient power to meet demand. The report available for the paper is the 2016 report 
with 2017 in the making but not yet available. 
  
Figure 29. Peak demand in Tennet’s 2016 monitoring report 
The reference peak demand scenario for 2017 or 2018 in the report is about 18 GW with 
a more or less linear increase of 1.8 % on a yearly basis. The calculations in chapter 15 
are in accordance with this peak demand. 




Figure 30. Installed power in Tennet’s 2016 Monitoring report 
 
Figure 31. Mothballed power in Tennet’s 2016 Monitoring report 
 
Evidently the installed power is important. Figure 30 (figure 3.7 from the 2016 report) 
shows the large contribution of gas power (Combined Cycles) together with coal 
supplying between 7000 MW and 5000 MW. The figure also shows that a large fraction 
of gas is mothballed. This in more detail given in figure 31 (figure 3.8 from the 2016 
report) which shows that on a demand of about 15000 MW market overcapacity has 
resulted in 4500 MW conserved = mothballed power. Even new power has been 
conserved. About 3000 MW is thought to be feasible for de-mothballing, evidently only 
when economical conditions are favourable. As yet there is no capacity market in the 
Netherlands that pays for keeping power in reserve. Furthermore it shows that some 7000 
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MW are “missing” in the calculations in chapter 15. A meeting with Tennet has made it 
clear that this is industrial power, not incorporated in the large traditional utility power 
that is listed on Tennet’s site. Evidently the Dutch security of supply situation is dependent 
on the behaviour of a large number of smaller producers, making their own financial trade-
offs for generation (either produce it yourself or depend on the grid). 
 
 
Figure 32. Availability prediction and realisation in Tennet’s Monitoring reports 
 
 Evidently the unavailability of plants is input in Tennet’s Monitoring Report. Figure 32, 
based on figure 4.2 of the 2016 report and its earlier versions shows over the early periods 
a systematic underestimation by electricity production companies of the unavailability of 
their plants of about 2.1%. The companies have been too optimistic. In recent years (2013, 
2014, etc.) the forecast of companies for unavailability appears to be more random with 
less underestimation and even overestimation.  
 Finally the basic result of Tennets monitoring report is shown in figure 33 (figure 4.3 
from the 2016 report). This figure shows that from 2017 on the Dutch are depending on 
import from abroad. The formal Tennet LOLE allowable is defined as 4 hrs per year.  The 
dependency increases when realized unavailability is considered instead of the predicted 
unavailability by the companies involved. 




Figure 33. Results for LOLE in Tennet’s Monitoring report 
 
It appears that for electricity there is no independent checking of both realized and 
predicted unavailability while for distribution there is independent checking by certified 
auditors. It is recommended to carry out such checking, which was disbanded with the 
introduction of liberalization. Before liberalization Sep and KEMA were working together 
collecting data from plants, discussing the data at plants, etc. By showing the interest of 
decision makers into (forced) unavailability it appeared that the forced unavailability was 
decreasing! 
The authors had a meeting with Tennet discussing trends for confirmation purposes. It is 
hoped to continue discussion with Tennet to have power plants modelled as realistically 
as possible and in order to improve data quality for unavailability data. The VGB KISSY 
database can be used as a tool, however inputting data is by VGB members only and no 
obligation exists to do so. 
The simple Billington model is consistent with Tennet’s Monitoring report in that for 
typical forced unavailability not taking an increase for economic reasons into account, it 
shows that LOLE is negligible. However if a fraction of large combined cycles continue 
to be mothballed in the situation that the aged coal fired plants (A-81, MV-1-2, G-13, 
BS12) are out of operation as per the Energie Akkoord, large forced unavailability for 
economic  reasons leads to an unacceptable LOLE in the Billington model. Connections 
to abroad will dampen this effect however abroad similar conditions may exist. Also 
increased wind power will only dampen this effect as out of every MW installed only 30 
– 40 % is available on a yearly basis as windpower is a function of windspeed to the third 
power and conditions without much wind may occur over Central Europe for a week or 
more. 
The detailed PLEXOS model is consistent with Tennet’s Monitoring report in that it 
shows the increased dependency on the grid connections with abroad. However it also 
shows that blackouts occurring say next year are unrealistic. It is recommended however 
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to repeat the calculations over a larger time horizon and somehow incorporate the 
statistical uncertainty of both forced outages as well as wind conditions. 
 
18. Conclusions 
Minimal maintenance is thought likely to occur in the Dutch production situation when 
prices are low due to overcapacity in combination with more renewables in the grid. As 
yet, there is no reserve market in the Netherlands that pays for the costs of keeping power 
plants in reserve. As a consequence, the forced unavailability of plants will increase which 
is not desirable as fossil power is the replacement of renewable power when this is not 
present (no sun or no wind) as long as there is no storage. 
The security of supply and the acceptable Loss of Low Probability LOLE appears to be 
not immediately at risk. However, the Dutch will be more depending on abroad precisely 
when the grid connections with abroad are less dependent as the same economic situation 
for fossil power plants is present abroad as well. 
It is recommended to improve the quality of availability data from power plants by 
applying stringent definitions as per the VGB KISSY database, visiting the plants to 
discuss and validate the data and model the plants taking teething problems for new plants, 
ageing for old plants and High Impact Low Probability HILP problems into account.  
Forced unavailability should be defined on an as-need basis rather than on the basis of 
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The Learning Review:  




US Forest Service, Innovation and Organizational Learning 
 
Crista Vesel 




Accident investigation techniques have remained essentially the same for many decades, 
yet the recognition that complexity is increasing in most organizations demands an added 
form of inquiry. The Learning Review, first adopted by the U.S. Forest Service, explores 
the human contribution to accidents, safety, and normal work. It is specifically designed 
to facilitate the understanding of the factors and conditions that influence human actions 
and decisions by encouraging individual and group sensemaking at all levels of the 
organization. The Learning Review introduces the need to create a narrative inclusive of 
multiple perspectives from which a network of influences map can be created. This map 
depicts the factors that influence behaviors and can aid the organizational leadership to 
effect meaningful changes to the conditions while simultaneously helping field personnel 
to understand and manage system pressures. 
 
Keywords: Accident investigation, complex systems, investigation models organizational 
learning, sensemaking.  
1. Introduction 
The Learning Review67 emerged from organizational necessity, as the prescriptive model 
of accident investigation used by the U.S. Forest Service was unable to effect positive 
change to its most important element: the human. From 1995 to 2015 the Forest Service 
lost over 400 wildland firefighters in active fire operations. These line-of-duty deaths 
affected our community and our organization emotionally, yet no substantive changes in 
operation or policy resulted from the investigations that followed these accidents. The 
investigative model in use was delineated by the Serious Accident Investigation Guide 
(SAIG), which was formalized in 2001 (Whitlock, 2001). The SAIG was an amalgamation 
                                                 
67 The Learning Review is the process that formally replaced the Serious Accident Investigation Guide in 
2014. It is the outgrowth of seven years of experimentation and research in alternative methodologies. 
 Attribution 4.0 International (CC BY 4.0) 
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of the most common investigative tools in use; however, it did not provide wildland 
firefighting operations with the information needed to prevent accidents. Forest Service 
investigations often pointed to the failure of people, without understanding why they 
failed or what failure really meant to the system. In addition, the accident rates were 
trending upward. 
The need for a new approach was also deeply felt at the field level. The results of 
investigations, called ‘factual reports,’ chronicled accidents from the often-biased 
perspective of the investigation team. Secrecy surrounded the process as the team 
collected ‘evidence’ and treated the incident like a criminal event, even if there were no 
criminal implications. Lurking beneath the surface of each causal statement was a sense 
that the firefighters intended to err, as almost all the listed causes in reports were 
counterfactual and did not provide the ‘hard data’ that the investigators claimed to have 
uncovered. Distrust brewed in the wildland firefighting ranks following the release of 
these reports, and people became less willing to share information or take positions of risk 
in the agency. 
The SAIG was revised in 2005 with the best intent; however, it was an adaptation of 
several tools designed for the analysis of linear events that displayed straightforward 
cause-and-effect relationships, such as those developed in machines. These analytical 
methods of investigation are referred to as linear because they follow a straight path from 
problem detection to problem solution. The model can be useful when dealing with strict 
mechanical problems; however, it is not useful in human-centered work environments. 
People do not handle problems in a linear fashion—in fact, their solutions are often the 
antithesis of linear. The tools described in the SAIG worked well for the analysis of 
mechanical failures, but it did not help us to make sense of the complex human interactions 
that make up wildland fire operations. 
The SAIG’s approach is not uncommon in modern investigations. The approach does not 
consider that workers are balancing conflicting goals, messages, rules, regulations, 
direction, and even laws in their everyday encounters with complex work environments. 
In contrast to the SAIG instruction to create a timeline-centric narrative, we recognized 
the importance of building context around decisions and actions. This approach focuses 
on the correlation between the behaviors and the influencing conditions while avoiding 
any unintentional implication that workers intended to do harm, which is rarely the case. 
English is a particularly agentive language; this means that by language alone we can 
inadvertently name a person as the agent of an action, even if that was not our primary 
intention. The words that people use to describe everyday actions can carry with them 
powerful implications that can lead to causal explanation of the event(s) (Vesel, 2012). 
Thus, accident investigators must be mindful of language throughout the process of 
gathering information and creating a report. 
The SAIG process is designed to measure performance against an unreasonable 
expectation that work as designed fully represents the work required by the operational 
environment. Compare and contrast some of the expectations we have of our experts with 
those of novice workers (See Table I). We expect our novices to have knowledge of and 
to follow prescriptive policies, yet we expect our experts to adapt policies and direction 
to meet the challenges they face. We expect our novices to comply with instruction, 
direction, and procedures, yet we expect experts to improvise solutions. We expect 
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novices to use knowledge of basic rules, regulations, policies, and procedures to navigate 
all work situations, yet we expect our experts to use complex adaptive problem solving 
and critical thinking skills to achieve results.  
Table I: Comparison of Expectations, Novice to Expert (adapted from Pupulidy, 2005). 
We expect our novices to: We expect our experts to: 
Have knowledge of prescriptive policy.  Apply rules to situations and adapt rules 
as needed. 
Comply with instruction. Know how to improvise to meet 
operational goals. 
Know basic rules, regulations, policy, and 
procedures. 
Use complex adaptive problem solving 
or critical thinking skills to achieve 
results. 
Know and follow the plan. Use intuition to know when to change 
the plan. 
The basic goal is to “control” actions and limit 
decisions. 
The basic goal is to facilitate 
“empowerment.” 
 
The fundamental difference is we expect to control the behavior of our novices while 
simultaneously facilitating the empowerment of our experts. When the expert is 
successful, we reward the innovation (rule bending, outside the box thinking, risk taking, 
etc.). However, when the outcome is adverse or negative, the tendency is to hold the expert 
to the expectations of the novice. 
2.  Designing the Learning Review 
We (Pupulidy, 2015) identified the need to recognize the differences between key system 
types and the corresponding need to review accidents through the lenses provided by each 
of these systems. Three systems were identified: simple, complicated, and complex (See 
Table II). This classification helped us to shape an understanding of the origin and 
application of traditional methods of investigation. The identification and mapping of 
these three systems also helped us to understand the limitations of the traditional methods 
of investigation and forced the development of an additional set of tools.68 Wildland 
firefighting is a unique laboratory, as the work is largely conducted in the absence of 
simple and complicated components. Simply put, wildland firefighting takes place almost 
entirely in the realm of complex system operation, and as a result, traditional tools were 
stretched to the breaking point and a new set of tools had to be developed. 
The first step was to understand that simple and complicated systems had some 
fundamental commonalities. Simple systems are made up of parts that are interconnected 
and interactive. Each part has a unique and specific role to play in the functionality of the 
machine. Think of a simple mechanical wristwatch in which each part, spring, or gear 
interacts in a specific and predictable way with its counterpart—this is required for time 
                                                 
68 See the US Forest Service “2017 Learning Review Guide.” 
https://www.wildfirelessons.net/HigherLogic/System/DownloadDocumentFile.ashx?DocumentFileKey=b
e30b128-0565-c151-2c68-cbe70dae0b85&forceDialog=0. 
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to be accurately captured and depicted. If a part breaks, the system fails in a very 
predictable way. Parts can be inspected, deficiencies found, and the part(s) can be replaced 
in a very procedural way. In a simple system, the cause and effect relationship is direct—
for every cause there is a single effect. Trending failures can result in processes that can 
reduce the likelihood of failures at unwanted periods of operations. This has resulted in 
increased safety margins for a number of industrial applications. 
Table II: Simple, Complicated and Complex Systems (Components list adapted from Page, 2011). 
System 
Name 
Components Frame Pathway Characteristic 







Organic – These 
systems cannot be 
broken down 








adaptations in real 
time. 
Unlimited number 

















cause and effect 
connections exist 
with a limited set 
of outcomes. 
Each question has 
a limited number 
of discrete 
answers. 
Reacts well to 
analysis. 
Simple The parts are 
interconnected 
and interactive. 
Mechanical. Cause and effect 
connections are 
strong—problems 
can be solved. 
Each question has 
one discrete 
answer. 
Reacts well to 
analysis. 
 
Complicated systems share some commonalities with simple systems; the parts are 
interactive and interconnected—however, we can add diverse to this list. In this case, 
diversity represents the system design quality of multiple defenses in depth and/or the 
inclusion of redundant systems. This type of diversity strengthens the reliability of the 
system because in situations where there is a component failure, other parts of the system 
can compensate, allowing for continued operations. Processes of this type are often 
depicted as flow diagrams where a malfunction can be identified, isolated, and bypassed, 
allowing other parts of the system to take the place of the failed component. This design 
generally allows for failures to occur gracefully (without major consequence) and 
catastrophic failure to be avoided.  
Complicated systems exhibit cause and effect relationships that are as diverse as the 
system being analysed. For every cause, there can be a limited number of effects. The 
number of effects is limited to the number of system permutations (normal system 
variability). This type of system drove the development of many of the current models of 
accident investigation, such as the Swiss-Cheese, Fishbone, and the SHELL models. 
Analysis of complicated systems is often effectively conducted using these and other 
engineering analytical models.  
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Complex systems share the first three components (interactive, interconnected, and 
diverse); however, there is a very dynamic addition—adaptation (Page, 2011). Complex 
systems exhibit qualities of adaptation and can opportunistically change based on 
innumerable variables, or they can intrinsically change based on conditions, perceptions, 
and perceived stimuli. These systems are often learning systems. Complex systems defy 
full prediction or control (Morin, 2008). More data can help to refine predictions; 
however, these predictions are always fraught with some uncertainty. Human interaction 
with a complicated or simple system often evolves into a complex system. In these cases, 
it is challenging to avoid being seduced into mechanical or engineering models of accident 
analysis, which can only describe simple or complicated systems. 
Adaptation is demanded by the uncertainty inherent in complex systems. Cause and effect 
relationships are non-linear—for every cause there can be an unlimited number of effects. 
This quality directly affects prediction and places the organizational ability to both control 
the system and control reactions to the system, out of reach. In the case of complex system 
interaction, the expectation on workers should be that they recognize when the system is 
delivering the ‘unexpected.’ In novel situations, experts recognize the need to perform 
outside routine, exemplifying an understanding of complexity—that no one can write a 
rule or process to fit every situation. The requirement on workers is to create safety in 
these situations. Professor Reuben McDaniel provides a doctrinal approach: “Workers are 
expected to make sense of the situation, learn in the moment, and improvise solutions, 
much like a jazz musician during improv sessions” (Author’s personal conversation, 27 
November 2015).  
The need for workers to improvise actions when faced with novel situations places the 
investigator in a very difficult situation. Judging actions as right or wrong can only be 
accomplished when the outcome of the situation is known. This information is not 
accessible to workers—workers do not know the outcome of their innovation. 
Pupulidy (2015) recognized that complex systems need a unique framework for post-
accident learning, which we refer to as sensemaking. The actions of people are often, if 
not always, complex. People do not perform precisely the same way in all situations. This 
is the result of individual heuristics, unique learning, and biases. As no two humans will 
perform in exactly the same way when placed in identical situations, system analytics that 
rely on trending frequently fail. Our research shows the use of system mapping can be 
more useful to the sensemaking process. 
3.  Human Actions in Complex Systems 
The way that people react to situations is influenced by many factors or conditions. If they 
are familiar with the work and the system is delivering the expected conditions, then 
routine responses are appropriate and will often work. In these cases, the routine response 
is also usually the most effective and efficient response (Klein, 1999). When the system 
delivers the unexpected and the worker follows a routine, success is not guaranteed. In 
this case, the routine or procedure is being applied to a situation that is outside the original 
intent or design. Routine processes, when applied to unpredicted or unexpected 
conditions, might work if the worker is lucky. Our research has shown that routine actions 
applied in novel situations can make the worker more vulnerable, as the routine response 
can result in increased risk exposure (Saddleback Fire Fatality Learning Review, 2013).  
Enhancing Safety: the Challenge of Foresight 
260 
 
When the system is delivering the unexpected, the situation will require that the workers 
make sense of the conditions, learn in the moment, and innovate actions (McDaniel, 
2007). With practice, this skill can be improved through coordination with others and is 
referred to as “Group Sensemaking” (Weick, 1995; Jordan et al., 2009; Maitlis, 2014). In 
time-critical situations, sensemaking is often overlooked, and people tend to “Satisfice” 
(Gigerenzer, 2010; Simon, 1956). This means that workers often find solutions that meet 
the minimum needs of the conditions they perceive in the moment; workers will act based 
on the limited information they have at hand. Satisficing is efficient; however, it represents 
actions driven by the need for efficiency, which can result in a loss of thoroughness 
(Hollnagel, 2009).  
Satisficing can also be seen as a blend of action (intuitive response) and deliberate 
decisions. Our research indicates that this is common in wildland firefighting operations 
and is supported by Professor Gary Klein’s work with structural firefighters. 
Acting/deciding is a natural human endeavour, and it takes place in a non-linear way. 
Every person tends to process information in his or her own way. The resulting responses, 
or action/decisions, are related to the perceived conditions or stimulus, and these can vary 
considerably from one person to the next (Panther Fire Fatality Report, 2008).  
Work systems are becoming more complex daily, and this complexity brings a level of 
uncertainty. This uncertainty equates to greater risk in the system. If workers can equate 
uncertainty to risk, Professor John Adams suggests they will naturally react to create 
safety in the work system. This is something we see every time we do not experience an 
accident in the workplace (what we will call ‘normal work’). With this in mind, we have 
to not only expect workers to create safety; we have to learn how to encourage it. Our 
research demonstrates the importance of recognizing the role of the worker in the creation 
of safety and the corresponding need for the worker to innovate solutions in complex 
situations. 
4.  Action/Decision – It’s More Than a Choice 
“To err or not to err is not a choice” (Dekker, 2006). 
Following an accident, it can seem that some of the actions of workers were careless or 
even negligent. In fact, discussions with investigators reveal that the term “stupid” is often 
casually used to describe these actions. These labels are common to events where the 
outcome is known. Leaders express this form of hindsight bias when they ask questions 
such as, “Why didn't they stop?” or “Why didn't the workers follow the rules?” The easiest 
way to respond to this line of inquiry is to point out, “Had they known that there was going 
to be an accident, they would have stopped or followed the rule.” This line of questioning, 
quite unfairly, asks the investigator to explain something that did not happen. The 
Learning Review process recognizes the shortcomings of this approach and directs energy 
toward understanding what actually happened by asking, “Why did it make sense for the 
worker to do what he/she did?” (Dekker, 2006) This same line of reasoning is also applied 
to the leadership of the organization in order to begin to understand their motivations. 
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5.  The Learning Review 
The Learning Review is not designed to replace traditional accident investigation tools; 
rather it is a fully developed process designed to explore the social contribution to 
accidents and to relate the resulting learning products to normal work operations. The 
process, while designed to review negative outcome events, has been used to understand 
the pressures and conditions in work that resulted in a desired outcome or what we call 
normal work.  
The fundamental goal in producing a learning product is to move the reader from judgment 
of action to understanding the conditions that influenced people during the 
mission/operation. The foundation for understanding an event emerges from the 
recognition of these conditions. Leadership is asked to manage conditions in order to 
create a workplace where workers can be effective (Reason, 1990). Scenarios can be 
presented to workers under the premise that they explore the ways conditions can 
influence decision and actions in normal work environments. 
5.1  The Learning Review began with operating principles: 
 Forest Service employees are well intentioned and work within organizational systems 
to meet the expectations of leadership and the system. 
 Accidents and incidents can be a by-product of the uncertainty inherent in complex 
systems. 
 Enhanced accountability:  
o Prior to incidents, leaders and managers are responsible for knowing how the 
organization functions. At this point, traditional forms of accountability can be 
valuable.   
o After the incident, prevention is based on learning. The organization becomes 
accountable to learn all it can from the event.  
 Actions and decisions are consequences, not causes. Following an event where the 
outcome was a surprise, the goal is to understand why the action or decision made 
sense to those involved at the time. This is based on the premise that, “If it did not 
make sense to them at the time, they would not have done it.”   
 Conditions shape decisions and actions; revealing these conditions will aid the agency 
and personnel in understanding how to recognize, change, and react to conditional 
pressures. 
 
These principles led to the development of tools and techniques specifically designed for 
the Learning Review. One tool is the complex narrative, which includes a deliberate 
emphasis on reducing the inadvertent bias of language. We realized that human 
recollection is fundamentally inaccurate, no matter when the story is gathered. This 
knowledge allows us to approach interviews in a different way. The stories shared by 
participants are captured and recorded as perspectives—we don't attempt to create a 
factual account from the narratives or a plausible single view of the incident—which is 
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what most investigative processes demand. Instead, we recognize witness accounts as 
perspectives, and we try to capture each as accurately as possible, but with the 
understanding that these accounts may be in conflict with one another. This conflict is an 
important part of the narrative, as it may lead to different questions. For example, “Did 
the participants recognize their differences in perspective?” And if so, “How did they 
communicate that understanding?”  
The complex narrative is paired with a network of influences map, which is a 
representation of the conditions that influenced decisions/actions. It is similar to 
Rasmussen’s Acci-map with some striking differences. For example, it is based on 
influence, rather than cause. Searching for causes restricted our teams from exploring 
some very critical aspects of our organizational culture and prevented us from asking hard 
questions regarding the perverse nature of some of the influences we discovered. For 
example, we had trouble making the case for the influence of overtime pay on the behavior 
of our crews. We had recorded admissions of workers indicating that overtime played a 
role in decision-making and risk acceptance, but we could not prove a causal link. Simply 
shifting the conversation to ‘influence’ was enough of a softening of language to allow a 
dialogue to begin that could explore the possible ways that overtime nudged decisions. 
The initial network of influences map represents the interaction between the conditions as 
they were perceived during the incident; however, our goal is to move quickly into the 
normal work environment. Prevention is forward looking, and our processes were all 
retrospective. Our traditional techniques kept us rooted in findings that led to causes and 
then to recommendations, with each needing a direct tie to the accident. This method 
prevented us from examining the influences in normal work operations, which is where 
safety really starts. We now present the complex narrative and the network of influences 
map to focus groups, which helps us understand how the conditions noted during the 
accident are perceived in normal work environments. If the focus groups indicate that the 
conditions are common in normal work, we focus attention there. If the conditions are 
unique to the incidents, we place them in another category. 
Conditions are a currency for change. We have found it best to divide the conditions into 
four categories to facilitate organizational acceptance and learning: 
1. Conditions that are outside the control of the agency leadership.  
2 Conditions that will have meaningful impact but will take time to change (these are 
usually cultural issues). 
3. Conditions that will have meaningful impact on the operations and can be changed 
quickly.  
4. Conditions that, if changed, would likely have a negligible impact. 
 
It is a fallacy that simply attending an accident investigation course suddenly imbues the 
investigator with the ability to directly create social corrections to the system. We used to 
develop recommendations that were meaningless or impossible to put into action. Instead, 
the Learning Review Team humbly engages those closest to the work to help craft 
recommendations. Recommendations are now a collaborative effort with field personnel 
who provide input through focus groups. 




The Learning Review was specifically designed for complex systems, particularly those 
involving people. The Learning Review is fundamentally a social sensemaking activity 
that reviews an accident, incident, or even normal work for clues as to where workers 
contribute to the safety of operations or where the system inhibits this capacity. 
This approach describes a new way to view the human contribution to work and safety, 
one that strives to understand the context of action. This context is converted into 
dialogues that serve as opportunities to share stories that challenge deeply held 
assumptions about the way things are supposed to be done. The goal is to place learning 
above correcting and fixing. This moves us from judging actions as right or wrong, and 
inadvertently, people as good or bad, to a forward looking exploration of our system.  
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This paper concentrates on assessing events described in hazardous industry's 
incident/accident reports using the Event and Causal Factor Charting technique. Event 
and Casual Factor Charting (ECFC) is a process that first identifies a sequence of events 
and aligns the events with the conditions that caused them. It is used to visually give better 
insights and emphasize important points. 
Events and respective conditions are aligned along a time line. After the representation 
of the problem is complete, an assessment is made by "walking" the chart and asking if 
the problem would be different if the events or conditions were changed asking the 
questions: What went wrong, how and why? Which deviation occurred? Which rules were 
transgressed? This leads to identifying causal factors which are evaluated. This approach 
provides basics for brief risk assessment and can reveal some hidden warning signs in 
related event reports. 
The use of ECFC has proven to be a valuable tool for accident investigators and a clear 
and concise aid to understanding of accident causation for the report readers and 
stakeholders. This paper also suggests using a more standardised approach in presenting 
events by graphical tools for greater effectiveness in accident investigating and reporting.  
Keywords: foresight, safety, investigation, weak signals, risk assessment, 
incident/accident report 
1. Introduction 
The key evidence in the most of incident/accident investigation is collected early in 
investigation phase [1].  Beside collection and preservation of physical evidence, it is 
equally important to collect all actors' statements, i.e. their perception of the event or parts 
in which they were involved [2]. Unfortunately, the most of operational event safety 
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assessments experts are not present on the site and not in contact with the actors involved 
in incident or accident. Therefore, written statements and preserved evidence should be 
used for assessment. Final reports should provide all findings, analysis and 
recommendations, but, depending on the authority's requirements [3], which are usually 
legally defined, reports could cover only part of the whole event. 
From other side, the authority, interested in the event (internal or from other similar 
organisation), may miss important information that could be used for concrete definition 
of actions. Fortunately, some weak signs, often presented in reports, could trigger 
additional investigation on their existence and result in measures for their elimination. 
Therefore, helping stakeholders to find these signs is of high importance in 
incident/accident prevention. 
For the purpose of detecting weak signals, visualisation of event evolution could be used. 
Using Event and Causal Factor Charting (ECFC) technique [4] can help in detection and 
amplification of these signals, and consequently give appropriate level of attention. 
ECFC technique is used in event investigation. The process first identifies a sequence of 
events and aligns the events with the conditions that caused them. It is used to visually 
give better insights and emphasize important points. Events and respective conditions are 
aligned along a time line. After the representation of the problem is complete, an 
assessment is made by use of other investigation tools, such as Cause and effect analysis, 
Interviewing, Task analysis, Change analysis, Barrier analysis etc. [4]. The main purpose 
is to understand accident causation and reveal causal factors that can be eliminated to 
prevent occurrence of similar events. 
Use ECFC diagram in presenting event provides basics for brief risk assessment and can 
emphasizes some hidden warning signs in related event reports. By this paper, author will 
try to justify usefulness of ECFC in detection, amplification and elimination of latent 
weaknesses by two concrete examples from Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) event reports. 
2. Warning Signs in ECFC 
Due to strict reporting criteria, the original incident/accident report (e.g. Licensee Event 
Report) has to provide relevant information to regulatory body or other authority, but does 
not need to explicitly address all Causal Factors that could be found in thorough event 
analysis. Event and Causal Factor Chart (ECFC) can be of practical use to show the other 
possible Causal Factors. These factors could be latent weaknesses of the reporting 
organisation, but because of weak transparency, some of them present Weak Signs of 
decreased safety.  
2.1 Example 1 
Often, Operating Experience Feedback (OEF) process efficiency is not explicitly 
addressed in event report's action plans, although deficient use of OEF could contribute 
or result in decreased safety of the operating plant [5]. The US Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission Licensee Event Report [6] "Loss of Cooling to the Unit 1 and Unit 2 
Shutdown Board Rooms due to Faulted Chiller Coils" (highlighted part on Figure 1) can 
be used as example, because it does not transparently address OEF process weakness as 
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contributor to the event, but suggests that the affected NPP had similar problems in the 
past which resulted in unsuccessful actions ("lack of existing actions to address natural 
phenomena affecting plant equipment").   
  
Figure 1: 1st case 
The additional causes, "No conditional walkdown requirement for insect’s infestation" 
and "CB CHLR Equipment Reliability Classification for PRA calculations needed re- 
evaluation" (Control Building Chiller Equipment Reliability Classification for 
Probabilistic Risk Assessment…), could give a sign that some weaknesses exist in the 
area of Management Directions and/or Equipment Environmental Qualification process.  
2.2 Example 2 
The ECFC of second example "Unit 1 'B' Inboard Main Steam Isolation Valve, 
HV141F022B closed during surveillance test which caused a SCRAM on Unit 1" 
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(highlighted part on Figure 2), shows with more credibility, that in reporting organisation, 
management deficiencies may exist. 
 
Figure 2: 2nd case 
 
In both ECFC examples (Figure 1, Figure 2), it is easy to address suspicious deficiencies 
(dot line in the diagrams) and point to area where additional investigation may take a 
place. In both examples, many reasons for these weaknesses may exist, and they should 
be additionally investigated. 
It is expected that reporting site provides adequate explanations or taken measures to 
requesting authority, but if not, then it is the authority's duty to raise the safety question 
about findings. 
3. Qualification of the Risk  
For efficient accident prevention, decision makers of the organisation dealing with hazard 
should base action plans on risk assessment results. To estimate the risk of potential 
accident, it is necessary to assess possible consequences and probability of occurrence [7]. 
By use only Short ECFC, it is obvious that quantification of risk is not possible, but for 
the most of decisions on internal Minor Event or external Operational Experience (OE) 
reports, precise calculations are not necessary. Therefore, qualitative approach is very 
welcome.  
The following two subchapters, Potential consequences and Probability of similar event 
simplify risk assessment [8] by qualifying these two parameters which define the risk. 
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3.1 Potential consequences  
To assess possible consequences of event described in event report (e.g. external OE 
report), it is important to be familiar with own operating organisation and understand its 
design and safety features. Skilful, knowledgeable and experienced decision makers can 
foresee potential consequences on safety if the similar even occurs in their organisation. 
In Short ECFC, it is easy for them to determine main safety aspects by assessing the 
primary event line in ECFC.   
In the example on Figure 3: Primary event line - Case 1, it is visible that Main Steam 
Isolation Valve (MSIV) of the affected NPP inadvertently closed and produced shutdown 
signal. Reader should be able to envisage this event in the organisation under his/her 
responsibility and foresee possible specific safety consequences. There are different 
designs of NPP, so the potential consequences for them could easily differ. E.g. in 
Pressurised Water Reactor NPP type, this event would be considered as design bases event 
that triggers only protective system and not safety. However, closing function of MSIV is 
of highest importance for safety and wider perspective could be applied. 
 
Figure 3: Primary event line - Case 1 
 
In the second example on Figure 4: Primary event line - Case 2, there is a chain of 
happenings that produced inoperability of several safety systems and affected more units. 
In this NPP, the design is very specific and, comparing to other designs, consequences 
could significantly differ. Safety degradation assessment, in this case, is more 
concentrated on specific scenarios to stakeholder’s NPP in the case of similar initiating 
event – Loss of Chilled Water system.    
 
 
Figure 4: Primary event line - Case 2 
 
3.2 Probability of similar event 
Other important element of risk assessment is probability of similar event. Again, decision 
maker should be capable to estimate probability of similar event to occur in his/her NPP.  
In first example on Figure 5: Causal sequence – Case 1, it may be estimated on many sites 
that insect’s invasion is not probable but construction and excavation work could produce 
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similar effects. Consultation with operator could be the first step before making any 
decisions. 
In second example on Figure 6: Causal sequence – Case 2, it should be necessary first to 
find faulted solenoid assembly model and manufacturer, and then set some action plans. 
These details are important part of report, so it shouldn’t be problem to find them there. 
  
Figure 5: Causal sequence – Case 1 Figure 6: Causal sequence – Case 2 
 
4. Benefits from use of Short ECFC diagrams 
Through these two examples, it is shown that events can be efficiently presented in the 
simple form. For the most of NPP event reports, the important parts of report are clearly 
visible, but those "hidden" should be visible too. The Short ECFC diagram used for that 
purpose would enable reader to quickly understand the event evolution and causation.  
The Short ECFC diagram presents not only course and causation of event, but also 
significantly helps in highlighting weak signs of degraded safety. These signs can be 
easily noticed by decision makers, and push them to foresee possible consequences that 
are not explicitly presented in original report.  
Furthermore, dotted-line figures, although just assumptions, are based on the facts which 
causes may need additional investigation. Usually they didn’t result in described event(s), 
but they are weaknesses that may evolve in significant event if adequate attention is not 
paid. 
The technical part of original event report is usually very specific and many readers or 
stakeholders don’t really need to understand all specificities of affected technological 
process or equipment. It is important that decision makers possess adequate experience 
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and knowledge of safety aspects of design and operation. The Short ECFC diagram can 
also help them to estimate the risk of leaving deficiencies unsolved. This means that they 
should understand causality i.e. be able to estimate probability of reoccurrence, and 
potential safety consequences, which gives them idea of risk and possible decisions.  
Although Short ECFC is the best if drawn by expert from affected organisation, it is 
important to note that author of Short ECFC could also be from external organisation. 
Furthermore, Short ECFC can be used for internal as well as external OE event, i.e. other 
similar organisation event.  
It is also very important to standardise approach in presenting events by graphical tools 
for greater effectiveness in accident investigating and reporting. ECFC technique has 
being used for a long time in many areas for analysing problems [9]. Therefore, it is 
somehow natural to use this type of diagram for presenting the events. According to this 
paper author's experience in use of presented form, it looks that readers can be familiarized 
with this approach very quickly. It is advisable to keep the standardised, user-friendly 
visual appearance in every Short ECFC report. 
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The Hydrogen Incident and Accident Database (HIAD) has been designed to hold high 
quality information on accidents and incidents related to hydrogen production, transport 
(road/rail/pipeline), supply and commercial use. The database is updated with the latest 
information concerning each event in order to take advantage of the most recent outcomes 
of accident investigations. The database has been set up to improve the understanding of 
hydrogen unintended events, to identify preventive measures and strategies, to avoid 
incidents/accidents and to reduce the consequence if an accident occurs. The experience 
of the past years has revealed some shortcomings and generated improvement needs for 
HIAD. Some of the original goals related to risk assessment had to be abandoned, due to 
the limited amount of statistics available on faults and failure modes. A major overhaul 
of the database structure and interface was undertaken. The new version is mainly focused 
on facilitating the sharing of lessons learned and other relevant information related to the 
safety of hydrogen technologies. The database will contribute to improve safety 
awareness, enabling the users to benefit from the experiences of others as well as to share 
information from their own experiences. The main challenge at present is to attain a clear 
commitment of the fuel cells and hydrogen technology community to provide sufficient 
information on safety relevant events. 
Keywords: Hydrogen database safety lesson learned  
1. Introduction 
Current trends in energy supply and use are economically, environmentally and socially 
unsustainable. Without decisive action, energy-related emissions of carbon dioxide (CO2) 
will more than double by 2050 and increased fossil energy demand will heighten concerns 
over the security of supplies. Within this scenario, low-carbon energy technologies will 
have a crucial role to play. In order to achieve reductions in greenhouse gas emissions, 
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increased energy efficiency, renewable energy sources, carbon capture and storage and 
new transport technologies will all require widespread deployment. 
Hydrogen and fuel cell technologies can support climate change and energy security goals 
in several sectors of the energy system, such as transport, industry, residential and power 
generation sector. Hydrogen has the potential to connect different energy sectors and 
energy transmission and distribution networks, and thus increase the operational 
flexibility of future low-carbon energy systems [1-3]. 
Hydrogen technologies and applications should provide the same level of safety, 
reliability and comfort currently experienced by consumers for established technologies. 
Compared to the fossil energy carriers used at present, hydrogen introduces different 
safety and regulatory issues which need to be understood and tackled. Hydrogen has 
already been used and safely handled for many years in several application areas (e.g. in 
aerospace technology, chemical processing, food and electronic industries). Information 
related to hydrogen incidents and accidents is available on the internet and in literature, 
but the scientific community identified a gap due to the fragmented experience and 
knowledge on hydrogen safety. The Hydrogen Incident and Accident Database (HIAD) 
has been created as a repository for data describing undesired hydrogen-related events 
(incidents or accidents). HIAD had originally been developed in the frame of the HySafe 
EC co-funded Network of Excellence (NoE).The main purpose behind the creation of 
HIAD was to be an international hydrogen accident and incident reporting platform and 
to assist all stakeholders in better understanding hydrogen-related undesired events. 
2. The Hydrogen Incident and Accident Database (HIAD) 
The Hydrogen Incident and Accident Database (HIAD) has been designed to hold high 
quality information on accidents and incidents related to hydrogen production, transport 
(road/rail/pipeline), supply and commercial use. The database is updated with the latest 
information concerning each event in order to take advantage of the most recent outcomes 
of accident investigations. 
HIAD had originally been developed in the frame of the HySafe EC co-funded Network 
of Excellence (NoE), which aimed at filling the lack of structured information clearly 
identified by the scientific community [4]. HySafe NoE (2004-2009) aimed at facilitating 
the safe introduction of hydrogen as an energy carrier, contributing to the safe transition 
to a more sustainable development in Europe [5]. The HySafe NoE network brought 
together competencies and experience of 24 partners from 12 European countries and one 
partner from Canada, representing private industries (automotive, gas and oil, chemical 
and nuclear), universities and research institutions; more than 100 scientists performed 
integrated research activities related to hydrogen safety issues. The main objective of the 
HySafe NoE network was to strengthen, integrate and focus fragmented research efforts 
to provide a basis allowing the removal of safety-related barriers to the deployment of 
hydrogen as an energy carrier. Synthesis, integration and harmonization of these efforts 
aimed at breaking new ground in the field of hydrogen safety and at contributing to the 
increase of public acceptability of hydrogen technologies within Europe by providing a 
basis for communicating the risks associated with hydrogen. One of the means to achieve 
those objectives was the development and establishment of the Hydrogen Incident and 
Accident Database, HIAD. After the end of HySafe NoE in 2009, a new legal entity was 
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founded to continue the activities such as HIAD and the biannual International Conference 
on Hydrogen Safety. The new legal entity is a non-profit organization, the International 
Association for Hydrogen Safety (IA HySafe), whose mission is to facilitate the 
international coordination, development and dissemination of hydrogen safety knowledge  
The Hydrogen Incidents and Accidents Database HIAD had originally been designed as 
a multi-tasking tool: a communication platform suitable for risk and safety lessons as well 
as a potential data source for risk assessment [6]. The tool had the ambition to promote 
both the safety performance of existing hydrogen technologies and safety actions after 
events involving hydrogen.  
Specifically, HIAD was originally intended to: 
 contribute to the integration and harmonization of fragmented experience and 
knowledge on hydrogen safety; 
 contribute to the progress in common understanding of hydrogen hazards and 
risks; 
 constitute a reliable tool that provides inputs for safety and risk assessment [7]; 
 enable generation of common generic accident and incident statistics; 
 serve as a common reference database for ongoing data collection and storage; 
 keep the industry updated with recent hydrogen events, along with trend analyses; 
 represent a reference source for the understanding and experience transfer of 
hydrogen accident phenomena, scenarios and hazard potential. 
 
In order to achieve those objectives, HIAD data collection was and still is characterized 
by a significant degree of detailed information about recorded events (e.g. causes, 
releases, fires, explosions, consequences). The data are related not only to real incident 
and accidents but also to hazardous situations and false positive events. 
The partners in the NoE HySafe collected and entered a considerable amount of data into 
HIAD. A quality assurance plan was developed to ensure a sufficient level of quality for 
all entered data. Each event submitted by a provider to HIAD was therefore subjected to 
a quality assurance process managed by a group of experts. This process was in place till 
the end of the HySafe project (2009). 
The experience of the past years has revealed some shortcomings and generated 
improvement needs for HIAD. The goal of HIAD to become a tool for quantitative risk 
assessment was too ambitious, due to the limited number of events made available by a 
technology which has not yet attained full market maturity and is not yet deployed 
extensively. Available statistics on failures and failure modes of individual components 
belonging to the hydrogen technology chain are still not enough to allow for reliable 
quantitative analysis. This is the reason why activities on Quantitative Risk Assessment 
(QRA) of hydrogen technologies still now make use of failure statistics from different, 
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though partially equivalent, technologies such as off-shore gas industry data. Finally, 
another identified issue was that after the end of NoE HySafe the database has not been 
supported financially by the community of hydrogen stakeholders. This had as a 
consequence that the pool of international experts which were providing quality assurance 
was not available anymore and that the communication channels linking potential event 
providers with the database had disappeared together with the network. After the end of 
the project, JRC became the only data provider, only publicly reported events have been 
collected and the quality assurance process had to be organised relying only on internal 
expertise. [8]. 
Based on the experience gained from HIAD operation of the previous years, JRC 
performed in 2016 a thorough analysis of the database functions, from a strategic as well 
as operative point of view. As a consequence, it was found that a complete overhaul of 
the database was required, addressing shortcomings in several areas.  
The usefulness of the database as a tool providing information to the hydrogen and fuel 
cell community was also identified as an area for improvement. Among the various 
objectives of the database, the one related to making HIAD an input tool for QRA was far 
from being achieved, for the reason mentioned above. To maximise the impact of the 
database it was necessary to focus on what could be learned from events. These lessons 
learned could result from the analysis of each individual event and/or from summarising 
conclusions from a cluster of similar events specific to each sub-technology. The 
dissemination of these lessons to the whole hydrogen technology Community had to 
become the overarching goal of the tool; as a matter of fact, the analyses of the incidents 
and accidents recorded in the database will help to identify lessons learned, which then 
can be disseminated throughout the Community to prevent a recurrence of similar 
accidents. The detailed assessment will be of high value in terms of establishing 
improvement needs in safety, health and environmental protection. This shift in focus is 
very similar to the one experienced by a comparable database developed by the US 
Department of Energy [9]. To allow for this strategic re-focussing, the structure of HIAD 
had to be reviewed. The need of providing a tool for QRA required an extremely high 
level of detail for the description of events. The thorough analysis mentioned above 
identified a considerable number of fields which had remained empty for all the events. 
The re-structuring of HIAD started with the simplification of the events descriptors by 
merging several fields and reducing the level of detail for fields in which data were non-
existent. In addition a qualitative description of the event is now encouraged, rather than 
the previously compulsory quantitative data entries which are now optional.   
The need for improvement of the data collection process is another of the strategic aspects 
emerging from the mentioned analysis. Getting access to information on safety related 
events is a challenge, as facility owners or project coordinators, with some exceptions, do 
not have any obligation to provide data to HIAD. Several publically funded projects are 
mandated to report any incidents to HIAD, but this does not apply for all European and 
nationally funded projects. Establishing a requirement for any publically funded project 
to report any incident to HIAD would improve the data collection process considerably. 
Another option to get better access to safety related information is to have a commitment 
to report to HIAD as a requirement by permitting authorities. These measures would 
ensure a robust and distributed, European-wide network of data providers. 
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As to the event data itself, the attainability of accurate event reports is also a concern. The 
providers of an event description tend to give only a minimal amount of information, 
which limit any further analysis and lessons learned from the event. Relying on publically 
available information is not an option, as public press journal articles almost never provide 
data with the required quality and resolution. HIAD would profit from full accident reports 
made available by internal investigators, local authorities and/or first responders. Contacts 
with associations of first responders are on-going. 
Finally, the interface of HIAD for entering event data was not easy to use as it had been 
developed for expert operators, not for end users. As mentioned above, the ambitious goal 
to serve as quantitative risk assessment tool had as a consequence that the level of details 
for a full event description was rather daunting and involuntarily encouraged misreporting 
and incomplete event description.  Experience showed that the amount of detailed data 
required must be balanced with the average availability of information provided for a 
typical event. Therefore a simplification of HIAD users' interface was deemed critical, 
from event input to data selection and retrieval. 
3. The new version of HIAD 
The upgrade work on HIAD was started by the JRC with close collaboration of the Fuel 
Cells and Hydrogen Joint Undertaking (FCH JU). The development of a new version of 
the database in order to specifically collect incidents from FCH JU projects (namely 
FCHJU-HIAD) began in 2016. The new database has a significantly simplified structure: 
based on an in-depth analysis of the data quality collected in the previous years, entry 
fields were redefined and reduced, resulting in a more streamlined user interface compared 
to the older HIAD version. The front-end and back-end of the database were completely 
redesigned: a new database structure and a new user interface has been redesigned. In 
addition, a template for data collection was developed; it includes explanations for each 
entry field and guides the reporting activities. The access to the FCHJU-HIAD database 
is limited only to staff of the FCHJU and to the HIAD team. 
At the same time JRC will maintain a public database which will be further developed in 
the future (namely HIAD 2.0)[10]. This database will only contain publically available 
reports on events and incidents. The FCHJU-HIAD database and HIAD 2.0 will be 
completely independent from each other. Both databases will share the same graphical 
front-end user interface (see Figure 1). 




Figure 1. New databases and their relation with HIAD. 
 
4. The structure of the new databases 
The events inserted into the new databases are divided into three main categories, giving 
the first quick piece of information about the full event scenario: “Event classification”, 
“Physical consequences” and “Application” (see Figure 2). The “Event classification” is 
grouped in the following sub-categories: 
 Hydrogen system initiating event: event not directly caused by the hydrogen 
system (e.g. sudden, unintended damage to hydrogen vehicles, installations or 
plants caused by impact, high voltage, failure of conventional components, etc.) 
 Non-hydrogen system initiating event: event triggered directly by system 
containing hydrogen (e.g. rupture of hydrogen pipe, valve, tank)  
 False positive: emergency alarm or procedure triggered in the absence of any 
actual problem; a hydrogen sensor giving a false alarm, for instance, falls in this 
category. 
 The “Physical consequences” category is sub-divided in jet fire and explosions, no 
hydrogen release and unignited hydrogen release; while the “Application” 
category has several subcategories such as hydrogen production, hydrogen 
transport and distribution, hydrogen refuelling station, road vehicles, etc. 




Figure 2. The front-end retrieval page. 
 An advanced selection process allows the possibility to filter the event search 
results using additional fields such as year of the event, cause, etc. (see Figure 3) 
 
Figure 3. Advanced selection criteria page. 
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5. Data collection 
A dedicated on-line form will be used for reporting any safety-related event. The on-line 
form welcome page is shown inFigure 4; the form is divided into sub-sections (some of 
which are mandatory): 
 Provider information: the contact information will only be used by the JRC for 
requesting clarifications on information provided, but will not be disclosed any further 
and will not be entered in HIAD. 
 General information: together with the event category (i.e. “Non-Hydrogen system 
initiated event”, “Hydrogen system initiated event” and “False positive”) a summary 
of the key aspects of the event has to be reported. This summary should specify the 
causes of the event and the context, the event dynamics, the technical details of the 
accident and a quantitative description of the effects. 
 Initial situation (pre-event): it is a description of conditions prior to the event; it should 
be mentioned if the event occurred during planned or routine operation; there is also 
the possibility to specify information on the weather conditions, if considered 
important for understanding the event 
 Application: it is the category related to the type of operation during which the event 
occurred (such as hydrogen production, hydrogen transport and distribution, hydrogen 
refuelling station, road vehicle, non-road vehicle, stationary fuel cell, portable fuel 
cell, laboratory / R&D and chemical/petrochemical industry). By selecting one 
category, relevant sub-category will appear allowing further specification of the type 
of application. 
 Consequences: it is the description of the physical consequence (i.e. no hydrogen 
release, unignited hydrogen release and hydrogen release with jet fires and explosions) 
after the event; it is optionally possible to specify which part failed or was most 
affected in the event (e.g.: tank of a road vehicle, compressor of a hydrogen refuelling 
station, etc.); in addition a describe of the consequences to people, equipment and 
environment (e.g.: which kind of injury, damage, etc.) is request. 
 Cause of the event: it is a description of which causes were identified or are deemed 
most likely (e.g.: human error, lack of maintenance, untrained personnel, etc.) 
 Corrective actions taken (if any): the description of the corrective actions already taken 
to avoid recurrence of the event and if the event required further investigation (for 
instance official investigation) has to be reported. 
 Lessons learned: it is related to any lessons learned from the event; this could consist 
in improved procedures, new preventive and/or mitigating measures, better training, 
etc. 
 Reference: it is also possible to upload reference documents or pictures of the event, 
if available. 




Figure 4. Event report form: first page overview 
Previous experience has shown that in some cases the information given in a report form 
is not sufficiently detailed or that clarifications are necessary. Therefore a direct contact 
with the event provider is crucial, to prevent misunderstandings and to ensure that a 
complete picture of the event is available. This will be also necessary in the case of a 
complex accident, where the description may need further details to enable understanding 
of the event circumstances and consequences. Once the additional needed information is 
received, the event will be formatted, entered in HIAD and validated by the HIAD team.  
In the specific case of the FCHJU-HIAD, if needed, the acquired information will be 
processed, analysed and reported with the external support of selected FCHJU Hydrogen 
Safety Panel (HSP) members (see Figure 5), consisting of a group of recognized hydrogen 
safety experts. In this case, the experts of the HSP will have access to individual events 
within FCHJU-HIAD for further analysis and for obtaining the lessons learned together 
with the JRC HIAD team. This will take place under a confidentiality agreement with the 
selected HSP experts. 




Figure 5. Data collection, analysis and reporting process. 
 
6. Current status and outlook 
Based on the experience gained from HIAD operation of the previous years, JRC has 
performed a thorough overhaul of the HIAD database. A strategic re-focussing was 
undertaken, to facilitate the sharing of lessons learned rather than providing a tool for 
QRA. The original goal of providing input to QRA could possibly be revisited in case the 
knowledge on failure modes and statistics advances to a sufficient degree. The 
simplification of the user interface will enable a more effective event reporting and 
subsequent analysis. The database is now separated into a public (HIAD 2.0) and a limited 
access (FCHJU-HIAD) section. All reported incidents will be analysed by safety experts 
and the lessons learned from events will be made available to the FCH community.  
The data entered into FCHJU-HIAD from FCHJU Projects will be owned by the FCHJU, 
whereas the database itself is property of the JRC. The events already entered in HIAD 
during the FP6 and FP7, before the start of the collaboration with the FCH2JU are 
belonging to the broader technology and scientific community and have been transferred 
to the HIAD 2.0. 
Initial contact with the FCHJU Projects required to report to FCHJU-HIAD has been 
established. Future efforts by the JRC, assisted by the safety community, will be to 
encourage other funded projects to report into HIAD 2.0, and in general increase the 
awareness of this tool for the hydrogen and fuel cells community. 
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The analysis of risks and threats, whether it is on the macro level (geopolitical security) 
or micro-level (personal well-being or enterprise risk management) suffers from issues 
resulting from human limitations: it is ultimately humans that operate their own lives, run 
companies and governments. Unfortunately, humans suffer from cognitive limitations that 
have an adversarial impact on their ability to manage risks and threats: they create static 
authority-based organizations instead of empowering agile teams; they compartmentalize 
to manage complexity, which leads to blind spots (e.g. the 2008 financial crisis) and 
inconsistent behaviour (we have all seen smoking medical doctors); and they lack the 
ability to globally evaluate quantitatively complex systems, tending to forget or under-
rate activities that are further removed from their personal “centre of gravity” as the 
saying “out of sight, out of mind” suggests. In this paper, we demonstrate how some of 
these human and organizational limitations can prevent us from conducting effective risk 
and threat management by giving examples from geopolitical and natural disaster risk, 
environmental risk, people risk, company risk, supply chain risk, and technology risk. By 
focusing on the risk identification stage, we show how software tools can be used to make 
the risk management process more objective, in the sense of inter-personally verifiable 
and consistent. We conclude that risk and threat management should attempt to overcome 
cognitive limitations by installing an auditable process that uses a human-machine 
collaborative approach.  
Keywords: risk mining, computer-supported risk identification, risk analysis, natural 
language processing, machine learning.  
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Foresight is a field that can aid public policy: to anticipate possible futures as they are 
influenced by current and likely future advances in the sciences and technology are at its 
core, and it “explores the future of scientific and technological achievements and their 
potential impacts on society. It aims to identify the areas of scientific research and 
technological development most likely to bring about change and drive economic, 
environmental and social benefits for the future.” (European Commission, 2017). The 
anticipation of future trends includes both the positive implications (opportunities) and 
negative implications (risks) associated with companies, people, topics/themes, countries, 
movements. Risk identification is the creation of a risk register or inventory of identified 
risks or threats. Threat assessment is a structured group process used to evaluate the risk 
posed by something or someone. 
The analysis of risks and threats and their subsequent assessment, whether it is on the 
macro level (geo-political security) or micro-level (personal well-being or enterprise risk 
management) suffers from issues that are a result of human limitations: it is ultimately 
humans that operate their own lives, run companies and governments. Unfortunately, 
humans suffer from cognitive limitations that have an adversarial impact on their ability 
to manage risks and threats: they create static authority-based organizations instead of 
empowering agile teams; they compartmentalize to manage complexity, which can lead 
to blind spots (e.g. the 2008 financial crisis) and inconsistent behaviour (we have all seen 
smoking medical doctors); and they lack the ability to globally evaluate quantitatively 
complex systems, tending to forget or under-rate activities that are further removed from 
their personal “centre of gravity” (centre of attention, personal geographic centre, as 
captured by the saying “out of sight, out of mind”). 
In this paper, we will focus on the negative risk, and on those cases of risk surrounding 
companies, people and topics in particular, how human cognitive imperfections can lead 
to oversights, and how technology can usefully supplement human cognitive 
imperfections for better risk management. We demonstrate how some of these human and 
organizational limitations can prevent us from conducting effective risk and threat 
management by giving examples from geopolitical and natural disaster risk (Leidner and 
Schilder, 2010) people risk (Leidner and Nugent, 2017), company risk (Nugent and 
Leidner, 2016), supply chain risk (Carstens et al., 2017) and technology risk. By focusing 
on the risk identification stage, we show how software tools can be used to make the risk 
management process more objective, in the sense of inter-personally verifiable and 
consistent). We conclude that risk and threat management should attempt to overcome 
cognitive limitations by installing an audit-able process that uses a human-machine 
collaborative approach. 
Our main contributions are: 1. a discussion of the effect on cognitive inhibitors and 
cognitive dissonance on an organization’s ability to detect risks early, and to deal with 
them effectively; and 2. a demonstration how software tools can help with a more 
responsive and consistent approach that overcome some of these issues. 
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2. Humans: Cognitive Inhibitors and Cognitive Dissonance 
2.1 Cognitive Inhibitors 
Humans have many shortcomings when dealing with risk. Taleb (2007) pointed out at 
length how humans struggle to deal with probabilities, and how that adversely affects the 
area of finance.  Humans are not just limited with respect to assessing probabilities, they 
also are slow at processing data, and poor at handling it consistently. For example, 10 
analysts tasked with the job of tracking fires in the same daily newspapers will almost 
always come up with disparate results based on humans’ limited ability to concentrate on 
quasi-mechanical tasks. 
At a higher level, we observed that in many organisations such as governments and 
corporations, risk analysis is highly specialised and compartmentalised; in other words, 
while there may be many roles, each of which are concerned with particular types of risk 
(e.g. a bank’s CRO may focus only on financial risk), there is typically no function that 
deals with the “other” risk types not covered by anyone else. This may also be true in 
other organizations, such as governments or NGOs. Generally, an organisation can suffer 
from such a “tunnel view” of risk, which can be seen as a form of selection bias. These 
and other human and organisational limitations motivated our research into computer 
supported approaches to risk identification. 
2.2 Cognitive Dissonance 
Dealing with risks and the impacts of them once they materialise can work out quite 
differently based on an organization’s culture. 
Syed (2015: 3-40) contrasts a non-learning system and a learning system based on two 
case studies, one from the medical domain and one from the air transportation domain. In 
the former, errors are often not admitted because there is a lack of openness, learning, 
feedback and continuous improvement, whereas in the latter, open information sharing 
across organisation and national borders promotes self-improvement, which means that at 
least the same types of error become less likely to re-occur. 
In psychology, cognitive dissonance (Festinger (1957); Syed (2015: 69-116)) is the notion 
that any group or individual will attempt to reconcile their beliefs. Festinger's (1957) 
cognitive dissonance theory suggests that we have an inner drive to reconcile all our 
attitudes and beliefs to make them harmonic (and to avoid disharmony or dissonance).  In 
a situation of conflicting beliefs a feeling of discomfort or friction is felt, which leads to a 
change of one's beliefs to reduce this discomfort. Importantly, this mechanism, which is 
useful as such, as it aims to avoid or reduce inconsistency ("principle of cognitive 
consistency"), can actually lead to irrational behavior. 
Our conjecture here is that any external tool that provides an explicit documentation of 
identified risks (including the automatic production of tentative risks for review) could 
help reduce the effects of cognitive dissonance, since deriving risks from external sources 
in a transparent, objective and automatic way should make the process more immune to 
“group think”. In the next section, we describe one such technology that could serve such 
a purpose. 
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3. Machines: Computer-Supported Risk Identification 
Many organisations have long had news analytics functions (also known as content 
analysis or news analytics) to track topics of significance, either automatically (typically 
based on news keyword alerts) or manually (newspaper clippings). 
The attempt to create a holistic risk and threat management by applying tools, e.g. for 
computer-supported risk identification, is relatively new (Leidner and Schilder, 2010; 
Leidner 2015; Nugent and Leidner, 2016; Leidner and Nugent 2017). In this section, we 
argue that tool support by computational tools can supplement human skills so that 
together, more consistent risk management can be accomplished. 
We developed an approach (ibd.) that frames the problem as a binary relation extraction 
task between an entity (e.g. a person, a company, a topic) and a risk type (Table I). We 
built a semi-automated system for inducing a risk taxonomy of 4,000+ risk types, arranged 
in a graph (Leidner and Schilder, 2010). This permits us to use a risk type taxonomy, 
which is both detailed in granularity, data-driven/empirical (it is acquired from the World 
Wide Web), and up to date. As technologies emerge and geo-political situations change, 
risks change, and so do their names. But with our taxonomy learning approach, risk terms 
like “Brexit” (Britain’s risk pertaining to existing the European Union) or “DDoS” 
(Distributed Denial of Service Attack) are coined, and can be identified by our risk 
taxonomy learning procedure. 
Table I: Example Risk Tuples and Potential Application Domains. 
Example Risk Tuples Application Domains 
Kodak — bankruptcy risk 
‹COMPANY-NAME› IS-EXPOSED-TO ‹RISK-TYPE› 
Foresight: Finance (investing) 
BP — oil spill risk 
‹COMPANY-NAME› IS-EXPOSED-TO ‹RISK-TYPE› 
Foresight: Environment (preservation) 
John Doe 169 (name of the head of government procurement) 
—  corruption risk 
‹PERSON-NAME› IS-EXPOSED-TO ‹RISK-TYPE› 
Foresight: Anti-Money Laundering 
Rules  (compliance) 
John Doe 2 (government employee) — radicalisation risk 
‹PERSON-NAME› IS-EXPOSED-TO ‹RISK-TYPE› 
Foresight: Law Enforcement (counter-
terrorism) 
fracking (hydraulic fracturing) — skin burn risk 
‹TOPIC›  IS-LINKED-TO ‹RISK-TYPE› 
Foresight: Health & Safety (medical 
accident prevention) 
oil — geo-political risk 
‹TOPIC›  IS-LINKED-TO ‹RISK-TYPE› 
Foresight: Political/Global Security (war 
risk) 
uranium —  nuclear proliferation risk 
‹TOPIC›  IS-LINKED-TO ‹RISK-TYPE› 
Foresight: Political/Global Security (war 
risk) 
 
These terms and phrases from the risk type taxonomy are then looked up in sentences in 
the vicinity of named entity mentions of companies or persons (and can likewise be 
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applied to country names, or any topic noun phrase, using the same method). A syntactic 
analysis of the sentential structure using a dependency parser followed by a supervised 
machine learning classifier (Nugent and Leidner, 2016) extracts likely pairs of risk-
exposed entity (e.g. BP) and type of risk that characterises the kind of exposure in more 
detail (e.g. oil spill), together with a confidence value between zero (near-certainty that 
there conjecturing a risk relationship is not warranted by the evidence in a sentence) and 
one (near-certainty that the sentence supports postulating the given risk type). Figure 1 
shows an interactive interface that permits any user to engage in risk profiles based on a 
drop-down menu for choosing a company, for which all found risks (shown here: for a 
year’s worth of Reuters News 2016-2017) are extracted and displayed. Note that in a 
sense, journalists are used as social sensors by exploiting stated risks in recent or older 
news articles, so the quality of the extraction relies both on the quality of our model as 
well as the reliability of the journalistic reporting. 
 
 
Note that peaks in the diagram on the left does not indicate “high risk” as such, but high 
frequency of mention of a risk type. That is because we are conducting risk identification 
(including risk type identification), but not estimating the likelihood nor the impact 
associated with the stipulated risk (these two problems are harder, and are left for future 
work). 
Nevertheless, our risk profiles computed by combining machine learning with fine-
grained natural language processing provide a 360 degree “risk radar”. While past work 
has been conducted in document classification, we believe that sentence-level processing 
is more appropriate in the context of automated risk analysis; imagine an article about a 
 
Figure 1. Output from Thomson Reuters Risk Identifier™. Shown is a visualization of risk mentions 
associated with a sample company; we processed one year of news and extracted risks from it. 
 
 
Figure 1. Visualization of Sample Output from Thomson Reuters Risk Identifier™. 
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football club, in which corruption issues linked to one coach are mentioned in passing – a 
document-level text classification approach would likely tag the whole story as 
“SPORTS”, not “CRIME”, missing a vital piece of information.  
Returning back to our initial investigation of the shortcomings of human cognition 
adversely affecting risk analysis, we are now able to argue that computational support 
improves risk analysis effectiveness more convincingly due to the existence of our 
capability for mining risk relations: (1) it is computational, so it is resistant to fatigue, 
which leads to improved consistency. (2) Because it is processed by a computer, it can 
rapidly analyse thousands of news sources – a modern compute server can easily process 
12,000 English news sources without creating a back-log. (3) because the risks are 
extracted (and thus stipulated) by a machine, the ensuing risk registers are objective, 
transparent, and not subject to “group think” effects. 
4. Related Work 
Many computational tools exist for manually constructing models of risk likelihood and 
impact (Garvey, 2008); as far as we aware, they all require manual entry (directly or 
indirectly) of their parameters, and none of them provide automation support for the first 
step of any risk management process, risk identification. 
Automatic sentiment analysis (Liu, 2015) is similar to our presented risk analysis in that 
negative sentiment could point to a risk, and sentiment is also a relationship (between a 
holder who has the sentiment and a target that the sentiment is about). However, sentiment 
is defined as affective state (in psychology/linguistics), like/dislike of a product or feature 
(in marketing) or bearish-ness/bullish-ness of financial markets (in finance), respectively, 
and is more subjective in nature (does the holder believe it?), whereas risk exposure, as 
expressed in a news article, is something that can be reasonably reliably determined by 
humans. 
5. Humans & Machines: Summary & Conclusions 
We have discussed the topic of human cognitive shortcomings in the context of risk and 
foresight. We described a computer-supported risk identification capability (Leidner and 
Schilder, 2010; Leidner, 2015; Nugent and Leidner, 2016; Leidner and Nugent, 2017) that 
uses a combination of natural language processing and machine learning to compute an 
open-ended risk register (threat radar, risk profile) for an entity or topic from trusted 
textual sources. This capability is very applicable to foresight related topics, from 
environmental issues over global pandemics to the topic of nuclear proliferation. Its main 
strength is that it does not rely on a fixed list of keywords, and uses machine learning to 
induce a risk taxonomy from the World Wide Web (Leidner and Schilder, 2010). We then 
described how the combination of human analyst and automated risk analysis can 
overcome some of the described human limitations. 
In future work, the correlation of risk types across classes of entities sharing a property 
should be explored (e.g. all retail companies, all company directors). Processing multiple 
languages and integrating extracted risk in a unified format, and data mining of risk 
causality graphs would also be very desirable directions for further research. 




The authors would like to acknowledge the support of Khalid Al-Kofahi and Mona 
Vernon. We would also like to thank the contributors to previous research in this space 
that we built on: Artsiom Matronkin, Frank Schilder, and Steve Pommerville. Finally, 
thanks to Zdenko Šimić for discussions. 
References 
Berg, Heinz‐Peter (2010), Risk Management: Procedures, Method and Experiences, 
Reliability: Theory & Applications, vol. 5, no. #2(17), pp. 62-78. 
Budzier, Alexander (2011) "The risk of risk registers – managing risk is managing 
discourse not tools", Journal of Information Technology vol. 26, 274-276, 
doi:10.1057/jit.2011.13 
Carstens,  L., Leidner J. L., Szymanski K., Howald B. (2017), "Modeling Company Risk 
and Importance in Supply Graphs" In: Blomqvist E., Maynard D., Gangemi A., 
Hoekstra R., Hitzler P., Hartig O. (eds.) Proc. ESWC, LNCS vol. 10250. 
Douglas, Mary (1992), Risk and Blame Essays in Cultural Theory. 
Elahi, Ehsan (2013), "Risk management: the next source of competitive advantage", 
Foresight, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 117-131, https://doi.org/10.1108/14636681311321121 
European Commission (2017), “Foresight”, 
https://ec.europa.eu/research/foresight/index.cfm, (online, cited 2017-09-30). 
Festinger, Leon (1957), A Theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford, CA, USA: Stanford 
University Press. 
Garvey, P. R. (2008), Analytical Methods for Risk Management: A Systems Engineering 
Perspective, Boca Raton, FL, USA: Chapman-Hall/CRC-Press. 
ISO (ed.) (2009), ISO 31000:2009, Risk management – Principles and guidelines, 
Geneva, Switzerland: International Organization for Standardisation (ISO). 
Leidner, Jochen L. and Frank Schilder (2010), Hunting for the Black Swan: Risk Mining 
from Text. Proceedings of ACL, Uppsala, Sweden. 
Leidner, Jochen L. (2015), Computer-Supported Risk Identification for the Holistic 
Management of Risk. Technical Report, ArXiv Pre-Print Archive, 
arXiv:1510.08285 [q-fin.GN], 19 pp., https://arxiv.org/abs/1510.08285 (online, 
cited 2017-09-30) 
Leidner, Jochen L. and Tim Nugent (2017), “Towards Automating People and Company 
Risk Extraction for Extended Due Diligence Support”, 26th SRA-Europe Annual 
Meeting of the Society of Risk Analysis (Europe), Lisbon, Portugal (SRA-E 2017). 
Liu, Bing (2015), Sentiment Analysis: Mining Sentiments, Opinions, and Emotions, New 
York, NY, USA: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Nugent, Tim and Jochen L. Leidner (2016), “Company Risk Identification from 
Unstructured Sources” Proceedings of ICDM, Barcelona, Spain. 
Syed, Matthew (2015), Black Box Thinking: Marginal Gains and the Secrets of High 
Performance. London: John Murray. 
Taleb, Nassim N. (2007), The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable. 
Voros, Joseph (2003), "A generic foresight process framework", Foresight, vol. 5, no. 3, 
pp. 10-21, 2003. ISSN: 1463-6689, doi:10.1108/14636680310698379 
 
 

































Enhancing Safety: the Challenge of Foresight 
295 
 
 SEMINAR OPENING 
  
Biography Luìs ANDRADE FERREIRA 
Luis Andrade Ferreira (Associate Professor, 
Department of Mechanical Engineering, Faculty of 
Engineering, University of Porto - FEUP) has a 
degree in Mechanical Eng. (FEUP, 1980), PhD in 
Mechanical Eng. (INSA Lyon, 1985) and 
“Agregação” (equivalent to DSc.) by FEUP (2005). 
Vice-Dean of FEUP (2010 – 2014).  
 
Member of Board of Directors of APMI - 
Portuguese Association of Industrial 
Maintenance. Editor of Maintenance magazine. 
APMI representative in EFNMS - European 
Federation of National Maintenance Societies. 
Chairman of the Board of Directors of ESReDA - 
European Safety, Reliability & Data Association. 
He has published over one hundred and fifty 
papers in the fields of Tribology, Reliability and 
Maintenance. He is the author of two books on 






University of Porto, 









Enhancing Safety: the Challenge of Foresight 
296 
 
SEMINAR OPENING  
  
Georg PETER Biography 
Head of Unit 
Technology Innovation in 
Security 
European Commission 








Dr.-Ing. Georg Peter, born in 1959 in Frankfurt, 
Germany, holds a degree as Mechanical Engineer 
and a Ph.D. in nuclear safety. He joined the 
European Commission in 1989 as a research 
engineer in the Joint Research Center in Ispra 
analysing accident scenarios in nuclear power 
plants and in hydrocarbon facilities by developing 
and applying complex computer simulation 
models.  
 
After having been responsible for the Safety & 
Security Unit of the JRC Ispra site, he was appointed 
as Head of the Unit "Technology Innovation in 
Security" in the Directorate "Space, Security and 
Migration" of the Joint Research Center of the 
European Commission.  
 
His team is dealing with innovative solutions for the 
protection and resilience of critical infrastructures 
in Europe, advanced radio signal processing such as 
5G, spectrum sharing and interference studies, 
scientific support to the European Global 
Navigation Satellite System Galileo, hazards in 
chemical industry and consequences of natural 
hazards to technological installations as well as 











Enhancing Safety: the Challenge of Foresight 
297 
 
 SEMINAR OPENING 
  
Biography Ana Lisa VETERE 
ARELLANO 
She graduated from University of Pavia as a 
geologist studying rock slides. As Marie Curie 
Fellow, she studied floods at University of 
Birmingham. She has worked at the European 
Commission Joint Research Centre since 2001, in 
different research areas: natural, environmental & 
technological risks, energy and information 
technology. Her expertise lies in risk management, 
working together with Competent Authorities, 
research centres, industry and international 
organisations and participated in several 
European research projects. She currently leads 
an IT team underpinning activity on accident 
analysis, lessons learned, and knowledge 







Technology Innovation in 
Security Unit70 
European Commission 









                                                 
70 At the time of this publication, Ana Lisa VETERE ARELLANO has moved to the Knowledge for Security 
& Migration Unit. 
Enhancing Safety: the Challenge of Foresight 
298 
 
SEMINAR OPENING  
  
Zdenko ŠIMIĆ Biography 
Scientific Officer 
Knowledge for Nuclear 
Safety, Security & 
Safeguards Unit 






Zdenko Šimić is working as scientist at the EC JRC in 
the area of nuclear operating experience and 
safety. He has worked as a professor at the Faculty 
of Electrical Engineering and Computing, University 
of Zagreb, Croatia, where he was teaching courses 
in the field of energy technology and risk and 
reliability in power systems. He has received his 
Ph.D. in 2001 from the same University. His 
research and expertise is especially related to 
nuclear power safety assessment and renewable 
energy source's characterization and utilization. In 
his career, he has twice stayed in the USA for 
several years - long expert work and research, and 
recently he has finished a two-year position as a 
visiting scientist at the European Commission Joint 
Research Centre - Institute for Energy and 
Transport in the Netherlands, all related to nuclear 
power risk and reliability. He has published more 
than a hundred scientific papers and expert study 
reports. He is active as a distinguished lecturer for 
the IEEE Power and Energy Society and he was 
Chair of the Croatian IEEE Power and Energy 
Society Chapter. He was also president of the 
Croatian Nuclear Society. Currently he is working in 
the EC JRC on nuclear energy operating experience 










Enhancing Safety: the Challenge of Foresight 
299 
 
 SEMINAR CLOSING 
  
Biography Franck WASTIN 
Franck Wastin holds a PhD in Chemistry-Nuclear 
Chemistry from Liège University, Belgium and has 
developed, during almost 30 years research 
experience in nuclear fields, a broad expertise in 
condensed matter physics and chemistry of 
Actinides, nuclear fuel cycle and reactor safety. He 
has contributed to more than 170 scientific peer 
reviewed publications and to more than 200 
conferences, He is currently the Head of the 
Knowledge for Nuclear Safety, Security and 
Safeguards Unit (JRC.G.10) at the European 
Commission, Joint Research Centre, Directorate 
G-Nuclear Safety and Security, which is one of the 
ten Directorates of the EC's Joint Research Centre.  
Previously, he was heading the Nuclear Reactor 
Safety Assessment Unit (F05) at the JRC-Institute 
for Energy and Transport, Petten, The 
Netherlands, and from 2007 to 2015, the 
Director's Office of the JRC-Institute for 
Transuranium Elements in Karlsruhe, Germany. 
He is the EC representative at the Steering 
Committee of the IAEA Technical Support 
Organisation Forum (TSO-Forum) and at the NEA's 





Head of Unit 
Knowledge for Nuclear 
Safety, Security & 
Safeguards  
European Commission 









Enhancing Safety: the Challenge of Foresight 
300 
 
SESSION 1 - 
TRANSFERRING 
FORESIGHT APPROACHES 







Deputy Head of Unit 
Foresight, Behavioural 
Insight & Design for Policy 
European Commission 


























Fabiana Scapolo works at the European 
Commission Directorate General Joint Research 
Centre (JRC) in Brussels. She is Deputy Head of Unit 
for the Foresight, Behavioural Insights and Design 
for Policy. The Unit is responsible for the EU Policy 
Lab that aims at combining foresight, behavioural 
insights, design for policy and science and 
technologies studies to bring innovation and 
improve policymaking at European level. The EU 
Policy Lab combines the methods and tools of 
these disciplines to explore, connect and find 
solutions for better policies by making sense of 
emerging trends and envisaging alternative 
futures.  
 
Fabiana’s current duties are related to the general 
management of the unit. She is also coordinating 
the foresight and horizon scanning activities and 
she is very active in strengthening the JRC capacity 
and position as a key actor on Foresight and 
Horizon scanning at European and international 
level. She has more than 15-years of working 
experience on foresight both in terms of applying 
foresight to specific context and topics as well as 
advancing on the application of Foresight methods 
and tools in support to policy-making formulation 
at European level. 
 
In the past she was involved in exercises on 
strategy formulation for the JRC and on the 
monitoring and implementation of the work 
programme of the JRC. 
 
Fabiana's background is in Political Sciences 
(University of Milan) and she has a PhD on foresight 
methodologies (University of Manchester). 
fabiana.scapolo@ec.europa.eu  
 
Enhancing Safety: the Challenge of Foresight 
301 
 
Invited Lecture I 
Foresight as tool to 
support policymaking and 
some reflection on how it 




The presentation will start with a brief introduction 
on why thinking about the future is becoming more 
and more a necessary activity for many 
organisations and domains. From there, definition 
and key characteristics of foresight will be provided 
together with an overview on what Foresight is and 
how and when it should be applied to policy 
making. An illustration on features, requirements 
and capabilities needed for foresight in a 
policymaking context to deliver will be delivered.  
 
The presentation will also illustrate a number of 
possible foresight activities and methods. These 
include horizon scanning, trend analysis, visions, 
scenarios, technology assessment. Some examples 
on how these methods are applied will be 
provided. 
 
The presentation aims also at reflecting on how 
foresight could be applied to safety management 
and risks assessment. It will suggest some practical 
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Foresight is a relatively new research discipline, 
established in the 1960s especially in Japan and 
United States, and later further developed in many 
research environments in other countries. The 
purpose of the use of foresight techniques is to 
employ a participant-based process for the 
systematic collection of forward-thinking 
knowledge and develop visions and future 
perspectives in a medium and in a long-term 
perspective. Based on a holistic approach and 
making use of knowledge of former events - such 
as results from the investigations of accidents and 
near misses and knowledge of the present 
situation - one can improve the current decisions 
and promote better prevention and harm 
reduction measures. Unfortunately, foresight 
methodology has so far been used only to a small 
degree in a safety context. 
The paper will briefly review the evolution of 
foresight-theories and outline its historical 
background. It will describe the characteristic 
elements in foresight and give an overview of the 
most important methods used. In this context, the 
basic comprehension forms within the safety 
thinking are analysed, and it will be argued for 
changes in the moral and ethical values within 
safety for technological changes and 
improvements, as well as for the developing safety 
as a societal value. It is emphasized that the 
recognition of a necessary system shift must take 
place on two levels: as an incremental shift with 
derivative solutions for known problems, and as a 
substantial change with disruptive solutions for 
new problems. In addition to comparative 
examples of release of energy during aviation and 
railway accidents, and nuclear disasters, also the 
characteristics of so-called "weak signals" are 
discussed. The necessity of a paradigm shift is 
underlined. The paper ends with a brief 
description of the ESReDA PGs approach to 
foresight methodology within the safety area, and 
examples of challenges are given, and 
recommendations proposed for a new holistic 
safety management based on feed forward as well 
as on feedback information and insights. 
Uncertain future. Unsafe 
future? Or foresight in 
safety - theories, 
traditions and the 
ESReDA safety approach 
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How did aviation become 
so safe, and beyond? 







Aviation has been recognized as one of the ultimate 
safe socio-technical systems. This contribution 
discusses the conditions and context that moulded 
the system safety to its present level by applying 
integral safety, a sectoral approach and safety as a 
strategic value. At present the aviation system 
consists of institutional arrangements at the global 
level, a shared repository of knowledge and 
operational experiences, feedback from reality, the 
notion of Good Airmanship, together with the 
choice of technology as the flywheel for progress. 
This architecture made aviation a Non-Plus Ultra-
Safe system characterized by a safety performance 
level of beyond 10-7 accident rate. To cross this 
mythical boundary in legacy systems like aviation, 
it is imperative to apply game changers such as 
socio-technical systems engineering, disruptive 
technologies and innovation transition 
management. In such a transition, a shift in focus 
occurs from performance to properties, from 
hindsight to foresight, highlighted by the case study 
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the safety margin and the 
process of safety 
foresight for the nuclear 
power plants 
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The McNamara Fallacy 












Famously, ‘what gets measured gets done’, but the 
sociology behind the measurements, particularly 
those used to manage organisations, are little 
studied in the field of safety. Yankelovich described 
a pattern dealing with traps of quantification that 
he called the "McNamara fallacy" and which has 
four steps.  
Process safety might be particularly vulnerable to 
the McNamara fallacy because the paradigm of 
reliance on numbers is very strong in engineering 
culture. However, as we argue, the McNamara 
fallacy is less a failing of individuals, than it is an 
outcome of the forces that produce order in 
organisations. In this paper after an explanation of 
the four steps of the “fallacy”, we will argue how 
some failures of foresight are connected to poorly 
managed quantification, which is, according to 
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For several years now, resilience concepts appear to 
challenge traditional risk approaches. One of the key 
difference suggested is the way foresight is tackled 
in both. This paper discusses commonalities, 
differences and any overlaps in the use of foresight 
between these two approaches. Several lessons 
learned from historical cases are used for this 
purpose (before and after Toulouse chemical 
disaster, Fukushima nuclear accident, business 
continuity and crisis management for critical 
infrastructure). Both approaches are in fact rather 
complementary in fulfilling certain critical functions, 
and are less opposed than as claimed by resilience 
promotors. While the expectations and foresight 
differ, recovery is included in risk approaches as well 
as in resilience approaches. Furthermore, risk 
approaches also deal with unexpected events. The 
paper concludes with an analysis of the knowns, 
unknowns and awareness that enables one to 
distinguish different foresight categories in risk 
(defensive, reactive, ethical, proactive) and in 
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Technological advances potentially impact all 
stages of the life cycle of safety related systems. 
This is increasingly so with advanced sensors, as 
well as the exponential increase of computing 
power, communication bandwidth and storage 
capacity. The design and operation of safety 
related systems can benefit significantly with 
potential to continually reduce risk through the 
application of advanced software and hardware 
solutions including artificial intelligence (AI). The 
question is which kind of technological advances 
are in use and being developed and how they can 
potentially improve safety? 
This paper aims at identifying major existing and 
emerging technologies with tangible potential 
safety benefits applicable to different life cycle 
phases of concerned systems (i.e., design, 
verification, validation, production, testing, 
commissioning, operation, maintenance, 
emergency response and decommissioning). 
These technologies generally comprise a 
combination of hardware and software used for 
e.g.: development, training, operation, 
monitoring, diagnoses and predictions. Examples 
are computer aided hybrid development, real 
time modelling analysis and various artificial 
intelligence applications. In this preliminary 
review the aim is to identify potentials, limitations 
and difficulties associated with the application of 
these advanced technologies for the 
enhancement of safety and foresight.  
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Some of the problems associated with the use of 
advanced technologies are related to the 
increased technical complexity that they may 
bring to the design (e.g., software and digital 
instrumentation and control validation and 
verification). In addition, other issues related to 
the need for connectivity like cyber security and 
privacy are becoming even more worrying. The 
open question is what are the limitations or 
ultimate potential benefits which can be gained by 
using advanced technology to enhance safety and 
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expert on nuclear energy in the Ministry of 
Economy. Member of the Boards of Polish Nuclear 
Society, Zygmunt Zaleski Stichting, European 
Safety, Reliability and Data Association; Member 
of the Executive Committee of Sustainable 
Nuclear Energy Technology Platform, Member of 
the Steering Committee of TSO Forum, 
Coordinator of the NC2I-R FP7 Program. Member 
of the Gemini + H2020 Program, Member of the 
Program Committee of the HTR 2018 and of the 
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Newly designed nuclear reactors can be applicable 
not only for the generation of electricity, but also 
for the production of process heat, hydrogen or 
hydrazine, which is of great importance for 
chemical industry. In the presentation entitled 
„Cogeneration: technologies, possibilities, 
challenges” a summary of the problems related to 
the licensing process of such reactors, safety and 
reliability issues of the whole processing 
combined chemical-nuclear installation and the 
challenges for needed research program will be 
given. 
Head of the Centre of 
Excellence MANHAZ 
(Management of Health 
and Environmental 
Hazards) 
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Ana Afonso, is the team leader of the Emerging 
Risks team at the European Food Safety Authority. 
Objectives of the Emerging Risks team are to: (i) to 
carry out activities aiming at identifying, assessing 
and disseminating information on  emerging issues; 
(ii) ensure coordination with EFSA units, Panels 
other relevant EU institutions, MS and 
international organizations (iii) promote the 
identification of data sources and data collection  
and /or data generation in prioritized emerging 
issues and (iv) evaluate the collected information 
to identify emerging risks in the area of food and 
feed, animal and plant health. The team is also 
contact point for the Rapid Alert system for Food 
and Feed providing scientific and technical 
assistance and coordinates EFSA urgent response 
procedures and crisis preparedness.  
She is a veterinarian specialized in Aquatic 
Veterinary studies and joined EFSA in 2006 as a 
scientific officer for the Animal Health and Welfare 
Unit. Prior to that she worked as a Veterinary 
official responsible for approval and inspection of 
food establishments, as a Veterinary assistant for 
hygiene and animal health issues on fish farming 
and as a Research / Lecturer assistant at the 
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Dr Kenisha Garnett is a Lecturer in Decision Science 
at Cranfield Institute for Resilient Futures (CIRF) at 
Cranfield University. Kenisha has expertise in 
strategic foresight. Her current research is 
developing underpinning robust foresight 
methodologies that link evidence-based strategic 






risk with value judgements to assess system 
resilience and the robustness of policies, strategies 
and delivery mechanisms for the green economy. 
Kenisha has led the development of medium and 
large scenarios projects and delivered a strategic 
foresight programme, focused on the long-term 
sustainability of environment and food systems, 
primarily through a £1.8M pan-government futures 
partnership led by the Department of 
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) and 
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Hub Noteborn holds the position of program 
manager Risk-ranking and Data Intelligence in the 
Netherlands Food and Consumer Product Safety 
Authority (NVWA). There,fore he was head of 
Integrated Risk Assessment department and 
deputy Director of the Office for Risk Assessment 
and Research (BuRO), which is a governmental 
independent body to advice on animal and plant 
health, animal welfare, food and consumer product 
safety threats. Prior to his appointment at NVWA 
(2002) he was head of the GMO and novel food 
safety testing program in RIKILT-Institute of Food 
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Petros A. Maragkoudakis holds degrees in 
microbial biotechnology and medical microbiology. 
His PhD and post-doctoral research focused on 
probiotics, health and food microbiology, 
technology and safety. Since 2010 he has been 
working mainly for the European Commission in 
the Joint Research Centre, providing scientific 














Invited Lecture II 
Emerging Risks in food 
and feed, the importance 
of foresight 
support in the area of food and nutrition policies 
and public health. He was a key participant in two 
recent major JRC food-system related foresight 
studies, one on research priorities for food and 
health and one on the resilience of the EU food 
safety and nutrition legislative/policy framework. 
He has contributed in various future and food 
system-oriented workshops, activities and fora 
inside and outside the JRC, and has a keen interest 
in the subject. Currently he is co-ordinating a joint 
JRC/SANTE project that maps scientific evidence, 
recommendation and policies in the broader field 
of nutrition and food. Petros has also worked as a 
free-lance consultant, a project manager for a 
company providing IT solutions in food 





Food is produced, distributed and sold on a global 
scale. The interconnectivity of the market 
simultaneously builds resilience in supply chains 
but magnifies vulnerabilities, so it is more 
important than ever to have the best possible 
understanding of the world around us, and how it 
is changing. Reflection is required on how new 
technologies transform our global supply chains, 
trade policies, and future food production. The 
identification and prioritization of emerging risks is 
a complex process involving the gathering and 
evaluation of large amounts of information from 
different sources and the biggest challenge is to 
make sense of the complex interactions of different 
factors and actors in the food system to predict and 
possibly prevent future risks. 
  
Forward-looking exercises have been employed by 
organisations, institutions, authorities or 
governments to enhance policy preparedness and 
promote prevention-based policy approaches.  
Foresight employs methods to explore change in 
the mid-to-long-term future based on the 
assumption that developments outside the food 
supply chain and even outside the food system are 
either directly or indirectly related to the 
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development of a particular food-borne hazard. 
Typical outputs from foresight studies, specifically 
scenario planning, are multiple scenarios that 
model systemic change in the food system in order 
to reveal potential unknown patterns of food-
related challenges. This paper briefly describes the 
development and use of scenario planning as a 
foresight methodology, presents specific case 
studies applied in the area of food safety, and 
discusses the challenges and opportunities linked 
to this approach for identification of emerging risks 
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Milos Ferjencik graduated in nuclear engineering 
at Prague Technical University in 1981. Between 
1981 and 1992 he worked in the Nuclear Research 
Institute, and in Temelin NPP. Since 1992 he 
concentrated on chemical risk analysis. In 1995 he 
started his own consultancy profession. In 2004 he 
started to work as a full-time assistant professor 
of safety engineering at the University of 
Pardubice. In 2015 he was habilitated as an 
associate professor. Since 2015 he is a head of 
Institute of Energetic Materials. In his research 





The article is focused on visibility of early warning 
signs. It describes how the incident scenarios can 
be used as a supporting tool for foresight. Possible 
appearance of the incident scenarios represents a 
starting point. The use of scenarios for the 
identification of early warning signs and for the 
prioritization of early warning signs is shown. Uses 
of both predictive and retrospective scenarios are 
analysed and common features of both the types 
are identified. Ways of the use of scenarios are 
illustrated by examples. According to the article, 
visualisation of hazard realizations represents the 
common principal purpose of the use of scenarios. 
Relation of the visibility of hazard realizations to 
the visibility of early warning signs is discussed and 
demonstrated. Methods of hazard identification 
and risk analysis and methods of incident cause 
analysis are brought to mind in the article. 
 
Abstract 
The article is focused on visibility of early warning 
signs. It describes how the incident scenarios can 
be used as a supporting tool for foresight. Possible 
appearance of the incident scenarios represents a 
Associate Professor 



























Roles of Incident 
Scenarios in Foresight 
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starting point. The use of scenarios for the 
identification of early warning signs and for the 
prioritization of early warning signs is shown. Uses 
of both predictive and retrospective scenarios are 
analysed and common features of both the types 
are identified. Ways of the use of scenarios are 
illustrated by examples. According to the article, 
visualisation of hazard realizations represents the 
common principal purpose of the use of scenarios. 
Relation of the visibility of hazard realizations to 
the visibility of early warning signs is discussed and 
demonstrated. Methods of hazard identification 
and risk analysis and methods of incident cause 
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University of Science and 






Foresight in process 
industry through dynamic 
risk assessment: 
implications and open 
questions 
Nicola Paltrinieri is an associate professor in risk 
assessment at the department of Mechanical and 
Industrial Engineering of the Norwegian University 
of Science and Technology (NTNU). His position is 
sponsored by the “Onsager Fellowship 
Programme” rewarding high academic merit. He 
received his Ph.D. in Safety Engineering from the 
University of Bologna (Italy). He is associate editor 
for the journal Safety Science and the Norwegian 
Delegate at the EFCE (European Federation of 
Chemical Engineering) Working Party on Loss 











Risk analysis is about to enter an era of larger and 
more complex data sets (big data), where the main 
challenges are represented by the ability to provide 
continuous acquisition, effective process and 
meaningful communication of information. 
However, most of the methods for quantitative risk 
assessment allow for static evaluations of risk in a 
frozen instant of the system life. Research on how 
to dynamically assess risk in process industry has 
been carried out, but no real implementation has 
been attempted. Some open questions are still 
undermining this approach and should be directly 
addressed to provide reliable models and exploit 
new technology opportunities. i) Which strategy 
should be adopted? ii) How early warnings and past 
events should be assessed and connected to the 
overall risk? This contribution aims to give an 
overview on preliminary answers and highlight 
possible uncertainties of future developments. 
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of interest is risk- and safety management 
approaches at both operational, tactical and 
strategic levels. Okstad has years of experience 
from projects within offshore petroleum industry, 
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Øyvind Dahl is senior researcher at SINTEF. He 
holds a PhD in organizational sociology from 
NTNU. Dahl has long experience from research 
within the field of organizational safety, practical 
frontline experience in safety work within the oil 
and gas industry and experience in governmental 











The presentation is about horizon-scanning, which 
is a collective term of approaches capturing weak 
or early warning signals for use in political 
discourse and decision-making. The authors 
Senior Research Scientist 








approaches for early 
sensing of cyber-physical 
threats to water utilities 
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would like to demonstrate whether horizon 
scanning methods fit in sensing emerging cyber-
physical threats to water-supply and waste water 
systems. Could such methods enforce early 
warning capabilities, increase awareness and 
cooperation in the water sector aiming for policy- 
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Micaela Demichela is an Assistant Professor at the 
Applied Science and Technology Department of 
Politecnico di Torino in Italy. Her research field is 
related to process safety and operator safety in the 
work environment, with a glance to both technical 
and human and organisational factors. She is a 











The present work deals with the development of a 
new Accident Precursors Management System, 
starting from the HFACS taxonomy and the Fuzzy 
Application Procedure – FAP, already devised for 
the industrial risk analysis. The methodology 
proposed is composed by a data collection 
procedure, carried out in situ and that requires a 
short interview to the personnel involved in the 
observed events. Afterward, a data analysis tool, 
based on the Fuzzy Logic Approach, allows to 
obtain the preventive measures suitable to cope 
with the accident precursors analysed. The 
methodology described is generic and it does not 
depend on the working site type. It has been tested 
in a real industrial workplace and the results 
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50 papers published in journals and conference or 
workshop proceedings. He acts as expert reviewer for 
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nuove tecnologie, 









Biography Giordano VICOLI  
Giordano Vicoli graduated in Electronic Engineering 
with computer science specialization. He has been 
working since 1988 for ENEA in the field of design and 
development of decision support systems for training 
and/or managing emergency in high risk industrial 
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systems, soft computing techniques and discrete 
simulation. He extended his research in the field of 
Critical Infrastructure Protection with particular 
emphasis on energy infrastructure and electrical 
SCADA protection. For this last topic he developed, 
during the European SAFEGUARD Project, a SCADA 
emulator where it is possible to simulate middle 
attacks in order to test algorithms to prevent and/or 
to detect cyber attacks.  He also participated in 
several national and European projects like 
SAFEGUARD, IRRIIS, CRESCO, ESTEC and ASTROM. 
Furthermore he is interested in ICT technologies and 
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programming, UML, JSE, JEE, JME, Web Services, 
Semantic Web, agile programming, discrete 
simulation, Mobile Development (iOS and Android).  
giordano.vicoli@enea.it 
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Andrea Falegnami is PHD student in Industrial and 
Management Engineering at Sapienza University 
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of Rome). He holds a master degree in Mechanical 
Engineering from Sapienza University of Rome. His 
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Department of Industrial 
and Management 
Engineering 










Biography Riccardo PATRIARCA 
Riccardo Patriarca holds a Bsc in Aerospace 
Engineering and an MSc in Aeronautical 
Engineering both at Sapienza University of Rome 
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as researcher and assistant lecturer at the 
Deptartment of Mechanical and Aerospace 
Engineering of Sapienza. His research interests 
focus on risk management and resilience 
engineering for complex socio-technical systems. 
He is author of research papers focused on 
innovative methodological approaches to risk and 
safety management, airline inventory 








We present a novel framework to enhance safety 
imagination in socio-technical systems with 
gamification and computational creativity. This 
relies on the usage of the Functional Resonance 
Analysis Method (FRAM) for systemic analysis of 
socio-technical system. Information on the system 
structure and organization is elicited from sharp-
end operators by means of a gamified and 
participatory approach. Then such knowledge is 
organized as a domain ontology compliant with 
FRAM and is used to feed a computational 
creativity system and to support the analyst in 
conceiving FRAM models. The case study concerns 
healthcare and, in particular, an accident 











Enhancement of Safety 
Imagination in Socio-
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Antonio D’AGOSTINO works, since October 
2012, as Project Officer at the European Union 
Agency for Railways where he is working on: 
 Training and workshops on: 
o EU Railway Safety regulatory 
framework; 
o Safety Management Systems; 
 Research on big data analytics; 
 Development of a new safety performance 
reporting and analytics scheme. 
 
Antonio is a Mechanical engineer and has 8-
years of operational experience.  He worked for 
several years in Competence Management, 
Railway Safety and Rolling Stock. He also gained 
experience as train driver. 
 
Safety Certification and Safety Management 
Systems are his main areas of expertise. 
antonio.dagostino@era.europa.eu 
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PhD in Telecommunications Engineering 
(UPV/EHU), MSc in Management of 
Manufacturing Systems at Cranfield University 
(UK) and BSc in Telecom Engineering – 
Radiocommunication (UPV/EHU). More than 10 
years professional experience in the railway 
industry. Her expertise is focused on train 
control systems and communication 
technologies for transport systems. Currently, 
she manages the European Railway Agency 
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Strategy and projects for a 
predictive safety 
regulation and safety 
management  
Abstract 
The presentation is about the European Union 
Agency for Railways and the pieces of legislation it 
has developed aiming at harmonizing safety 
management in Europe and trying to support 
operators and countries in improving their safety 
performances.   It also describes its tasks and 
projects that have been designed to push the 
railway industry towards a more proactive and 
predictive safety management.  
 
The European Union Agency for Railways is moving 
from being essentially a technical body supporting 
the European Commission and, to a certain extent, 
the railway sector, to being an active player in the 
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Eric Marsden manages research projects at FonCSI 
(Foundation for an Industrial Safety Culture), a 
French public-interest research foundation. He 
works on organizational aspects of safety in high-
hazard industries, including experience feedback 
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Safety interventions suggested as a result of a 
foresight process are more likely to be related to 
non-urgent issues, and be affected by a greater 
level of uncertainty, than interventions suggested 
by experience feedback or by regulatory changes. 
By analyzing a number of accident cases where 
proactive foresight-based suggestions were not 
implemented before the accident, we assess 
whether the uncertain and long-term nature of 
the predictions had a negative effect on the 
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interventions based on 
uncertain foresight: 
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Is whistleblowing a 












Due to several reasons, challenge of managing 
warning signs is hardly taken up by companies. 
Indeed, very often, a sign makes sense in terms of 
safety after the event. In other words, meaning of 
signs related to safety is not obvious, and companies 
put in place system for collecting and gathering signs 
that they do not know what to do except compiling 
statistics on data “accumulated”. Furthermore, 
companies have to cope with two concerns: 
 
• Taking into account and treating a “wrong” sign (i.e. 
sign which did not impact safety) which would lead 
to waste of resources and time; 
• Not detecting a relevant sign which would be 
symptomatic of poor safety management. 
Major events (accidents) analysis show that, in many 
cases, that they have been preceded by alerts, 
warnings launched by persons close to (or knowing) 
system technical functioning.  
In the paper, we will define features of 
whistleblowing and whistle-blowers. We will also 
analyse how companies face whistleblowing. 
 
An investigation is made on whether if there are 
lessons to be learned from civil society 
whistleblowing (e.g. protection of whistle-blowers). 
The paper will argue about interest of considering 
whistleblowing in the frame of safety prevention and 
will indicate directions on manners to deal with 
whistle-blowers for maintaining process safety. 
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KEYNOTE 
Lorenzo is a former Chief Petty Officer of the Italian 
Coast Guard. After serving as a safety and security 
inspector for almost fifteen years, he joined the 
European Maritime Safety Agency in 2008. He has 
cooperated in many international projects since, 
including the development of SafeSeaNet, the 
implementation of Integrated Maritime Services and 
more recently, the development of the European 
Marine Casualty Information Platform (EMCIP). 
Lorenzo holds a BS in Public Administration and is 
completing an MSc in Digital Education at the 







EMSA operates, along with the Member States of the 
European Union, the SafeSeaNet, the vessel traffic 
monitoring and information system covering the 
waters in and around Europe. The platform enables 
for maritime data exchange across the Union’s 
competent authorities. VHF radio signals are 
captured from Automatic Identification System (AIS) 
which are installed aboard the circa 17,000 vessels 
which operate in and around EU waters. By tracking 
ships using AIS signals, the system gathers also 
identity details, latest positions and other status 
information in near-real-time. In the course of a 
technical enquiry into a marine casualty, 
investigators need to reconstruct the events that led, 
or contributed to an occurrence. This often implies 
the need to know the whereabouts of the vessel that 
was involved in the casualty, or of other vessels that 
may hold important information about the 
occurrence. Vessels’ position and voyage data have 










sensorial data acquisition 
systems to the prevention 
of marine accidents 
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been already used to this end, and has enabled 
investigators to identify and understand the peculiar 
circumstances in which very serious or catastrophic 
accidents have developed. 
  
Recent developments have brought to life additional 
services, like the vessels’ behaviour monitoring tools 
or other automatic alerting features which may be 
the precursors of future intelligent and smart agents 
for the prevention of accidents, rather than for the 
mitigation of existing risky conditions or threats. 
 
Kinematic data could be streamed directly form 
onboard sensors and crew’s biological parameters 
captured from wearables devices. Big-data 
dynamic algorithms may be used to get the 
foresight of critical conditions and of dangerous 
situations and to warn users in real-time. 
Multidimensional and multisensorial data-
acquisition is already a reality in the maritime 
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certified courses in maritime issues, courses in 
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skills. Research focuses on international 
projects on renewable energies at sea and 
European educational projects. He has 
published books, articles in international 
referred journals and conferences. 
idag@aegean.gr   
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Protection/Homeland Security technology & 
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coordinator for KEMEA’s participation in the 
various European Programmes, funded by the 
E.C. as Senior Researcher in more than 45 EU 
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Evolution of remote 
performance monitoring 
in ship’s safety decision 
making reinforced by 
Analytic Hierarchy Process 
Abstract 
Among the objectives of shipping industry are to 
maintain safety. Also the measuring of safety in 
relation to the application of evolutions in 
operational management of ship's and developing 
strategies to avoid future accidents is crucial. So 
recognizing signals before an accident occurs and 
by enhancing with the right decisions any 
operational procedure is offered the possibility for 
improving safety. 
 
In this paper, we address the challenge to evaluate 
the Remote Performance Monitoring by identify 
and scrutinize features which may affect the ships 
safety and must take into consideration of the 
decision makers during its implementation. The 
evaluation performed by using the Analytic 
Hierarchy Process and answers the question, how 
remote performance monitoring using internet of 
things and big data, leads in further improvement 
in terms of machines performance with safety. The 
implementation of method for ship’s safety 
decision support will be presented and analysed 
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reliability, availability, maintainability and safety of 
mechanical and electrical systems. His fields of play 
include power plants, marine engineering, railways 
and waterways. His relation with power plants 
started in 1988 when a project was initiated to gather 
failure data of Dutch power plants in order to further 
improve their forced unavailability. The direct 
application of these data for betterment of power 
plants, the discussions with operators, maintenance 
personnel and management has led him to believe 
that failure data are a reflection of the asset 
management of a plant.  Benchmarking the 
performance of power plants and their components 
against other plants, application of FMECA and RCM 
and the modeling of power plants and their crew are 





Electrical production must be equal to electrical 
demand in order to maintain a precise frequency. 
When a power plant fails unexpectedly, other plants 
take up the load as normally there is reserve power 
available to counteract forced unavailability of plants. 
Insufficient reserve leads to potential overload of 
generators which is prevented by shutting down load 
to areas, if not a blackout on the electrical grid may 
occur. Forced unavailability of power plants may 
increase due to the present low electricity prices 
which are especially low when large wind and sun 
generation is input in the grid. Such economical 
conditions result in minimal maintenance of fossil 
plants as well as a potential increase in failures due to 
changing operating conditions. The increase is 
expected to be especially present at vintage coal fired 
Engineer in Risk 
Management & Decision 
Analysis 










unavailability of power 
plants due to economical 
conditions 
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plant that was not designed for cycling but it can also 
be present in other types of plants. Minimal 
maintenance is expected for every plant at too low 
electricity prices. Numerical data in the Netherlands 
as well as from the VGB's KISSY database show the 
presence of such effects, however the effect of 
changing operating conditions is not so clear as plants 
operate less (reduced exposure to for instance creep) 
but start more often (increased exposure to low cycle 
fatigue). These effects are not taken into account 
when assessing the probability of grid blackouts by 
authorities and grid operators, as well as possible 
effects due to imperfect mothballing causing teething 
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Ivan PUPULIDY Biography 
Innovation and 
Organizational Learning 
US Forest Service 
Albuquerque, New Mexico 
USA  
 
Dr. Ivan Pupulidy applies dynamic perspectives to 
complex systems and high-risk environments, such 
as wildland firefighting, aviation, military and 
medicine. His approach to human factors includes 
the social aspects of human interaction and 
sensemaking, which are essential components of a 
learning organization. As a U.S. Forest Service 
Director, Ivan replaced the traditional accident 
investigation model with the Learning Review, 
which embraces complex events by looking at 
conditions and networks of influence; this 
approach helps organizations develop learning and 
cultural change. 
 
Ivan’s ability to integrate academic research with 
real world application comes from his varied life 
experiences, which have included work as a mine 
geologist, exploration geophysicist, and a U.S. 
Coast Guard pilot for rescue and law enforcement 
missions. Ivan served in the U.S. Air Guard and Air 
Force Reserves, where he flew the C-130 Hercules, 
including missions as a MAFFS tanker pilot on 
wildland fires. He also served on active military 
operations for combat and humanitarian support 
in Iraq, Afghanistan and Central Africa. 
 
Ivan earned a Master’s of Science degree in Human 
Factors and Systems Safety at Lund University, 
Sweden, under Professor Sidney Dekker. He 
completed his PhD in Social Science at Tilburg 
University, Netherlands, under Professor Kenneth 
Gergen. 
 
Ivan is an international consultant and 
organizational coach who focuses on topics related 
to human factors, the “New View” of human error, 
real-time risk perspectives, holistic safety, learning 
from events, organizational dialogue, development 
of high-leverage learning products, and the 
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Crista VESEL Biography 
Manager 
Dynamic Inquiry LLC 














The Learning Review:  
Adding to the accident 
investigation toolbox  
 
Crista Vesel holds a B.A. in Communication and 
Philosophy from the University of New Mexico and 
a Masters of Science in Human Factors and Systems 
Safety from Lund University, Sweden. Her focus on 
language in accident investigation was an 
important element in the development of the 
Learning Review process. She has been a principle 
contributor for fatality investigations in US Federal 
agencies and international organizations. Ms. Vesel 
manages Dynamic Inquiry LLC, which offers 
worldwide consulting services and language 
analysis for organizations looking to increase the 





Accident investigation techniques have remained 
essentially the same for many decades, yet the 
recognition that complexity is increasing in most 
organizations demands an added form of inquiry. 
The Learning Review, first adopted by the U.S. 
Forest Service, explores the human contribution to 
accidents, safety, and normal work. It is specifically 
designed to facilitate the understanding of the 
factors and conditions that influence human 
actions and decisions by encouraging individual 
and group sensemaking at all levels of the 
organization. The Learning Review introduces the 
need to create a narrative inclusive of multiple 
perspectives from which a network of influences 
map can be created. This map depicts the factors 
that influence behaviors and can aid the 
organizational leadership to effect meaningful 
changes to the conditions while simultaneously 
helping field personnel to understand and manage 
system pressures. 
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 SESSION 8 - LEARNING 
FROM EXPERIENCE TO 
IMPROVE FORESIGHT IN 
SAFETY 
  
Biography Maria Grazia GNONI 
Maria Grazia Gnoni is currently an Associate 
Professor of Industrial Systems Management at the 
Engineering Faculty of the University of Salento 
(Italy). Her research activity focused on operations 
management and safety management in hazardous 
industries as wells as SMEs. Research fields include 
near-miss data analysis, developing multi-criteria 
model for risk analysis, and designing IOT-based 
systems for preventing accident at workplace. She is 
author of more than 60 papers and reviewers for 
Safety Science, International Journal of Loss 




Department of Innovation 
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Biography Silvia Maria ANSALDI 
Degree in Mathematics. She has over 20 years of 
industrial experience in problem analysis and 
software solutions development, operating in several 
industrial fields, including mechanical and civil 
design, manufacturing sectors, environmental 
assessment. For 10 years, she has been working in the 
field of occupational safety, especially in major 
accident hazards topics. Her expertise concerns the 
conceptual model design, knowledge management, 
information retrieval methodologies, besides more 
technical competence, from analysis to software 


















Biography Paolo A. BRAGATTO 
Dr. Bragatto, graduated in Physics in 1980, after 
12 years of industrial experience, he entered, as a 
scientist, the National Institute for Prevention and 
Safety at Work, merged in INAIL in 2010. His main 
scientific interest is in the prevention of major 
industrial accidents. In particular, he has 
investigated the methods for Risk Analysis, the 
Human and Organizational Factors, the Safe Aging 
of Process Plants and, in the last years, the Smart 
Systems for Safety. He has a long experience as 
inspector of Seveso establishments and often 
transfer his experience to the research. He has 
leaded a number of national and international 
research projects and he is the Italian 
representative in the Saf€ra research consortium 






The investigation of near misses is a pillar of major 
accident prevention at Seveso establishments. 
The improvement of classification and 
understanding is needed to exploit near misses for 
an effective safety foresight. For this purpose, the 
paper aims at investigating the contribution of the 
“Safety Principles”. They are domain-independent 
and technologically agnostic; they are based on a 
small set of general rules from which many safety 
measures derive. Safety principles include “Fail-
Safe”, “Safety Margins”, “Defense-in-Depth”. The 
idea is to have a new lens to analyse them. The 
near misses can be classified and interpreted in 
light of violated principles, to make more effective 
forecasts and interventions. A sample of near 
misses, recorded at some Seveso sites, has been 
used as case study. 












A model for analyzing 
near-miss events by 
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Miodrag STRUCIC Biography 
Scientific Officer 
Nuclear Safety & Security 
Unit 












Use of event and casual 
Factor Short Chart reports 
to access and simplify 
accident reports 
In 1989, Miodrag Stručić concluded Nuclear 
Energy study at Electrical Department of 
University of Zagreb in Croatia and earned his 
Master degree.  
 
For more than twenty years, he worked in 
Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) Krško, where he 
accomplished different tasks from position of 
Reactor Operator to Independent Safety 
Engineering Group (ISEG) engineer. He was 
mainly involved in NPP Operations, Corrective 
Action Program, Event Investigation and Root 
Cause Analysis activities.  
 
For last seven years Miodrag Stručić is working 
in European Commission, Joint Research Centre 
(EC JRC). The most of the time, he was engaged 
in Clearinghouse for European NPPs 
Operational Experience team activities. 
Recently, in EC JRC Directorate G – Nuclear 
Safety & Security, in Nuclear Reactor Safety and 
Emergency Preparedness unit, his job is mostly 
oriented to development of Emergency 
Preparedness and Response project for the case 
of accident in NPP. 
 
Abstract 
This paper concentrates on assessing events 
described in hazardous industry's 
incident/accident reports using the Event and 
Causal Factor Charting technique. Event and 
Casual Factor Charting (ECFC) is a process that 
first identifies a sequence of events and aligns 
the events with the conditions that caused 
them. It is used to visually give better insights 
and emphasize important points. 
 
Events and respective conditions are aligned 
along a time line. After the representation of 
the problem is complete, an assessment is 
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made by "walking" the chart and asking if the 
problem would be different if the events or 
conditions were changed asking the questions: 
What went wrong, how and why? Which 
deviation occurred? Which rules were 
transgressed? This leads to identifying causal 
factors which are evaluated. This approach 
provides basics for brief risk assessment and can 
reveal some hidden warning signs in related 
event reports. 
 
The use of ECFC has proven to be a valuable tool 
for accident investigators and a clear and 
concise aid to understanding of accident 
causation for the report readers and 
stakeholders. This paper also suggests using a 
more standardised approach in presenting 
events by graphical tools for greater 
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The Hydrogen Incident and Accident Database (HIAD) 
has been designed to hold high quality information 
on accidents and incidents related to hydrogen 
production, transport (road/rail/pipeline), supply and 
Energy Storage Unit 






HIAD - Hydrogen Incident 
and Accident Database 
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commercial use. The database is updated with the 
latest information concerning each event in order to 
take advantage of the most recent outcomes of 
accident investigations. The database has been set up 
to improve the understanding of hydrogen 
unintended events, to identify preventive measures 
and strategies, to avoid incidents/accidents and to 
reduce the consequence if an accident occurs. The 
experience of the past years has revealed some 
shortcomings and generated improvement needs for 
HIAD. Some of the original goals related to risk 
assessment had to be abandoned, due to the limited 
amount of statistics available on faults and failure 
modes. A major overhaul of the database structure 
and interface was undertaken. The new version is 
mainly focused on facilitating the sharing of lessons 
learned and other relevant information related to the 
safety of hydrogen technologies. The database will 
contribute to improve safety awareness, enabling the 
users to benefit from the experiences of others as 
well as to share information from their own 
experiences. The main challenge at present is to 
attain a clear commitment of the fuel cells and 
hydrogen technology community to provide 
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Royal Academy of 
Engineering Visiting 
Professor of Data 
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Department of Computer 
Science  
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Biography Jochen L. LEIDNER 
Director of Research, Thomson Reuters 







Royal Academy of 
Engineering Visiting 
Professor of Data 
Analytics 
Department of Computer 
Science  












The analysis of risks and threats, whether it is on 
the macro level (geopolitical security) or micro-
level (personal well-being or enterprise risk 
management) suffers from issues resulting from 
human limitations: it is ultimately humans that 
operate their own lives, run companies and 
governments. Unfortunately, humans suffer from 
cognitive limitations that have an adversarial 
impact on their ability to manage risks and 
threats: they create static authority-based 
organizations instead of empowering agile teams; 
they compartmentalize to manage complexity, 
which leads to blind spots (e.g. the 2008 financial 
crisis) and inconsistent behaviour (we have all 
seen smoking medical doctors); and they lack the 
ability to globally evaluate quantitatively complex 
systems, tending to forget or under-rate activities 
that are further removed from their personal 
“centre of gravity” as the saying “out of sight, out 
of mind” suggests. In this paper, we demonstrate 
how some of these human and organizational 






Cognitive Inhibitors for 
Threat Assessment and 
Automated Risk 
Management 
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limitations can prevent us from conducting 
effective risk and threat management by giving 
examples from geopolitical and natural disaster 
risk, environmental risk, people risk, company risk, 
supply chain risk, and technology risk. By focusing 
on the risk identification stage, we show how 
software tools can be used to make the risk 
management process more objective, in the sense 
of inter-personally verifiable and consistent. We 
conclude that risk and threat management should 
attempt to overcome cognitive limitations by 
installing an auditable process that uses a human-
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Technology Innovation in 
Security Unit71 
European Commission 





See p. 297  
 
Zdenko ŠIMIĆ Biography 
Scientific Officer 
Knowledge for Nuclear 
Safety, Security & 
Safeguards Unit 






See p. 298 
 
 
SESSION CHAIRS  
SESSION 2  
  
Frank VERSCHUEREN Biography 
Process Safety Inspector 




Frank Verschueren has a Master in Chemical 
Engineering. He worked in several sectors (Non 
Ferro Metallurgy, Printing and Automotive) with 
several managerial functions (Production, Projects, 
R&D, Quality). 
 
From 2003 he works for the Ministery of Labour as 
Process Safety Inspector (Major Hazards Industry in 
Belgium).  
 
His knowledge domains are Human and 
Organisational Factors, Learning from Incidents, 
Reactor Safety Technology, Psycho-social aspects. 
                                                 
71 At the time of this publication, Ana Lisa VETERE ARELLANO has moved to the Knowledge for Security 
& Migration Unit. 
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 He lectures at the Universities of Antwerp, Brussels 
and Gent and has given presentations in several 
countries. 
 
The last years he is involved in Safety Research as 
vice-chairman project group “Foresight in Safety” 
(ESReDA) and Chairman expertgroup Safety and 
Security (Flemish Engineers association). 
Frank.VERSCHUEREN@werk.belgie.be 
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Programme manager 
Foundation for an 
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Management des Risques 
Industriels 







After ten years of operational experience in a 
nuclear power plant and in EDF Nuclear Division 
headquarters, Bastien Brocard joined EDF R&D in 
2008 to work on the fields of industrial risk 
management, operating experience feedback, 
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Tuuli TULONEN Biography 
Senior Officer 
Finnish Safety and 








Dr. Tuuli Tulonen is currently working as a Senior 
Officer at the Finnish Safety and Chemicals Agency 
(Tukes), the national authority to endorse the 
safety and reliability of products, services and 
industrial activities in Finland. She is responsible for 
the Agency’s multi-sectorial accident database; her 
work concentrates on analyses of accidents 
occurred in sectors supervised by Tukes, e.g. 
chemicals, mining and electricity. Her background 
is in occupational safety research (Tampere 
University of Technology). She completed her 
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Deputy Head of Unit 
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European Commission 
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Milos FERJENCIK Biography 
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Dan SERBANESCU Biography 
Nuclear Safety Expert 
Societatea Nationala 
Nuclearelectrica S.A.  
Bucharest, 
ROMANIA 
For participation in 
ESReDA actions he 
represents the Division of 
Logic and Models – DLMFS 
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Frank VERSCHUEREN Biography 
Process Safety Inspector 
Ministry of Labor, 
BELGIUM 
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Researcher 
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Nicolas DECHY Biography 
Specialist in human and 
organizational factors 
IRSN (French National 
Institute for nuclear safety 
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Scientific Officer 
Nuclear Safety & Security 
Unit 
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Sever PAUL Biography 
Investigator 
Romanian Railway 







Born on the 6th April 1966 in Medias, Romania. He 
graduated in 1990 Polytechnics Institute from 
Bucharest – railways specialty, which is rolling 
stock. 
 
After graduation and until 2003, he worked in the 
Engine Shed Brasov, in all its sectors of activity:  
 1990-1994 engineer in locomotive repair 
work; 
 1994 - 1996 position of workshop head in 
charge with the coordination of locomotive 
repair; 
 1996-1998, I coordinated theoretical and 
practical training of locomotive drivers 
from the position of regional instructor; 
 1998 - 2001 deputy of the Engine Shed 
Head, in charge with the locomotive 
movements and the coordination of the 
driver activity, with reference to the traffic 
safety;  
 2001-2003 I coordinated the whole activity 
of the Engine Shed Brasov from the position 
of Head of Engine Shed (the repair of 
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locomotives, the locomotive movements 
and the activity of locomotive drivers, rail 
machine maintenance) as Chief of Depot; 
 2003-2010 I worked within Romanian 
Railway Authority – Romanian Railway 
Safety Authority, like inspector in charge 
with the traffic safety, performing state 
inspections and controls;  
 
From 2010 until now I have been working in railway 
investigation domain within Romanian Railway 
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Annex A - 53rd ESReDA seminar programme 
 
1st day, Tuesday November the 14th, 2017 
 
7.40 Departure from Hotel, (Final time will be notified a few days before 
the Seminar) 
8.00 Arrival of the buses at JRC, clearance of entrance permissions, 
security matters,  
8.15 Arrival at the seminar room, JRC Auditorium, Registration, Welcome 
coffee 
 
8.30-9.00 Welcome to the participants, opening, logistics 
Luis Ferreira, ESReDA President 
Georg Peter, Unit Head, Technology Innovation in Security 
Ana Lisa Vetere Arellano & Zdenko Šimić 
 
9.00-10.00 SESSION 1.  
Transferring foresight approaches to the safety domain Chairs: 
Ana Lisa Vetere Arellano and Zdenko Šimić 
 
9.00-9.35 Invited Lecture I: Foresight as tool to support policymaking and 
some reflection on how it can be applied to safety management 
  Fabiana Scapolo, Deputy Unit Head, Foresight, Behavioural Insight & 
Design for Policy 
 
9:35-10:00 Uncertain future. Unsafe future? 
Sverre Røed-Larsen and John Stoop  
10.00-10.30 Coffee Break 
10.30-12:10 SESSION 2.  
Foresight challenges in safety management  
Chairs: Frank Verschueren and Eric Marsden  
 
10:30-10:55 How did aviation become so safe, and beyond?  
John Stoop 
10:55-11:20 On some issues related to the safety margin and the process of 
safety foresight for the nuclear power plants 
Dan Serbanescu 
11:20-11:45 The McNamara fallacy blocks foresight for safety  
John Kingston and Yves Dien 
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11:45-12:10 Foresight for risk prevention and resilience: to what extent do they 
overlap?  
Nicolas Dechy, Myriam Merad, Laura Petersen, Maria Luisa Pestana, 
Igor Linkov and Yves Dien 
12.10-13.10 Lunch and Coffee 
 
13.10-14:00 SESSION 3.  
Foresight and technology  
Chairs: John Stoop and Bastien Brocard 
13:10-13:35 Potentials, limitations and problems of technologies for enhancing 
safety and foresight  
Zdenko Šimić 
13:35-14:00 Cogeneration: technologies, possibilities, challenges  
Tomasz Jackowski, Karol Kowal and Sławomir Potempski 
14.00-14.20 Coffee Break 
14:20-16.00  SESSION 4.  
From risk analysis as input to foresight  
Chairs: Tuuli Tulonen and Fabiana Scapolo 
14:20-14:45 Invited Lecture II: Emerging risks in food and feed, the importance 
of foresight  
Ana Afonso, EFSA, Italy 
14:45-15:10 Roles of incident scenarios in foresight  
Milos Ferjencik 
15:10-15:35 Foresight in process industry through dynamic risk assessment: 
implications and open questions  
Nicola Paltrinieri 
15:35-16:00 Horizon scanning approaches for early sensing of cyber-physical 
threats to water utilities  
Eivind H. Okstad and Øyvind Dahl 
16.00-16.30 Coffee Break 
16.30-17:45 SESSION 5.  
Tools and methodologies  
Chairs: Milos Ferjencik and Dan Serbanescu  
16:30-16:55 Analysis and management of accident precursors in manufacturing 
industry  
Micaela Demichela, Gabriele Baldissone and Salvina Murè 
16:55-17:20 The role of mathematics in the enhancement of safety  
Bernard Beauzamy 
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17:20-17:45 Enhancement of safety imagination in socio-technical systems with 
gamification and computational creativity  
Antonio De Nicola, Andrea Falegnami, Riccardo Patriarca, Giordano 
Vicoli and Maria Luisa Villani 
17.45-17:55 Close of Day 1, Dinner logistics 
18:00 Bus to Hotels 
19.45 ESReDA 53rd Seminar Dinner 
 
2nd day, Wednesday November the 15th, 2017 
7.45 Departure from Hotel 
8.00 Arrival of the buses at JRC, clearance of entrance permissions, 
security checks of luggage etc. 
8.30 Arrival at the meeting room, Welcome coffee 
8.45-10.10 SESSION 6.  
Foresight for safety management  
Chairs: Sverre Roed Larsen and Frank Verschueren 
8:45-9:20 Invited Lecture III:  
Strategy and projects for a predictive safety regulation and safety 
management  
Antonio d'Agostino, ERA, France 
9:20-9:45 Justifying safety interventions based on uncertain foresight: 
empirical evidence  
Eric Marsden 
9:45-10:10 Is whistleblowing a promising "tool" for event occurrence 
prevention?  
Yves Dien 
10.10-10.40 Coffee Break 
10.40-12:05 SESSION 7.  
Early warning signs: Understanding threats through monitoring  
Chairs: Yves Dien and Bastien Brocard 
10:40-11:15 Invited Lecture IV:  
From maritime multi-sensorial data acquisition systems to the 
prevention of marine accidents  
Lorenzo Fiamma 
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11:15-11:40  Evolution of remote performance monitoring in ship’s safety 
decision making reinforced by Analytic Hierarchy Process  
Ioannis Dagkinis, George Leventakis and Nikitas Nikitakos 
11:40-12:05 Increasing forced unavailability of power plants due to economical 
conditions  
Henk Wels and Thijs Slot 
12:05-13.05 Lunch and Coffee 
13.05-13.55 SESSION 8.  
Learning from experience to improve foresight in safety  
Chairs: Nicolas Dechy and Miodrag Strucic  
13:05-13:30 The Learning Review: Adding to the accident investigation toolbox  
Ivan Pupulidy and Crista Vesel 
13:30-13:55 A model for analyzing near-miss events by adopting system safety 
principles  
Silvia Maria Ansaldi, Maria Grazia Gnoni and Paolo A. Bragatto. 
13:55-14:15 Coffee Break 
14.15-15.30 SESSION 9.  
From database management to foresight  
Chairs: Tuuli Tulonen and Sever Paul 
14:15-14:40 Use of event and causal Factor Short Chart reports to assess and 
simplify accident reports  
Miodrag Strucic 
14:40-15:05 HIAD - Hydrogen Incident and Accident Database  
Daniele Melideo, Eveline Weidner, Francesco Dolci and Pietro 
Moretto 
15:05-15:30 Cognitive inhibitors for threat assessment and automated risk 
management  
Jochen L. Leidner and Timothy Nugent 
15:30-15:50 CLOSING SESSION 
 Chairs: Ana Lisa Vetere Arellano and Zdenko Šimić 
 Closing speeches 
Ana Lisa Vetere Arellano and Zdenko Šimić, JRC 
Frank Wastin, Unit Head, Knowledge for Nuclear Safety, Security & 
Safeguards 
Luis Ferreira, ESReDA President 
 
16.00  Bus to Airport and Hotels 
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Annex B - About the seminar 
Seminar scope 
Conventional safety management relies on prevention and protection approaches, but it is 
clear, especially after disasters, that this is not enough. Reactive approaches after events are 
valuable strategies to provide information and lessons on risk management deficiencies. The 
analysis of major accidents and crises has shown that there were early warning signs that 
could have been heeded and used as valuable information to design "relevant tools" and 
proactive strategies for preventing major events. Such missed opportunities point towards the 
need to improve foresight methods for enhancing safety management. 
 
Several high-technology sectors, such as aviation and nuclear power have achieved a high 
performance level. Their call for a next generation of safety enhancement strategies and more 
proactive approaches have broadened to other sectors during the last decades. The shift from 
safety management approaches in which improvement is predominantly based on hindsight 
to include more foresight approaches has many hurdles to overcome, in theory, as well as in 
practice. 
 How can safety imagination be enhanced: can we go beyond scenario approaches and 
techniques? 
 How can foresight theories, methods and techniques contribute to broad risk assessments 
in order to improve systematic and holistic safety management? 
 Addressing short term foresight versus long term planning: which methods/approaches 
are more appropriate for one and the other? 
 How can we anticipate the new multi-faceted risks created by new technology, the digital 
revolution, industry 4.0, etc.? What can be done to improve our management of emerging 
risks? 
 How to detect and handle early warning signs (EWS), weak signals, accident pre-cursors, 
etc.? Can the analysis techniques developed for “big events” (accidents, near misses) be 
applied to “tiny events” (EWS, weak signals), or are new classes of techniques needed? 
 Which anomalies/surprises should we pay attention to? How to discriminate the signal 
from the noise? How to deal with and benefit from whistleblowers? 
 How to increase the visibility of EWS? Are there tools and methods available? If yes, which 
are they? 
 What role do leading indicators play and can they help achiev foresight with efficiency? If 
yes, how? 
 Are new methods and technologies related to “big data” part of the solution? 
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 How does the social climate impact risk awareness and an organization’s ability to identify 
early warning signals (reporting culture, speak-up behavior and psychological safety, 
debate, attitude towards bad news, etc.)? 
 How can safety analysts generate the political capital needed to produce organizational 
change when they cannot point to a past accident to demonstrate the need for 
improvement and face the cost challenge? 
 Is knowledge of the past obsolete? Is current knowledge management practice and 
organizational learning in organizations well-structured to tackle foresight in safety? 
 How can foresight improve resilience and accident prevention? 
 How did some sectors become highly reliable, ultra-safe, non-plus ultra-safe? Why are 
there such big differences (performance, approach) across sectors? 
 
The 53rd ESReDA seminar will be a forum for exploring these questions. We aim to discuss 
theories, concepts, and experiences of enhancing foresight in safety. Authors are invited to 
present their proposals and discuss successes and failures in foresight and to identify future 
needs in safety research and training. We want to encourage new ideas, scientific papers, 
conceptual papers, case studies and cross-sectoral research on the theme of foresight in 
safety. This seminar will bring together researchers, practitioners, specialists and decision-
makers to discuss strategies to improve foresight. 
 
Target groups and domains of application (examples) 
Papers for the seminar are welcome from various stakeholders (industrialists, regulators, 
safety boards, universities, R&D organisations, engineering contractors and consultants, 
training specialists) and could address different sectors: 
 Energy sector: nuclear and non-nuclear (e.g. fossil, hydro) power plants and networks; 
 Process industry: oil and gas, chemical and petrochemical facilities; 
 Transport (rail, road, air and maritime): supply and distribution network, operation; 
 Aerospace industry; 
 Critical infrastructure: electricity, water, telecommunications, information systems; 
 Public sector and government. 
 
This seminar is aimed at addressing issues met by different industries. Other topics may be 
included if they fit well within the theme of the seminar and are applicable to foresight in 
safety, such as natural disasters, na-tech disasters, food safety, sanitary crisis, and banking. 
 




European Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC) 
Via Enrico Fermi 2749 




The Seminar is jointly organised by ESReDA and JRC. 
 
Seminar Chairman 
L. FERREIRA (ESReDA President, Professor at University of Porto, PORTUGAL) 
 
Technical Programme Committee Chairs 
Ana Lisa VETERE ARELLANO (JRC Directorate E – Space, Security and Migration, ITALY) 
Zdenko ŠIMIĆ (JRC Directorate G – Nuclear Safety and Security, The NETHERLANDS) 
 
Technical Programme Committee Members 
Ludwig BENNER Jr. (Investigation Process Research, USA) 
Bastien BROCARD (Électricité de France S.A., FRANCE) 
Nicolas DECHY (IRSN, FRANCE) 
Yves DIEN (CHAOS, FRANCE) 
Antonio FELICIO (ESReDA, PORTUGAL) 
Milos FERJENCIK (University of Pardubicze, CZECH REPUBLIC) 
Paulo MAIA (EDP, PORTUGAL) 
Eric MARSDEN (FonCSI, FRANCE) 
Sever PAUL (AGIFER, ROMANIA) 
Sverre ROED-LARSEN (SRL HSE, NORWAY) 
Fabiana SCAPOLO (JRC Dir. I - Foresight, Behavioural Insight & Design for Policy, BELGIUM) 
Dan SERBANESCU (Romanian Academy, ROMANIA) 
Miodrag STRUCIC (JRC Directorate G – Nuclear Safety and Security, The NETHERLANDS) 
John STOOP (Kindunos, The NETHERLANDS) 
Tuuli TULONEN (Tukes, FINLAND) 
Frank VERSCHUEREN (Ministry of Labor, BELGIUM) 
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Opening of the Seminar 
Georg PETER (EC JRC Directorate E – Space, Security and Migration, Unit Head, ITALY) 
 
Closing of the Seminar 




Orsolya SUDAR (EC JRC Directorate E – Space, Security and Migration, ITALY) 
 
Maria IOAKEIMIDOU (EC JRC Directorate G – Nuclear Safety and Security, The NETHERLANDS) 
 
 
European Commission Joint Research Centre (EC JRC) 
As the European Commission's science and knowledge service, the Joint Research Centre's 
mission is to support EU policies with independent evidence throughout the whole policy 
cycle. Its work has a direct impact on the lives of citizens by contributing with its research 
outcomes to a healthy and safe environment, secure energy supplies, sustainable mobility and 
consumer health and safety.  
Two directorates are supporting organization of this seminar:  
JRC Directorate E – Space, Security and Migration  




European Safety, Reliability & Data Association (ESReDA) 
European Safety, Reliability & Data Association (ESReDA) is a European Association 
established in 1992 to promote research, application and training in Reliability, Availability, 
Maintainability and Safety (RAMS). The Association provides a forum for the exchange of 
information, data and current research in Safety and Reliability. 
ESReDA membership is open to organisations, privates or governmental institutes, industry 
researchers and consultants, who are active in the field of Safety and Reliability. Membership 
fees are currently 1000 EURO for organisations and 500 EURO for universities and individual 
members. Special sponsoring or associate membership is also available. 
For more information on ESReDA, contact: Inga.Zutautaite@lei.lt  
ESReDA General Secretary, Dr. Inga Žutautaitė 
Senior Researcher at Lithuanian Energy Institute 
ESReDA address: European Safety, Reliability & Data Association, an International Non-Profit 
Scientific Association under the Belgium law (June 27, 1921, Title III). Headquarter: ESReDA, 
rue Gachard 88 Bte 14, B-1050 Bruxelles, Belgium, Siret: E00005802.  
Any interested party is welcome to contribute to ESReDA project groups. See 
https://www.esreda.org/projectcasestudy/ 
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About the ESReDA Foresight in Safety Project Group 
Background 
To avoid occurrence of events (accidents, incidents or crises), prevention is often seen as the 
main, not to say the only, goal of (industrial or system) safety. 
Since the nineties, 3 ESReDA’s working/project groups have obtained results regarding 
improvement of safety thanks to learning from experience (e.g. accident database, accident 
investigation; dynamic learning as a follow-up from accident investigation). They especially: 
 Gave overview of accident investigation practices, institutions and regulatory framework 
in Europe; 
 Gave overview of accident investigation practices, institutions and regulatory framework 
in Europe; 
 Gave guidance of principles for how to conduct accident investigations and design event 
and accident databases; 
 Gave guidance for dimensions to be taken into account for dynamic learning after an 
event; 
 Provided some requirements for designers of training in the domain of accident 
investigation and learning; 
 Gave overview of the main barriers to learning from events. 
 
This work has been documented through different publications (books, reports, guidelines, 
publications, ESReDA seminar proceedings), some freely available on the ESReDA website and 
others that are mainly available at ESReDA editor (DNV library).  
Some results of these previous works showed that, before event happened, there were early 
warning signs (EWS) that could have, to some extent, provided useful information and to some 
extent been "relevant tools" for preventing events occurrence. 
 
Goals 
Goals of the Project Group “Foresight in Safety” are: 
 To better define these EWS (e.g. weak signals, precursors, near misses …); 
 To focus on the human and organizational mechanisms for their treatment (e.g. role of 
whistle-blowers, role of learning, enabling features of organizational culture and concepts 
such as mindfulness, chronic unease). 
 
To fulfil these goals the Project Group aims will try to identify how to: 
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 Enable organizations to deal with unexpected situations, situations not described by rules 
and procedures; 
 Link them with vulnerabilities reliability and resilience of organizations; 
 Characterize contrast between and change from apathetic to foresighted approach; 
 Apply a systems perspective regarding life cycle analysis (from design to operations and 
further) including the synergy between feedback and feed-forward controls; 
 Address the need for collaboration between technological and sociological disciplines; 
 Articulate them with monitoring of Safety Performance (e.g. KPIs, SPIs ...); 
 Make them visible in Databases treatment; 





Expected duration of the Project Group is 2 to 3 years. The Project Group was launched in 
September 2015 after a kick-off meeting in Paris at EDF R&D and IRSN.  
 
The PG have the following meeting schedule: 
 Ispra, ITALY 
 Petten, The NETHERLANDS 
 Prague, CZECH REPUBLIC 
 Ispra, ITALY 
 
Deliverables 
Work of the Project Group will be made visible through a deliverable, including articles tackling 
issues listed above and through organisation of the 53rd Seminar on “Enhancing Safety: the 
Challenge of Foresight”. 
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Participating Organisations 
Agenţia de Investigare Feroviară Română (AGIFER), Romania 
Club Heuristique pour l’Analyse Organisationnelle de Sécurité (CHAOS), France 
Électricité de France Recherche et Développement (EDF-R&D), France 
European Commission Joint Research Centre (JRC), Belgium 
Federal Public Service Employment, Labour and Social Dialogue, Belgium 
Finnish Safety and Chemicals Agency (TUKES), Finland 
Fondation pour une Culture de Sécurité Industrielle (Foncsi), France 
Gestão da Produção de Energia, S.A. (EDP), Portugal 
Institut de Radioprotection et de Sûreté Nucléaire (IRSN), France 
Investigation Process Research, USA 
Kindunos Ltd., The Netherlands 
SRL HSE Consulting, Norway 
University of Pardubice (UP), Czech Republic 
 
ESReDA former related Project Groups 
ESReDA has supported several project groups that have produced deliverables and books. 
Available publications are listed on ESReDA website. https://www.esreda.org/esreda-
publications/  
ESReDA former project groups deliverables on “accident investigation” (2001-2008) and 
“dynamic learning as a follow-up from accident investigations” (2009-2015) edited books and 
electronic reports available on ESReDA website.  
https://www.esreda.org/projectcasestudy/dynamic-learning-as-the-follow-up-from-
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This publication is a conference proceedings by the Joint Research Centre (JRC), the European 
Commission’s science and knowledge service. It aims to provide evidence-based scientific support to 
the European policymaking process. The scientific output expressed does not imply a policy position of 
the European Commission. Neither the European Commission nor any person acting on behalf of the 
Commission is responsible for the use that might be made of this publication. 
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GETTING IN TOUCH WITH THE EU 
In person 
All over the European Union there are hundreds of Europe Direct information centres. You can find the 
address of the centre nearest you at: http://europea.eu/contact 
 
On the phone or by email 
Europe Direct is a service that answers your questions about the European Union. You can contact this 
service: 
- by freephone: 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (certain operators may charge for these calls), 
- at the following standard number: +32 22999696, or 
- by electronic mail via: http://europa.eu/contact 
 
FINDING INFORMATION ABOUT THE EU 
Online 
Information about the European Union in all the official languages of the EU is available on the Europa 
website at: http://europa.eu 
EU publications 
You can download or order free and priced EU publications from EU Bookshop at: 
http://bookshop.europa.eu. Multiple copies of free publications may be obtained by contacting Europe 
Direct or your local information centre (see http://europa.eu/contact). 
 
Enhancing Safety: the Challenge of Foresight 
373 
 
 
doi:10.2760/713354 
ISBN 978-92-79-98156-2 
K
J-N
A
-2
9
4
8
8
-E
N
-N
 
